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WORD AND ITS MEANING— A NEW PERSPECTIVE

(in the light of Jagadisa's Śabda śakti prakāśikā)

K.N. CHATTERJEE

CHAUKHAMBHA ORIENTALIA

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

Dr. K. N. Chatterjee was born in the year 1930 in a family of traditional sanskrit scholars in a remote village of Bengal. He had his education in the University of Calcutta. Having done his M.A. in the year 1952, he joined *Visvabharati* as a Research scholar in the year 1953. There he came in touch with two towering personalities Late Dr. P. C. Bagchi and Dr. S. Bhattacharya. As desired by Dr. Bagchi, he went to China on Govt. of India scholarship in the cultural exchange scheme in the year 1956. He stayed there for three years and studied a few Buddhist texts with Prof. Wang Shen Tien. On his return to India in the year 1959, he joined *Visvabharati* as a Lecturer in Sanskrit. In 1965, he was awarded the Ph. D. degree by the University of Calcutta. He joined B. H. U. in the year 1973 as a Reader in Sanskrit. He

(*Continued on next flap*)

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NO. 18

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A NEW PERSPECTIVE

(in the Light of Jagadīśa's Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā)

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by
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

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to

Dr S. BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

the great savant

logician of

India.

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काव्येषु द्रवतां नीतः शाब्दे शास्त्रे विचक्षणः ।
तर्केषु वज्रनिर्घोषो ब्राह्मे तत्त्वे विशारदः ॥
मीमांसाधर्मशास्त्रेषु गतिर्यस्य निरङ्कुशा ।
सांख्ये योगे तथा जैने चार्वाके सौगते नये ॥
पुराणेषु च तन्त्रेषु सिद्धविद्यश्च तं गुरुम् ।
ईशं सिद्धेश्वरं नौमि शिष्यानुग्रहकातरम् ॥

(कृष्णनाथः)

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FOREWORD

The Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā from the pen of Jagadiśa Tarkālaṁkāra, a luminary of the Nava-dvīpa School of Neo-logicians, is a masterpiece on Indian Semantics. It subjects to close scrutiny the Mīmāṁsakas and the grammarians on all fundamental issues related to the semantic analysis of sentence, the unit of language, and ekes out a superstructure of judgments as original as based on the best of logical tradition.

Beneath apparent transparency, profundity of thought has been obscured by corrupt readings in available editions. Dr. K. N. Chatterjee, Reader in Sanskrit, Department af Sanskrit and Pali, Banaras Hindu University, has not spared himself to rescue the text from all vagaries. With unflinching grasp of details, he has brought his critical acumen to bear upon the topics in the same serial order as in the text. His English has matched seriousness of approach. Exposition, critical notes and supplementary matters have all added to the quality of the work.

I have no doubt that this less trodden branch of knowledge will now receive approbation from the scholarly world. Dr. Chatterjee deserves congratulations for this pioneering endeavour.

Dated 3–4–80

S. Bhattacharya

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PREFACE

The **Śabda- Śakti-prakāśikā** *is the* **magnum opus,** *a brilliant luminary in the firmament of the Neologicians, belonging to the* **Navadvīpa** *School of Bengal. In scope, content and technique, the work is grammar and logic, sublimited to a full-fledged philosophy of semantics.*

Critical acumen and minutest grasp of details from original sources have been brought by **Jagadīśa** *to bear upon this work, so indispensible to the understanding of the meaning of meaning. Divided into thirty-seven chapters and viewed in the light of two illustrious commentaries by* **Kṛṣṇa-kānta** *and* **Rāmabhadra,** *the present work aims at a critical analysis of all the topics discussed therein. The virgin soil of the text is liable to yield luscious harvest.*

The author gratefully remembers his infinite indebtedness to Dr Siddheśvara Bhaṭṭācārya, M. A. Ph. d. D. Litt., **Nyāyācārya,** *ex-Mayūrbhañj Professor of Sanskrit and Ex-Head of the department of Sanskrit & Pali, B. H. U. The author had the unique privilege to sit at the divinely benign feet of this great master of Sanskrit learning to take lessons on Neo-logic and other allied subjects. The author joyfully recollects the days of reading the text of the* **Śabda-Śakti-prakāśikā** *with him. He bows down his head in reverence and gratitude to his master. He longs for his blessings and puts on record that but for his grace, the present work would not have seen the light of the day. He is happy that his blessings have been so kindly communicated through the Foreword as well.*

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The author, in this connection, also remembers some of his erstāwhile teachers like late Surendramohan Bhaṭṭācārya, Dr Haripada Chakravarty, Dr Rama Ranjan Mukherjee, Dr Krishna Gopal Goswami, Late Dr Amaresvar Thakur, Late Dr Satkari Mukherjee, Late M. M. Cinnaswami, Śāstrī, Late M. M. Sitārāma Śāstrī and Late M. M. Yogendranath Tarka-vedānta-tīrtha and above all, Late Dr P. C. Bagchi, the great Indologist.

In fine, the author expresses his gratitude to the Chaukhambha Orientalia who took great pains to see the present work go through the press and to Dr Sudhākara Malaviya, Deptt of Sanskrit & Pali, B. H. U. for his ungrudging help and assistance at various stages.

B. H. U. Varanasi.
12-2-80.

Krishnanatha Chatterjee

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INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of the fourteenth century, Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya brought in an epoch-making era in the history of Indian Logic. He founded a new school of writers and commentators who represented the *Navadvīpa* school of *Navyanyāya* philosophy.

Gaṅgeśa was followed by two writers viz., Jayadeva later known as Pakṣadhara Miśra and Vāsudeva sārvabhauma. Pakṣadhara wrote his *maṇyāloka*, a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. Vāsudeva, also wrote a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Work. Both of them flourished during the latter half of the fifteenth century.

Vāsudeva sārvabhauma was a man of remarkable personality and he distinguished himself to be the teacher of four wonderful pupils like Chaitanyadeva, Raghunātha, Raghunandana and Kṛṣṇānanda who revolutionised the different schools of thought and work and brought in an augustan age in India. They all flourished in the beginning in the sixteenth century.

Raghunātha was succeeded by a series of commentators like Mathurānātha, Harirāma Tarkālaṁkāra and Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra.

Jagadīśa wrote a commentary on Raghunātha's work viz., *dīdhiti* known as *Jāgadīśī*. His other work is *cintāmaṇimayūkha*. But the best of Jagadīśa, has come out in his *Śabda-Śakti-prakāsikā*-'*Jagadīśasya sarvasvaṁ Śabda-Śakti-prakāśikā*', so goes the saying. Its topics of discussion are as follows.

Instruments of valid knowledge :

Philosophy is investigation of truth and this investigation is conducted through certain definite methods. These methods are known as the instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The

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number and kinds of these instruments vary with the various schools of philosophy.

The *cārvākas* recognise perception (*pratyakṣa*) as the essential and the only instrument of valid knowledge; the Buddhist and the *vaiśeṣikas*, two, perception and inference (*anumāna*); the *sāṁkhya*, three, with the addition of verbal testimony (*Śabda*); the *Naiyāyikas*, four, including analogy (*upamāna*); the Prābhākāra Mīmāṁsakas add one more viz, presumption (*arthāpatti*); one more is added by the *Bhāṭṭa* school of *Mīmāṁsā* and the *vedānta* alike viz, non-perception of the perceptible (*anupalabdhi*).

The above position suggests that leaving aside the *cārvākas*, all the systems of Indian philosophy recognise the value of inference although the role of analogy, presumption or non-perception as distinct instruments of valid knowledge has not gone unchallanged.

Verbal testimony—a distinct instrument of valid knowledge :

The role of verbal testimony, too, as a distinct instrument of valid knowledge has been challenged by many. The Buddhists and the *Vaiśeṣikas*, for example, claim that verbal testimony be included in the category of inference.

Nevertheless, they do not discard tradition and to that extent, they also implicitly admit the role of verbal testimony. They only deny the 'logical status' of a *pramāṇa* to it, distinct from inference.

Verbal testimony consits of a sentence comprising of expectant, compatible and juxtaposed words. It has a two-fold aspect. When a sentence is uttered, it is received by the hearer and the reaction is but auditory perception (*śrāvaṇa-pratyakṣa*) of the so many words constituting a particular sentence. *Śabda* or sentence, as an instrument of valid knowledge, obviously, is not limited to the auditory perception of the words of a sentence.

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Śabda or sentence has another aspect—the semantic one. The Value of this aspect has hardly been denied. Of the innumerable facts of life, only a small fragment is experienced by a person for himself. The rest, he has to deduce from the 'testimony of others' through words, spoken or written.

The major part of this 'testimony of others' is a matter of tradition, handed down from generation to generation. Words, therefore, come to be a standard medium of communication and to that extent, they are an integral part of tradition.

Tradition in general, however, could not be regarded as an unchallangeable source of valid knowledge. They, therefore, had to be examined and interpreted. 'Reasoned enquiry' had to settle the claims of conflicting schools of thought. *Śabda* or sentence as an instrument of valid knowledge, therefore, came to stand for systematised tradition–the result of 'reasoned inquiry' and not tradition as such.

In the beginning, *śabda* as an instrument of valid knowledge, therefore, stood only for the Vedas. In course of time, it came to include any authoritative statement even outside the pale of the vedas. It now stands for verbal testimony as such.

Verbal testimony as an instrument of valid knowledge is distinct from any other such instrument in that it leads to a distinct kind of knowledge. Though based upon the memory of meanings, it is not likely to be equated with extra-ordinary perceptin (*alaukika-pratyakṣa*). For in extra-ordinary perception, no word-meaning is ever presented to be comprehended. Not only that. Memory plays the role of sense-object contact called for in the context of the apprehension of its content (*viṣaya*) involved in such perception. In verbal knowledge, conversely, the contents are, as a rule, presented by words, used in a sentence and the said words are mutually expectant, are used in juxtaposition and the meanings, thereof, are compatible for syntactical relation. Moreover, in extra-ordinary perception, the *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva* is not determined while in verbal knowledge, there is

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absolutely no such possibility. An expression like '*gaurasti*' cannot, in any case, bear out the knowledge of cow, embraced as a feature against being (*astitva*) on par with being, embraced as a feature against cow.

Verbal knowledge cannot be identical with recollection either. For recollection, unlike verbal knowledge, is rooted in impression (*saṁskāra*), born of direct apprehension (*anubhava*).

Verbal knowledge can neither be equated with inference. For in inference, things, not presented in consideration (*parāmarśa*), a condition of inference, are embraced while in verbal knowledge, things, not presented in the knowledge of import (*śakti-jñāna*), a parallel condition of verbal knowledge, are not embraced.

Meaningful words :

Verbal testimony has been said to be comprising of a sentence and a sentence is but a collection of mutually expectant, juxtaposed words signifying meanings, compatible for syntactical relation. Such words, too, are to be meaningful and in the context of verbal testimony *vis-a-vis* verbal knowledge, a word is meaningful only is respect of a certain meaning, it presents in association with some other kind of a word, used in juxtaposition, ultimately leading to the said meaning being embraced in the verbal knowledge from the sentence, constituted thereof.

Such words are of three kinds viz., Radicals (*prakṛti*), Suffixes (*pratyaya*) and particles (*nipāta*).

Radicals :

By a Radical is meant a word, the knowledge of which as of being possessed of by some other kind of a word through the relation of *svā'vyavatitottaratva* is the cause of the verbal knowledge of what it itself signifies, not qualified by the meaning of the other kind of a word, used in juxtaposition there-

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with. Radicals, therefore, include only the Nominals and the Root-verbs.

Suffixes :

By suffixes are meant the words that being other than Radicals and Particles (though of identical significance at times) present certain meanings through denotation or through frozen metaphor. It is of four kinds viz. declensional suffixes, verbal suffixes, primary suffixes and secondary suffixes.

This definition of suffixes, however, militates against the law of parsimony in the sense that the knowledge of their being different from Radicals (*prakṛti-bheda*) is involved and that the determinant of the said difference is *prakṛtitva* which, not being a universal, is a complex property (*gurudharma*).

A sufffx, therefore, may be defined as what being other than those that come under the words like *nibha* or so, is incapable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of what is denoted by a personal suffix, posited as a feature against what is denoted by itself, not qualified by the meaning, borne out by the other kind of a word, used in juxtaposition.

Particles :

Words, other than a declensional ending and a verbal ending, incapable of bearing out verbal knowledge of what is signified by some other word, posited as a feature against what is signified thereby are called particles. These are as many as the words like *ca* or so.

Sentence :

These three kinds of words viz., Radicals, Suffixes and Particles, but for forming into a sentence, cannot bear out the verbal knowledge and an intelligible sentence cannot be formed merely by stringing a few stray words, together. Words like *ghaṭa, paṭa, pāka* or so, strung together cannot form into a sentence. Words that are mutually expectant alone can form into a sentence to bear out a co-ordinate sentence-meaning.

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Although juxtaposition (*āsatti*) and compatibility (*yogyatā*) are also the recognised aides that words require in the matter of bearing out verbal knowledge, in the formation of a sentence, these are of no consideration. *Vahninā sekaḥ*, therefore, is the valid kind of a sentence and it is altogether a different issue as to whether the said sentence should bear out verbal knowledge or not. It is quite reasonable that such a sentence should fail to bear out a verbal knowledge in view of the fact that what it bears out is liable to contradiction and thus wanting in compatibility to call for a verbal knowledge.

Sentences, again are of four kinds viz, a Radical, ending in a declensional suffix, a Root-verb, ending in a personal suffix, a Radical, ending in a declensional suffix in sequence with some other kind of a word and a Radical, ending in a declensional suffix in association with a Root-Verb, ending in a personal suffix.

Nominals (nāma) :

Radicals are categorised into two viz.. Nominals or Nouns (*nāma*) and Root-verbs (*dhātu*). By Nominals are meant the crude forms of substantives (*prātipadika*) or nouns at their uninflicted stages.

Words, therefore, that need be suffixed with the first declensional suffix in the matter of bearing out the verbal knowledge of a certain meaning, thereof, embraced as the invariable substantive are known as Nominals in so far as these are to signify the said meanings.

Classification of Nominals :

Nominals are classified into four viz., Conventional (*rūḍha*), secondary (*lakṣaka*), Derivative-conventional (*yogarūḍha*) and Derivative (*yaugika*); others add one more viz., conventional and Derivative (*yaugika-rūḍha*).

Conventional Nouns :

A word like *go* meaning cow is the conventional kind of a Nominal; for the suffix, *ḍa* added to the root-verb, *gam* to give

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the formation of the said word is without any import in the present case and the word, *go*, not being covered by any other category of Nominals viz, derivative (*yaugika*) or derivative-conventional (*yogarūḍha*) on that ground and not being secondary (*lakṣaka*) since no implication is involved.

Secondary Nouns :

Some are of the secondary kind like the word, *gaṅgā* when used in the sense of the bank of the Ganges. For although the primary understanding of the said word, used in the sense of the bank of the Ganges is processed through the same kind of the knowledge of import (*śaktijñāna*) in respect of the said word, used in the sense of the river-current, yet there is a difference between the knowledge of the *Ganges* from the word, *Gaṅgā* and that of the bank of the *Ganges* from the said word. When the knowledge of import in respect of the word, *gaṅgā* takes the form, 'the word, *gaṅgā* is denotative of the river-current, the *Ganges* (*gaṅgā-pravāha*)', it is apparent that the fact of the said word being used in the said sense since time inmemorial is conceived of. On the contrary, the knowledge of import in respect of the said word, when takes the form—the word, *gaṅgā* is significant of the bank of the river, *Ganges*, it is obvious that the word has been given a wilful orientation as otherwise the said word would denote the river-bank as does the word, *tīra* denote. The denotative function of a word is determined by the use thereof in reference to a certain meaning, each subsequent use being occasioned by the preceding one. The word, *tīra*, therefore, denotes the bank or the word, *gaṅgā* denotes the river-current—the *Ganges* in view of the fact that these words are used in these respective senses since time immemorial, each subsequent use thereof being occasioned by the preceding one. The word, *gaṅgā*, therefore, used in the sense of the bank of the *Ganges*, is not held to have the denotative function in respect thereof in-as-much as the use of the said word in the said sense has not been occasioned by a similar use thereof. The word, *gaṅgā*

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used in the sense of the bank of the river, *Ganges*, therefore, is held to be an instance of the secondary (*lakṣaka*) kind of Noun.

Derivative-Conventional Nominals :

Some are derivative-conventional (*yogarūḍha*). The word, *paṅkaja*, for example, derivatively means 'whatever grows in mud'. But the said meaning has been restricted to the lotus only. The word apparently means what are presented by the constituents thereof and to that extent, it seems to be derivative. Nonetheless, the use thereof being restricted to only the lotus, the conventional meaning of the said word, the word comes to be regarded an instance of the derivative-conventional Noun.

Derivative Nominals :

A word like *pācaka* is only derivative (*yaugika*) in the sense that it denotes the agent of the act of cooking (*pāka-kartā*) or what are presented by the constituents thereof—the root-verb, *paci* meaning the act of cooking and the suffix, *ṇaka* meaning the agent.

Derivative-and-Conventional Nominals :

Words like *maṇḍapa*, *mahā-rajata* or so are cited by way of so many instances of what are called derivative-and-conventional kind of Nouns. These words, on occasions, present the derivative meanings thereof and on other occasions, the conventional ones only. The word, *maṇḍapa*, for example, derivatively means 'a man who drinks the scum' (*maṇḍaṁ pivati*) and conventionally, it means 'a house'.

Classification of Conventional Nominals :

The conventional (*rūḍha*) kind of Nouns is called *saṁjñā* or Proper (and common) Noun. It is further divided into three viz., the occasional (*naimitiikī*), the current (*pāribhāṣikī*) and the conditional (*aupādhikī*).

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The occasional kind of Conventional Nominals :

The conventional kind of Nominals (or nouns) that have the potency to denote what is qualified by a genus or universal (*jāti*) are called occasional (*naimittikī*). Words like *go* or *caitra*, for example, have the potency to denote what are qualified by cowness (*gotva*) or caitrahood (*caitratva*), the respective universals and these are thus recognised as the instances of the occasional kind of conventional Nominals or Nouns.

Jāti-śakti-vāda :

It is an open question as to whether a word denotes what is qualified by a universal or only a universal. Opinions differ and divergent theories of competing considerations have been advanced by different schools. Of these, the most outstanding theories are known as *kevala-jātivāda*, *kevala-vyaktivāda*, *jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyaktivāda* and *apoha-vāda*. The first one is put forward by the Mīmāṁsakas, the second by the Modern Naiyāyikas, the third by the Ancient Naiyāyikas and the fourth by the Buddhists.

On hearing a sentence like *gāmānaya*, one does not go to fetch cowness (*gotva*), the universal but a cow-individual. Unless the word, *go* denotes a cow-individual, how could one do so ?

Modern Naiyāyikas, therefore, the advocates of the theory of *kevalavyakti-vāda* rely upon the fact that 'practical efficiency' (*arthakriyākāritva*) is only in an individual thing and that a word denotes that alone.

There are obvious objections to such a view. For if a word like *go* denotes a cow-individual then there should be as many such words as such individuals and each of such words has to be admitted to have a power of denotation in respect of each such individual, severally. But the fact is that there is only one such word. It applies to cows in general. Hence while pointing out an individual, a word like *go* signifies that a

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cow is similar to any other cow and at the same time, it distinguishes it from things other than cows. The word, *go*, therefore, should denote a cow-individual (*go-vyakti*), cowness (*gotva*), the universal or rather the 'class-notion' of cow and being possessed of a particular configuration like the state of having the dew-lap, tail or so (*sāsnālāṅgulādimattva*), a trait that distinguishes cows from all other dissimilar things.

Mīmāṁsaka-view :

According to Mīmāṁsakas, the advocates of the theory called *kevala-jātivāda*, are of the view that words denote merely universals or the class-notions. In other words, while according to the Modern Naiyāyikas, words are only 'concrete names', according to Mīmāṁsakas, they are only abstract ones.

As for the comprehension of the cow-individual from an expression like *gāmānaya*, the Mīmāṁsakas, amongst themselves, differ.

Bhāṭṭa-view :

According to Kumārila or the Bhāṭṭas in general, cowness or the class-notion of cow as such cannot be separated from a cow-individual, or concrete thing as such in view of their being inseparably related (*avinābhāva*) and as such for the sake of simplicity (*lāghava*), it is more reasonable that the significance of a word like *go* is confined to *gotva*, the class-notion of cows while the notion of the cow-individual is borne out by implication (or presumtion, *ākṣepa*). This view is known as *ākṣepa-vāda* and it is shared by grammarians and by rhetoricians as well.

Rejection of Bhāṭṭa-view :

Naiyāyikas do not accept it. For it is fraught with a number of objections. Firstly, unless a word like *go* is not verbally denotative of the cow-individual, the cow-individual cannot be a content of the verbal knowledge from an expression like

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gāmānaya. But as the cow-individual is a content of such verbal knowledge, it is obvious that it is liable to denotation by the word, *go*. Secondly, unless the cow-individual is liable to significance by the word, *go*, the knowledge of import (*śaktigraha*) in respect of the said word is to be—'*gopadaṁ gotve śaktam*' and this would involve the fault of a universal, verbally referred to (*ullikhyamāna-jāti*) being *per se* liable to verbal comprehension. Thirdly, in *gaurgacchati*, no verbal knowledge would be forthcoming since movement, for obvious reasons, cannot be syntactically related to cowness *per se*.

Conversely it is a matter of common experience that even without the inference (or presumption), as contemplated of by the Mīmāṁsakas, an expression like *gāmānaya* bears out the verbal knowledge of (bringing) a cow-individual.

There is no reason, therefore, to hold that a word like *go* should denote cowness (*gotva*), the class-notion.

Maṇḍana Miśra's view :

Maṇḍana Miśra holds that the import of a word like *go* is in the universal or the class-notion, *gotva* and that the comprehension of a cow-individual from an expression like *gāmānaya* is borne out by implication (*lakṣaṇā*).

Muṇḍana Miśra's view refuted :

Jagadīśa rejects the view of Maṇḍana Miśra outright. He observes that mere *gotva* or cowness cannot be the primary meaning of the word, *go*. The view, therefore, that a cow-individual is only borne out by the said word through implication in an instance like *gāmānaya* is only a myth.

Prabhākara's view :

Prabhākara holds that a word like *go* is denotative merely of the universal or the class-notion, *gotva* or cowness and that the comprehension of the cow-individual from an expression like *gāmānaya* is *ip so facto* borne out thereby. His theory is,

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therefore, known as the theory of *tulya-vitti-vedyatā*. What he means to say is that in an expression like *gāmānaya*, the word, *go* is known to be denotative of cowness only, the knowledge of import being—*gopadaṁ gotva-śaktaṁ* and with this along with the comprehension of cowness, the cow-individual too is *ip so facto* embraced in the resultant verbal knowledge. The said expression, he argues, gives the verbal comprehension of cowness, as a rule, embraced as the determinant characteristic of a cow-individual.

Prabhākara's view discarded :

Jagadīśa disapproves this theory of Prabhākara. The theory has failed, he points out, to properly account for the verbal comprehension of a cow-individual; for it is logically untenable that although the knowledge of import in respect of the word, *go* embraces only cowness, the class-notion, it is *ip so facto* embraced in the resultant verbal knowledge with the said class-notion being embraced. Such a view, he argues, militates against the law of causality in respect of verbal knowledge.

Word and the knowledge of import :

How should the conventional import or rather import as such of a word be initially apprehended is a major question in semantics. Definitely not by way of an analogy or through lexicon or by way of an exposition thereof or on the basis of its co-ordinate use with a word of well-known meaning or through a supplementary statement, says Jagadīśa. For prior to the knowledge of import, none of these are of any aid to one who is yet to be initiated into the language concerned.

Verbal knowledge works at the root of one's inclination (*pravṛtti*) and it is through the observation of one's inclination vis-a-vis the sentence, subsequent to the listening of which, one gets inclined to a certain job, one determines the import of a word. The senior elder (*uttama-vṛddha*) utters (the words or) the sentence, *gāmānaya* (bring the cow) and

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the child who is yet to be initiated into the language (*pṛthuka*) observes that on hearing the said (words or) sentence, uttered by the senior elder, the junior elder (*madhyama-vṛddha*) proceeds to fetch the cow. In other words, the child observes that the junior elder physically moves to fetch the cow or that he is possessed of the physical efforts (*ceṣṭā*) involved in the act of fetching a cow. The child, thereupon, starts inferring that the physical efforts on the part of the junior elder must be rooted in his cognition and the junior elder must have had a resolve to undertake the said act. He thinks to himself that the act of bringing the cow must have been undertaken by the junior elder because he has been inclined thereto. For it involves physical efforts like the act of his 'sucking the mother's breasts'. He further goes on reasoning that the inclination on the part of the junior elder towards the act of bringing the cow is due to the knowledge of what-ought-to-be-done (*kāryatā-jñāna*) in respect of the act of bringing the cow. The idea is that the plan that the junior elder had decided upon had its roots in his desire to do the job or that it was his duty to do the job. The whole thing, therefore, comes to be ultimately rooted in the knowledge, in the junior elder, of the meaning of the sentence, uttered by the senior elder. The child realises that the *kāryatā-jñāna* or the knowledge of what-ought-to-be-done, occurring to the junior elder, must have had a specific (*asādhāraṇa*) cause and he finds out that the sentence, uttered by the senior elder is the said cause. For it readily presents itself as such and also because there is simplicity in admitting such a cause. The child, therefore, concludes that the said *kāryatā-jñāna* on the part of the junior elder to the effect that bringing the cow was a matter of duty for him (*gavānayanaṁ mama kāryaṁ*) has come to be caused by the sentence—*gāmānaya*, (bring the cow), uttered by the senior elder.

But this is not enough. The child realises that but for a sentence (*vākya*), no sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha-jñāna*) is ever comprehended of and that but for words or *padas*, no

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sentence is ever formed. Not only that. The knowledge of import or the denotative function of a word is inevitable before the meaning of the sentence concerned is realised. The child thus discovers that in the process of verbal knowledge, a word like *go* must present its meaning (*padārtha*) through the recollection of which verbal knowledge occurs. Thereupon, he argues within himself that as the verbal knowledge of the given *padārtha* occurs, consequent upon the use of the specific word and that the said word, if not used, the verbal knowledge thereof does not occur, the said word must have an intrinsic relation with the said *padārtha*. This relation is called *saṅketa* and the knowledge of *saṅketa* is considered as the cause of verbal knowledge.

Subsequently, however, the knowledge of import happens to be caused by analogy or so. In analogy (*upamiti*) what happens is that one hears a statement of comparison like *go-sadṛśo gavayaḥ* (the species, called *gavaya* is similar to the cow). One, thereafter, proceeds to a *gavaya* and perceives the semblance of the cow in *gavaya*. This knowledge of semblance (*go-sādṛśya-jñāna*) may be described as *go-pratiyogika-gavayā'-nuyogika-sādṛśya-jñāna*. Thereupon, one has the recollection (*smṛti*) of the statement of comparison, *go sadṛśo gavayaḥ*. This recollection is the *vyāpāra* or the intermediary operation of the knowledge of semblance (of the cow in *gavaya* the *sādṛśya-jñāna* or the instrument (*karaṇa*) of analogy). As a result of this, analogy (*upamiti*) to the effect that *gavaya*, the denoted meaning of the word, *gavaya* occurs. The whole process reveals that analogy is the result of recollection of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha-smṛti*), rooted in impression (*saṁskāra*) born of an earlier knowledge of a sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha-jñāna*) through the process of the knowledge of import (*śakti-graha*). Analogy, too, therefore, is recognised as a cause of the knowledge of import though itself is the result of such a knowledge. According to Jagadīśa, therefore, the initial knowledge of import of a word is due to

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usage (*vṛddha-vyavahāra*) as it is so called. Analogy and the like are only the subsequent sources of such knowledge. For analogy or so are of no use unless usage initially bears out the knowledge of import of words. One must learn the language before one could understand the technicalities involved in analogy and the like.

Sometimes from grammar too, the knowledge of import occurs. In the *sūtras* like *karmaṇi dvitīyā* or *kartari parasmaipadaṁ* or so, the second declensional suffix (*dvitīyā*) is said to be denotative of *karmatva* or the *parasmaipada* kind of a personal suffix of *kartṛtva* and so on.

The knowledge of import is also borne out by Lexicon. That a world like *śukla*, for example, when used in the masculine form gives the sense of the attribute, whiteness and that it takes to the gender of what it qualifies in case it is denotative of something else is known from Lexicon only.

Paraphrasing (*vivaraṇa*), too, at times gives the knowledge of import. The knowledge of import of the personal suffix, *ti* in *pacati* is brought about by way of paraphrasing it into *pākaṁ karoti*.

Co-ordinate use too bears out the knowledge of import. Words like *nirūpa-sparśavān* and *nisparśaṁ* are known to be denotative of *vāyu* and *manaḥ* by virtue of their being co-ordinatedly used therewith viz, *nirūpasparśavān vāyuḥ nisparśaṁ mūrtiman manaḥ*.

Anvitābhidhānavāda refuted :

Prabhākara raises a problem. It has been found, he argues, that verbal knowledge, arising in the junior elder, of *kāryatā* or the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* in respect of the act of fetching a cow is deduced syllogistically from the movement of the junior elder on his listening to the words, *gāmānaya* uttered by the senior elder in the form of a sentence The sentence again is understood by the junior elder to have been constituted of words, of which one is denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*. The cause of verbal knowledge, there-

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fore, Prabhākara says, is the word, denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* or at least the words, expectant of a word, denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*. The knowledge of import is an auxilliary cause of verbal knowledge. It takes shape only through inference of the knowledge of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* from inclination (*pravṛtti*). As such, Prabhākara concludes, Lexicons or expository statements (*vivaraṇa*) or even subsequent observations (*vidhiśeṣa*) should not be regarded as so many independent means of the knowledge of import (*śaktigraha*). Lexicons or so are either words used individually or words, un-expectant of a word, denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* like the *arthavāda* kind of a sentence. These are therefore, incapable of causing verbal knowledge.

Jagadīśa says in reply that at the initial stage, verbal knowledge may have been caused by the words, expectant of a word, denotative of the state of *what-ought-to be-done*. Applying the methods of agreement and of difference, the uninitiated in the language deduces like this : because of the words in the sentence, *gāmānaya*, being expectant of a word, denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*, the verbal knowledge of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* in respect of the act of bringing the cow has come to occur. But later when initiated into the language, he finds that but for such a word even, verbal knowledge occurs. He has reasons, therefore, to discard his earlier view.

It is no argument, Jagadīśa says, that once accepted, words, expectant of a word, denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* could not be discarded as the cause of verbal knowledge; for such a concomitance, would lead to a dangerous position. The image, once reflected on a minor cannot be admitted to be there even after the mirror is taken away, he points out.

The current kind of Nominals (*pāribhāṣikī saṃjñā*) :

Words that denote what are qualified by a characteristic exclusively abiding one single category come under the

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category of the current kind of nominals. The word *ākāśa*, for example, denotes what is qualified by *Śabda* that exclusively inheres in one single category viz., *ākāśa*.

The conditional kind of Nominals (*aupādhikī Saṁjñā*)

Words signifying what are qualified by a generic property other than a universal are known as the conditional kind of Nominals.

Nominals and the faculty of implication (*lakṣaṇā*)

A word is defined as what is *śakta* or what signifies a certain meaning. *Śakti* or significance, however, does not entirely exhaust the import of a word. For many a word is capable of conveying a secondary meaning as distinguished from its primary meaning. The faculty (*vṛtti*) of communication, therefore, is twofold viz., expression (*śakti*) and implication (*lakṣaṇā*). Expression is rooted in convention (*saṁketa*) and implication is derived from and dependent on expression. When expression is ineffective, implication operates. The definition of a *pada*, viz., 'what is *śakta*', therefore, also accomodates the words of implication (*lakṣakanāmans*), for unless a word is expressive (*śakta*), it cannot imply.

Implication (*lakṣaṇā*), therefore, is defined as *sva-śakya-* or *śakya-sambandha* i.e. connection with the primary meaning of a word. In *gaṁgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, for an example, the primary meaning of the word, *gaṁgā* is the stream of the river, Ganges. But the said word in the given instance signifies the bank of the river, Ganges which is connected to the primary meaning thereof through the relation of *sāmīpya*.

As for the condition for implication, incompatibility of the sentence-meaning (*anvayānupapatti*) is suggested. In *gaṁgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, it is pointed out that a hut or hamlet cannot stand on the stream of the river-current and so the primary meaning of the word, gaṁgā is inapplicable. The meaning of the said sentence, therefore, makes room for implication.

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In *Kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām, yaṣṭhiḥ praveśaya* and like other instances, however, no such incompatibility of sentence-meaning is in view. Implication in such instances, therefore, is held to have been called for in view of the fact that the mere literal sense is not intended to be conveyed by the speaker. Implication, therefore, also operates in case the primary sense does not conform to the intention of the speaker. *Tātparyānupapatti* has, therefore, been conceived of as the base of implication (*lakṣaṇā-bīja*).

Jagadīśa says that a word presents a certain meaning through implication (*lakṣaṇā*) where the implied meaning is clearly related to its primary meaning not conforming to the intention of the speaker. In other words, the meaning which is not the primary meaning of a word but only closely connected therewith is the implied meaning of the said word.

A word of implication (*lakṣaka-nāma*) is, therefore, defined by Jagadīśa as what presents, through implication, a certain meaning, which it cannot express and what it expresses is only related thereto (the implied meaning).

In *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, the word, *gaṅgā* implies the bank of the river, Ganges because the said meaning is not understood as the primary or expressed meaning of the word, *gaṅgā*, so closely related thereto (the implied meaning of the said word). The word, like *saindhava*, however, does not yield the meaning of horse (*turaga*) through implication since the said word is also denotative thereof.

The knowledge of implication (*lakṣaṇāgraha*) of a word, according to Jagadīśa, therefore, is like this : *tīrāśaktaṁ gaṅgāpadaṁ tīra-sambandhini nīre śaktaṁ* or 'the word, *gaṅgā*, not denotative of the bank of the river, Ganges is denotative of the water (current, Gaṅges), closely related therewith (the implied meaning of the said word).

Classification of Implication :

Implication is classified into four viz., *jahat-svārthā, a-jahat-svārthā, nirūḍhā* and *ādhunikā*.

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An implication that calls for the verbal knowledge of a certain property, not inherent in the expressed meaning of the word, involved is called *jahatsvārthā*. The implication in the word, *gaṅgā* in the instance, *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, for an example, bears out the comprehension of *tīratva* that does not inhere in the river-current of the Ganges, the primary meaning of the word, involved viz., *gaṅgā*,

In some instances, implication leads to the verbal knowledge of what is qualified by what abides both the expressed and the implied meaning and it is, therefore, known as *ājhatsvārthā*. The word, *ghaṭa*, for example, may lead to the verbal knowledge of cloth, qualified by the property, substancehood, (*dravyatva*) commonly abiding both jar and cloth, the expressed and the implied meanings of the said word. The said word, in the same manner, may lead to the verbal knowledge of a blue jar too or a jar qualified by blueness which commonly abides, blue-jar embraced by jars as such and blue jar only, the expressed meaning and the implied meaning respectively of the said word.

An implication conventionally leading to the verbal knowledge of a property, embraced by convention as the determinant of the secondary meaning is known as *nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā* or frozen metaphor. In *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā gavā somaṁ krīṇāti*, for example, the implication in the word, *aruṇā*, conventionally leads to the verbal knowledge of a heifer, qualified by redness (*āruṇya-viśiṣṭā gauḥ*).

Implication, at times, again bears out the verbal knowledge of an object, qualified by a property not conventionally embraced as the determinant thereof is known as *ādhunikā lakṣaṇā*. The word, *paṭa*, for an example, may imply a pitcher, qualified by pothood not conventionally obtained as the determinant thereof.

A word of implication and the causality of verbal knowledge :

A word of implication (*lakṣaka-pada*) is also a cause of verbal knowledge. For whatever word is embraced in the

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knowledge that bears out the recollection of the word-meanings that brings about the verbal knowledge is a cause of verbal knowledge (*anubhāvaka*). Causality of verbal knowledge, therefore, subsists in both the knowledge of a word of denotation and that of a word of implication too, the way causality of burning (*dāha*) is in straw (*tṛṇa*), wood (*araṇi*) and gem (*maṇi*).

Classification of Derivative Nominals :

Derivative Nominals are classified into three viz., what are formed of a compound (*sāmāsika*) what are formed of a secondary suffix (*tāddhitāka*) and what are formed of a primary suffix (*Kṛdanta*).

Compounds :

A continuous sentence (*mahāvākya*) i.e., a unity of two or more words is a compound in the sense of what comes out to be posited as a feature in the verbal knowledge from the suffix, *tva* or *tal* added thereto (the said unity), against the meaning of the said suffix. *Nilotpala*, a unity of the words, *nīla* and *utpala* is a compound, therefore, in the sense of the blue lotus.

By a unity of two or more words, again, is meant a unity of two or more nominals. Hence *pācaka* or so are not componunds. In *upakumbha*, the particle, *upa* is a nominal, following the view of the elders or by a nominal is to be understood a word other than a verb. By 'continuous sentence' too is meant what is incapable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of merely the meaning thereof, posited as a feature against that of a suffix. The definition, therefore, is not too narrow to exclude *upakumbhaṁ* or too wide to include *nīla-ghaṭatva*. Instances like *kṣīrapāyī*, *kumbhakāra*, *odanabhoktā*, however, are readily covered by such a difinition and *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* is left out.

Classification of Compounds :

According to Grammarians, Compounds are of four kinds viz., *avyayībhāva*, *tatpuruṣa*, *bahuvrīhi* and *dvandva*.

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Jagadīśa classifies them into six viz., *karmadhāraya*, *dvigu*, *tatpuruṣa*, *avyayībhāva*, *bahuvrīhi* and *dvandva*. *Upapada*, if counted as a distinct category, would be an addition.

Compounds are also classified as regular (*nitya*) and irregular (*anitya*). A compound is called regular either in view of the irregularity of the sentence of analysis (*vigraha-vākya*), thereof, either due to impossibility or due to unusualness of any such analysis as in *Kṛṣṇa-sarpaḥ* or *Vṛkṣāntaraṁ*.

Jagadīśa says that in case the meaning of a compound is conveyed by the constituent members thereof only with the declensional suffixes being inserted, the compound is understood as irregular and if otherwise regular. An irregular compound, therefore, may be understood as what bears out an identical meaning with the sentence of analysis thereof. There are instances, however, of irregular compounds, the sense of which fall short of what is conveyed by the sentence of analysis thereof as in *sphuradvāṇī* and the like. The number and gender liable to comrehension from the sentence of such a compound are often missed in a compound unless the comprehension thereof from the compound is otherwise called for as in *jaratī-citraguḥ* or so. *Kaṇṭhe-kālaḥ*, *sarasijaḥ* and the like may well come under the category of irregular compounds, according to Jagadīśa.

Karmadhāraya Compound :

According to Jagadīśa, the *Karmadhāraya* compound is the couple of any two nominals used In juxtaposition, bearing out the verbal knowledge of what the said nominals present as identically related to one another by way of the feature and the substantive in the order of their use as in *nīlotpalaṁ*.

In *puruṣa-siṁhaḥ*, however, the implied meaning of the word, *siṁha* is embraced as a feature, posited against the meaning of the word, *puruṣa* through the relation of identity, contrary to the order of the use of the member-words. For the word, denotative of the object of comparison (*upameya*)

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forms the first member of the *Karmadhāraya* compound in view of a special provision therefor.

The definition does not over-extend to a sentence like *nīlaṁ utpalaṁ* although the meanings of these two words are identically related in the order of their use. For the words, *nīla* and *utpala* are not used in juxtaposition since a declensional suffix has come to intervene.

The definition also does not over-extend to *rāja-puruṣaḥ*; for the meaning of the word, *rājan* is not syntactically related as a feature with that of the word, *puruṣa* through identity. Had it been so related, the verbal knowledge from the combound would be different from what is comprehended from the sentence of analysis thereof.

Conversely, the word, *rājan* in the said compound implies the meaning *rāja-sambandha* to be posited as a feature against the other word-meaning through a relation other than that of identify and it is an instance of the *tatpuruṣa* compound and the meanings of nominals are admittedly related through a relation other than that of identity.

Dvigu Compound :

A nominal, closely following another nominal denotative of what is qualified by a number and capable of bearing out the comprehension of the primary meaning thereof, posited as a feature through the relation of identity against the meaning of itself constitutes the *dvigu* compound as in *pañcavaṭī*. It is of three kinds viz., *taddhitārtha-dvigu*, *uttara-pada-dvigu* and *samāhāra-dvigu*.

Jagadīśa defines *taddhitārtha-dvigu* compound as what leads to the comprehension of the meaning of itself related to the meaning of a secondary suffix, following itself as in *dvimudrā* in *dvimudro vṛśaḥ*.

By *uttara-pada-dvigu* is meant a compound that has fallen within a compound, formed of the nominals constituting the said compound and another expectant therewith. The

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compound, *pañcagava*, for an example, has fallen within the compound *pañca-gava-dhana* formed of the nominals viz., *pañca* and *gau* constituting the compound, *pañca-gava* and *dhana*, a nominal, expectant therewith.

Samāhāra-dvigu may be defined as what being a *dvigu* compound is other than the two referred to above.

Tatpuruṣa Compound :

The compound, potentially capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of a word, constituting itself, qualified by what is likely to be conveyed by a declensional suffix in respect of what is denoted by another word, constituting the compound is known as the *tatpuruṣa* compound.

The instance, *rājapuruṣa*, for an example, bears out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the word, *puruṣa* (i e., a person), qualified by relation (*sambandha*) or what is likely to be conveyed by the sixth declensional suffix in respect of king (*rājā*) or what is denoted by the other word (*rājan*), constituting the compound in question.

It is of six kinds in accordance with the difference of the meanings of the six declensional suffixes beginning with the second one to be known as *dvitīyā-tatpuruṣa*, *tṛtīyā-tatpuruṣa* and so on.

Avyayībhāva Compound :

Jagadiśa defines the *avyayībhāva* compound as one, the first constituent of which is an indeclinable (*avyaya*), the meaning of which is embraced as the invariable substantive, related to meaning of the word (nominal), following itself, in the verbal knowledge, therefrom. *Nirmakṣikaṁ*, *upakumbhaṁ* and the like are the instances in point.

Bahuvrīhi Compound :

Jagadīśa defines the *bahuvrīhi* compound as what being a compound is formed of such a word as is likely to signify,

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through frozen metaphor, a part of what it means and is (thus potentially) capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of what is embedded in the meaning of itself as of being related (to what is qualified thereby).

In *ārūḍha-vānaraḥ vṛkṣaḥ*, the exposition (*vyutpatti*) of the compound, *ārūḍha-vānaraḥ* is *ārūḍho vānaro yaṁ*, what a monkey has climbed on. The compound is formed of the word, *vānara* which through frezen metaphor signifies a part of what the compound is to mean viz., what is related to a monkey (*vānara-sambandhī*). The word, *ārūḍha* means the agent of the act of climbing on what is to be comprehended as the object of the said act (*sva-karmakā'rohana-kriyā-kartā*). Thereupon, the meaning of the word, *ārūḍha* gets syntactically related to a monkey', a part of what the word, *vānara* signifies. The whole thing viz., the agent of the act of climbing on to what is to be comprehended as the object of the said act, who is none other than a monkey (*svakarmakā' rohana-kriyā-kartrabhinna-vānaraḥ*), thus is comprehended as of being related to the tree (*vṛkṣa*) or what the compound qualifies, the meaning of a word, not constituting the compound (*anyapadārtha*).

The *bahuvrīhi* compound is primarily known to be of two kinds viz., collocative (*Samānādhikaraṇa*) and non-collocative (*vyadhikaraṇa*). Although Pāṇini has not directly provided for the non-collocative kind of the *bahuvrīhi* compound, one of the aphorisms (II. 2.35) given by him fairly indicates it. Later grammarians recognise it to have been admitted of by Pāṇini.

Grrmmarians speak of another classification of the *bahuvrīhi* compound viz., *tad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi* and *atadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi*.

By *tad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi* is meant the kind of a *bauvrīhi* compound that leads to the verbal knowledge of the meaning of a constituent member as of abiding what is qualified by the compound i.e., the *anyapaaārtha*. In *trilocana*

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(*sivaḥ*), for example, eye abides Lord *Śiva* ; the *anyapadārtha*. *Lambakarṇaḥ* (*puruṣaḥ*) in another instance in point.

The kind of the *bahuvrīhi* compound that leads to the comhension of a meaning of the constituent member thereof not as abiding what is qualified by the compound (i.e., the *anyapadārtha*) is known as *atadguṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi*). In *hata-kaṁsaḥ* (*Kṛsṇaḥ*) or in *dṛṣṭa-samudraḥ* (*puruṣaḥ*) neither *Kaṁsa* nor *Samudra* abides *Kṛsna* or *puruṣa*, the *anyapadartha*.

According to Jagadīśa, *tad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi* compound refers to such kind of the *bahuvrīhi* compound as leads to the verbal knowledge of what is embraced as the invariable substantive in the sentence of analysis, as the invariable substantive and what is other than that is known as *atad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi*. The compound, *ghaṭa-svarūpaḥ* is regarded as an instance of *tad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi* in case the sentence of analysis is *ghaṭaḥ svarūpaṁ yasya* facilitating the verbal comparison of jar (*ghaṭa*) or what is embraced as the invariable substantive in the sentence of analysis, as the invariable substantive. Conversely, if the sentence of analysis reads as *ghaṭasya svarūpaṁ yasmāt*, the said compound turns out to be an instance of the *atad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna-bahuvrīhi*. Since it leads to the verbal knowledge of the stick (*daṇḍa*) which is other than what is other than what is embraced as the invariable substantive in the sentence of analysis (viz., *svarūpa*), as the invariable substantive.

The *bahuvrīhi* compound is also classified into *dvipada-bahuvrīhi*, *tripada-bahuvrīhi*, *catuṣpadā-bahuvrīhi* and so on in accordance with the numbers of the constituent members thereof.

Dvandva Compound :

Jagadīśa defines the *dvandva* compound as what being formed of two or more nominals, used in strict chronology and being known to have been thus formed is capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of the individual meanings, severely presented by the said nominals, posited as features.

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The compound, *pāṇipādaṁ* in *pāṇipādaṁ vādaya* or *dhava-khadirau* in *dhava-khadirau chinddhi*, is formed of the two nominals viz., *pāṇi* and *pāda* or *dhava* and *khadira* and the said compound bears out the knowledge of *pāṇi* and *pāda* or *dhava* and *khadira*, severally presented by the said nominals, posited as features against the meaning of the declensional suffix (viz., *karmatva*).

It is of two kindes viz., *itaretara* and *samāhāra*. By *itaretara-dvandva* compound is meant a compound conveying the sense of inter-connection of the individual meanings of the constituent members thereof, severally related to the predicate. By *samāhāra-dvandva* compound, conversely, is meant a compound carrying the sense of aggregation (*samāhāra*) in which the meanings borne out by the constituent members thereof are together related to the predicate.

Upapada Compound :

The compound that has as its last member, a word, formed of a root-verb and a primary suffix, presenting a meaning, it does not carry, unless suffixed to a nominal is known as the *upapada* compound. *Kumbhakāraḥ* for an example, has as its last member, the word, *kāra*, formed of the root-verb, *Kṛ* and the primary suffix, *ghañ*, presenting the meaning-*Kartā* which it itself does not carry, unless suffixed to a nominal like *Kumbha*.

Derivative nominals, formed of a secondary suffix :

Words like *vaiṣṇava* formed of the nominal *Viṣṇu* suffixed with *aṇ*, a secondary suffix or *bahudrākṣā* formed of the secondary suffix, *bahuc* followed by the nominal, *dṛākṣā* and the like are known as the derivative nominals, formed of a secondary suffix. But as the state of a nominal being followed by a secondary suffix or that of a secondary suffix being followed by a nominal either, cannot include both kinds of such nominals, the derivative nominals formed of a secondary suffix is defined as a nominal and a secondary suffix, possessed of a sequence enabling them to convey their import. Such a definition

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falls short to include an instance like *pacatitarām* etc. and as such the definition given may be slightly improved upon by replacing the word, nominal with the word, 'word' (*śabda*). The femenine suffixes like *ṭāp* or so are as good as secondary suffixes and hence *ajā*, *brāhmaṇī* or so fairly come to be included in the list of derivative nominals, formed of a secondary suffix.

Derivative nominals, formed of a primary suffix :

By a derivative nominal, formed of a primary suffix is meant a primary suffix, added to a root-verb, which when thus known bears out the meaning of itself as qualified by the meaning of the said root-verb. Nominals like *pācaka*, *pācyamāna* and the like are the instances in point; for the primary suffixes like *ṇaka*, *śānac*, known to have been added to the respective root-verbs bear out the verbal comprehension of *Kartṛtva* or *Karmatva* as qualified by the meanings of the respective root-verbs. In *caitreṇa grāmasya gantavyaṁ*, though *iṣṭasādhantva* is comprehended of as qualifying the meaning of the root-verb concerned, as the suffix, *tavya* and the like (other verbal adjectives as these are called), nonetheless bear out the comprehension of being a content (*viṣayatā* i.e., being a feature, *prakāratākhya-viṣayatā*), the meaning of itsalf, determined (*nirūpita*) by the state of a content, (*viṣayata* i.e., being a substantive, *viseṣyatākhya-viṣayatā*), the meaning of the root-verb and thus to that extent it bears out the verbal comprehension of what it signifies, as qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, it is suffixed to. The primary suffixes used impersonally (*bhāva-kṛt*) are admitted to be denotative of self-abstraction (*svarūpa*) of the root-verbs concerned and thus covered by the afore-said definition.

Classification of nominals on grounds of gender :

Nominals are also teachnically classified into three kinds on grounds of genders that they end in, that are of three kinds viz., masculine, feminine and neuter like *taṭa*, *taṭī*

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and *taṭaṁ*. Such classification, is resorted to only with a view to observing a grammatical formality. In an instance like *dundubhī suvarṇaḥ*, the word, *dundubhī* ending in the feminine gender, however, gives a specific meaning viz., *suvarṇa* weighting eighty *attis*, not availed of otherwise. In *sampat* or so though no feminine suffix is in view, the feminine suffix, added to words qualifying that bears it out.

Root-verbs :

A word, capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of what it signifies, embraced as a feature against what is expressed by the suffix, *tṛc* or so is a root-verb. The word, *pac* or *pipakṣā* or so are capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of *kartā*, the meaning of *tṛc* suffixed thereto; words like *ghaṭa* or so are obviously incapable of that.

Classification of root-verbs :

Root-verbs are classified into three viz., *mūla-dhātu* or what are read in *gaṇa-pāṭha* like, *paca*, *bhū* and like, *sautra-dhātu* or the root-verbs, read in *sūtras* like *skan*, *ju* or so and *pratyayānta-dhātu* or the root-verbs that convey import through derivation like, *pāci* (*pac* + *ṇic*) *pipakṣā* or so. Bopadeva adds one more to the list viz., the popular *dhātus* like *hindola*, *āndola* or the like. Jagadīśa includes all these in either of the *sautra* and the *pratyanta-dhātus*.

Root-verbs also are classified on grounds of the two sets of personal terminations viz., *parasmaipadī* and *ātmanepadī*. Some are designated as *parasmaipadī* and some as *ātmanepadī* while others as both (*ubhayapadī*).

A root-verb if it bears out the sesne of itself posited as a feature against agency (*Kartṛtva*), expressed by a verbal termination of a certain *pada* is designated as a root-verb of that *pada*. Root-verbs like *gam*, *bhū*, and the like, therefore, are held to be *parasmaipadī*. The root-verb, *saṁ-gaṁ* and *bhū*, bear out as they do the sense of agency of *saṅgatī* and *prāptī* when followed by a personal suffix of the *ātmanepada*

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as in *saṅgacchate, bhavate* are of course, *ātmanepadī* ones. The root-verbs like *yaji, kṛ* and the like followed by a personal termination of the either *padas* bear out the sense of agency and are thus designated as *ubhayapadī dhātus.*

Suffixes :

Suffiex are of four kinds viz., inflection (*vibhakti*), a constituent of a root-verb (*dhātvaṁśa*), secondary suffix (*taddhita*) and a primary suffix (*kṛt*). The suffix, *ka* as in *aśvaka* (in *aśvakabhārya*) is recognised as of the fifth kind of a suffix by the followers of the *kalāpa* school of Grammar.

Inflection (vibhakti) :

Inflection, is defined as a suffix that has the potency to denote what is qualified by a generic property, invariably concomitant with the state of number. Alternatively, it may also be defined as what bears out the verbal knowledge of what the base of itself signifies, predicated against the meaning of its own. The inflection, *aṁ* in *ghaṭaṁ* bears out the verbal knowledge of *ghatīya-karmatva* and so also *ti* in *pacati* of *pākīyā kṛti.*

It is classified into two viz. nominal inflection (*sup-vibhakti*) and verbal inflection (*tiṅ-vibhakti*).

Nominal Inflection (sup-vibhakti) :

Nominal inflection bears out the verbal knowledge of number, denoted by itself, embraced as a feature against what is signified by the base.

These are seven in number and of these seven, the first one is defined as what is incapable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of what its base signifies, embraced as a feature against the meaning of its own, through a relation other than identity. The others are all capable of causing the verbal comprehension of the meaning of the base concerned, embraced as a feature against the state of the object (*Karmatva*) and the like.

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Nominal Inflections as Case-endings (*Kāraka-vibhakti*) :

Nominal Inflections have a distinct role to play. These bring about the syntactical relation of a case (*Kāraka*) with the meaning of a verb The nominal inflections while bringing about such a relation, therefore, are called case-endings (*Kāraka-vibhaktis*) as distinguished from those while not bringing about any such relation and thus known as prepositional inflections (*upapada-vibhakti*).

Cases (*Kāraka*) :

The meaning of a case-ending, therefore, posited as a feature against the meaning, presented by a root-verb, concerned is regarded as a case in respect of the said act, borne out by the root-verb, involved.

Cases are classified into six viz., ablative (*apādāna*), dative (*sampradāna*), instrumental (*Karaṇa*), locative (*adhikaraṇa*), objective (*karma*) and nominative (*Kartṛ*), in view of the six different case-endings.

Ablative Case (*āpādāna-kāraka*) :

The meaning of the fifth case-ending, constituting a sentence of analysis of a compound, comprehended as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved, is known as state of the ablative case.

Vṛkṣāt patitaḥ, the sentence of analysis of the compound, *vṛkṣa-patitaḥ*, gives the verbal knowledge of the agent of the act of falling down, leading to separation from the tree. Separation, therefore, the meaning of the fifth case-ending, comprehended as a featute against the act of falling down, the meaning of the root-verb, involved viz., *pat* through the relation of *svānukūlatva*, is known as the state of the ablative case.

Dative Case (*Saṁpradāna-Kāraka*) :

The meaning of the fourth case-ending, constituting a sentence of analysis of a compound, liable to being embraced as

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a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, other than those denotative of movement is known as the state of the dative case in respect of the said meaning of the root-verb, involved.

In *brāhmaṇāya dānaṁ dhanasya,* the fourth case-ending, suffixed to the word, *brāhmaṇa,* bears out the comprehension of a *brahmin's* state of being the counter-co-relate (*pratiyogitva*) or of being in respect of (*nirūpitatva*), embraced as a feature against title (*svattva*), a constituent of the meaning of the root-verb, *dā.* The state or being the counter-co-relate or of being in respect of, therefore, is understood as the state of the dative case.

Instrumental Case (*Karaṇa-Kāraka*) :

What is borne out by the third case-ending to be verbally comprehended as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, marked by a conjugational transformation (*vikāraṇa*) is known as the state of the instrumental case.

In *dātreṇa chinatti,* for an example, the state of being caused through an intermediary action (*vyāpāra*) by the cutter is borne out to be verbally comprehended as a feature against the act of cutting ((*chedana-kriyā*) the meaning of the root-verb, *chidi,* marked by the conjugational transformation, *śap* is borne out by the third case-ending, suffixed to the word, *dātra,* to be designated as the state of the instrumental case.

Locative Case (*adhikaraṇa-kāraka*) :

What is borne out to be comprehended of as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, by the seventh case-ending, constituting a sentence of analysis is known as the state of the locative case of the said meaning of the said root-verb.

In *grāme gantā,* the state of the locus, abiding a village (*grāmaniṣṭhā'dhikaraṇatā*) or rather the state of abiding, the counter-co-relate of the state of the locus abiding a village (*tan-nirūpitā'-dheyatā*) is borne out by the seventh case-ending constituting the sentence of analysis of the compound, *grāmagantā,* to

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be comprehended of as a feature against movement, the meaning of the root-verb, *gam* (constituting the word, *gantā*), to be known as the state of the locative case.

Objective Case (*Karma-Kāraka*) :

What being other than the state of the agent (*Kartṛtva*) is embraced in verbal knowledge as the substantive against which the meaning of the root-verb, concerned, ending in *yak* is posited as a feature is known as the state of the objective case.

Following this definition, in *grāmo gamyate*, conjunction, the meaning of the verbal termination, *te*, as it is embraced as the substantive of what the root-verb, *gam* ending in *yak* means viz., the act resulting in conjunction (*Saṁyogāvacchinna-kriyā*), embraced as a feature, thereagainst, through the relation of *sva-janyatva*, is the state of the objective case.

It is obvious that such a definition falls short of covering all the instances of the state of the objective case and hence it is alternatively defined as what being borne out by the second case-ending is embraced in verbal knowledge as a feature against a certain meaning of the root-verb, involved.

In *caitro grāmaṁ gacchati*, the second case-ending means conjunction that is embraced as a feature against the act of going to be known as the state of the objective case :

Nominative Case (*Kartṛ-kāraka*) :

What is borne out by a verbal termination to be embraced in verbal knowledge as the substantive of a certain meaning of the root-verb, involved, undergoing a conjugational transformation is the state of the Nominative Case.

In *pacati*, for an example, agency (*Kṛti*), the meaning of the verbal termination *ti* empraced as the substantive of the act of cooking, borne out by the root-verb, *pāci*, undergoing the conjugational transformation, *śap*, is known as the state of the Nominative Case.

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Alternatively, it is defined as what being borne out a verbal termination of the present tense (*laṭ-lakāra*) is embraced as of being qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, other than what ends in *yak* with a view to covering instances like *atti*, *juhoti* or so formed of roots not undergoing any conjugational transformation.

Identification (*abhidhāna*) of Cases :

Casee are broadly devided into two viz., identified (*abhihita*) and non-identified (*anabhihita*) and by identification is meant being embraced as the substantive of the meaning of the root-verb, involved in verbal knowledge from a verbal termination or the like.

In *pacati* and *pacyate*, for example, agency or the state of the nominative case and that of the objective case are identified by the verbal termination, *ti* and (*yak*) *te* respectively to be embraced in verbal knowledge, therefrom, as the substantive of what the root-verb, involved, viz., *paci* means.

In *pacanaṁ kāṣṭhaṁ, dānīyḥ viprah, bhīmo gajaḥ, śayanaṁ gṛhaṁ* or so, instrumentality or the state of the instrumental case, the state of the dative case, the state of the ablative case and the state of the locative case are identified by primary suffixes.

Prepositional inflection (*upapada-vibhakti*) :

The meaning of a noun or of a pronoun is syntactically related to that of a verb or of a noun or of a pronoun or of any other kind of a word. The relation of a noun or of a pronoun with that of a verb is known as a case-relation that is brought about by a nominal inflection known as a case-ending. The relation of the meaning of a noun or of a pronoun or so with that of a noun or of a pronoun or so other than a verb is also brought by a nominal inflection known as a prepositional inflection (*upapada-vibhakti*). A nominal inflection, therefore, the meaning of which is not embraced in verbal knowledge as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb is known as prepositional inflection,

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All the seven nominal inflections are denotative of numbers that are not embraced in verbal knowledge as feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved. These, on the other hand, are embraced as feature against what are borne out by the respective bases.

Each of the nominal inflection is used as a prepositional inflection in a number of senses.

Verbal inflection (*ākhyāta*) :

An inflection, capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of a number, denoted by itself, posited as a feature against the meaning of a nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection as distinguished from itself is called a verbal inflection.

Jagadīśa also provides for an alternative definition viz., a word, capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of agency (*yatna*) denoted by itself, qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, involved and embraced as the predicate of assertion in a sentence is a verbal inflection.

Tenses and Moods :

The Sanskrit verb has ten different forms corresponding to the tenses and moods of Western grammar. The technical names of these ten forms are *laṭ*, *loṭ*, *laṅ*, *liṅ*, *liṭ*, *luṅ*, *lṛṭ*, *luṭ*, *lṛṅ* and *leṭ*.

Of these, six may be called tenses viz, *laṭ*—present tense, *luṅ*—aorist tense, *lṛṭ*—future tense and *luṭ*—periphrastic tense.

The remaining four viz, *liṅ*—potential or optative mood, *loṭ*—imperative mood, *lṛṅ*—conditional and *leṭ*—subjunctive mood.

Liṅ, again, is of two forms—*Vidhi-liṅ* and *āśīrliṅ*, the former one standing for the potential or optative mood while the latter one for what may be called 'benedictive.'

The *leṭ* forms occur only in the Vedas. The six forms, singled out as tenses, nevertheless, represent a mood viz, the indicative mood.

Tenses and Moods : Present Indicative.

The verbal inflection that, for not being followed by the particle, *sma*, do not (efficiently) bring about the verbal

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comprehension of pastness, liable to be signified thereby (if followed by that said particle) are called the verbal inflections of the present Indicative forms (*laṭ*) of a verb. In view of the two-fold classification of a verb (viz, parasmaipada and *ātmanepada*); these are eighteen in number and so are other forms too.

Tenses and Moods : Imperative

The verbal inflections that are capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of being authorised by the speaker of itself, embraced as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, these are suffixed to, are called verbal inflections of the imperative mood (*loṭ*).

Tenses and Moods : potential or optative

The verbal inflection which being other than that of the subjunctive mood (*leṭ*) or of the imperative mood (*loṭ*), is capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of injunction (*vidhi*), is called a verbal inflection of the potential or optative mood.

By injunction (*vidhi*), again, is meant the substratum of the individual state of the feature, abiding the determinant of causality in respect of desire that impels one to undertake the agency of the act involved.

The said substratum, too, is threefold, to be comprehended of severally viz, the state of being accomplished by (one's) agency (*kṛtisādhyatā*) the state of being an instrument to (one's) welfare (*iṣṭasādhanatā*), and the state of being other than what is conducive to (one's) non-welfare of larger dimension (*balavadaniṣṭānanubanditva*) or hell.

One is inclined to undertake the agency of the act of sacrifice or of cooking, only on one's having the desire for the said act, subsequent to one's having known, for certain, that the said act is capable of being accomplished by one's agency, that it is an instrument to one's welfare and that it is not an instrument to one's non-welfare (or hardship) of larger dimension (or hell). Hence *yajeta* or *paceta* gives the verbal knowledge of the act of sacrifice or of cooking, severally qualified by these three states.

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Tenses and Moods :

Imperfect tense :

A verbal inflection that bears out the verbal knowlegde of pastness, embraced as a feature aginst the meaning of the root verb, involved, ending in the conjugational transformation *śap*, even without the use of the particle, *śma* in addition, is called an inflection of the imperfect tense (*laṅ*).

Perfect tense :

A verbal inflection that is not capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of what it means, embraced as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, not undergoing reduplication, is designated as the verbal inflection of the perfect tense (*liṭ*).

Aorist tense :

A verbal inflection that bears out the verbal knowledge of pastness, embraced as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *han*, substituted by *vadh* or against the meaning of a root-verb, ending in the conjugational transformation, *sic*, in called the verbal inflection of the aorist tense.

Tenses and Moods :

Future tense :

A verbal inflection bearing out the verbal comprehension of the relation of future time, embraced as a feature against the negation of the act, presented by the root-verb, involved is called the verbal inflection of the future tense (*lṛṭ*).

Peri-phrastic future tense :

A verbal inflection bearing out the verbal knowledge of the state of occurring the next day, embraced as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved, is the verbal inflection of the periphrastic future (*luṭ*).

Conditional mood :

A verbal inflection, bearing out the verbal knowledge of the relation of the time gone by embraced as a feature against 'the negation' of the act, involved, is the verbal inflection of the conditional mood (*lṛṅ*).

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Bendictory mood :

A verbal inflection, bearing out the verbal knowledge of benediction and of futurity is the verbal inflection of the benedictory mood (*āśirliṅ*).

Denominative verbs :

There are certain suffixes other than the verbal ones, that bear out the verbal comprehension of what these mean, not related to the meaning of a declesnional suffix. These suffixes are known as what form part of a root-verb. These may, therefore, be described as what form the ultimate part of a root-verb. These include the suffixes like *kyac, kyaṅ, kāmyac, ṇic, san, yaṅ* and the like.

Such suffixes again are of two kinds viz, those that are added to a nominal and those that are added to a root-verb. The suffixes like *kyac, kyaṅ* and the like are added to nominals and the suffixes like *san, yaṅ* and the like are added to root-verbs.

The nominals, ending in such suffixes turn out to be known as denominative verb (*nāma-dhātus*).

Desiderative Verbs :

A root-verb, suffixed with *san* turns out to be known as a desiderative verb and such a verb is formed from all roots and are conjugated in all tenses and in all moods. The desiderative base is formed by reduplication of the original root-verb and with the addition of the letter, *sa* thereto. The general rules of reduplication are also applicable in this case. But *a, ā* and *ṛ* in reduplication become *i*. Generally, an intermediary *i* is prefixed to *sa* after *seṭ* and optionally after *veṭ*. No such *i* is prefixed in the case of an *anit* root-verb.

Frequentive verbs :

Frequentative or Intensive verbs, expressing repetition or intensity of the action, denoted by the original root-verb, may be formed from any monosyllabic root-verb of the first

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nine classes, beginning with a consonant, suffixed with *yaṅ* that denotes repetition (or frequentation) or intensity.

Frequentative bases undergo a peculiar kind of reduplication. The vowel of the reduplicated syllable takes to *guṇa*; *a* is lengthened. To the reduplicated base, the personal suffixes of only the *parasmaipada* are either directly added and the conjugation follows that of *juhotī* or else *yaṅ* is inserted between the reduplicated base and the personal suffix of *ātmanepada* only. The former is called *yaṅ-luganta* since the suffix *yaṅ*, after the root, is understood to have been elided and the latter is knawn as *yaṅanta*. The final *i* or *u*, of the primary root-verb, preceding *yaṅ* while forming into a frequentative base is lengthened, final *ṛ* turns into *ri*, final long *ṝ* into *īr* (or *ūr* in the case of certain verbs). Thus from *bhū*, *bobhīti* (*yaṅ-luganta*) and *bobhūyate* (*yaṅanta*), from *nī*, *nenīyate* (*yaṅanta*) from *tap*, *tātapyate* (*yaṅanta*), from *lih*, *lelihati* (*yaṅ-luganta*) and *lelihyate* (*yaṅanta*), are formed. There are may special rules to give forms like *caṅkramyate* from the root-verb, *kram*, *varī-vṛtyate* from the root-verbs *vṛt*, *jarīgṛhyate* from the root-verb, *grah*, *narīnṛtyate* from the root-verb, *nṛt* and so on.

Secondary Suffixes :

The kind of the suffixes that is distinct from the three other kinds of suffixes viz, the inflections, the primary suffixes, the suffixes that form part of verbs, is called the secondary kind of suffixes. Such suffixes are used in various senses such as 'descended from', 'produced by', 'made of', 'connected with', 'proclaimed by', and the like. Some of these suffixes bring about changes in the words (nominals) that these are added to.

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Word and its Meaning—a New Perspective

(in the light of Jagadīśa's Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā)

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CHAPTER I

VERBAL TESTIMONY—A DISTINCT INSTRUMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.

Indian Philosophy at its beginning was largely concerned with conclusions (*siddhānta*) although the conclusions must have been reached through definite methods of investigation. The early Indian thought, however, does not define what these methods were.

Philosophy, however, as a system of academic discipline cannot remain satisfied only with imparting the knowledge of the resultant conclusions. Along with the conclusions, therefore, the methods leading to them had to form a part of Indian Philosophy, in course of time. At a stage, it was incumbent on every system of Indian Philosophy to consider the methods of investigation, before it set on to present its matters of enquiry. Indian Philosophy, this way, assumed the character of a 'critique of knowledge'.

Logic came to emerge thereby. Parties to controversies forced one another to get entrenched behind the walls of reasoning. The increasing opposition of thought, posed by the free-lancing schools of Jainism and Buddhism, made the situation more complex. This brought in a change of standpoint in Indian Philosophy.

With this change of standpoint, systematic attention had to be paid by all the schools of Indian Philosophy to the methods of investigation of truths. These methods came to be known as so many *pramāṇas* or instruments of valid knowledge. The word *pramāṇa*, therefore, came to stand for the distinct and essential instrument of valid knowledge.

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As to the nature and scope of such *pramāṇas*, views are found to be divergent. The Cārvākas recognise perception (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) as the essential and the only instrument of valid knowledge; the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas—two perception (*pratykṣa-pramāṇa*) and inference (*anumāna*); the Sāmkhya—three, with the addition of verbal testimony (*śabda*); the Naiyāyikas four, including analogy (*upamāna*); the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā adds one more viz, implication (*arthāpatti-pramāṇa*); one more is added by the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta alike viz. non-perception of the perceptible (*anupalabdhi*).

The above position suggests that leaving aside the Cārvākas, all the systems of Indian Philosophy recognise the value of inference in addition to perception recognised by the Cārvākas as well. The role of analogy, implication and non-perception as distinct instruments of valid knowledge has not remained unchallenged.

In regard to verbal testimony too, the same kind of attitude prevails. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas, for example, claim that verbal testimony be included in the category of inference.

Nevertheless, they do not discard tradition and to that extent, they also implicitly admit the role of verbal testimony. They only deny the 'logical status' of a *pramāṇa* to it, distinct from inference.

Verbal testimony consists of a sentence as an unit. It has two-fold aspect. When a sentence is uttered, it is received by the hearer and the reception is but auditory perception (*śrāvaṇa-pratyakṣa*). What come to be apprehended by such a perception are only so many words constituting a particular sentence. *Śabda* or sentence as an instrument of valid knowledge obviously is not limited to the auditory perception of the words of a sentence.

Śabda or sentence has another aspect—the semantic one. The value of this aspect of *śabda* could hardly be denied. Of the

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innumerable facts of life, only a small fragment is experienced by a person for himself. The rest he has to deduce from the 'testimony of others' through words spoken or written.

The major part of this 'testimony of others' is a matter of tradition handed down from generation to generation. Words, therefore, came to be a standard medium of communication and to that extent, they became an integral part of traditon.

Tradition is recognised as one of the most fundamental sources of what may be called 'philosophic knowledge'. By the time *pramāṇas* came to be formally enunciated, the Indian society must have come to possess vast materials of tradition. Philosophy as a social science, therefore, could not deny the claim of tradition to be recognised as an independent source of knowledge.

On the one hand, there was with the orthodox Schools the literature, namely, the Vedas known as '*Śruti*' or what is orally transmitted. The heterodox schools, on the other hand, came to individually possess the '*Āgama*' literature—a great repository of human knowledge, much of which is the result of independent and popular thinking.

Diverse and often mutually conflicting sets of traditions were thus put forward by the orthodox and the heterodox Schools. Philosophy, as deduced from tradition, came to face a critical situation.

It became imperative, therefore, that the mutually conflicting sets of traditions be put to the test of reason. Tradition in general could not be regarded as an unchallengeable source of valid knowledge. Whatsoever come in the way cannot and should not necessarily be regarded as valid. The traditions, therefore, had to be examined and interpreted. 'Reasoned enquiry' had to settle the claims of the conflicting Schools of thought. In the process, traditions became systematised and what is understood as a distinct source of knowledge is but tradition systematised and not tradition as such.

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Śabda as a *pramāṇa*, therefore, comes to stand for systematised tradition—the result of 'reasoned enquiry' and not tradition as such.

In the beginning, *Śabda* as a *pramāṇa* stood only for the Vedas. The Prābhākara School of Mīmāṁsā till to-day holds this view and to the Mīmāṁsā School of thought as such the systematic interpretation of the Vedas has been the sole aim of enquiry.

In course of time, however, *Śabda* as a *pramāṇa* has gained in dimension. It includes any authoritative statement even outside the pale of the Vedas. It stands for verbal testimony in general.

The problem in regard to the authority of verbal testimony leading to a distinct type of cognition has yet to be logically resolved. Verbal testimony as a distinct instrument of valid knowledge presupposes perception and inference—the two fundamental instruments of valid knowledge, recognised by almost all the Schools of Indian Philosophy, except the Cārvākas. The Cārvākas admit perception as the only instrument of valid knowledge and seek to explain all epistemological problems in terms of perception alone. But life is too complex a phenomenon and human experience is too variegated to be squeezed into perception only. Inference, therefore, had to be admitted besides perception by all other Schools.

As for *Upamāna, Arthāpatti* and *Anupalabdhi*, there is no uniform opinion. Almost each of such instruments has been sought to be included either in perception or in inference by one School or the other.

In respect of verbal testimony also, the same standard of argument has been launched. With many, it is just a case of extra-ordinary perception; with some just recollection while with others, it is nothing more than inference.

Verbal knowledge, according to those who recognise it as a distinct type of knowledge, is held to be arrived at by the

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memory of the meanings presented by individual words constituting a particular sentence. Thus being based upon memory of an object which comes within the perview of verbal knowledge, such verbal knowledge, it is argued, should legitimately be regarded as a case of extra-ordinary perception (*alaukika-pratyakṣa-jñāna*) like the knowledge—'the sandal wood is savoury '(*surabhi candanam*)' which also is based upon the memory of savour.

The Neo-logicians sponsored by Gaṅgeśa of Tattvacintāmaṇi eminence and elaborated by scholars like Jagadīśa, however, hold that the knowledge derived from words or a sentence (*śabda*) is distinct from other types of knowledge. In extra-ordinary perception (*alaukika-pratyakṣa*), they point out, no word-meaning is presented to be comprehended and that memory comes to play the role of sense-object contact called for in the context of the apprehension of the substantive aspect (*viśeṣyāṁśa*) involved in such perception. In verbal knowledge, on the contrary, they argue, the contents are, as a rule, to be presented by the words used in a sentence and the words are to be mutually expectant and used in juxtaposition and the meanings of the said words again are to be competent for mutual relation. Apart from this, the co-relations (*saṁsarga*) of the meanings too are to be embraced by such a knowledge.

The conditions involved in the said two kinds of knowledge, therefore, are absolutely different–say the logicians. Perception or inference, they point out, is a kind of knowledge that apprehends things not presented by any word; these are, therefore, termed as *padā'nupasthāpya–padārthāvagāhi-jñāna* while verbal knowledge is a knowledge that does not comprehend a thing not presented by a word. It is what may be called a *padānupasthāpya–padārthānavagāhi-jñāna.*[1]

It is also to be noted that verbal knowledge is a distinct variety of the synthetic type of a knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*)-

1. विलक्षणः पदानुपस्थाप्यपदार्थानवगाहीत्यर्थः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 7.

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they argue. It is not that the words constituting a sentence present the individual word-meanings and there the matter ends. On the contrary, the auditory perception of the words constituting the sentence happens to be the instrument of verbal knowledge by way of presenting the word-meanings, the co-relation of which comes to arise out of syntax (*saṁsarga-maryādā*).

As for the synthetic nature of verbal knowledge, the Neo-logicians point out that the nature and form of the confirmatory knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) in this context comes to be *'astitvena gāṁ ahaṁ jānāmi* or *śṛṇomi'*. This proves that the sentence—*'Gour asti'* must have had caused a distinctly direct apprehension of the existence of cow (*astitvaprakāraka-go-viśeṣyakā'nubhava.*)[1]

In case, such a confirmatory knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) is not acknowledged in respect of verbal knowledge, there is no reason why it should be adhered to in the case of an inferential judgement (*anumiti*) either. Nor could it be accepted as a welcome objection. But for the confirmatory knowledge–*parvataṁ vahnimattayā'anuminomi* (or *jānāmi*)—the inferential knowledge involved gets reduced to two non-integrated cognitions like *parvataṁ jānāmi* and *vahniṁ jānāmi*[2] in view of the *sāṁkarya* of *pratyakṣatva* and *anumititva* involved.

It could not be so held, argue the logicians, that in respect of inference, the confirmatory knowledge would be taken into account; for that would involve double standards.

The Neo-logicians further point out that memory is admittedly a vital factor of verbal knowledge. Yet there is a fundamental difference between the memory involved in verbal knowledge and the memory involved in extra-ordinary perception. In verbal knowledge, such memory is to be effected

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1. विशिष्टमतेरानुभविकत्वात्। रा० श० प्र० p. 7. अस्तित्वेन गामहं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायसाक्षिकत्वादित्यर्थः। 'कृष्णकान्ती' p. 7.
2. vide कृष्णकान्ती p. 7–8.

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only through words possessed of expectancy and other virtues; while in extra-ordinary perception, it is to be effected otherwise as indicated above. In '*surabhi candanam*', for example, the memory of *saurabha* or savour is caused by the impression rooted in some earlier perception or inference thereof.

Hence, in case verbal knowledge is taken to be identical with extra-ordinary perception, it must be conceded that the memory of the things to be apprehended thereby is liable to be caused due to the impressions rooted in perception or inference, in spite of the sentence. But such a situation is logically untenable. It cannot be imagined that the words or rather the sentence uttered would remain inoperative while the things to be apprehended will come to be presented otherwise.

Not only that. The confirmatory knowledge in that case should come to take the form—*anumityādi-prakārāntareṇopasthāpita-padārthaviśiṣṭa-jñānavān aham* or I have the synthetic knowledge of the things presented by the memory thereof caused by the impressions rooted in inference or some other knowledge or experience, instead of *viśiṣṭa-jñānavān aham* or I have the synthetic knowledge.

In case it is so held that although the things of apprehension of the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) may well be presented through memory rooted in perception or inference, in so far as the confirmatory knowledge of the knowledge is to be caused by a sentence, it will be presumed that the contents thereof have been presented through the memory caused by the individual words constituting the sentence. Thus the confirmatory knowledge will not take to a different form; the determinant of causality (*kāraṇatā'vacchedaka*) involved would come to be complex. Instead of *vyavasāyatva*, the determinant of causality will come to be *tat-tat-pada-janya-padārtha-viṣayakatva* or the state of being a knowledge of the word-meanings presented by the respective words involved.[1]

1. तत्तदर्थविषयकशाब्दमतेरनुव्यवसायं प्रति तत्तदर्थसाकांक्षपदजन्यतद्-गोचरशाब्दत्वेन विषयविधया हेतुत्वकल्पनायामतिगौरवात्। श.श.प्र. p. 48.

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It should also be noted that the cause of the confirmatory knowledge like *ghaṭam aham jānāmi* or 'I know the jar' is not the knowledge of the jar as derived from the word 'jar' but only the knowledge of the jar.

Not only that—*tat-tat-pada-janya-padārtha-viṣayaka-viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is found to be not the cause of the confirmatory knowledge of the knowledge of *chidretaratva* or the state of being what is other than what is with a hole, that has come to be presented to the first knowledge caused by the sentence *ghaṭam ānaya* (bring the jar) by way of the knowledge of unsuitablility (*ayogyatā*) of what is other than that.

It may be pointed out that there is divergence of opinion in regard to *chidretaratva* or the state of being other than what is with a hole, being ever a content of the knowledge to occur due to the sentence—*ghaṭam ānaya* and that the logicians themselves reject the theory of *arthādhyāhāra* on the strength of which *chidretaratva* is being claimed to be regarded as a content of verbal knowledge. As such, the arguments adduced on that score cannot rule out the said causality.[1]

Even then, the situation does not improve—says Jag adīśa For, although the said idea of causality comes out to be free from the fault of inconsistancy, verbal knowledge remains fundamentally different from extra-ordinary perception in view of the fact that the *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva* involved in such perception is not well determined[2], while in verbal knowledge, it is. In *vāyū rūpābhāvavān*, for example, it is *vāyu*, the *viśeṣya* that happens to be the content of extra-ordinary perception while in *surabhi candanam*, *saurabha*, the *viśeṣaṇa*. Jagadīśa, therefore, argues that in *gaur asti* also there would be a reasonable possibility, in case the knowledge to occur therefrom is taken

1. ननूक्तस्थले छिद्रेतरत्वज्ञानं विवादग्रस्तम् ; प्राचीनैः पदोपस्थाप्यस्यैव शाब्दधीविषयत्वोपगमात् ; परन्तु इतरबाधवशात् घटत्वेन वस्तुगत्या छिद्रेतरघट एव भासते । कृष्णकान्ती p. 9.

2. उपनीतयोः प्रत्यक्षे विशेष्य-विशेषणभावस्य कामचारात् । ibid p. 9.

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to be an instance of extra-ordinary perception of *go* being apprehended by way of the feature against *astitva* on par with *astitva* featuring against *go*.[1] But in verbal knowledge, there is absolutely no such possibility.[2]

Verbal knowledge could neither be held to be an instance of *smṛti* or recollection; for *smṛti* or recollection is rooted in *saṁskāra* or impression born of a direct apprehension (*anubhava*). Hence, if verbal knowledge is held to be an instance of *smṛti*, the contents of the said knowledge viz. *prakāratā*, *viśeṣyatā* and *saṁsargatā* are to be traced back in some *saṁskāra* or impression which on its turn is to be rooted in some direct apprehension (*anubhava*) that has had occurred earlier. In respect of a sentence vis-a-vis verbal knowledge to occur therefrom, such a process is inconceivable; for the sentence is 'heard' here and now—a fact that leaves no scope for the imagination of any such impression or of a direct apprehension bearing out the said impression.[3]

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists maintain that the knowledge derived from a sentence is only a case of inferential knowledge. The Vaiśeṣikas, for example, argue that verbal knowledge is a knowledge that comprehends the syntactical relation of the word-meanings (*saṁsargā'vagāhi-jñāna*) and this syntactical relation (*saṁsarga*) could be apprehended by inference. As such, they hold, there is no reason why verbal knowledge be admitted a distinct instrument of valid knowledge. They put forward their argument in the form of a syllogism thus :

"These words are possessed of the mutual relation that subsists between the respective word-meanings denoted thereby" (*etāni padāni saṁsargavanti*),

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1. गवादावस्तित्वादेरिवास्तित्वादावपि गवादेर्भानप्रसङ्गस्य तावताप्यपनुद्धाराच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 9.
2. नियन्त्रितविषयत्वादेव। कृष्णकान्ती p. 9.
3. न चासौ स्मृतिः समानाकारसंस्काराप्रभवत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 8.

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"For, these are only a collection of words possessed of expectancy and the like" (*sākāṁkṣatvādi-pada-kadambatvāt*) like the collocation of the words—'bring the cow with a stick.' (*daṇḍena gām-ānayeti pada-kadambavat*).[1]

What the Vaiśeṣikas seek to emphasise is that a sentence is not an independent instrument of valid knowledge; for it does not bring out a knowledge having a new content. When one speaks out, they argue, one just communicates an integrated idea in the form of a sentence. In other words, much earlier than the sentence is 'uttered', the idea contained therein had come to exist. The sentence is, therefore, only an embodiment of that idea. It is not a fact, they say, that the sentence causes a valid knowledge to grow; on the contrary, it is a valid knowledge, they claim, that has come to cause the sentence to take its own form.

Sentences like '*yajeta*' (a Vedic one) and '*daṇḍena gām ānaya*'—(a secular one) are cited as so many instances in point. Each of these sentences is nothing more than a collocation of words, that is preceded by the valid knowledge of the syntactical relation (*saṁsarga*) of the word-meanings (*padārtha*) presented through the recollection caused by the words themselves and this relation is but what is sought to be comprehended as what is conveyed by the sentence concerned. There is, therefore, no point to hold, say the Vaiśeṣikas, that a sentence leads to a distinct knowledge having a content left uncovered by inference.

The Vaiśeṣikas, however, are conscious of the fact that against their view viz, that a valid knowledge leads to the articulation of a sentence, it might be argued that '*idaṁ rajatam*' or this is silver—such a statement would not have been made at all. Not only that, it might also be argued that when the junior elder (*madhyama-vṛddha*), for example, on hearing a sentence '*gām ānaya*' or 'bring the cow' sets out to fetch a cow, it is not that he should have the knowledge

1. vide न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली on कारिका–140.

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that the sentence is preceded by the (valid) knowledge of what it conveys. On the contrary, it may be pointed out that it is the knowledge caused by the sentence by itself (*svarūpa-sat*) that makes him set out to fetch the cow. The sentence might be preceded by an integrated idea that it is going to convey in so far as the speaker is concerned but; this argument does not hold good in respect of the hearer of the sentence–it might be objected. The Vaiseṣikas, therefore, resort to the alternative syllogistic reasoning like the following :

"These word-meanings are mutually connected (*ete padārthāḥ paraspara-saṁsargavantaḥ*) for, these are the meanings of only a collocation of words possessed of expectancy, compatibility and are used in juxtaposition" (*ākāṁkṣā-yogyatā-āsatti-mat-pada-kadamba-smāritatvāt*). Like the word-meanings recollected by the words like "bring the cow with a stick." (*daṇḍena gām ānayeti pada-kadamba-smārita-padārthavat*).

What the Vaiśeṣikas seek to drive home is that in a sentence like *ghaṭam ānaya* or 'bring the jar', the syntactical relation (*saṁsarga*) that binds the word-meanings together is to be apprehended on the analogy of some other similar collocation of words like *gām ānaya* or 'bring the cow'. But the question remains as to how will the fact of the word-meanings in '*gām anāya*' being mutually related be ever known ? There is thus the risk of one's landing in *anavasthā* or what is called 'argumentum ad infinitum'.

The Vaiśeṣikas try hard to free themselves from such a situation and argue that the fact of inter-relation of the word-meanings in the case of *gām ānaya* is a matter of hard perception and thus there is no risk of *anavasthā* or 'argumentum ad infinitum.'

Jagadīśa's answer is simple. It is on the strength of the same old logic, says Jagadīśa, that verbal knowledge cannot be identified with inference, for, in inference too, the objects of apprehension are not well determined while in verbal knowledge, they are.[1] Things not presented in con-

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sideration (*parāmarśa*), it may be pointed out, come to be apprehended by inference[2] while in verbal knowledge nothing other than what are presented by words are ever liable to be apprehended.

Hence any attempt to identify verbal knowledge with inference, argues Jagadīśa, would change the very character of inference; for, that would mean that in inference too the objects of apprehension are to be well-settled, i.e., nothing other than what come to be presented to be considered alone are to be apprehended by inference[3] or the other way round, it has to be agreed upon that the objects of apprehension of verbal knowledge should not be confined to what have come to be presented by the words of a sentence.

It is no argument either, points out Jagadīśa, to hold that the kind of inference involved in verbal knowledge is somewhat different from inference as such on the score that verbal knowledge is determined by an additional cause viz, the presentation of the things of apprehension thereof by the respective words used in the sentence involved. For, in case verbal knowledge be at all of the nature of inference, it must not be so claimed that much unlike inference as such, its objects of apprehension are to be well determined. On the contrary, inference of things other than what have come to be presented by the words constituting the sentence involved would come to occur in view of the fact that the conditions of inference as such are there to call for such a situation.[4]

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1. सोऽयं नियन्त्रितार्थत्वान्न प्रत्यक्षं न चानुमा। श. श. प्र. कारिका 3; अत एवासौ नानुमितिरपि। *ibid.* p. 9.
2. व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मता is presented in consideration, while what comes to be apprehended by अनुमिति or inference is the साध्य; वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वतः is the content of परामर्श while वह्नि is the content of अनुमिति.
3. पूर्वपरामृष्टस्य वस्तुमात्रस्यैवासति बाधके शाब्दधीविषयतापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 9.
4. न च तत्तदर्थगोचरशाब्दधियं प्रति साकांक्षापदजन्यायास्तत्तदर्थगोचरस्मृतेः कारणत्वकल्पनान्नैषो दोषः; तावतापि पदार्थानामन्वयधीदशायाम·

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It would be no argument either that inference as such is not to occur in the face of the conditions (*sāmagrī*) of verbal knowledge being at work on the ground that the conditions of verbal knowledge (*śābda-bodha-sāmagrī*) is an impediment to (perception or) inference as such; for the verbal knowledge itself has been squeezed into inference.[1]

It must in that case, be so argued, says Jagadīśa, that the conditions of *Śābda-pratyakṣa* or *śābdā'numiti* pose an obstacle to *śābdānya-pratyakṣa* or *śābdānyānumiti*. But such an argument would tell upon the law of parsimony, argues Jagadīśa; for in that case the *pratibadhyatāvacchedaka* or determinant of what is to be resisted comes to be *śābdānyapratyakṣatva* or *śābdanyā'-numititva* which is more complex–*gurudharma* in comparison to *śābda-bodhatva* or what comes to be the *pratiyogitā'vacchedaka* or the determinant of the counterpositive of the *bheda* involved in the idea of considering verbal knowledge as distinct from perception and the like.[2]

Not only that in considering the conditions of verbal knowledge, one has to admit an impediment to perception by or inference as such, the presentation of the word-meanings the individual words constituting the sentence involved have to be considered an additional cause.[3]

It may, however, be so insisted that the law of parsimony cannot alter the actual state of things or the fact that verbal knowledge is an instance of perception or inference. Thus, despite the fact that the *pratibadhyatā'vacchedaka* is of complex nature or that an additional cause has to be imagined, the situation does not change. But the question remains—Is there

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पदार्थानामपि स्वस्वसामग्रीबलेन प्रत्यक्षानुमित्योरन्यतरप्रसङ्गस्य दुर्वारता-पत्तेः। *ibid* p. 8–9.

1. शाब्दधियः प्रत्यक्षत्वाभ्युपगमे प्रत्यक्षादिसामान्यं प्रति शाब्दसामग्र्याः प्रति-बन्धकत्वासम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 10.
2. शाब्दान्यप्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति तस्यास्तथात्वमपेक्ष्य शाब्दधियः प्रत्यक्षादि-भिन्नत्वकल्पनायामेव लाघवात् (मानाभावाच्च)। *ibid.* p. 10.
3. पदार्थस्मृतेः स्वतन्त्रहेतुत्वकल्पनाच्चेति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 10.

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any proof that verbal knowledge is an instance of perception or of inference ?[1]

Let *yogayatā* or *ākāṁkṣā, aśābda-bodha-sāmagrī* be regarded a *hetu* by virtue of which verbal knowledge could be held to be an instance of inference, the form of syllogism being like *gour astitāvān astitva-yogytvāvattvāt*[2]—it may be argued. Verbal knowledge being thus demonstrated as an instance of inference, or rather a distinct category of inference to be termed *śābdā'numiti*, the conditions (or *sāmagrī*) of which would pose an impediment to inference as such or rather *śābdānyā'numiti*—it may be claimed.[3]

Jagadīśa disapproves such an argument : Neither *yogyatā* or *ākāṁkṣā* severally nor *yogyatā* and *ākāṁkṣā* collectively could ever play the role of the said *hetu.*[4]

As for *yogyatā* being the said *hetu*, a question would arise as to what is the nature of *yogyatā* then ? If *yogyatā* means just the mutual relation of the word-meanings, then the syllogism itself does not stand. For, in that case, the *sādhya* or what is desired to be inferred by the syllogism in question viz, *vākyārtha-saṁbandha* which is nothing else than the *padārtha-saṁbandha* or the mutual relation of the word-meanings involved, comes to be identical with the *hetu.* The syllogism *gourastitāvān astitva-yogyatvavattvāt* presents the *hetu* as what is identical with the *sādhya* as a result of which there is no scope left for the proposed inference[5]—it may be pointed out.

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1. मानाभावाच्च । श. श. प्र. p. 10.
2. कृष्णकान्ती p. 11.
3. अथ लिङ्गजत्वेनान्वयबुद्धेरनुमितित्वसिद्धावनायत्या शाब्दान्यानुमितौ तत्सामग्रथाः प्रतिबन्धकत्वं वाच्यम् । श. श. प्र. p. 11.
4. योग्यतार्थगताकांक्षा शब्दनिष्ठानुभाविका ।
प्रत्येकं वा मिलित्वा वा नैते लिङ्गमसिद्धितः । श. श. प्र. कारिका 4.
5. गौरस्तितावान् अस्तित्वयोग्यतावत्त्वादित्यनुमाने यद्येकपदार्थऽपरपदार्थवत्त्वरूपयोग्यत्वं हेतुः क्रियते तदा साध्याविशेषः; तथा सति नियमतः सिद्धिसत्त्वेन विनाऽनुमित्सामनुमित्यसम्भवः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 11.

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If to avoid such a situation, it is claimed that it does not mean the mutual relation of the word-meanings (*padārtha-sambandha*) as such but the negation of the negation thereof, *padārtha-sambandhabhāvā'-bhāvā* otherwise described as *padārtha-bādha-virahitva* and that *yogytā*, therefore, in the present instance comes to be *astitva-bādha-virahitva* (*astitvābhāvā'bhāva*). In other words, the *hetu* is not *astitva-yogytva* but *astivābhāvābhāva*.[1] But in that case *yogyatā-jñāna* will become totally irrelevant in the context of *śābda-bodha*.[2] Those who advocate *yogyatā-jñāna* as a factor in *śābda-bodha* argue that *yogyatā-jñāna* has to be admitted as what causes the non-occurance of a verbal knowledge otherwise called for, in the face of *bādha-jñāna* or *tad-abhāva-buddhi* i.e., *ghaṭaviṣayaka-śābda-bodha* is not to occur in the face of *ghatā'bhāva-buddhi* and *yogyatā-jñāna* being a *pratibandhaka* of *bādha-jñāna*, they claim, *bādhajñāna* itself is not to occur in the face of the *śābda-sāmagrī* or the conditions favourable for a verbal knowledge, being in operation. But in case *yogyatā* comes to be regarded as what is *padārtha-sambandhābhāvā'bhāva* or *astitvābhāvā'bhāva* then in the present case the suggested *hetu-vīz*, *astitva-bhāva* to be technically called *bādha-jñāna* which is per se an impediment (*pratibandhaka*) to a synthetic knowledge will appear to be enough to resist a *śābda-bodha* otherwise likely to occur due to the sentence *gaur asti*, (*pratibandhakā'bhāva* being the acknowledged common cause of everything occuring) and the *yogyatājñāna* will ipso facto forfeit all its claim as an impediment by itself to a verbal knowledge otherwise called for, in the face of *bādha-jñāna*.[3]

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1. तथा चास्तित्वाभावाभाव एव तत्र हेतुरिति भावः । ibid., p. 11.

2. गवादावस्तित्वादेरनुभवार्थं न तावदस्तित्वादेर्बाधविरहित्वरूपं योग्यतामात्रं लिङ्गं, बाधनिश्चयाभावेनान्यथासिद्धस्य योग्यतानिश्चयस्यानावश्यकत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 11.

3. बाध-निश्चयदशायां शाब्दबोधवारणाय योग्यता-निश्चयस्य हेतुत्वं स्वीक्रियते, निरुक्तयोग्यतानिश्चयस्य बाधज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् बाधनिश्चय एव शाब्द-सामग्रीकाले न सम्भवतीति तादृशयोग्यतानिश्चयहेतुत्ववादिनामाशयः । स च न सङ्गच्छते, विशिष्ट-बुद्धिसामान्यं प्रत्येव बाधनिश्चयस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् तद्-

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To put it the other way, if the *hetu* in the syllogism involved comes to be *astitvābhāvā'bhāva*, and if *astitvābhāvā'-bhāva-buddhi* comes to be equivalent to *yogyatā*, then *astitvābhāvā'bhāva-buddhi* turns out to be *yogyatā-jñāna*. In the face of *astitābhāva'-bhāva-buddhi* again, the knowledge of *astitvā'bhāvā* is not to arise not because *astitvā'bhāvā-bhāva-buddhi* is there to operate by way of *yogyatā-jñāna* but because it operates by way of *tadabhāvabuddhi* or the knowledge of the negation of *astitvābhāva* for *tadabhāva-buddhi* is the *pratibandhaka* of *tadvattābuddhi*. In other words, if *yogyatā* is taken to mean *bādha-virahitva* as Jagadīśa puts it, *yogyatā-jñāna* comes out to be equivalent to *bādha-virahitva-jñāna* which means *pratibandhakā'bhāva-jñāna* and as such *yogyatā-jñāna* loses its identity. Hence *yogyatā-jñāna* cannot be conceived as the *hetu* in the said syllogism for that would bring in the fault of redundance.

On the other hand, if *yogyatā* per se be the said *hetu* a curious situation will crop up. *Ghaṭaḥ karmatvam* instead of *ghaṭam* would in that case bear out the possibility of the *śābda-bodha* of *ghaṭaniṣṭha-karmatva*, *Karmatva* having the *yogyatva*, per se of being related to *ghaṭa* through the relation of *niṣṭhatva*.[1]

It may be argued that in *ghaṭaḥ karmatvam* no such *śābda-bodha* would be forthcoming for the words involved are not mutually expectant and as such the objections cited on that score do not go to militate against *yogyatā* per se being conceived of as the *hetu* in the proposed inference.[2]

But all said and done, the fundamental question remains in respect the situation that arises in the case of *yogyatā-*

भावरूपकारणविरहादेव तदानीं शाब्दवारणसम्भवात् योग्यतानिश्चयस्य हेतुताकल्पने प्रयोजनाभावात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 11.

1. योग्यतामात्रलिङ्गकसंसर्गानुमानस्यान्वयबुद्धित्वे घटः कर्मत्वमित्यादिस्थलीयस्यापि तस्य तथात्वापातात्। श. श. प्र. p. 12.

2. ननु अन्वयबुद्धौ निराकांक्षपदत्वेनापि स्वातन्त्र्येण विरोधित्वं वाच्यम्। रामभद्री p. 12.

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saṁśaya. The idea is that *anumiti* calls for the *hetumattva-jñāna* (*hetumattva-niścaya*) or the knowledge of the kind of *niścaya* of the *hetu* being present in the *pakṣa* and *saṁśaya* in respect of the said *hetu* being present in the *pakṣa* has no scope in the context of *anumiti*. But in the context of *śābda-bodha*, it is admitted that *yogyatā-jñāna* irrespective of the fact as to whether the said *jñāna* is of the nature of *saṁśaya* or otherwise, is the cause. *Yogyāta-saṁśaya* again rules out *yogyatā* per se and hence in cases of *yogyatā-saṁśaya* at least, *anumititva* of the verbal knowledge involved has to be ruled out.[1]

Nor could *ākāṁkṣā* be conceived of as the *hetu* to give the syllogistic form *gaur astitāvān tatra tadbodhakānukūlā'kāṁkṣāvattvāt* for *ākāṁkṣā* being a *padaniṣṭha-dharma* or a property of words, cannot be regarded as what abides in a word-meaning (*padārtha*) nor the *viśiṣṭajñāna* of the said *padārtha* be contemplated as the *pakṣa* in the scheme of the syllogistic reasoning resorted to.[2] The idea is that towards *ghaṭa-karmatāka-śābda-bodha*, for example, it is the desire for the second case-ending immediately following the word *ghaṭa* that functions as the cause[3] and this state of immediately following (*uttaravartitva*) is what is called *ānupūrvī* or sequence which is a property of words alone. Hence if *ākāṁkṣā* is to be conceived as the *hetu* and the *pakṣa* is what is other than a word, the fault of *svarūpā'-siddhi* creeps in.

Having failed to function severally as the *hetu* in the scheme of the syllogistic reasoning resorted to in the matter of converting *sābda-bodha* into an instance of *anumiti*, *yogyatā*

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1. योग्यतायाः संशयसाधारणज्ञानसत्त्वेऽपि शाब्दबुद्धेरुदयात्; तस्याश्चानुमितित्वे निश्चयत्वेनैव हेतुत्वं वाच्यम्, योग्यतायाः न तथेत्यतोऽपि योग्यता नानुमापिकेति भावः। ibid., p. 12.
2. गवादावस्तित्वादेरन्वयबोधानुकूलानुपूर्वी पर्यवसिता त्वाकांक्षा स्वयमसिद्धा कथमस्तित्वादेरन्वयबोधं साधयेत्? श. श. प्र. p. 12.
3. घटकर्मताबोधं प्रति घटपदोत्तरद्वितीयारूपाकांक्षाज्ञानं कारणम्। न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली on का. 84.

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and *ākāṁkṣā* have no prospect to act either collectively.[1] The fact is that the idea of these two functioning as the said *hetu* in a collective form involves that *yogyat-āviśiṣṭa'kāṁkṣā* and *ākāṁkṣā-viśiṣṭayogyatā* as well are to function as the said *hetu*. But as it has been seen that *ākāṁkṣā* being a *padaniṣthadharma*, it does not abide in the *pakṣa* and it is inconceivable that *ākamkṣā-viśiṣṭa-yogyatā* or *yogyatā-viśiṣṭā'kāṁkṣā* would ever come to abide in the *pakṣa* for either because of the *viśeṣaṇa* or the *viśeṣya* wanting, the idea of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* or collocation thereof falls through.

The Neo-Vaiśeṣikas[2] or all those who are of the opinion that verbal knowledge is just a kind of inference seek to get rid of the fault of *svarūpā'siddhi* in respect of the *hetu* suggested above and present two different forms of syllogisms (*anumāna-prayoga*) in that context, of which one is *padātrha–pakṣaka* and the other *pada-pakṣaka*.

The *padārthapakṣaka* is like this :

"*Gaur astitāvān* Cow (the denotated meaning of the word cow) is possessed of existence" *Svadharmikā'stitā'nvaya-bodhā'nukūlā'kāṁkā'śraya-pada-smāritat-vāt* for it is presented by a word (cow) which is the locus of sequence (*ākāṁkṣā* = *ānupūrvi*) that goes to contribute to the cognition of the syntactical relation of existence abiding in self (the cow—the meaning of the word go)" "*ghaṭavat*" like a pitcher.[3]

OR

Gaur asitāvān or Cow (the denotated meaning of the word *go*) is possessed of existence, *astitva-pada-samabhivyāhṛta-gauḥ-pada-smāritatvāt* because it is recollected by the

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1. अत एवास्तित्वादेर्योग्यत्वविशिष्टमप्याकांक्षावत्त्वं गवादौ न तद्न्वयस्यानुमापकमप्रसिद्धेः । श. श. प्र. pp. 12–13.
2. The Vaiśeṣikas other than Vyomaśivācārya, including the भाष्यकार.
3. Vide श. श. प्र. pp. 13–14.

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word go (used) in association with the word *asti* or 'exists' (in *gaur asti*); *cakṣurvat* or like *cakṣus* (another meaning of the word *go*.)[1]

It is to be noted that the *hetu* in these two sets of (*padāratha–pakṣaka*) syllogisms (*anumāna-prayoga*) is *pada-smāritatva* and the rest are only its qualifying adjuncts. The *pakṣa* is *go-padārtha* or *go*–the word-meaning wherein *go-pada-smāritatva* safely abides to do away with the *svarūpāsiddhi-doṣa*. Of these again, the first one is a form of *sāmānyā'numāna* and the word *sva* (in *svadharmika* and so on) means *go* and the word *sva* also means *ghaṭa* so that *svadharmīkā'stitvā'nvaya-bodhā'nukūlā'kāṁkṣā'śraya-pada-smāritatva* could come to abide in *ghaṭa*, the *dṛṣṭānta* also.

The second one, on the contrary, is a case of *viśeṣā'numāna* so to say and so instead of the expression *svadharmika*, the text reads *gauḥ-pada-smāritatva* merely as the *hetu* which safely comes to abide in *cakṣus* the *dṛṣṭānta*, another meaning of the word, *go*.[2]

The word *samabhivyāhāra* used in what has been projected as the *hetu* in the second syllogism *asti-pada-samabhivyāhṛta-gauḥ-pada-smāritatvāt* creates a problem. The question is whether the knowledge of the words being mutually associated (*samabhivyāhāra–niścaya*) is a factor in *śābda-bodha* or not. Needless to say, the sponsors of the syllogism consider that but for the knowledge of the words forming into a syntactical whole (*eka-vākyatā*) otherwise to be called *samabhivyāhāra-niścaya*, *śābda-bodha* does not come to occur. But the trouble is that in that case a *ghaṭa* destroyed or a *ghaṭa* yet to be not being possessed of *asti-padasambhivyāhṛta-ghaṭa-pada-smāritatva* for although *ghaṭatpada-smāritatva* is there in such a *ghaṭa*, *asti-pada-samabhivyāhṛta-ghaṭa-pada-smāritatva* is not there. As a result, the whole syllogism falls through.[3]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 14.
2. दिङ्नेत्रघृणि भूजले etc. कोष quoted कृष्णकान्ती p. 14.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 14.

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The situation, however, is sought to be saved with the argument that such kind of inconstancy (*vyabhicāra*) does not have much of a bearing on what is called *svārthā'numāna* and that such inconstancy is liable to be done away with, in case some other kind of *vyāpti* (as provided for by some other definition thereof) is taken up for consideration.[1]

All said and done, Jagadīśa contends, verbal knowledge could in no case be proved identical with inference or rather an instance of inference as claimed by the Vaiśeṣikas. He argues that in the face of the knowledge-*gauḥ-pada-smāritatvā'-bhāvavān* or that cow is possessed of the negation of the state of being recollected through a word, there could not occur the inference *gaur asti* by way of *pada-smāritatva* being conceived of as the *hetu*. But inspite of the said knowledge the *śabda-bodha* to the effect *gaur asti* (i.e. the verbal knowledge of *astitva* featuring against *go*) would safely occur due to the sentence *gaur asti* in view of the fact that the knowledge of *pada-smāritatva* or the negation thereof (*pada-smāritatvā'bhāva*) is no factor in the matter of *śābda-bodha*. While inference is in the need of the knowledge of *padārtha-smṛti*, points out Jagadīśa, verbal knowledge needs only *padārtha-smṛti* or *padārtha-smṛti* per se (*svarūpasati*). Verbal knowledge, therefore, stands unique,[2] he concludes.

It is also to be noted, says Jagadīśa, that at times a thing mistaken as *hetu* (as *dhūli-paṭala* for *dhūma*) leads to a valid inference but nothing mistaken as *padasmārita* or presented by a word could help one reach a verbal judgement.[3]

As for the idea that a sentence is a mere embodiment of an integrated idea and thus verbal knowledge is not to be

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1. ibid., p. 14.
2. गवादेः पदस्मारितत्वाद्यभावग्रहदशायामुत्पन्नस्य गौरस्तीत्याद्यन्वयबोधस्योक्तहेतुनाप्यनिष्पत्तेः; पदजन्या हि पदार्थस्मृतिः स्वरूपसत्येवान्वयबुद्धावुपयुज्यते, न तु ज्ञाता, प्रमाणाभावात्। श. श. प्र. p, 15.
3. पदैरस्मारितस्यापि तत्स्मारितत्वग्रहदशायामन्वयधीप्रसङ्गाच्च। ibid., pp. 15–16.

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regarded as what is rooted in a sentence but a sentence on the contrary is to be held as what is rooted in a knowledge, the Vaiśeṣikas take resort to what has been referred to earlier—the *pada-pakṣaka* kind of syllogism (*anumāna-prayoga*)—"*gauḥ-padam astitvavad-go-gocara-jñāna-pūrvakam*, or *gauḥ* or the word *gau* is used following the knowledge of *gau* or cow the meaning as possesed of *astitva* or existence", *astitva-pada-sākāṁkṣa-gauḥ-padatvāt*-because of its being the word *gauḥ* used in sequence with the word *asti*.

"*Yannaivam tannaivam* what is otherwise is other-wise" *yathā ākāśam* as in the word *ākāśa*.[1]

Jagadīśa points out that as in the previous case, the verbal knowledge of *astitva* featuring against *go* the invariable substantive admittedly occurs even in the face of the negation of the knowledge of the word like *go* being preceded by such a knowledge—a fact that cuts at the very root of the syllogism given.[2]

What Jagadīśa seeks to drive home is that many a time, a sentence is uttered by the uninitiated in the language, say, a child or a foreigner by way of imitation so to say, without knowing what it means but still it successfully leads to a valid verbal knowledge on the part of one initiated in the language listening there to—a fact that proves that even without the knowledge of *gau* (for example) possessed of *astitva*, the verbal knowledge of *gau* possessed of *astitva* occurs detering the scope of the suggested syllogistic reasoning.[3]

Jagadīśa, thereupon, levels a charge against the Vaiśeṣikas that they first read a thought to the effect that verbal know-

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1. ibid., p. 16,
2. गवादिपदानां ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वाद्यभावनिश्चयदशोत्पन्नस्य गवादिमुख्य-धर्मिकास्तित्वाद्यन्वयबोधस्य सर्वजनानुभवसिद्धस्योच्छलिङ्गादप्यनिष्पत्तेः। ibid., p. 16.
3. वाक्यार्थस्यापूर्वत्वेन तद्गर्भसाध्यस्य प्रायशः प्रागनुपस्थित्याऽनुमानायोगाच्च। ibid. p. 16.
4. ibid., p. 17.

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ledge is an instance of inference and as such it must be caused by a *liṅga* and it is in this process that *pada-smāritatva* is found to be the handy *liṅga*. But Jagadīśa points out, the very idea that verbal knowledge is an instance of inference is wrong, for the *anuvyavasāya* or the confirmatory knowledge that comes to occur on the heel of the knowledge *gaur asti* takes the form *astitvena gām aham śṛṇomi* or I hear the cow as possessed of the state of being and not *astitvena gām-ahamanuminomi* or I infer a cow to be possessed of the state of being.[1]

If inspite of the said *anuvyavasāya*, argues Jagadīśa, it is insisted upon that verbal knowledge is to be regarded as an instance of inference and that *pada-smāritva* will be the required *hetu*, then there is no reason to hold that inference is not to be regarded an instance of verbal knowledge for *pada-janyatva* in the like manner will come out to be the much needed *hetu* by virtue of which the verbal nature of an inferential judgement could be demonstrated.[2] The idea is that there being *abhāva* or negation of the conditions of *pratyakṣa* of the same thing involved (i.e., *samāna-viṣayaka-pratyakṣa-sāmagryabhāva*), which is of the nature of *pratibandhakābhāva*, both—*anumiti* and *śābda-bodha* have the possibility to occur, there being no reason to hold that *anumiti* alone would prevail at the cost of *śābda-bodha*. Following the logic involved in the apprehension of the invariable concomitance of the word *paṭa* and the word-meaning *paṭa* on seeing *paṭa* the word-meaning or the *padārtha* being everytime recollected through the word *paṭa* calling for inference, the knowledge of expectancy and the like in respect of a word like *paṭa* or *vahni* coming to be recollected through the corresponding *padārtha* to call for a verbal know-

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1. प्रत्युत गौरस्तीतिवाक्यादस्तित्वेन गौः श्रुतो न त्वनुमित इत्यनुभवाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 17.

2. (अन्यथा) न चेदेवमनुमितिमात्रस्य पदजन्यत्वं प्रकल्प्यान्वयबोधत्वं किमिति न रोचयेः। ibid., pp. 17–18.

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ledge cannot be ruled out. As for the recollection of a word through the corresponding *padārtha*, it is pointed out that as through the relation of *vācyatva*, a *padārtha* is considered liable to be recollected by the corresponding word so is a *pada* through the relation of *vācakatva* is liable to be recollected by the corresponding word-meaning (*padārtha*).[1]

As for the argument that in a situation like *hrado dhūmā' bhāvavān vahnyabhāvāt* where *dhūma*, the *padārtha*, does not exist and as such *dhūma*, the corresponding word, is not liable to be recollected by *dhūma*, the *padārtha* itself, wanting, Jagadīśa points out that *pada-jñāna* might have been called for by some other stimulant (*udbodhaka*) (say, *adṛṣta* at least); it is not essential that *padārthas* are always to be there to occasion the recollection of *padas*.[2]

As a matter of fact, the theory of *sākāṁkṣādimat-pada-smṛti* is nothing new—the *padā'dhyahāravāda* of Prabhākara lends support to it.

Moreover, Jagadīśa continues, a sentence like *ghaṭād-anyaḥ* does not hold out the prospect of an inferrential knowledge. An inferential knowledge calls for the knowledge of the determinant of what has come to be projected as the substantive in the said (inferential) knowledge;[3] *parvato vahnimān* as an inferential knowledge is to be *vahninisṭha-prakāratā-nirūpita-parvatatvāvacchinna-viśeṣyatāka-jñāna*. *Ghaṭād anyaḥ* in the like manner, if it is to be an instance of *anumiti*, has to be *anyatvaniṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpitā'nyatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatāka-jñāna*.

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1. अनुमितावेवान्वयमतावपि समानविषयकप्रसक्तसामग्र्यादेः प्रतिबन्धकतया तदभावजन्यत्वेनैकशेषस्य दुष्करत्वात्, पादिपदैरर्थस्य पटादेः स्मरणे सति तदीयव्याप्तेरिव दहनाद्यर्थैस्तदर्थकवह्न्यादिपदस्य स्मरणोत्तरं तदीयाकांक्षाद्यवगमस्य सुवचत्वात्, वाच्यतावद्वाचकत्वस्यापि सम्बन्धस्य स्मारकतायामविशिष्टत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 18.
2. तत्र साध्यज्ञान-विरहेऽपि उद्बोधकान्तरात् साध्यवाचक-पद-स्मरण-सम्भवात्। ibid. p. 19.
3. निर्धर्मितावच्छेदकानुमितेरनभ्युपगमात्। कृष्णकान्ती p, 19.

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But the difficulty is that *anyatva* has come to be projected as *prakāra* and thus it cannot be projected as the *viśeṣyatā'vacchedaka* as well.[1]

Even if the syllogism is sought to be given the form—*bhedaḥ* (*anyatvam*) *ghaṭapratiyogitākaḥ*(*ṃ*), *tat-sākāṁkṣā'nyapadasmāritatvāt*; to show that *bhedatva* or *anyatvatva* comes to be the *viśeṣyatāvacchedaka* as distingushed from *anyatva*—the *prakāra*, there is no escape for *anyatva* being projected as *pakṣa*. In that case it can not be projected by way of *prakāra*.

Nor is it reasonable to hold that the knowledge caused by *ghaṭād anya* is only of the kind of recollection, the word *anya* alone having presented the meaning of *ghaṭa-pratiyogika-bhedāśraya* by *lakṣaṇā* and the word *ghaṭa* is only a *tātparya-grāhaka* for that would mean that in *ghaṭo'sti* too, the word *ghaṭa* would present *astitva-viśiṣṭaghaṭa* by way of *lakṣaṇā* and the word *asti* will be reduced to only a *tātparyagrāhaka*, a position that cuts at the very root of verbal knowledge as such.[2]

On the contrary, *ghaṭād anyaḥ* leads to a valid verbal knowledge called for by words possessed of the particular sequence involved and the like[3], it may be pointed out. As such, all such attempts as are undertaken by the Vaiśeṣikas in respect of their view that verbal knowledge is but an instance of inference falls through.

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1. किञ्च घटादन्य इत्यादिवाक्याद्घटप्रतियोगिताक···परेषां तु भेदो घटप्रतिप्रतियोगिताकस्तत्साकांक्षान्यपदस्मारितत्वादित्यादिरीत्या अनुमित्या न तन्निर्वाहः। श. श. प्र. p. 19.

2. न च तत्रान्यपदमेव घटान्यत्व-प्रकारेण घटान्यस्य लक्षकम्, घटादित्यस्य व्यर्थतापत्तेः, अन्यथा घटोऽस्तीत्यादावपि घटादिपदस्यैवास्तित्वादिविशिष्टघटादिलक्षकत्वसम्भवात्, तत्राप्यस्तित्वघटयोरन्वयबोधापलापापत्तेः। ibid, p. 19–20.

3. किञ्च घटादन्यः इत्यादिवाक्याद्घटप्रतियोगिताकान्यत्वादि-प्रकारेण निरवच्छिन्न-विशेष्यताको घटादन्यस्य बोधः सर्वजन-सिद्धः; स चास्माकं तादृशानुपूर्वीक-पदज्ञानत्वेन तथाविधान्वयबोधं प्रति हेतुत्वादुपपद्यते। ibid., p. 19.

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It will not be out of place to refer to the view of Viśvanātha—the author of Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvali. He points out that verbal knowledge is found to occur without the knowledge of the invariable con-commitance. But if it is insisted upon that for every piece of verbal knowledge, the knowledge of the invariable con-commitance has to be contemplated, then there is no logic, he argues, in refusing to accept the idea that for every piece of an inferentinl knowledge, the knowledge *of* words be equally imagined.[1]

Even Vyomaśivācārya, a celebrated teacher of the Vaiśeṣika school itself, is in favour of the view that verbal knowledge stands distinguished from inference. He argues that a word does not lead to the knowledge of the thing it denotes in the way smoke leads to the knowledge of fire. The relation between smoke and fire is natural so to say, he points out, while the relation of the word 'smoke' and the thing 'smoke' is only conventional in the sense that the word 'smoke' has been invested with the power to denote the thing it denotes.[2]

The Mīmāṁsakas are equally interested in combating the view of the Vaiśeṣikas and to that extent they are one with the logicians. But the arguments that they resort to are different. They argue that as the knowledge of expectancy and the like are at the root of a verbal knowledge, so also the knowledge of the words or rather of the sentence involved being 'uttered' by a trust-worthy person or *āptokta-jñāna* as they call it, is also at the root thereof. By *āpta* or a trust-worthy person again is to be understood 'a man who has the right knowledge of the meaning of the sentence'. Verbal knowledge, therefore, comes to be what comprehends things that are already known. Inference on the contrary seeks to deduce something unknown

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1. सर्वत्र शाब्दस्थले यदि व्याप्तिज्ञानं कल्प्यते तदा सर्वत्रानुमितिस्थले पदज्ञानं कल्पयित्वा शाब्दबोध एव किं न स्वीक्रियतामिति ध्येयम्। न्या. सिद्धान्त मुक्तावली का. — 141.
2. व्योमशिवाचार्य's commentary of वैशेषिकभाष्य vide श. श. प्र. fn. p. 13.

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through what is known, by way of a syllogistic reasoning. A Verbal knowledge, therefore, if accepted to be an instance of inference, the *sīddha-sādhana-doṣa* or the fault of 'deducing what is already deduced (known)' would be inevitable. In other words, because of the *siddha-sādhana-doṣa* in view, the normal course of inference will be resisted in that case; involuntary inference will not occur although involuntary verbal knowledge or *śābda-bodha* has its full scope. As for the risk of the *śābda-bodha* being stamped as invalid in that case on grounds of 'comprehending what is already comprehended' (*gṛhīta-grāhitva*), the Mīmāṁsakas do not worry; for in their view the *śābda-bodha* caused by a secular sentence is not valid.[1]

Jagadīśa discards this view. He finds no reason to admit that *āptokta-jñāna* is one of the causes of *śābda-bodha*; for that would either mean that the Vedic sentences are only repetitive (*anuvādaka*) by nature or that *āptokta-jñāna* is an additional cause of the *śabda-bodha* occurring due to a secular sentence only at the cost of violating the law of parsimony.[2]

Thus the situation is such that despite the negation of *āptokta-jñānā* i.e., in the face of *āptokta-jñānā'bhāva, śābda-bodha* admittedly occurs in the case of a Vedic sentence and in the case of secular sentence *śabda-bodha* is found to occur in the face of doubt in respect of the said *jñāna. Aptokta-niścaya,* therefore, cannot be reasonably held to be a cause of *śabda-bodha* in any case[3], argues Jagadīśa.

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1. साकांक्षत्वादिधीरिव वाक्यार्थगोचरयथार्थज्ञानवदुक्तत्वरूपस्याप्तोक्तस्यापि निश्चयः शाब्दधीहेतुरतो नैकपदार्थधर्मिकोऽपरपदार्थस्यान्वयबोधोऽनुमितिः, सिद्धिसत्त्वे विनाऽनुमित्सां तदसम्भवात्, परन्त्वनुमितेरन्य एव, किन्त्वसौ गृहीतग्राहित्वान्न प्रमा । श. श. प्र. p. 20.

2. अन्यथा वेदस्याप्यनुवादकतापत्तेः, न हि लौकिके तत्त्वेन ज्ञातवाक्येन जनित एवान्वयबोधे तस्य हेतुत्वं, गौरवात् । ibid., p. 22–23.

3. अतएवाऽऽप्तोक्तस्य संशये व्यतिरेकनिश्चये वाऽन्वयबुद्धेरनुत्पादादवश्यं तन्निश्चयस्तत्र हेतुरित्यपि प्रत्युक्तम्, असिद्धेः । ibid., p. 23.

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The Mīmāṁsakas argue that *tātparya-jñāna* is an acknowledged cause of *śābda-bodha* on the ground of which *śābda-bodha* will stand distinguished from *anumiti*; for it is on this score that *śābda-bodha*, will come out to be what 'deduces the deduced' negating the possibility of *anumiti* thereby.[1]

As for the *tātparya-jñāna* being recognised as a cause of *śābdabodha*, the Mīmāṁsakas point out that but for *tātparya-jñāna* or in case the said *jnāna* is oriented otherwise, the 'desired' *śābda-bodha* does not occur. *Ghaṭam*, the sentence, they argue, is 'uttered' with a view to causing the verbal knowledge of *ghaṭa-niṣṭha-karmatā*[2], but in case the hearer of the sentence fails to comprehend the purpose of the said sentence i.e., the idea that *karmatā* is to be pertaining to *ghaṭa* (*ghaṭīya-karmatā*) as *ghaṭa* or if he comprehends it otherwise i.e., *karmatā* pertains to something else than *ghaṭa*, the said verbal knowledge does not occur to him.[3]

Tātparya-jñāna has been recognised as a cause of *śābda-bodha* by the logicians too. *Prakaraṇas* vary with every individual situation and as such in ascribing causality thereto in respect of *śābda-bodha*, complexity (*gaurava*) is bound to occur. As for the idea of explaining *prakaraṇa* as what determines the purport of (the speaker of the) sentence (*tātparya-nīyāmakatvena*), and thus freeing the *prakaraṇa* of the faults that it otherwise leads to, the logicians argue that in that case

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1. ननु माभूदाप्तोक्तत्वस्य निश्चयानुरोधेन सिद्धसाधनं तात्पर्यस्य तु स्यात्, तन्निश्चस्याऽन्वयधीहेतुत्वात्। ibid., p. 24.
2. घटनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपित-कर्मतानिरूपित-विशेष्यताकबोधो भवत्विती च्छ्यो-च्चरितम्।
3. अन्यथा घटकर्मत्वादिपरत्वाभावस्य घटकर्मत्वाद्यन्यमात्रपरत्वस्य वा निश्चयेऽपि घटमित्यादिवाक्यात् कर्मत्वं घटीयमित्याद्यन्वयबोधापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 24.
   The Mīmāṁsaka view may be summed up like this :
   —शाब्दज्ञानं तात्पर्यज्ञानजन्यम्, तात्पर्यव्यतिरेकज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्न-प्रतिबध्यत्वात्।

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the inevitability of *tātparya-jnāna* as a factor of *śābda-bodha* gets much the more established and that in view of the law of parsimony it is more reasonable to accept *tātparya-jñāna* instead of the knowledge of what determines the *tātparya* or *prakaraṇa* as the cause of *śābda-bodha.*[1] But for *tātparya-jnāna, lakṣaṇā* too loses its ground, they point out.[2]

Jagadīśa points out that the reasons adduced in favour of *tātparya* as against *prakaraṇa* are not convincing; *śābda-bodha* in each individual case would need the knowledge of the corresponding individual *tātparya,* so to say. The verbal knowledge of *ghatīya-karmatva* could come to occur only if the *tātparya-jñāna* comes to be of the kind that 'the sentence in question viz, *ghaṭam* has been uttered with the desire that may it cause the verbal knowledge of *ghaṭīya-karmatva*' (*ghaṭaprakāraka-karmatva-viśeṣyatāka-bodhecchayoccaritam idam vākyam*).

Not only that : The *tātparya-jñāna* as such is not ever responsible for *śābda-bodha* as such. It must be of the kind that the sentence concerned is uttered now with the intention that may it lead to the said kind of verbal knowledge. A sentence comprising of words of the same sequence uttered long back and the knowledge of the purport thereof (*tātparya-jñāna*) having come to have occured then, cannot lead to a situation that the same sentence uttered long after would lead to the desired *śābda-bodha* with the help of the same old *tātparya-jñāna. Tātparya,* therefore, like *prakarṇa* comes to vary with each individual case. As such, on the score of *prakarṇas* being of the manifold nature, the knowledge thereof cannot be reasonably discarded in favour of *tātparya-jñāna.* In other words, if in ascribing causality of *śābda-bodha* to *prakarṇa-jñāna,*

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1. न च तात्पर्यग्राहकाणां प्रकरणादीनामेव शाब्दबोधे कारणत्वमस्त्विति वाच्यम् । तेषामननुगमात् । तात्पर्यज्ञानजनकत्वेन तेषानुगमे तु तात्पर्यज्ञानमेव लाघवात् कारणमस्तु । न्या. सि. मुक्तावली on का. p. 84.

2. लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धस्तात्पर्य्यानुपपत्तितः । ibid., का. 82 (मुख्यार्थबाध cannot be the determining factor of लक्षणा for in 'काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम्' there is no मुख्यार्थबाध).

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it is so objected that there arises the fault of imagining *ananta-kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*, there is no escape therefore even in contemplating *tātparya-jñāna* as the cause of *śābda-bodha*.

But even then if causality is to be ascribed to any one of them, it is reasonable to hold that the individual knowledges that go to occasion the inference of the individual *tātparyas prakaraṇa-jñānas* i.e., the individual *prakarṇa-jñānas* are the causes of individual *śābda-bodhas* in view of their severally being the invariable antecedents thereof. It is because of this that even is respect of a sentence like *Saindhavam ānaya* the knowledge of its being uttered with a view to causing the verbal knowledge of salt, is not the cause of the verbal knowledge of salt; on the contrary, it is the knowledge of the *bhojana-prakaraṇa* leading to the inference of the said purport (*tātparya*), that occasions the said verbal knowledge.

As a matter of fact, according to the logicians, *tātparya-jñāna* is a factor in *śābda-bodha* only in view of the fact that it presents the *nirūpyanirūpaka-bhāvā'panna-viṣayatā* involved in a sentence. In a sentence like *ghaṭam*, for example, there are only two words—*ghaṭa* and *am* meaning *ghaṭa* and *karmatva* respectively and it is through *tātparyajñāna* that *ghaṭa-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpita-karmatā-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā* comes to be comprehended. But *tātparya-jñāna* has nothing to do with the *ekapadārtha-viśiṣṭā'-para-padārtha-rūpa-śābda-bodha*.

It may be further pointed out that if by *tātparya-jñāna* is meant *'tat-pratītīcchayā tād-uccaritatava-jñāna*, or the knowledge that the sentence in question has been uttered with the intention that it should cause the specific kind of a verbal knowledge, then what it comes to mean is that prior to *śabda-bodha*, the hearer of the sentence has comprehended that the speaker

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1. तथाच तत्तद्धेतुभूतानां प्रकरणज्ञानाभिधानामेव विज्ञानव्यक्तीना तथात्व-मुचितम् अवश्यक्लृप्तपूर्ववर्तिताकत्वात्। अत एव सैन्धवमानय इत्यादावपि लवणपरत्वधीर्न लवणान्वयबुद्धौ हेतुः, किन्तु तदर्जकत्वेनाभिमतं भोजनादि-प्रकरणस्य प्रतिसन्धानमिति न्यायसिद्धान्तः। श. श. प्र. pp. 26–27.

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has the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha*). In the case of a sentence like *gaur asti*, therefore, the *tātparya-jñāna* may be described as—*'astitva-niṣṭha-samavāyasambandhā'-vacchina-prakāratā-nirūpita-go-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatāka-bodho bhavatvitya-cchayoccaritatva-prakāraka-vākyaviśeṣytākam jñānam.'*

The contents of *tātparya-jñāna*, therefore, are *astitva-niṣṭha samavāya-sambandhā'vacachinna - prakāratā-nirūpita-go-niṣṭha-viśe-ṣyatā-ka-bodho bhavatvicchayoccaritatva*—the *prakāra* and *vākya*, the *viśeṣya* and *svarūpa*, the *saṁsarga*, involved as against *astitva* —the *prakāra*, *gau*– the *viśeṣya* and *samavāya*—the *saṁsarga* the contents of the *vākyārtha-jñāna* or the *śābda-bodha* intended to be caused by the sentence—*gaur asti*. Prior to the *śābda-bodha*, the meaning of the sentence that is supposed to have been comprehended by the hearer of the sentence—*gaur asti* by way of *tātparya-jñāna*, therefore, does not mean that the contents of the knowledge to be caused by the sentence—*gaur asti* have been comprehended by him; on the contrary, what have come to be comeprehended by him are but the contents of the *tāt-parya-jñāna-vākya*. The argument, therefore, that *tātparya-jñāna* leads to the comprehension of what the sentence involved is to mean, a fact that may be regarded to be involving *siddha-sādhantā* or deducing the deduced' which is a fault in the context of inference on ground of which *śābda-bodha* is sought to be established as a distinct instrument of knowledge falls through.

If again *tātparya* is defined as *vākyārtha-pratīti-janakatayā-bhipretatva*[1] and in which case *vākyārtha* by way of being the *avacchedaka* or the determinant of *tātpraya-jñāna* (and thus to that extent a constitinent thereof) *vākyārtha* comes to get itself projected by way of a content of the *tātparya-jñāna*, prior to the *śābdabodha* to occur, laying bare the fact that *śābda-bodha* involves *siddha-sādhantā* which is regarded as a *doṣa* or fault in in the context of inference.

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 27.

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Jagadīśa refutes all such arguments. He points out that in the case of a sentence uttered by a parrot (*śuka*) inspite of the knowledge that the sentence is without a purport (i.e. inspite of *tātparyya-jñāna-bhāva*) the usual *śābda-bodha* occurs. In the case of a poetic expression like *gato'stamarkaḥ*, in the same manner, it is clear that the purport of the sentence is to indicate *abhi-sārasamaya* or the time of dalliance, but that does not mean that the sentence is not to impart the primary meaning viz. the fact of sun-set. It is obvious, therefore, that *śābdabodha* is liable to occur without a *tātparyya-jñāna* and even in the face of a *tātpryya-jñāna* to the contrary—a fact of inconstancy (*vyabhicāra*) on grounds of which *tātparyya-jñāna* can not be regarded a cause of *śābda-bodha*—Jagadīśa concludes.[1]

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1. कविवाक्यानामन्यार्थमात्रपरत्वस्य शुकादिवाक्यानाञ्च स्वार्थपरत्वाभावस्य निश्चयेऽपि कुतः सामाजिकादेरन्वयानुभावोत्पत्त्या व्यभिचारादित्यास्तां विस्तरः। श. श. प्र. p. 29.

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CHAPTER II

THE CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS

Verbal knowledge, it has been seen, comprehends the meanings presented by words used in the form of a sentence. A sentence again is what is but the collocation of words that are used in juxtaposition and are mutually expectant and the meanings that they present are competent of mutual relation. Verbal knowledge, therefore, comes to be rooted in the words possessed of the aforesaid virtues. The other way round, the words come to be meaningful only by way of presenting their individual meanings in the context of the verbal knowledge to occur. The words, however, can not present their individual meanings in isolation. In the context of verbal knowledge, therefore, a word is understood to be meaningful only in case it happens to present its individual meaning severally, in association with some other kind of word used in juxtaposition therewith, ultimately leading to the comprehension of the said meaning by the verbal knowledge to occur as caused by a sentence of which it is a constituent.[1]

Jagadīśa holds that such words may be put under three categories—viz *prakṛti*, or the radicals, *pratyaya* or the suffixes and *nipāta* or the particles.[2]

He obviously discards the older classification of such words into *nāma* or nominals, *ākhyāta* or verbs, *upasarga* or prepositions and *nipāta* and conjunctions. By *prakṛti* therefore

1. शब्दान्तरमपेक्षयैव सार्थकः स्वार्थबोधकृत्। श. श. प्र. कारिका, 6.
2. प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययश्चैव निपातश्चेति स त्रिधा। op. cit.

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he seeks to mean the nominals and the root-verbs; by *pratyayas*—the *sup-vibhaktis* or case-terminations, the *tiñ-vibhaktis* or the verbal terminations, the *kṛt-pratyayas* or the primary suffixes, the *taddhita-pratyayas* or the secondary suffixes and the other *pratyayas*; and by *nipātas* he means *upasargas* too.

Some of these words again in association with another kind of word individually presents their own meanings denoted by themselves through a single faculty (of import or of implication), to be projected in the verbal knowledge to occur. Words like *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* and like other nominals, the case-terminations, the verbal terminations, the particles like *ca* and so on are the so many instances in point.

Some other words, however, like *pāka*, *pācaka* and so on in association with other kind of word or words individually do not present their meanings denoted by themselves through a single such faculty; on the contrary, they present the meanings denoted by the constituents thereof through more than one faculty involved.[1] The word *pāka*, for example, is constituted of *paci-dhātu* and the *ghañ-pratyaya*, meaning *pāka-kriyā* and *bhāva* or the abstract notion respectively through their individual faculty of import by virtue of which the word *pāka* comes to mean the abstract notion of the act of cooking (*pāka-kriyā-bhāva*). It is, however, to be noted that although in the context of verbal knowledge, a word is to present its individual meaning in association with another kind of word or words, *ghaṭaṃ* presents its meaning even without the association with *ānaya* the other kind of a word, for *ghataṃ* is not a *pada* but a *vākya* or sentence according to the logicians.[2]

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1. यादृशः शब्दः शब्दान्तरं सहकृत्यैव स्वस्य स्वघटकस्य वा वृत्युपस्थाप्य-यादृशार्थावगाहिबोधं प्रत्यनुकूलः स तथाविधार्थे सार्थकः । श. श. प्र. p. 30.
2. (पदवाचकाद्याः प्रकृत्ययः)……नियमत; शब्दान्तरं सहकृत्य जनयन्ति; वाक्यानि पुनरसहकृत्यैव । श. श. प्र. p. 30.

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A word like *śaśa-viṣāṇa*, then, should be held to be a meaningful (*sārthaka*) word in view of the fact that it could fairly present the meaning of *śaśīya-viṣāṇa* or the 'horns of a hare' in so far as the said word through two constituents thereof presents the said meanings through the individual faculty of import and of implication respectively and the said meaning is liable to be projected in a verbal knowledge to be caused by the word *śaśa-viṣāṇa* in association with another kind of word (say a *sup-vibhakti*) or, in other words, by a sentence composed of the said word as a component thereof. Jagadīśa welcomes this objection.

But as the meanings of the said two constituents are incompetent to bear out a co-ordinated meaning as such, the word does not come to be really meaningful.[1]

As for the conjugational transformations like *śap*, *śyan* and the like, the augments like *num* (in *narān*, for example), Jagadīśa observes that although they help the radicals like the root-verb *bhū* or the nominal *nara* in the matter of bearing out the verbal knowledges of what these radicals denote in association with a case-termination or a verbal termination as the case may be, they are not to be regarded as meaningful (or *sārthaka*) words in view of the fact that they have no meanings of their own.[2]

Similarly in '*putro vaḥ*' although the substitute *vas* presents the meaning *sambandha* or relation in association with *putra* another kind of word to bear out the verbal knowledge thereof, it is not a meaningful word

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1. शशविषाणादिकं शब्दोऽपि शशीयत्वादिनाविषाणादेरन्वयमादधा-नस्तादृश विषयताकबोधने सार्थक एव; परन्त्वयोग्यः। ibid., p. 30–31.

2. शप्श्यनादिविकरणोनुमादयागमश्चऽन्वयबोधने सहायोऽपि न स्वार्थोपस्थितिद्वारा, येन तमादाय चतुरादिविधः सार्थकः स्यात्। ibid., p. 31.

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for the meaning that it presents is not denoted by itself but by the *vākya* or sentence–*yuṣmākaṃ*.[1]

Words like *nibha*, *nikāśa* and so on also are not to be regarded as meaningful (*sārthaka*) words although they have their own meanings and they in association with some other kind of word present the said meanings viz., *sādṛśya* or similarity to be projected in the verbal knowledge to be caused by a sentence of which the said word is component; since by a meaningful word in the context of verbal knowledge is to be understood a word that is other than those which by virtue of being a member of a compound only could cause the verbal knowledge of the denoted meanings thereof.[2]

These words are to bear out the verbal knowledge of what they denote only by way of being a member of a compound and not otherwise and as such they are not to be treated as so many meaningful words although they happen to fulfil all the conditions laid down for a word to be regarded meaningful in the context of verbal knowledge as such.

The Radical Kind of a Word (*Prakṛti*) :

Of the three kinds of meaningful words, the Radical has been defined as a word, the knowledge of which as of being possessed of by some other kind of a word through '*svā'vyavahitottaratva-sambandha*' is the cause of the verbal knowledge of the meaning of itself not qualified by the meaning of other kind of a word used in juxtaposition. Words like '*bhū*', '*pata*' and the like, only when are known to be possessed of by the terminations suffixed thereto through the *svā'vya vahitottaratva-sambandha* that they come to cause the verbal knowledge of *janana* or being or *vasana* or cloth

1. Ibid., p. 31.
2. सदृशार्थे प्रकृत्यादिभ्यो भिन्नेषु निभनिकाशादिशब्देष्वतिप्रसङ्गस्तु समासान्तर्गतत्वनियतस्वार्थबोधकताकान्यत्वेन विशेषणाद्वारणीयः। ibid., pp. 32–33.

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projected as features against *kartṛtva* or *karmatva*–the respective substantives.[1]

It is to be noted that the suffixes cause the verbal knowledge of numerals (*saṁkhyā*), of time (*kāla*) or of the state of being conducive to welfare or rather the state of being an instrument of welfare (*iṣṭāsādhanatā*) as are denoted by them, not qualified by the meanings of words of other kinds, used in juxtaposition, themselves being not known as of being possessed of by some other kind of word through *svā-'vyavahitottaratva-sambandha*. In *caitraḥ pacati* or *yajeta*, although the knowledge of the suffixes—*su*, *ti* or *ta* as of being possessed of by some other kind of word through the said relation is wanting, the verbal knowledges of *ekatva*—the numeral, *vartamānatva*—the time and *iṣṭasādhanatva* posited as the feature against *caitra*, *pāka* and *yāga* respectively occur.[2]

Words like *pāka* and the like are to be regarded as so many Radicals as has been pointed out earlier; for it is the knowledge of these words as of being possessed of *sup-vibhaktis* and the like other kinds of words through *svā-'vyavahitottarat.a-sambandha* that comes to cause the verbal knowledge of what the constituents of these words denote unqualified by the meaning of the word of a different kind used in juxtaposition.[3]

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1. श. श. प्र. कारिका. Vide also the Vṛtti thereon ibid pp. 33–35.
2. प्रत्ययास्तु पदार्थान्तरानवच्छिन्नस्यापि स्वार्थस्य संख्याकालेष्टसाधनत्वादेरन्वयबोधं प्रत्यनिश्चिता अप्युपयुज्यन्ते, चैत्रः पचति यजेतेत्यादौ शब्दान्तरधर्मिकसुवादिनिश्चयस्यासत्वेऽपि तदर्थस्यैकत्व वर्त्तमानत्वेष्टसाधनत्वादेश्चैत्रपाक-यागदावन्वयात्। श. श. प्र. p. 35.
3. स्वान्यवहितोत्तरत्वसंसर्गेण यादृशशब्दवत्ताया निश्चय एव तदुपस्थाप्ययादृशार्थप्रकारकान्वयबोधं प्रति हेतुस्तादृशस्यैव शब्दस्य प्रकृते यथाविधः स्वार्थः। स च पाकेत्यादेः शक्यादिविरहेऽपि पचनादिरूप सुवच एव, पचनादेः कर्मत्वादावन्वयबोधं प्रत्यमादिधर्मिकतादृशशब्दवत्तायाः निश्चयस्यैव हेतुत्वात्। ibid., pp. 35–36.

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In *'bahuguḍo drākṣā'*, the word *'bahuc'* is the Suffix (*pratyaya*) kind of word and although towards the verbal knowledge of what it itself denotes viz., 'slightly less than full' posited as the feature against the word-meaning *drākṣā* it is the knowledge of the word *bahuc* as of being possessed of by *guḍa*, the word of another kind that is to be regarded as the cause, but still as the meaning that it presents is other than a numeral and the like and thus is not unqualified by the meaning of a word used in juxtaposition (i.e. *guḍa*) the definition of the Radical kind of a word does not over-extend thereto.[1]

If the word *bahuguḍa* itself were to be regarded as a Radical kind of word, then it is the knowledge of the word *bahuguḍa* formed of the primary suffix *'Ka'* as of being possessed of *sup-vibhakti* another kind of a word that would bear out the verbal knowledge in question[2] and not the knowledge of the word *bahuc* being possessed of by the word *guḍa* through the said relation to establish the Radical nature of the word *bahuc* in any case.[3]

Hence the definition of the Radical kind of a word should not over-extend to the words like *nibha* or *kāra* in *candranibho'yam* or *kumbhakāro'yam* and the like, meaning

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1. बहुगुडो द्राक्षेत्यादावीषदसमाप्तत्वादिरूपस्य स्वार्थस्य द्राक्षादावन्वयबोधं प्रति गुडादिपदधर्मिकः स्वोत्तरत्वसम्बन्धेन बहुजादि-प्रत्ययस्य निश्रय एव हेतुरपि न पदार्थान्तरानवच्छिन्नस्य तादृशस्वार्थस्य द्राक्षादावन्वयबोधकः, प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्नस्यैव संख्याविभिन्नस्य...अन्वयबोधकत्व-व्युत्पत्तेः। ibid., pp. 36–37.

2. कर्तृदादावन्वयबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तेः। ibid., p. 37.
Although the text reads कर्तृकृदादावन्वयबोधव्युत्पत्तेः, कृष्णकान्ती prefers the reading कृदादावन्वयबोधव्युत्परोः। cf. "कृदादाविस्येव पाठः कर्तृकृदादाविति पाठः प्रामादिकः। ibid., p. 37.

"ननु बहुगुड इत्यस्य प्रकृत्यन्तरस्वस्वीकारे नैष दोष इत्यत आह-कर्तृकृदादाविति। स्वोत्तरवर्त्तिसुवादिधर्मिकस्वप्रकारकनिश्चयस्यैव तादृशबोध-हेतुत्वादिति भावः।" कृष्णकान्ती on ibid., p. 37.

3. अतो नाम्नः प्राग्विहिते बहुचि न प्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 37.

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sadṛśa and *katṛ* respectively; for these meanings are not left unqualified by the meaning of the words preceding the words denotative thereof, in the context of the verbal knowledges to occur.[1]

The word '*eva*' will not come under the category of the Radical kind of words at least in so far as one of the meanings that it denotes viz., *anya-yoga-vyavaccheda* inasmuch as in a sentence like—*Pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ*, the said meaning of the word *eva* as qualified by the meaning of the other kind of a word viz., *pārtha* has come to be presented in the verbal knowledge occuring due thereto.[2]

Jagadīśa welcomes this objection. The Radical kind of a word is as a rule used as of ending in a termination in the context of verbal knowledge—argues Jagadīśa and there is no proof that the word *eva* ever ends in a termination.[3]

At this, the old school of Grammarians argue[4] that in *pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ* the word *eva* alone may be regarded to be denotative of *pārthānyayoga-vyavaccheda*, the word *pārtha* merely being what signifies the speaker's intention (*tātparyya-gṛāhaka*) or having been used only by way of imparting a

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1. न वा चन्द्रनिभोऽयं कुम्भकारोऽमित्यादौ सदृशकर्त्ताद्यर्थके-निभकारादौ पूर्वपदार्थावच्छिन्नस्यैव सदृशाद्यर्थस्य बोधकतायास्तत्रव्युत्पन्नत्वात् ।" ibid., p. 37.

2. न चैवमेवकारादेरन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदाद्यर्थे प्रकृतित्वं न स्यात्, पार्थ एव धनुर्धर इत्यादौ पार्थादिपदार्थविशेषितस्यैव तादृशस्वार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति हेतुत्वादिति वाच्यम् । ibid., pp. 37–38.

3. इष्टत्वात् । प्रकृतेः स्वोत्तरविभक्तिसाकांक्षसजातीयत्वनियमात्, एवकारादेश्च सविभक्तिकत्वे एव प्रमाणाभावात् । ibid., p. 38.

4. ये तु मन्यन्ते—पार्थान्ययोगत्वावच्छिन्नव्यवच्छेदस्यैव तत्रैवकारार्थत्वं तादृशार्थबोधने तात्पर्य्यग्राहकत्वेन शवादिवदाकांक्षासम्पादकत्वेनैव वा पार्थादिशब्दस्योपयोगादेवकारादिनिपातः प्रकृतिरेव, तस्य च लुप्तविभक्तिकत्वेन तादृशविभक्त्यंश एव तन्निश्चयस्य पार्थान्ययोगत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नव्यवच्छेदकरूपस्वार्थान्वयबोधं प्रति हेतुत्वम्—इति । ibid., pp. 38–39.

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valid sequence and it has no meaning of its own like the conjugational transformation like *śap* and the like used in words like *pacati*. At the same time, the word *eva* is to be imagined as of having ended in a case-termination gone elided. As a result, it is pointed out that the knowledge of the word *eva* as of being possessed of by another kind of a word viz., a case-termination bears out the verbal knowledge of *pārthā'-nya-yoga-vyavaccheda* or what is denoted by the word *eva* unqualified by the meaning of the word *pārtha* used in juxtaposition. The word *eva* therefore should be regarded as an instance of Radical kind of word, the Grammarians hold.

Jagadīśa points out that in that case, the word *eva* has to be conceived as of ending in the first case-termination; for in matters of doubt the first case-termination is provided for ultimately.[1] The word *pārtha* and the word *eva*—both—come to end in the first case-ending in that case providing scope for the syntactical relation of the meanings of the said two words being effected through the relation of identity (*abheda-sambandha*). On the contrary, if the word *pārtha* is taken to be a mere *tātparyya-grāhaka*, then the said word having presented no meaning whatsoever, there is no scope for a verbal knowledge to occur, since but for there being more than one word-meaning presented by words, no verbal knowledge occurs. In such a situation, if it is so preferred that let the word *pārtha* be not held as totally meaningless so that the verbal knowledge may occur and if it is so held that although a *tātparyya-grāhaka*, it also means *Arjuna*, then the syntactical relation of the two word-meanings have to be admitted as of having been effected through the relation of identity while the verbal knowledge expected is of the said two word-meanings related through the relation of non-identity[2] in view of the knowledge of compatibility involved.

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1. अपादान-सम्प्रदानकरणाधारकर्मणाम् ।
कर्त्तुश्चान्योन्यसन्देहे परमेकं प्रवर्त्तते ॥
2. तेषां मते पार्थ एवेत्यत्र पार्थैवकारार्थयोर्भेदेनानुभविकस्यान्वयबोधस्यापलापप्रसङ्गः, प्रसङ्गश्च तयोरभेदेनान्वयस्य । ibid., p. 39.

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It may be argued that the very knowledge of compatibility will stand in the way of the verbal knowledge of the said two word-meanings related through the relation of identity and thus the verbal knowledge of the said word-meanings related through a relation of non-identity will occur without any difficulty.

But what will happen in the case of '*vyavaccheda eva*'? For if *vyavaccheda* in addition to its being a *tātparyya-grāhaka* is to mean *vyavaccheda* and the word *eva*, *anya-yoga-vyavaccheda*, the verbal knowledge is to be *vyavacchedā'nya-yoga-vyavaccheda* which obviously involves *ārthikā'bhedānvaya* or the verbal knowledge of the word-meanings identically related by way of implicaion.[1]

As against the view of these old Grammarians, there is an opinion that words like *eva* are as meaningless as the so many affixes (*upasargas*) and that they merely signify that the word used in juxtaposition therewith is to imply by way of a conventionally accepted usage, the meaning like *tadanya-yoga-vyavaccheda* and so on.[2]

Jagadīśa discards this opinion with the observation that it has to stand the test of scrutiny as yet.[3] The idea is that in the *Amarakośa*—the lexicon, the word—*eva* has been held to be denotative of *vyavaccheda* and the like other meanings, and so it is unreasonable to consider it meaningless a word or a word devoid of any power of denotation in view of the fact that lexicon is one of the sources through which the knowledge in respect of the faculty of import of a word is held to

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1. तथा व्यवच्छेद एवेत्यादावपि प्रातिपदिकार्थयोरभेदान्वये तन्त्रस्य नाम्नोः समानविभक्तिकत्वस्यानपायादिति। ibid., p. 40.
2. यत्तु-उपसर्गाणामिवैवकारादिनिपातानामपि न प्रकृतित्वम्, निरर्थकत्वात्, परन्तु समभिव्याहृतपार्थादिपदानां तदन्ययोगव्यवच्छिन्नादिलक्षणायां निरूढत्व-सम्पादकत्वमात्रम्। ibid., p. 40.
3. तच्चिन्त्यम्। ibid., p. 40.

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occur.[1] Moreover, if in respect of the word *eva*, such a theory is admitted, then in regard to any word it may be reasonably applied with the result that words like *ghaṭa* and the like will come out to be devoid of any power of denotation.[2] Not only that. In '*pācaka eva*', *pācaka* being a sentence the said theory would come out to be inoperative.[3]

All said and done, the aforesaid definition of Radical kind of word is still likely to over-extend to a word like *sarasi* in *sarasija*; for it is the knowledge of the word *sarasi* as of being possessed of by the root-verb—*jan*—a word of another kind that causes the verbal knowledge of what itself denotes viz., *sarovṛttitva* or the state of abiding in water (featuring against what the word *jan* denotes and thus left) unqualified by the meaning of the word used in juxtaposition therewith.[4]

Jagadīśa, therefore, suggests an alternative definition.[5] He says that a word is to be treated as the Radical kind of word only in case the categorical knowledge of such word as of being possessed by a word of some other kind through the relation of *svā-'vyavahitottaratva* comes out to be the cause of the verbal knowledge of what the word in question specifically denotes. In the present case, the verbal knowledge of *sarovṛttitva* or the state of abiding in water (projected by way of the feature) against what the root-verb—*jan* ending in the

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1. अत्रेदं चिन्ताबीजम्—एवकारादेर्व्यवच्छेदादिवाचित्वस्याव्ययवर्गेऽमरसिंहैरभिहितत्वात् तत्र निरर्थकं कोषादेः शक्तिग्राहकत्वात्।" कृष्णकान्ती ibid., p. 40.
2. अन्यथा घटादिशब्दस्यापि निरर्थकत्वापत्तेः तत्समभिव्याहृत-प्रत्ययादेरेव लक्षणासम्भवात्। Ibid., p. 40.
3. पाचक एवेत्यादौ पाचक इत्यस्य वाक्यत्वेन लक्षणाऽसम्भवाच्चेति। रामभद्री० Vide ibid., p. 40.
4. नन्वु सरसिजं पुष्पमित्यादौ शब्दान्तरार्थानवच्छिन्नस्य सरोवृत्तित्वादिरूपस्वार्थस्यान्वयबोधने सरसीत्यादिभागस्य जनधात्वंशे निश्चीयमानस्यैव हेतुत्वात् तस्यापि प्रकृतित्वापत्तिः। रामभद्री vide ibid., p. 41.
5. श. श. प्र. कारिका. 8.

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suffix '*ḍa*' denotes is not caused by the knowledge by the word *sarasi* as of being possessed of by the word—*jan* through the said relation but by the knowledge of the word *sarsarija* as of being possessed of by a *sup* or a case termination—a word of another kind and as such the question of the definition being over-extended to a word like *sarasi* is ruled out.[1]

This alternative definition also enjoys the support of the law of parsimony.[2] It has been seen earlier that to arrest the unwarranted over-extension of the previous definition of the Radical kind of word to a suffix like *bahuc* in '*bahuguḍo drākṣā*', the clause *itarārthā'navacchinne* or not qualified by the word of another kind (used in juxtaposition) had to be inserted in the said definition. Following the principles laid down in the alternative definition it may be pointed out that as for the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the word *bahuc* posited as the feature word *bahu*-against *drākṣā*, it is the knowledge of the *guḍa* as of being possessed of by a *sup* or case-termination—a word of another kind through the relation of *svā-'vyavahitottara-tva* that has come out to be the cause and not the knowledge of the word *bahuc*, the definition *ipso facto* gets arrested from being over-extended even without the insertion of any such clause.[3]

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1. स्वोपस्थाप्ययादृशार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति स्वाव्यवहितोत्तरत्व-संसर्गेण यादृश-शब्दवत्तानिश्चयत्वेन हेतुत्वं तादृश एव शब्दस्तथाविधार्थे प्रकृतिरिति तु फलितार्थः। ibid., p. 41.

   स्वोपस्थाप्यस्यान्वयबोधने यादृशशब्दवत्ता निश्चयत्वेन हेतुत्वं तादृश-शब्दस्यैव प्रकृतित्वं वाच्यम्, तथा च उक्तजनधात्वर्थे सरोवृत्तित्वान्वयबोधं प्रति विभक्त्यंशे सरसिजेशब्दनिश्चयत्वेनैव हेतुत्वात्। रामभद्री Vide ibid., p. 41.

2. बहुगुडो द्राक्षा' इत्यादौ बहुजादिनिश्चयत्वेनाहेतुत्वात् न तत्रातिव्याप्तिः, अतस्तद्वारणार्थमुपात्तं स्वेतरार्थानवच्छिन्नत्वदलं व्यर्थमत आह लाघवा-दिति। रामभद्री Vide ibid. p. 41.

3. बहुगुड़ो द्राक्षेत्यादौ बहुजाद्यर्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति न गुड़ादिपदधर्मिक-बहुजादिनिश्चयत्वेन हेतुत्वमपि तु सुवादिधर्मिक-बहुगुड़ादिपदनिश्चयत्वेन। श. श. प्र. pp. 42–42.

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If such a position is not admitted, i.e., in case for the verbal knowledge of 'the state of being slightly less than *guḍa*', it is not admitted that the knowledge of the word *bahuc* being possessed of by the first case-termination through the relation of *svā-'vyavahitottaratva*, is the cause, then even without the said case-termination suffixed to the word *bahuguḍa* should give the said verbal knowledge which is untenable. Hence the definition of the Radical kind of word does not over-extend to the suffix *bahuc* in an instance like *bahuguḍo drākṣā*.[1]

The Suffix Kind of a Word (Pratyaya):

A word other than the Radical or the particle kind of word endowed with the faculty of communication either by way of denotation or of implication based on the conventionlly accepted usages in respect of certain meaning is to be regarded as the suffix kind of word to be nsed in the sense of the said meaning.[2]

Words like '*sthā*'—a root although is endowed with the faculty of import in respect of the meaning—*sthiti* or abiding and of implication based on conventionally accepted usages in regard to the meaning *prasthāna* or leaving away are not to be considered as so many instances of the suffix kind of word; for these words present the said meanings themselves being the words of the Radical kind. So also the words like *śukla* although denoting *śukla* or whiteness—the attribute or imply by way of a conventionally accepted usage what is possessed of the said attribute and the like are not to be regarded as the suffix kind of words because of the same reason.[3]

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1. अन्यथा केवलादपि बहुगुडादिशब्दात् द्राघादौ बहुजाद्यर्थस्यान्वयबोधापत्तेरिति न तत्र प्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 42.
2. श. श. प्र. कारिका. 9.
   यादृशार्थकप्रकृतिनिपाताभ्यां भिन्नो यादृशार्थे शक्तिनिरूढलक्षणान्यतरात्मकप्रशस्तवृत्तिमान् यादृशः शब्दः स तादृशार्थकप्रत्ययः। ibid., p. 43.
3. शक्त्या निरूढलक्षणया च गुणगुणिनोः स्थितिप्रस्थानयोश्च बोधका अपि शुक्लस्थाप्रभृतयः प्रकृतिभ्यो न भिन्नाः। ibid., p. 44.

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The particle kind of word in the like manner is not to be taken as a suffix in respect of what it comes to mean in the capacity of a particle. The particle '*ca*', for example, means *samuccaya* or aggregation in the capacity of a particle and thus it is not a suffix to be used in the said sense.[1]

The case-terminations, when they mean, themselves are but so many words of the Radical kind[2] as in '*samuccarati suvat*' (or it pronounces like *su*, the first case-termination) the word '*su*' means *su*—the first case-termination itself and is a word of the Radical kind.[3] When however a case-termination like *su* comes to mean *ekatva* or the state of being one—the numeral, it is to be regarded as a word of the suffix kind in asmuch as it is other than the Radical kind of word viz., *eka* to be used in the said sense,[4]

It is to be noted, however, that the third case-termination, for example, might come to imply *karmatva* by way of non-conventional secondary signification and not by way of conventionally accepted usage and as such, it is not to be regarded as a word of the suffix kind in so far as the said meaning is concerned. If, however, the said case-termination is found to be authoritatively used to imply *karmatva*, it is to be understood that the said case-termination implies the said meaning of *karmatva* by way of a conventionally accepted usage and it is on that score that the said case-termination is to be treated as an instance of the suffix kind of word. In '*paśunā rudram yajeta*', for example, the third case-termination is authoritatively used in the sense of *karmatva* and thus does it come to have the faculty of implication based on a conventionally accepted

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1. तथा शक्त्या समुच्चयादिप्रतिपादका अपि चादयो न निपातेभ्यः (भिन्नाः)। ibid., p. 45.
2. सुवादयस्तु स्वपरतायामेव प्रकृतयः। ibid., pp. 44–45.
3. समुच्चरति सुवदित्यादौ स्वपरतायां सुप्रभृतेः। रामभद्री Vide ibid., pp. 45–46.
4. (सुवादयस्तु....) न त्वेकत्वाद्यर्थ। श. श. प्र. p. 45.

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usage[1] in so far as the said meaning is concerned as distinguised from the Radical or the particle kind of a word used in the said sense to be recognised as a word of the suffix kind.[2] As for the rule that Jagadīśa provides to the effect that the suffix kind of word is either to denote or imply its meaning by way of a conventionally accepted usage only and it must not imply anything by way of a non-conventional secondary signification to be recognised as a suffix, he refers to an observation made by Patañjali in his *bhāṣya* on Pāṇini's aphorism—*dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane bahuṣu bahuvacanam.* He says that as on the very power of derivation or etymology *ekavacana* or the singular number is to mean *ekatva* and so on, the said aphorism of Pāṇini's is to be understood to imply that the use of *ekavacana* or *dvivacana* is to be strictly restricted to mean *ekatva* and *dvitva* respectively and in no cnse, the use of *dvivacana* in the sense of *ekatva* will be regarded valid.[3]

The same principle is to be applied to all the other kinds of suffixes viz., the *taddhita* or the secondary suffixes, the *kṛt* or the primary suffixes and the *ākhyāta* or the verbal terminations.[4] Hence in the word *Dākṣī* the *taddhita* suffix *ṇin* in the sense of *apatya* or progeny is not to imply by way of non-conventional significance (*ādhunika-lakṣaṇā*) a country or anything else. So also in the word *bhakṣaka,* the primary suffix is to mean *kartā* or the agent and it is not to

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1. सम्प्रदानं भवेत् कर्म, कर्म स्यात् करणं यजेः इत्यनुशासनस्य निरूढलक्षणाग्राहकत्वात्। Vide कृष्णकान्ती (श. श. प्र.) p. 45.
2. तृतीयादौ कर्मत्वादेः सत्यपि लक्षणा न निरूढा, प्रायशः प्रयोगविरहात्। अतएव यत्रास्ति प्रयोगस्तत्र तृतीयादितोऽपि कर्मत्वादेरवगमः, यथा 'पशुना रुद्रं यजेत' इत्यादौ। श. श. प्र. p. 45.
3. अत एव चान्वर्थबलादेवैकवचनादेरेकत्वादिबोधकत्वप्राप्तौ 'द्व्येकयोर्द्विवनैकवचने, बहुषु बहुवचनमिति' यत पाणिनिः प्राह, तदिदं द्वित्वैकत्वादावेव द्विवचनैकवचनादिनियमार्थमिति फणिभाष्यकृतः, तेन द्वित्वादावपि नैकवचनादिप्रयोगः प्रमाणम्। श. श. प्र. p. 46.
4. तद्धिताख्यातकृतोऽप्येतेन व्याख्याताः। तत्रापि शक्तिवन्निरूढलक्षणाया एव प्रत्ययत्वसम्पादकत्वात्। ibid., p. 46.

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imply a country or the like. Similarly in *pakṣyati* the verbal termination is to mean the futurity in respect of the act of cooking and is not to imply 'presentness' or anything else.[1]

It may be argued that in *jugupsate,* for example, the primary suffix *san* is devoid of any meaning for the meaning intended to be conveyed by it viz. censure has already been presented by the root-verb *gup* to which it has been suffixed and similar is tne case with the suffix *tal* in the word *devatā* and thus the definition given falls short to accomodate such cases.

Jagadīśa, therefore, says that all such suffixes that mean nothing more than what are meant by the Radicals these are suffixed to, to be known as *'svārthika-pratyayas'* are to mean *svarūpa* or self-abstraction and thus there is no incongruity whatsoever.[2]

Suffixes like *ghañ* used in *bhāva-vācya* or an impersonal construction are also be understood to be denotative of *svarūpa* or self-abstraction of what the root-verb denotes[3] and unless such a view is admitted the syntactical relation of *karmatva* to be denoted by *am*—a case-termination in the instance *pākaṃ paśya*, with *pāka*—the meaning of the root-verb *paci* could not be logically justified; for the meaning of a case-termination (*suvartha*) is not held liable to be related syntactically with what a root-verb means (*dhātvartha*). Not only that. Jagadīśa argues that unless the suffixes like *ghañ* used in an impersonal construction are not admitted as being denotative of *svarupa* or self-abstraction, so to say, uses like *'stokaḥ pākaḥ'* could not be held justified inasmuch as *pāka* in that case would come out to be only a *dhātvartha* or the mean-

1. नहि भक्तो दात्रिः पचयतीत्यादौ भक्तणार्दलक्षणया देशाद्यवगमः, कृतादित कस्यापि । ibid., p. 46.
2. स्वार्थिकप्रत्ययमात्रस्य च स्वरूपमर्थः, तेन जुगुप्सते, देवतेत्यादौ सन्तलादौ नाव्याप्तिः । ibid., pp. 46–47.
3. भावविहितानामपि घत्रादीनामुक्तैव गतिः, तत्रापि भावपदार्थस्य धात्वर्थ-स्वरूपपरत्वात् । ibid., p. 47.

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ing of a root-verb which to qualify the word *stoka* should have assumed the neuter gender, singular number and ended in the second case-termination.[1] Similar is the case with the word *avadhi* in the poetic expression *sañcāro*[2] *ratimandirāvadhi* or with the word *stoka* in *bhukti stokāpi yatra na* used by *Yājñavalkya*.[3]

The (old) Grammarians, however, are of the view that words like *stoka* come to take the second case-termination when the meanings thereof are to qualify a *dhātvartha* expectant of the meaning to be presented by a suffix added thereto and not in case they are to qualify a *dhātvarha* only. In *stokaṃ pacati* the meaning of the word *stoka* is to qualify the meaning of the root-verb—*paci*, expectant of the meaning like *kṛti* to be presented by the suffix *ti* giving the verbal knowledge—*stoka-prakāraka-pākānukula-kṛti-mān*. In *stokaḥ pākaḥ* on the contrary, they point out that the verbal knowledge being simply *stoka-prakāraka-pākaḥ*, the *dhātvartha* not being expectant of what the suffix *ghañ* added to the root-verb *paci*, is to mean, the word *stoka* is not to take to the second case-termination and there is also a specific provision to justify such an use, they argue.[4]

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1. अन्यथा 'पाकं पश्येत्यादौ धात्वर्थस्य पचनादेः कर्मत्वादावन्वयानुपपत्तेः सुबर्थे धात्वर्थस्यान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात्। इत्थमेव च 'स्तोकः पाक' इत्यादिप्रयोगस्य परिशिष्टाद्युक्तस्य प्रामाण्यम्। अन्यथा स्तोकादीनां धात्वर्थविशेषणत्वे नियमतो द्वितीयापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 47–48.

क्रियाविशेषणानां कर्मत्वमेकत्वं नपुंसकत्वं च इत्यनुशासनात्। रामभद्री vide ibid., p. 48.

2. ibid., p. 48.

3. yāj. smṛti : vyavahāra, 27.

4. स्वोत्तरप्रत्ययार्थसाकांक्षस्यैव धातोरर्थे विशेषणतापन्नस्य बोधने तदर्थकनाम्नो द्वितीयाद्यपेक्षा, न तु धातुमात्रस्य, तथा च 'स्तोकः पाकः' इत्यादिरेव प्रमाणं, न तु 'स्तोकं पाकः' इत्यादिः, 'अपृथग्रूपक्रियायाः विशेषणं कर्मेत्यनुशिष्टेरपि तत्रैव तात्पर्यात्। ibid., p. 48–49.

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. *Bhartṛhari*[1] is of the view that when a word is dependent upon another in the matter of brining out the verbal knowledge of what it itself denotes, projected by way of the feature against what the other word in question comes to denote, it is the preceding word that comes to be known as the Radical kind of a word and the word following is a suffix. Jagadīśa by way refuting this view of Bhartṛhari points out that such a definition would fall short to accomodate the suffix *bahuc* used in *bahuguḍo drākṣā* and at the same time the definition would go to cover the word *guḍa* involving thereby the fault of unwarranted over-extension thereof.[2]

The definition of the suffix kind of a word given by some Umāpati Sen[3] has also come up for review. According to him a word that is incapable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of what is to be denoted by itself, as unqualified by the meaning of the other kind of a word used in juxtaposition, is the suffix kind of a word.[4] In *pacati* for example, *ti* the suffix is incapable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of *kṛti* the meaning to be denoted by itself, as unqualified by the meaning of the word or rather the root verb *paci*.

Jagadīśa while refuting this view points out that although the definition given by *Umāpati* reasonably accomodates the instances like *ti* in so far as *kṛti*—one of the meanings thereof

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1. यत्तु वाक्यपदीये भर्तृहरिणोक्तम्—
   यः स्वेतरस्य यस्यार्थे स्वार्थान्वयबोधने ।
   यदपेक्षस्तयोः पूर्वा प्रकृतिः, प्रत्ययः परः ॥
   श. श. प्र. p. 49–50.

2. बहुजादावव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्तिप्रसङ्गादुपेक्षितम् । ibid., p. 50.

3. यदपि···हृद्युमापत्युक्तम् । श. श. प्र. p. 50–51.
   उमापतिसेनमतमुपन्यस्य निरस्यति–यदपीति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 50.

4. स्वेतरार्थानवच्छिन्नस्वार्थस्यान्वयबोधने ।
   योऽसमर्थः सैष शब्दः प्रत्ययोऽयम् चतुर्विधः ॥
   श. श. प्र. p. 50.

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is concerned but in respect of the meanings like *vartamānatva* or presentness or *saṁkhyā* or number to be denoted thereby, the said definition falls short to cover *ti* or even the *sup-vibhaktis* or the case-terminations[1], for the verbal knowledge in that case comes to be only *vartamāntva-prakāraka-pāka* and so on.

All said and done, the definition given by Jagadīśa himself has a serious drawback. The definition involves the knowledge of *prakṛti-bheda* for the suffix kind of a word has been defined as what is other than the Radical (*prakṛti*) kind of a word in which case the determinant of the said *bheda* has come to be *prakṛtitva* which not being a universal is admitted to be a complex property (*gurudharma*) and as such the definition militates against the law of passimony.[2]

Hence Jagadīśa suggests an alternative definition[3] of the suffix kind of a word. The suffix kind of a word, he says, is what is other than those that come under the group of the words like *nibha* and the like other particles and which is essentially incapable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of what is denoted by a *tiñ* or verbal termination, projected by way of the feature against what is denoted by itself not qualified by the meaning denoted by the other kind of word used in juxtaposition.

In *caitro'sti* for example, the verbal knowledge is *bhavanā'nukūlakṛtimāñscaitraḥ* in which *kṛti*—the meaning of the *tiñ* has come to be projected by way of the feature against *caitra*. In it the substantive has come to be the meaning of the word *caitra* and the said meaning has been left unqualified by the meaning of a word of the other kind used in juxtaposition.

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1. तदप्युक्तम्, सुप्तिङोः पदार्थान्तरानवच्छिन्नस्वार्थसंख्यादिप्रकारकबोधसमर्थं-त्वेन तयोस्तव्यादौ चाव्याप्तेः। ibid., p. 51.
2. उक्तलक्षणे प्रकृतिभेदस्य निवेशात् प्रकृतित्वस्यातिगुरुत्वाच्च। कृष्णकान्ती p. 51.
3. श. श. प्र. कारिका. 10.

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In other words the substantive has been *itārārthā'-navacchinnaḥ svārthaḥ*. The feature at the same time has come to be *kṛti*—a *tiñnartha* and thus the definition is not going to over-extend to the word *caitra*. Similarly in *yajeta*—the verbal knowledge comes to be *yāgaḥ iṣṭāsādhanam* in which case the substantive comes to be *yāga*—the *dhātvārtha* and it is left unqualified by the meaning of another word used in juxtaposition and what has been projected by way of the feature thereagainst is a *tiñnartha*. The root-verb, therefore, has come out to be *itārārthā'navacchinasvārthe tiñnarthānvaya-bodhanakṣamaḥ* or capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of a *tiñnartha* projected by way of the feature against what is meant by itself, as unqualified by the meaning of the word used in juxtaposition with itself like the word *caitra*. Thus the definition is not going to over-extend to words like *caitra* or *yaji*—the so many Radicals.

The word *ti* or *ta* in *asti* or *yajeta* for example in the aforesaid instances are not what are capable of bearing out a verbal knowledge in which a *tiñnartha* has come to be projected by way of the feature against what these words are to denote, left unqualified by the meaning of a word of another kind used in juxtaposition. In other words, these words have come out to be what may be described as incapable of bearing a verbal knowledge of a *tiñnartha* projected by way of the feature against the meaning of itself left unqualified by what is denoted by a word of another kind used in juxtaposition. The definition, therefore, goes to accomodate these words.

It may be objected that in *pacati* when the verbal knowledge comes to be *vartamāntva-prakāraka-pakāmukūlakṛtimān*, it is obvious that the word *ti* comes to bear out a verbal knowledge which is *tiñnarthaprakāraka-svārtha-viśeṣyaka* in view of the fact that what has come to be projected by way of the feature is a *tiñnartha* viz. *vartamāntva* and what has come to be projected by way of the substantive (it may not be the invariable substantive) is but *kṛti*—the meaning of itself—a *tiñ*.

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Jagadīśa points out that it should be noted that the substantive although is a *svārtha*, it is not left unqualified by the meaning of the word *paci*, a word of another kind used in juxtaposition therewith.

As for the apprehension that the definition might over-extend to words like *nibha* and the like other particles, Jagadīśa points out that such apprehension has been ruled out with the insertion of the clause 'being other than *nibha* and so on' in the definition itself.[1]

The Particle Kind Of Words (Nipāta)

Nipāta or the particle kind of a word is what being other than a case-termination or a verbal termination determined severally, is incapable of occasioning the verbal knowledge of of the meaning of another word, projected by way of the feature against the meaning of itself, left unqualified, through the relation of identily. The words like '*ca*' and the like are the so many instances of *nipāṭa* or the particle kind of words. The word *ca* for example in an instance like *smṛtaśca* is incapable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of *smṛta* or of what is to be denoted by the word *smṛta*—a word, (projected by way of the feature) against what it itself means viz *samuccaya* or aggregation through the relation of *tādātmya* or identily, the verbal knowledge likely to occur as caused thereby is to be effected through a '*bheda-sambandha*' or a relation of non-

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1. यः शब्दः शब्दान्तरार्थाविशेषिते यादृश-स्वार्थे धर्मिणितिङ्र्थस्यान्वयबोधने स्वरूपायोग्यः, स वा निभादिशब्देभ्यो भिन्नस्तादृशार्थे प्रत्यय इत्यर्थः। चैत्रोऽस्तीत्यादावर्थान्तरानवच्छिन्ने स्वार्थे नाम्नां तिङ्र्थान्वयबोधकत्वम्। 'एवं यजेत स्थीयते' इत्यादौ यजादिधातूनाम्। 'पचति' इत्यादौ तिङां 'पाचकोऽस्ति' इत्यादौ कृतां काश्यपिरित्यादौ च तद्धितानाम् प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्न एव स्वार्थे कृत्यादौ तिङ्र्थस्य वर्त्तमानत्वादेर्बोधकत्वं न तु तदनवच्छिन्न इति तेषु नाप्रसङ्गः। निभनिपातादिकस्तु शब्दान्तरार्थानवच्छिन्ने सदृश-समुच्चयादिस्वार्थे तिङ्र्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति स्वरूपायोग्योऽपि निभादिरेवेति न तत्र प्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 51–53.

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identily.[1] It should be noted that if instead of *smṛtaśca, smṛtaḥ samuccayaḥ* is used, the verbal knowledge comes to be *smṛtaśc-āsau samuccayaḥ.* In other words, the word *samuccaya* (used in leiu of *ca*) is found to be capable of bearing out a verbal knowledge of *smṛta*—the meaning of another word identically related to *samuccaya*—the *svārtha* or the meaning of itself.

In *Rāmaśca syāmśca* in the like manner, the verbal knowledge is to be *Rāma-syāma-pratiyogika-samuccayaḥ* involving the relation of *pratiyogikatva*—a *bheda-sambandha* and the word *ca* is to be recognised a particle in that case.

The definition does not over-extend to a root-verb[2] too. In *stokam pacati* for example, the root-verb *paci* is obviously capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of what the word *stoka* means, projected by way of the feature against *pāka* the meaning of itself.

A case-termination or a verbal termination although is incapable of causing a verbal knowledge of what is denoted by another word projected by way of the feature against what is denoted by itself through the relation of identity as in *ghataḥ* or in *pacati,* the verbal knowledges come to be *ghaṭa-niṣṭhaikatva* and *pākānukūla-kṛti* respectively in which *ghaṭa* and *pāka*—the meanings presented by words other than a case-termination and verbal termination respectively come to be projected by way of the feature against what are meant by the said words through *niṣṭhatva* and *anukūlatva* both of which are but so many *bheda-sambandhas* and not the *abheda-sambandha,* these terminations are not to be regarded as so many instances as provided for in the definition by the

1. यः शब्दः केवले यादृशस्वार्थे शब्दान्तरार्थस्य तादात्म्येनान्वयबोधं प्रत्यसमर्थः सुवादिप्रत्ययेभ्यः प्रत्येकं भिन्नः स तादृशार्थे निपातः। चादयोः निपाताः स्वार्थे समुच्चयादौ नामाद्यर्थस्याभेदेनान्वबोधं प्रत्ययोग्याः, न हि स्मृतमनुभूतश्चेत्यादितः कस्यापि स्मृतः समुच्चय इत्यादिरनुभवः, किन्तु स्मृतानुभूतयोः समुच्चय इत्यादिरेव। श. श. प्र. p. 34.
2. स्तोकं पचतीत्यादौ धातुरपि स्वार्थे नामार्थस्य तादात्म्यं बोधयंस्तत्समर्थ एव। ibid. p. 54–55,

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clause *suvādyanyaḥ* or (being) other than *sup* and the like.[1] When the word *ti* in *pacati* comes to mean *vartamāntva*, the relation involved also comes to be a relation of non-identity and the extension of the definition of *nipāta* is arrested in regard to that on the same logic.

It has to be noted, however, that while defining the *pratyaya* or the suffix kind of a word, it has been so observed that a *pratyaya* is other than a *nipāta* and now while defining the *nipātā* kind of a word, it is being said that a *nipāta* is other than a *pratyaya*. There is, therefore, the apparent flaw technically known as *'itaretarāśrya'* or the fault of 'mutual dependence'.

Jagadīśa, therefore, to save this situation indicates that while defining *nipāta* what has been said and meant is that it is other than *sup* and *tiñ* as such and *sup* and *tiñ* as so many *pratyayas*. In other words *sup* and *tiñ* in this context are to be understood as what are determined by *suptva* and *tiñtva* respectively and by *pratyaya-tva*.[2]

The word *ca*, however, when used with a word like *śabda* as in *'caḥ śabdaḥ'* is not to be confused with a *nipāta*[3] for it denotes a word to be identically related to 'a word' or what is meant by the word *śabda*.

How could a word like *purandara* be ever held to be an instance of the particle kind of a word in the face of the fact that it is capable of bearing out a verbal knowledge of what is denoted by another word viz *Indra* projected by way of the feature against what is denoted by itself through the relation of identity ? it may be asked.

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1. सुवाद्यन्यः । श. श. प्र. Kārikā p. 4.
2. सुवादिप्रत्ययेभ्यः प्रत्येकं भिन्नः । श. श. प्र. p. 54.
3. चः शब्द, इत्यादौ नामार्थस्याभेदसाकांक्षश्चकारादिः स्वपरतायां न निपातः, किन्तु नामैव । ibid., p. 55.

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Jagadīśa, therefore, observes that the said word because of its being formed in an irregular way has been held to be a particle in the secondary sense of the term.[1]

It may be argued that in the verse *kārtikyādau yanna dānam tadatyanta-vigarhitam*'[2] the word *nañ* in *yanna* is apparently capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of what is meant by the word—*yat* –a word other than the *nañ*, projected by way of the feature against *abhāva* or what is denoted by itself through the relation of identity and as such it should not be regarded a particle.

Jagadīśa points out that although the word *nañ* is capable of causing such a verbal knowledge, but still as the meaning of *nañ* i.e. *abhāvo* has come to be projected as what is further qualified by some other word-meaning, against which the meaning of the word *yat* has come to be projected by way of the feature, there is no reason to hold that the word *nañ* has come to cause the knowledge of some other word-meaning projected by way of the feature against what is denoted by the word *nañ* as such. The apprehension, therefore, in respect of the said word as used in the said expression, being regarded a particle is unfounded.[3]

Words like *svah, divā; naktam*—the so many indeclinables are but nominals and not particles, in-as-much as in an instance like *sobhanaḥ svaḥ* for example, it is with the meaning of itself the word *svaḥ* that the meaning of another word viz. *sobhanaḥ* comes to be syntactically related by way of identily.[4]

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1. पुरन्दरप्रभृतौ तु नाञ्नि निपातव्यपदेशः सूत्रानिष्पादयत्वप्रयुक्तो भाक्तः। ibid. p. 55–56.
2. Vide ibid. p. 56.
3. कार्त्तिक्यादौ यन्न दानं तदत्यन्तविगर्हितमि'त्यादौ न केवले नञर्थे यदर्थस्य तादात्म्येनाऽन्वयः किन्तु दानाद्यवच्छिन्ने। ibid. p. 56.
4. स्वर्दिवा नक्तमाद्यव्ययमपि नामैव न तु निपातः, शोभनं स्वरित्यादौ तदर्थे नामार्थस्य तादात्म्येनान्वयात्। ibid. p. 56.

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Words like *pra*—the so many prefixes have no meanings of their own. On occasions, however, they are found to be meaningful to be regarded as so many particles.[1]

It is argued that in case the word *nañ* is held to be a *particle* i.e. a word other than what come under the category of Radicals, no case-termination could be suffixed thereto and as such in an expression like '*jātau sattā nāsti*' no verbal knowledge is likely to occur. The logicians are of the view that the meaning of the word ending in the first case-termination is to project by way of the invariable substantive in a verbal knowledge and as such in *jātau sattā nāsti*, the verbal knowledge can not come to be *sattābhāvaḥ jāti-nirūpitādheyatāśrayatāvān* in view of the fact that the word *na* because of its being a particle is devoid of a case-termination like *prathamā*.[2]

Jagadīśa, therefore, says that the verbal knowledge to occur from *jātau sattā nāsti* is *jātinirūpitā'-dhikaraṇatā-nirūpita-vṛttitvābhāvavati sattā*. Questions may arise as to the *prati-yogitāvacchedaka-sambandha*. *Samavāya* can not be the said *sambandha* to give the verbal knowledge of the kind—*jātiniṣṭhādhikaraṇatā-nirūpita-samavāya — sambandhāvacchinna — vṛttitvābhāvavatī sattā*, for nothing abides in a *jāti* through *samavāya*.

Jagadiśa says that the *sambandha* is *samavāya-sambandhāvacchinna-vṛttitva-pratiyogika—svarūpa* which is otherwise[3] described as *samavetatva-nirūpita-svarūpa* and *vṛttitva* or *Jātitva* abides in a *jāti* through the relation of *svarūpa* and as such the specific *svarūpa-sambandha* may be described as *svarūpa-*

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1. प्रादयस्तूपसर्गाः न सार्थकाः, सार्थकाश्चेन्निपाताः अपि। श.श.प्र. p.56-57. प्रकर्षाद्यर्थे प्रादेर्निपातत्वमिष्टमेव। रामभद्री p. 57.
2. ननु नञादिनिपातानां प्रकृत्यन्यत्वे विभक्त्यन्तत्वाभावात् जातौ सत्ता नास्ति इति वाक्यात् सत्ताभावो जातिनिरूपिताधेयताश्रयतावान् इत्यन्वयबोधो न स्यात् नञः प्रथमान्तत्वाभावेन तदर्थे तिङर्थाश्रयत्वलक्षण-भावनाया अन्वयायोगात्। रामभद्री p. 57.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 57.

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sambandhā-vacchinna-pratiyogika-svarūpa and the *samavāya-sambandhā-vacchinna-prati-yogika-svarūpa* comes to be what is known as *vyadhi-karaṇa-sambandha. Vyadhi-karaṇa-sambandhā-vacchinnā-prati-yogikā-bhāva* again being what is called *kevalānvayin* or universally present, the verbal knowledge—*samavāya-sambandhā-vacchinna-vṛtti-tva-prati-yogika-svarūpasambandhā-vacchinna-vṛttitvā-bhāvatī sattā* comes to be effected.[1]

It must not be so insisted upon that in '*jātau sattā nāsti*'-*jāti-nirūpitā*'-*dheyātā*'-*śrayatā-vān sattā-bhāvaḥ*—such a verbal knowledge is a matter of hard experience for there are serious impediments in the face of which the reasonableness of any such experience is ruled out. In *jātau jātī na staḥ* for example, *abhāva* the denotated meaning of *naÑ* can not be syntactically related to what is denoted by the word *staḥ* for the *tiÑ* in *staḥ* denotes *dvitva* or duality while *abhāva* is qualified by *jāti-dvayatva*—a unitary property.[2]

What will to be the kind of the verbal knowledge to be caused by *jātau samavāyena sattā nāsti* ? it may be asked.[3]

Jagadīśa says that here the word *samavāya* is to be understood to imply the meaning of *samavāya-sambandhā-vacchinna-prati-yogika-svarūpa*[4] and the verbal knowledge to occur is to take the form—*samavāya-sambandhā'-vacchinna-prati-yogika-svarūpa-sambandhā'-vacchinna-vṛtti-tvā-bhāvatī sattā*

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1. जातौ सत्ता नास्तीत्यत्र सत्तायां जातिवृत्तित्वस्य समवेतत्व-निरूपितस्वरूप-सम्बन्धेनात्यन्ताभावो नञा प्रत्याय्यते, न तु सत्त्वस्याभावः प्रथमान्तपदानुपस्थाप्यत्वेन नञर्थे तत्रास्तित्वादिक्रियान्वयस्यायोगात्। श. श. प्र. p. 57.
2. जातौ जाती न स्तः इत्यत्र जातिद्वयत्वावच्छिन्नाभावस्यैकत्वेन तत्र तिङ्नर्थद्वित्वस्य पर्याप्तिबाधेनान्वयासम्भवाच्च। ibid. p. 57.
3. ननु समवायेन जातौ सत्ता नास्तीत्यादौ तादृशसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नजातिवृत्तित्वस्याप्रसिद्धया भवदुक्तबोधानुपपत्तिः, अस्मन्मते च तत्र समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-सत्ताभावे जातिवृत्तित्वावगाहे नान्वयानुपत्तिः।
कृष्णकान्ती p. 58.
4. सत्ता समवायेन जातौ नास्तीत्यादौ तु समवेतत्वीयस्वरूपसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वे समवायशब्दस्य लक्षणा। श. श. प्र. p. 58.

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The opponents are of the view that instead of admitting *lakṣaṇā* in the word *samavāya*, it is more reasonable to hold that the first case-termination suffixed to the word *sattā* denotes *pratiyogitva* and the third case-termination in the word *samavāyena* means *avacchinnatva* to give the verbal knowledge *samavāya-sambandhā'-vacchinna-sattā-prati-yogikā'-bhāvaḥ'*.

Jagadīśa disapproves of such a view with the observation that the first case termination does not ever mean *pratiyogitva*.[1]

If *'jātau sattā nāsti'* is held to bear out the verbal knowledge of the kind—*jāti-niṣṭā'-dhikaraṇatā-nirūpitā'-vṛtti-tvā'-bhāva-vatī sattā*, then *'guṇe viśiṣṭa-sattā nāsti'* should give the verbal knowledge—*'guṇa-niṣṭhā-dhikaraṇatā-nirūpitā-vṛtti-tvā-bhāva-vatī viśiṣṭa-sattā'*. But the difficulty is that *sattā* (or *jāti*) inheres in *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* and as such *guṇa-niṣṭha-dhikaraṇatā-nirūpita-vṛttitva* comes to be in *sattā* and *śuddha-sattā* and *viśiṣṭa-sattā* being one *guṇa-niṣṭādhi-karaṇatā-nirūpita-vṛttitva ipso facto* comes to be in *viśiṣṭa-sattā* too. Hence *guṇa-niṣṭhā-dhikaraṇatā-nirūpita-vṛtti-tva* being in *viśiṣṭa-sattā*, a statement like *guṇe viśiṣṭa-sattā nāsti* becomes erroneous. As a matter of fact Jagadīśa is of the view that the expression should be of the form—*viśiṣṭa-sattā-bhāvavān guṇaḥ* instead of *viśiṣṭa-sattā guṇe nāsti*.[2]

According to others, however, the statement—*viśiṣṭa-sattā guṇe nāsti* comes to be fairly valid if the *prati-yogitā'-vacchedaka-sambandha* comes to be *'viśiṣṭa-sattā-tvā-vacchinna-prati-yogika-samavāya'* instead of mere *samavāya*.[3]

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1. परेषामपि सत्ताभावस्य समवायावच्छिन्नत्वासम्भवेन समवायावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकत्वे तल्लक्षणायाः आवश्यकत्वात्। प्रथमार्थप्रतियोगित्वे समवायावच्छिन्नत्वस्य तत्रान्वय इति साहसम्, प्रथमायाः प्रतियोगितार्थकस्य क्वचिदप्यकल्पनात्। ibid. p. 58–59.
2. स्वमते विशिष्टसत्ता न गुणवृत्तिरितिवत् विशिष्टसत्ता गुणे नास्तीति वाक्यस्याप्रामाण्यमेव, परन्तु विशिष्टसत्ताभाववान् गुण इत्यादिरेव प्रमाणमित्याशयेन यदि प्रमाणमित्युक्तम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 59:
3. तथाच तादृशसम्बन्धेन विशिष्टसत्ता न गुणवृत्तिरितिवत् गुणे विशिष्टसत्ता नास्तीत्यादेरप्यप्रामाण्यं किन्तु विशिष्टसत्तात्वावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिक-समवायसम्बन्धेन तत्प्रमाणमित्याशयेन यदोक्तम्। ibid. p. 59.

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In other words, *guṇa-vṛttitva* may be in *sattā* in case *sattā* is qualified by *sattātva.* In other words, the *adhikaraṇatā* by virtue of which *guṇa* is to function as the locus of *sattā* is to be determined by the *ādheyatā* qualified by *sattā-tva*, i.e. the said *adhikaraṇatā* is to be *sattā-tvā-vacchinnā'-dheyatā-nirūpitā'-dhikaraṇatā* which means that the *nirūpakatā-vacchedaka* of such an *adhikaraṇatā* is *sattā-tvā-vacchinnā-dheyatā* and the *nirūpakatā-vacchedakā-vacchedakata* is *sattā-tva.*

As for *viśiṣṭa-sattā* the said *nirūpakatā'-vacchedaka* is *viśiṣṭa-sattā-tvā'-vacchinnā-dheyatā* and the *nirūpakatā'-vacchedakā-vacchedaka* is *viśiṣṭa-sattā-tva.* Now *ādheyatva* or *vṛttitva* being a category of limited application (*avyāpya-vṛtti*), *guṇa-vṛttitva* may be in *sattā* as qualified by *sattā-tva* while the negation thereof viz. *guṇa-vṛttitvā'-bhāva* may be there in *sattā* as qualified by *viśiṣṭa-sattā-tva.*[1]

Vāsudeva sārvabhauma[3] is of the view that *viśiṣṭa-sattā* is an independent entity by itself and as such the verbal knowledge–*guṇa-niṣṭhā'-dhikaraṇatā-nirūpita-vṛtti-tva-matī sattā* occuring due to the sentence *guṇe sattā asti* can not negate the possibility of the verbal knowledge–*guṇa-niṣṭhā'-dhikaraṇatā-nirūpita-vṛtti-tvā-bhāvatī sattā* to be caused by the sentence—*guṇe viśiṣṭa-sattā nāsti.*[3]

Jagadīśa obviously does not approve of this view as is evident from the manner he has referred to his view.[4] Jagadīśa probably is of the view that in case the situation could be reasonably explained otherwise, there was no need to

1. विशिष्ट सत्ता गुणे नास्तीत्यादिकस्तु प्रयोगो यदि प्रमाणं, तदाधेयत्वस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वादवच्छेदकभेदेन तस्यां गुणवृत्तित्वाभावसत्त्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 59.

2. सार्वभौममतमाह कश्चिदिति। कृष्णकान्ती. p. 59.

3. तथा च तन्मते विशिष्टसत्ता न गुणवृत्तिरितिवत् गुणे विशिष्टसत्ता नास्तीतिवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं सहजत एव स्थास्यतीति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती. p. 59-60.

4. कश्चिदित्यस्वरससूचनाय। ibid. p. 60.

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admit of an independent category like *viśiṣṭa-sattā.* Moreover, the maxim *viśiṣṭaṃ suddhāte nātiricyate* (or the particular is not to transcend the general) loses all its value in that case.[1]

The verse *'na krodho na mātsāryam na lobho nāsūbhā matiḥ/ bhavanti kṛtapuṇyānām bhaktānām puruṣottame//* arouses a peculiar problem. It is suggested that instead of reading thus, the verse could read *'krodho mātsaryam, lobho'śubhā matiśca na bhavanti kṛta-puṇyānām bhaktānām puruṣottame.* In other wouds, it is suggested that a single *nañ* would have been enough to serve the purpose all too well. The verbal knowledge in that case world come to be *krodho mātsaryaṁ lobho' śubhā matiśca bhavana-kartṛtvā'-bhāva-vantaḥ.* The use of *nañ* on the contrary with every individual nominal means that the desired verbal knowledge is *krodhā'-bhāvaḥ, mātsaryā'bhāva, lobhābhāvaḥ aśubhamatyabhāvaśca bhavana-kartāraḥ.*; *abhāva* in that case, the denoted meaning of *nañ* comes to be syntactically related to what is denotated by the verb—*bhavanti.* But this is possible only if *abhāva* comes to be regarded as the denoted meaning of *nañ* ending in the first case-termination but for which the said meaning does not project as the invariable substantive in the resultant knowledge in the view of the logicians, against which *bhavana-kartṛtva* denoted by the verb *bhavanti* is to be projected by way of the feature.[2]

Jagadīśa says that as multiple *nañs* are used in a verse like *na taṁ virincirana bhavo na śrīrnāpi dhanādipaḥ/ dātuma--rhanti vibhavam viṣṇorārādhanena yaḥ//* to give the verbal knowledge—*virinciḥ, bhavaḥ śrih, dhanādhipaḥ*—etc. *dhanam dātum*

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1. स च उत्कर्षोत्थैवातिप्रसङ्गभङ्गे किमतिरिक्तस्वीकारेणेति। एवं विशिष्टस्यानतिरिक्तप्रतिपादकग्रंथस्योन्मत्तप्रलपितत्वापत्तेरिति। ibid. p. 60.
2. ननु न क्रोधो न च मात्सर्यमित्यादौ क्रोधाभावो मत्सर्याभावोऽशुभमत्यभावश्च पुरुषोत्तमभक्तानां भवतीत्यन्वयबोधे नञां प्रथमान्तत्वाभावेन तदर्थे आख्यातार्थद्वारा भवनक्रियान्ययोगात् अवश्यं, नञादिनिपातानां प्रकृतित्वं स्वीकार्यम्। कृष्णकान्ती. p. 60.

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nārhantī, as *virinciviraha bhavaviraha tam dhanam dātumarhanti*—such a verbal knowledge is not possible,[1] So also in the present instance the verbal knowledge would come to be *krodho mātsaryam lobho'śubhā matiśca—ete na bhavanti*—(i.e. *na bhavankartārāḥ*)[2]. Question may arise that if one *nañ* can bring out the said verbal knowledge—all the other *nañs* become redundant in answer to which it may be pointed out that the use of synonyms does not always mean that any one of them is to be regarded redundant.[3]

As for the apprehension that in case the word *na* is not regarded as ending in the first case-termination or that no case-termination is to be affixed thereto, the use like *na te dhanam dharmyam* will come to be grammatically wrong in-as-much as the word *te* has been provided for as a substitute of *tava* only in case the word *tava* happens to be preceded by a *pada* and by *pada* is meant what ends either in a case-termination or a verbal termination, Jagadīśa observes that the word *pada* in the aphorism of Pāṇini[4] in this context stands for a *nipāta* or particle as well.[5]

Words like *nibha* and so on are not to be understood to come under the category of the *nipāta* or the particle kind of words and to exclude these words, the definition of *nipāta* is to be improved upon with the clause 'being other than *nibha* and the like'—the procedure adopted in earlier instances.[6] Under

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1. नहि विरिञ्चिविरहः श्रीविरहः धनपतिविरहश्च ते विभवं दातुमर्हन्तीत्याकारक एवान्वयबोधः तत्र विरिञ्चिविरहादेर्विभवदानस्वरूपायोग्यत्वेन उक्तवाक्यस्य वाधितार्थकत्वापत्तेः। रामभद्री p. 61.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 61.
3. रामभद्री p. 61.
4. पदादपादादौ। Pāṇini. VIII. 17–20.
5. पदात् परस्य युष्मदादेस्ते प्रभृत्यादेशविधौ च पदशब्दः साकांक्षनिपातस्याप्युपलक्षकस्तेन 'न ते धनं धर्म्यमि'त्यादौ न तस्यानुपपत्तिः। श. श. प्र. p. 61–62.
6. सदृशार्थे निभादेर्निपातव्युदासस्तु प्रागुक्तदिशावसेयः। ibid. p. 62.

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the category of *nipāta*, therefore, words like *ca. tu, na, punaḥ, iba, evam, mā, māsma* and so on are to be read.[7]

These three kinds of words viz. the Radical, the Suffix and the Particle kind of words only when formed into a syntactical whole (*eka-vākyatā-prāpta*) by way of *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* come to cause a verbal knowledge and not otherwise i.e., without having formed into a syntactical whole[2] or a sentence.

A sentence again is the collocation only of those words the mutual expectancy of which contribute towards the verbal knowledges of what are presented by these words.[3] Verbal knowledge come to be caused not by the knowledge of expectancy (*ākāṃkṣā*) alone, for the knowledge of compatibility and the like also are recognised as the so many causes thereof. But as all the other such causes do not go to occasion a verbal knowledge by way of being a factor in the matter of constituting a sentence, such causes are not referred to in the context of a sentence.

'*Vahninā sekaḥ*' is, therefore, held to be a valid form of a sentence although it is incapable of bearing out the valid kind of a verbal knowledge in view of the fact that the knowledge likely to be caused by such a sentence is liable to be contradicted by a competing knowledge to the contrary[4] or in other words in the absence of the knowledge of compatibility of the word-meanings involved towards being syntactically related, the said sentence fails to cause a valid verbal knowledge.

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1. स चायं निपातश्चतुनञ्पुनरिवैवमास्मादिभेदाद् बहुविधः। ibid., p. 62.
2. वाक्यभावमवाप्तस्य सार्थकस्यावबोधतः।
जम्पद्यते शाब्दबोधो न तन्मात्रस्य बोधतः॥
श. श. प्र. का. 12.
3. यादृशशब्दानां यादृशार्थविषयताकान्वयबोधं प्रत्यनुकूला परस्पराकांक्षा तादृशशब्दस्तोम एव तथाविधार्थे वाक्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 64.
4. वह्निना सेक इत्याद्यपि वाक्यमेव, परन्तु बाधिकतार्थत्वादयोग्यम्। ibid., p. 64–65.

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It may be argued that if in the face of the knowledge of compatibility wanting even, *vahninā sekaḥ* is regarded as the valid kind of a sentence then *nirvahnirvahnimān* or *pacan na pacati* and the like also may be regarded as so many valid sentences.

Jagadīśa says there is no reason why these should not be regarded as so many valid sentences in case an *āhāryya-jñāna* or the purposed kind of a knowledge comes to be caused therefrom. What he means to say is that verbal knowledge is only the purposed kind of a knowledge which comes to occur fairly in the face of the knowledge to the contrary (*bādha-jñāna*). The knowledge involved in the sentence *mukha-candra* i.e. the knowledge of the identification of *mukha* and *candra* comes to occur in the face of one's fully knowing that *mukha* and *candra* are not identifiable. The sentences like *nirvahnirvahnimān* or *pacan na pacati*, therefore, have every reason to be regarded valid as so many sentences in case some such purposed knowledge is likely to be caused therefrom; otherwise of course, these are not to be regarded thus.[1]

A sentence according to Jagadīśa is fourfold by nature viz. a radical ending in a case-termination, a root-verb ending in a verbal termination, a radical ending in a case-termination in sequence with some other kind of a word and a radical ending in a case-termination and a root-verb ending in a verbal termination.

Amarasiṃha has defined a sentence as the collocation of words ending either in a case-termination or in a verbal termination. Jagadīśa finds faults with such a definition for in that case '*ghaṭam paṭam* or *pacati gacchati* would come to regarded as so many sentences in view of the fact that these are each comprised of words that have come to end in case-termi-

1. शाब्दमतेराहार्यत्वोपगमे 'निर्वह्निर्वह्निमान्, पचत्र पचति' इत्यादिकमपि वाक्यमेव, नो चेदपार्थकमेव, यादृशबोधत्वावच्छेदेनाहार्य्यत्वं तादृशबुद्धयर्थं प्रयुक्तपदानामेव तथाविधार्थबोधं प्रत्यपार्थकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 65-66.

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nations and verbal terminations respectively. Not only that: The said definition would fail to accomadate *ghaṭaḥ* or *pacati* and like so many other valid sentences. For these have not come to be formed of words (or a couple of words) ending in such terminations.[1]

As for the argument made by the grammarians that but for the use of a verb, a sentence cannot be formed and as such *ghaṭaḥ* should not be regarded as an instance of a sentence, Jagadīśa observes that there is hardly any logic in such an argument.[2]

The *prakṛti* or the radical of a word again is of two kinds—*nāman* or noun and *dhātu* or root-verb and what is called a *prātipadika* or the crude form of a substantive is but a noun at its uninflected stage.[3]

The kind of a word that stands in the need of the first case-termination immediately following itself in the matter of causing a verbal knowledge in which a certain meaning of itself is to be projected as the invariable substantive (*mnkhya-viśeṣyataṇā*) is to be regarded as a noun (*nāman*) in so far as the said meaning is concerned. A word like *ghaṭa* only if known as of being immediately followed by the first case-termination, can cause the verbal knowledge of *ghaṭa* projected by way of the invariable substantive. The word *ghataḥ* causes the verbal knowledge of *ekatva* or oneness projected by way of the feature against *ghaṭa* or jar posited as the invariable substantive. The sentence *ghaṭāt*, however, bears out the verbal knowledge of *eka-ghaṭa* or 'a jar' projected by way of the feature against *hetutā* or causality—the meaning presented by the case-termination. The word *ghaṭa*, therefore, comes out to be a noun (*nāman*) in so far as the meaning—jar is concerned.

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1. यत्तु सुप्तिङन्तचयो वाक्यमित्यमरसिंहैरुक्तं, तन्न युक्तम्, सुबन्तादेः प्रत्येक-समुदायविकल्पेनाव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्त्योः प्रसङ्गात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 66.
2. क्रियारहितन्न वाक्यमस्तीत्यादिकस्तु प्राचां प्रवादो निर्युक्तिकत्वादश्रद्धेयः। ibid., p. 66.
3. तदपि नाम्नो नातिरिच्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 68–69.

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A compounded word like *pīta-paṭa* only if known to be immediately followed by the first case-termination, can cause the verbal knowledge of *pīta* projected by way of the feature against *paṭa* posited by way of the invariable substantive and this is the reason why the grammarians understand by *pada* what ends in a termination and insist upon *padas* alone being used in language.[1]

An objection may be raised against the logicians that as according to them a *pada* has to be understood as what is endowed with the power of denotation and a compound according to them is devoid of any such power, how could a compounded word be regarded as a *pada*.[2]

Jagadīśa, therefore, says that in this context by *pada* what ends in a termination is to be understood[3] ?

Difficulties arise in respect of the compounded word *pīta-paṭa* a member of the compounded word *pita-paṭa-rūpam*. *Pīta-paṭa-rūpam* bears the knowledge of *pīta-paṭa* projected by way of the feature against *rūpa* or colour and the said knowledge is technically known as *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyā'-vagāhi-jñāna*. *Viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyā-'vagāhi-jñāna* again could occur only in case the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* has come to occur earlier thereto. In other words *pītapaṭa-prakāraka-rūpa-viśeṣyaka-śābda-boda-(the viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyā' vagāhi-jñāna)* could come to occur only if the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* i.e. *pīta-prakāraka-paṭa-viśeṣyaka-śabda-bodha* comes to occur earlier thereto, *pīta-paṭa* stands an attrtbute to *pīta-paṭa-rūpa* and thus *pīta* comes out to be the determinant of attribution (*viśeṣaṇatā'vacchedaka*), so to say. In semantics it is but essential that *viśeṣaṇatā'vacchedaka-prakāraka-jñāna* or the knowledge of what has come to be the determinant of attribution should

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1. पीतपट इत्यादिकः समासोऽपि स्वोत्तरं प्रथमाप्रतिसन्धान-दशायामेव पटादि-मुख्य-धर्मिकस्य पीताद्यन्वयबोधस्य जनकः। अत एव 'नापदं प्रयुञ्जीते'ति वृद्धाः। ibid., p. 70.
2. ननु पदत्वं यदि शक्तिमत्त्वं तदा समासस्यातथात्वात् विभक्तिसहकारेणापि कथं तत्प्रयोगः ? कृष्णकान्ती p. 70.
3. पदं विभक्त्यन्तम्। श. श. प्र. p. 70.

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occur earlier than the *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyā'vagāhi-jñāna*; for the earlier knowledge is held to be a cause of the latter one, by way of (being) an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa-vidhayā*). Now the problem is how would then the *pīta-prakāraka-paṭa-viśeṣyaka-jñāna* occur inasmuch as the word *pīta-paṭa*, itself a compound and a member of the compound *pīta-paṭa-rūpam*, is without a case-termination, not to speak of the first one to give the verbal knowledge of *pīta* featuring against *paṭa* and a compound even has been held to be incapable of presenting a word-meaning but for a case-termination ?

Jagadīśa replies that the said knowledge (viz, the *viśeṣaṇatā'-vacchedaka-prakāraka jñāna*) would be held to have occurred by way of an extra-ordinary perception (*upanaya-bhāna*) prior to the verbal knowledge to occur due to *pīta-paṭa-rūpam*. As for the objection that in the face of the *śabda-bodha-sāmagrī* or the collocation of the causes of a verbal knowledge, such a perception cannot occur, it may be pointed out that hte *sāmagrī* of the verbal knowledge is still wanting in view of the fact that the first case-termination is to be suffixed as yet.[1]

Incidently, Jagadīśa refers to the words *anyonya* and *paras-para* to which the first case-termination is not liable to be suffixed according to the grammarians and by way of a counter-argument Jagadīśa cites the instance '*mallābhyāmanyo nyaṁ hanyate*' in which, he argues that the first case-termination has obviously been suffixed to the word *anyonyam* for the construction involved is of the passive kind inasmuch as the root-verb *han* is a transitive verb and as a transitive verb cannot be used in *bhāva-vācya* or an impersonal construction.[2]

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1. पीतपटरूपमित्यादावपि नावान्तरवाक्यार्थबोधपूर्वको महावाक्यार्थबोधः, पटादिनाम्नः प्रथमान्तत्वाभावेन तदर्थे पीताद्यन्वयधियः पूर्वमसम्भवात्, विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्या-वगाहितायाः प्रमाणान्तरेण पटधर्मिकपीतनिश्चयादपि तत्र सम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 71.

2. न चान्योन्यपरस्परादिनामस्वव्यासिः, एभ्यः प्रथमा नाभिधीयते इति वृद्ध-स्मरणदिति वाच्यम् ? मल्लाभ्यामन्योन्यं हन्यत इत्यादौ मल्लयोः परस्पर-

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Nāman or noun could be otherwise classified into four categories viz, *rūḍha* or conventional noun, *lakṣaka* or the Secondary noun, *yoga-rūḍha* or the derivatively conventional noun and *yaugika* or the Derivative noun. Others add, says Jagadīśa, one more to the list-viz, the conventional and the Derivative kind of Nouns or *rūḍha-yaugika*.[1]

A word like *go* meaning cow is the conventional kind of a noun; the suffix *ḍa* added to the root-verb *gam* involved in the formation of the word *go* is without any import in the present case and as such the word *go* could neither be a derivative kind of noun or anything else.[2]

Some are of the secondary kind as the word like *gaṅgā* used in the sense of the bank of the said river. For although the primary understanding of the said word used in the sense of the bank of the said river is processed though the same kind of the knowledge of import in respect of the said word used in the sense of the river-current, yet there is a difference between the said two knowledges. When the knowledge of import in respect of the word *gaṅgā* takes the form that the word *gaṅgā* is denotative of the river-current, it is apparent that the fact of the word being used in the said sense since time inmmemorial is conceived. On the contrary, the knowledge of *import* in respect of the said word when takes the form that the word *Gaṅgā* is denotative of the bank of the river *gaṅgā*, it is obvious that the word has been given a wilful orientation; as otherwise the said word would denote the riverbank the way the word *tīra* (or riverbank)

कर्तृकहननकर्मत्वान्वयानुरोधेन तेषामपि प्रथमान्तत्वात्, अन्यथा सकर्मकस्य हन्तेर्भावाख्यातसाकांक्षत्वानुपपत्तेरकर्मकस्यैव धातोस्तथात्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 71-72.

1. "रूढञ्च लक्षकञ्चैव योगरूढञ्च यौगिकम्।"
तच्चतुर्धा, परै रूढयौगिकं मन्यतेऽधिकम्॥ श. श. प्र. कारिका 16.

2. किञ्चिन्नाम क्वचिदर्थे रूढमेव, यथा गोप्रभृतौ गवादि 'गमेडोर्दाभाभ्यां नुर्धेट इच्चेत्यादेरौणादिकस्य प्रत्ययस्य शक्तिविरहेण यौगिकत्वायोगात्। ibid., pp. 72–73.

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does.[1] The denotative function of a word is determined by the use thereof in reference to a certain meaning, each individual use thereof being occasioned by the preceeding one since eternity. The word *tīra*, therefore, denotes the bank or the word *gaṅgā* denotes the river-current in view of the fact that the said words are used in their respective senses since time eternal, each time its use being occasioned by the preceeding one. Hence the word *Gaṅgā* being used in the sense of the bank of the river *Gangā* is not to be held to have the denotative function in respect thereof in view of the fact that the use of the said word in the said sense has not come to be occasioned by a similar use thereof. The word *Gaṅgā*, therefore, used in the sense of the bank of the river *Gaṅgā* is held to be a secondary kind of noun.

Some are *yogārūḍha* or derivatively conventional. The word *paṅkaja* for example, derivatively means 'whatever grows in the mud'. But the said meaning has been restricted to the *lotus* only. The word apparently means what are presented by the constituents thereof and to that extent it seems to be derivative. Nonetheless the use thereof being restricted to the *lotus*, the conventional meaning of the said word, the word comes to be regarded derivatively conventional.[2]

Words like *pācaka* are only *yaugika* or Derivative[3] in the sense that it denotes *pāka-kartā* or the meaning presented by the constituents thereof—the *paci-dhātu* meaning *pāka* and the suffix—*ṇaka* meaning *kartā*.

Words like *maṇḍapa* or *mahā-rajata* are cited by way of so many instances of what are called the Conventional and the Derivative kind of nouns. These words on occasions present the derivative meanings thereof while at times the con-

1. किञ्चिल्लक्षकमेव, यथा तीरादौ गङ्गादिः, आद्यव्युत्पत्त्या पूरवत्तीरे शक्तिग्रहस्याविशिष्टत्वेऽप्याजानिकप्रयोगापत्या तदप्रामाण्यकल्पनात्, शक्तेः पूर्वपूर्वप्रयोगनियतत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 73-74.
2. किञ्चिद्योगरूढमेव यथा पङ्कजाते पद्मादौ पङ्कजादि। ibid. p. 74.
3. किञ्चिद्यौगिकमेव, यथा पाककर्त्तादौ पाचकादि। ibid. p. 74.

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ventional meanings alone. The word *maṇḍapa*, for example, means by way of derivation 'a man who drinks the scum (*maṇḍaṁ pivati*); it also means a 'house' by way of convention.[1]

A word like *gau* in *gaur-vāhika* used in the sense of what is qualified by the state of being similar to what is denoted by the word *gau* is regarded as *gauṇa* by the elders. Jagadīśa holds that although such a word appears to be denotative of the resemblance of the primary meaning of itself with the secondary meaning in view of the characteristics (*guṇa*) of idiocy and the like involved by way of communication but yet as a matter of fact, the said word means only what is similar to *gau* and thus is only the secondary kind of Noun—in so far as the said meaning is concerned.[2]

As it has been said earlier, the Nominal kind of a word (*nāman*) comes to be known as the conventional kind of Nominal in reference to a certain meaning in respect of which it has a conventional import (*saṅketa*) and in respect of which it is not derivative. The word *gau*, for example, has conventional import in respect of what is possessed of a dewlap (*galakambalādimān*) and by way of derivation, the said word is not to present the said meaning in any case.

The nominals that are derivatively conventional, on the other hand, while denoting a certain meaning by way of a convetional import maintains its derivative character too in respect of the same meaning. The word *paṅkaja*, for example, denotes the lotus by way of convention, but it nonetheless denotes the same thing while it denotes by way of derivation 'what grows in mud'.

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1. रूढ्यौगिकमप्यधिकं नाम, यथा मण्डपमहारजतादि, तद्धि कदाचिदयवयवृत्त्या योगार्थमेव कदाचित्त समुदायशक्त्या रूढ्यर्थमेवाभिधत्ते इत्यपरेषां मतम् । श. श. प्र. pp. 74–75.

2. नौर्वाहिकेत्यादौ तु शक्यार्थसदृशत्वावच्छिन्नबोधकतया गौणं गवादिपदं गोसदृशादौ लक्षकमेव न तु ततो भिद्यते । ibid., p. 75.

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This conventional type of Nominal is known as *saṁjñā* or Name or rather proper Noun. *Saṁjñā* again is further divided into four kinds—*naimittikī* or occasional, *pāribhāṣikī* or the current and *aupādhikī* or the conditional.[1]

The grammarians are of the view that the conventional type of the Nominals is of four kinds in view of the fact that four different kinds of things viz, *jātimat* or what is possessed of a *jāti* or universal, *dravyavat* or what is possessed of a substance, *guṇavat* or what is possessed of a quality and *kriyāvat* or what is possessed of an action are denoted by four kinds of such words. Words like *gau*, *gavaya* denote what are possessed of *gotva*, *gavayatva*- so many *jātis* or universals. Words like *paśu* or *āḍhya* denote what are possessed of tail (*lāṅgula*) or wealth or riches (*dhana*)—the so many *dravyas* or substances. Words like *dhanya* or *piśuna* denote what are possessed of the qualities like *puṇya* or merit a *dveṣa* or *malice* and the words like *cala* and the like denote what are possessed of movement and similar activities.[2]

Jagadīśa discards this view of the grammarians. He says that words like *jaḍa* (idiot) *mūka* (dumb) *mūrkha* (uninitaied), *anya* (different) *śūnya* (void) and similar other words would remain beyond the purview of the conventional kind of Nominals in that case in as much as the relevant determinants of the denotated meanings of such words viz *ceṣṭā-rahitatva*, *śabdā'-bhāva*, *vidyā'-bhāva*, *bheda* and *atyantā'-bhāva* could not be regarded either as *jāti* or as *dravya* or anything else of the kind.[3]

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1. श. श. प्र. कारिका 17.
2. श. श. प्र. कारिका 18.
3. तदेतज्जडमूर्खादीनामन्यशून्यादीनाञ्च शब्दानामपरिग्रहापत्त्या परित्यक्तमस्माभिः। श; श. प्र. pp. 78-79.

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CHAPTER III

THE CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS AND THE FACULTY OF IMPORT

Of the *saṁjñā* or the conventional kind of Nominal, what is possessed of the potency to denote what is qualified by a *jāti* or universal has been described as the *naimittiki* or the occasional kind of *saṁjñā*. The words like *go* or *caitra*, for example, are possessed of the potency to denote what are qualified by *gotva* or *caitratva*-the respective *jātis*. Such words, according to the logicians, cannot mean mere *gotva* or *caitratva* and so on. For in that case, the knowledge of import (*śakti-jñāna*) being that 'the word *go* has the potency to denote *gotva*' (*go-padaṁ gotve śaktam*) it is *gotva* alone that would form the content of the verbal knowledge to occur as caused by sentence like *gām ānaya*. The knowledge of the individual cow occuring due to a sentence like that in that case would remain unexplained. Not only that : Had the word *go* meant *gotva-jāti*, the *karmatā* denoted by the (case-termination–*am* in the world (*gām*) or the state of being the object to the verb *ānaya* word turn out to be incompatible in the matter of syntactial relation resulting in the non-occurance of a verbal knowledge from a sentence like *gām ānaya*.

It is imperative, therefore, that the cow individual too be held the denotated meaning of the word *go*, to be presented as a content of the resultant verbal knowledge to occur as caused by the sentence like *gām ānaya*.

The *Mīmāṁsakas*, in this context, advance the view that a word has the potency to denote *jāti* or universal only.

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In a sentence like *gām ānaya*, therefore, according to them, the word *go* is to denote *gotva* only. As for the cow individual being a content of the resultant verbal knowledge due to the said sentence, there are difference of opinions amongst the teachers of the *Mīmāṁsā* School itself.

According to *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*, what is denoted by a word is but a *jāti* or universal and what is thus denoted is alone liable to forming a content of the verbal knowledge occurring thereform. But the fact is that the cow individual has to be admitted to have formed a content of the verbal knowledge occurring as caused by a sentence like *gām ānaya* as otherwise the inclination (*pravṛtti*) to fetch the cow individual, consequent upon the verbal knowledge thus caused cannot be resonably explained. The cow individual, therefore, has to be regarded to have been presented by the word *go* at the stage of *śakti-jñāna* or the knowledge of import of the word *go*.

Both *jāti* and *vyakti* or the universal and the individual, therefore, come to be presented by way of being the denotated meanings of a word, according to kumārila. There is, however, a little differencc in a *jāti* being denoted by a word from a *vyakti* or an individual being so denoted. The *śakti* or import by which a word denotes a *jāti* or universal is *jñātā* or known while the *śakti* or the import by virtue of which a word denotes an individual (*vyakti*) is *svarūpa-satī* or import *per se*.[1] This theory is known as what is called *kubja-śakti-vāda* supposed to have been formulated by kumārila.[2] By *jñātatva*

1. यद्वा गवादिपदानां व्यक्तौ शक्तिः स्वरूपसती न तु ज्ञाता। वेदान्त-परिभाषा p. 158.
2. तथाप्यन्विताभिधानवादिमते शक्त्या अभिहितान्वयवादिमते व लक्षणया वाच्यार्थ-भूतसंसर्गस्य वृत्तिज्ञाप्यत्वात्। आद्यपक्षे कुब्जशक्त्याङ्गीकारात्; द्वितीयपक्षे लक्षणायाज्ञाताया एव पदार्थनिष्ठाया वृत्तित्वाङ्गीकारात्। अद्वैतसिद्धि pp. 655-56.

कुब्जशक्तिवादिनस्तु गवादिपदानां गोत्वे गवि च शक्तिः परन्तु जातौ शक्तिर्ज्ञाता सत्युपयुज्यते, व्यक्तौ कुब्जा सत्युपयुज्यते। प्रभाटीका on कारिकावली, p. 57.

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again, it is to be understood that the *śakti* that has come out to be the determinant of the causality inherent in the *Śakti-jñāna* in respect of a verbal knowledge is possessed of *jāti* as its *viṣaya* or that the knowledge of import is such that the import (that has been) known to be in reference to the *jāti* or the universal comes to be the determinant of the causality inherent therein in respect of the verbal knowledge involved. Hence in respect of *jāti, śakti* is said to be *jñātā* or known while in respect of *vyakti* or individual it is *svarūpa-satī* or *per se.* The form of the *śakti-graha* or the knowledge of import, therefore, comes to be–*go-pada-nirūpita-gotva-viṣayaka-śakti–matī gauḥ* or the (individual) cow is possessed of the import known in reference to cowness (or *gotva*) in respect of the word (*go*).[1] As for the individual cow being posited as a content of the verbal knowledge due to *gām ānaya,* it is said[2] that the cause of the said knowledge being not merely the knowledge of import in respect of the *gotva-jāti* as such but the knowledge of the word *go* coupled with the knowledge of import in respect of *gotva-jāti,* of the word *go* (used) in reference to *go,* the individual. Hence the word *go* being used in reference to the *go* individual and being a qualifying adjunct to the causality inherent in the

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1. जातिशक्तेर्ज्ञातत्वं च शाब्दबोधजनकस्मृतिनिरूपितशक्तिज्ञाननिष्ठ-कारणतानिरूपितविषयतासम्बन्धावच्छिन्नशक्तिनिष्ठावच्छेदकतायां जाति-विषयकत्वावच्छिन्नत्वमेव । तादृशावच्छेदकतायां व्यक्तिविषयकत्वानव-च्छिन्नत्वमेव शक्तेर्व्यक्त्यंशे कुञ्जत्वम् । तादृशशक्तिग्रहस्य गोपदनिरूपित-गोत्वविषयकशक्तिमती गौरित्याकारः । एतादृशशक्तिज्ञाने गोत्वविषयकत्वेन शक्तेर्विषयत्वात् गोत्वांशे शक्तेज्ञातत्वम् । गोविषयकत्वेन शक्तेरविषयत्वात् तदंशे कुञ्जत्वम् । प्रभाटीका on ibid. p. 570.

2. तथा च गोविषयकगोपदनिरूपितगोत्वविषयकशक्तिप्रकारकज्ञानसहकृत-गोपदज्ञानात् कारणतावच्छेदककोटौ गोविषयकत्वनिवेशेन गोत्वस्येव गोरपि स्मृतिसम्भवात् गोपदान्न गोविषयकशाब्दबोधानुपपत्तिः, तच्छाब्दबोधं प्रति तच्छक्तपदज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वात् शक्तिज्ञानसहकृतगोपदज्ञानात् घटादिविषयक-शाब्दबोधापत्तिर्न । ibid., p. 570.

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knowledge of the word *go* coupled with the knowledge of import thereof, the verbal knowledge of the cow individual along with *cowness* or *gotva* comes to be reasonably explained. At the same time, for the verbal knowledge of something, the knowledge of the word denotative thereof being held to be imperative, there is no reason either to hold that a word like *go* should cause the knowledge of *ghaṭa* or a jar.

The Logicians discard this view of Kumārila. They point out that in imagining the knowledge of import taking to the form *go-pada-nirūpita-gotva-viṣayaka-śaktimatī gauḥ* by way of what occasions the recollection of *go* the individual as qualified by *gotva* in the process of the verbal knowledge of *go*—the individual qualified by *gotva*—the *jāti*, the law of parsimony comes to be violated. It is enough, on the contrary, they argue, that the knowledge of import of the kind–*gaur gopada-śakyā* or that the knowledge that the individual *gau* or rather the individual *go* qualified by *gotva* is what is liable to be denoted by the word *go*, be regarded as what occasions the said recollection towards the said verbal knowledge. As such, they conclude that there cannot be any such distinction of the kind that *śakti* is known in respect *jāti* and *per se* in respect of the individual.[1]

Jagadīśa in his *śabda-śakti-prakāśikā*, however, has not refered to this theory of *kubja-śakti-vāda*. On the contrary, in presenting the view of the Bhāṭṭas he has followed the path shown by Mammaṭa[2] and refers to the theory of *ākṣepa-*

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1. गोत्वप्रकारकगोविशेष्यकस्मृतौ गोत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितगोत्व विषयकत्वावच्छिन्नगोपदनिरूपितशक्तिनिरूपितशक्तिनिष्ठप्रकारताशालिज्ञानत्वेन न हेतुत्वम्, कारणतावच्छेदककोटौ गोत्वविषयकनिवेशे गौरवात्, प्रयोजनाभावात्। किन्तु गौर्गोपदशक्येत्याकारकगोत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यता निरूपितगोपदनिरूपितशक्तिनिष्ठप्रकारताशालिज्ञानत्वेनैव हेतुत्वम् लाघवात्; तावतैव गोत्वप्रकारकगोविशेष्यकस्मृतिसम्भवाच्च। एवं च शक्तिनिष्ठनिरुक्तावच्छेदकतायाः जातिविषयकत्वावच्छिन्नत्वे प्रमाणाभावेन शक्तेर्निरुक्तज्ञातत्वकुब्जत्वयोरप्रामाणिकत्वाच्च। ibid., p. 570–71.

2. जात्या शक्तिराक्षिप्यते न तु शब्देनोच्यते। काव्यप्रकाश. Sūtra 13, p. 44.

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vāda or that the individual is inferred (or presumed) to have been denoted, the moment a word denotes the universal.

The Bhāṭṭas contend that the word *go*, for example, in a sentence like *gām ānaya* denotes *gotva* and it is through the *svāśraya-vṛttitva-sambandha* that the *karmatva* or the state of being the object to the verb *ānaya* or *bring* conforms to *gotva*.[1] As for the *karmatva* conforming to *go* the individual, the Bhāṭṭas argue as follows : *Karmatva* or the state of being the object, has well conformed to *gotva*, the *jāti* and thus consequent thereupon an inferential judgement to the effect that *karmatva* or the state of being the object conforms to the-the individual *go* through the relation of *ādheyatva*.[2] The knowledge of the concomitance (*vyāpti-jñāna*) towards such an inference is to be of the form-what abides in a *jātt* inherent in what, through the relation of *svāśraya-vṛttitva-sambandha* abides therein through the *ādheyatva-sambandha*.[3]

But this is not enough. The inference of *karmatva* or the state of being the object being comformed to the individual cow merely would not serve the purpose. The said *karmatva* or the state of being the object must be understood in reference to the Verb, *ānaya*. Hence is the need of another inference to the effect that *ānayana* or the act of bringing is in reference to the *go* the individual for it is in reference to *gotva*[4]; the knowledge of concomitance is said to be of the form 'what is in reference to the *karmatā* abiding in a *jātī* inherent in what is in reference to the *karmatā* abiding therein'.[5]

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1. सुबर्थ-कर्मत्वादौ स्वाश्रयवृत्तित्वसम्बन्धेनैव प्रकृत्यर्थस्य गोत्वादेः साकांक्षत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 81.
2. गवादिकर्मताकत्वेन बोधस्तुत्तरकालमाक्षेपात्। कर्मत्वं गवीयं गोत्वनिष्ठकर्मत्वात्, आनयनं गोवृत्तिकर्मताकं गोत्ववृत्तिकर्मताकत्वादित्यनुमानसाम्राज्यात्। श. श. प्र. p. 81–82.
3. यत् स्वाश्रयवृत्तित्वसम्बन्धेन यद्वृत्तिजातिवृत्ति तत्तद्वृत्ति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 81.
4. आनयनं गोवृत्तिकर्मताकं गोत्ववृत्तिकर्मताकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 81.
5. यद् यद्वृत्तिजातिवृत्तिकर्मतानिरूपकं भवति तत् तद्वृत्तिकर्मतानिरूपकं भवति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 82.

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It may be pointed out that it is not enough that *karmatva* comes to conform to *go*, the individual, through an inferential judgement. *Karmatva* as a matter of fact comes to be comprehended by way of a substantive against which the meaning of the word *go* is to be projected by way of the feature and the rule being that whatever is liable to be comprehended by way of a feature or a substantive (i.e. whatever is liable to be projected by way of a feature or a substantive) is to be presented by way of a word-meaning. In other words at the stage of *śakti-graha* or the knowledge of import, unless the *go* individual comes to be presented by way of a word-meaning (i.e., by way of the denotated meaning of the word *go*) it cannot come to be projected by way of a feature in the resultant verbal knowledge to make room for *karmatva* to be related thereto.

In keeping with the principles laid down so far, the form of the knowledge of import according to the Bhāṭṭs should be—'*go-padam gotva-śaktam*' in which case *gotva*, the *jāti*, comes to be directly stated through a word, to be technically known as *ullikhyamāna*. In semantics, an *ullikhyamāna-jāti* is not held liable to be comprehended *per se*; it has to be qualified further. As such, *gotva* comes to be qualified by *gotvatva* which would mean that *gotva* as such or *śuddha-gotva* does not come to be projected in the ultimate *śabda-bodha* or verbal knowledge The argument on the other hand that the knowledge of import even if it comes to be of the form—'*gopadam gotva-śaktom*', there should not be any bar to the verbal knowledge of *gotva* as such, for *gotva-tva* is not to be projected as a matter fact in the knowledge of import, is of no avail, for that would mean that the said verbal knowledge (i.e. the verbal knowledge of *gotva*) should come to occur even if the knowledge of import comes to be—*go-padaṁ jāti-śaktimat*.[1]

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1. वस्तुगत्या यद्गोत्वशक्तत्वं तज्ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वे गोपदं जातिशक्तिमदित्येवं गोपदज्ञानादपि शुद्धगोत्वस्यान्वयबोधापत्तिः। श. श. प्र. p. 82.

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If to avoid such a situation, it is so argued that the form of the knowledge of import is *'go-padaṁ gotva-tvā'-vacchinna-śaktam'* and that *gotva* as qualified by *gotva-tva* is to be projected in the resultant verbal knowledge, then the *śakyatā'-vacchedaka* or the determinant of the primary meaning of the word *go* will come to be *gotvatva*—a complex property (*gurudharma*). Hence keeping in view the law of parsimony, it is more reasonable to hold that the knowledge of import takes the form–*go-padam gotvā-vacchinna-śaktam*[1] in which case, the *śakyatā-vacchedaka* will come to be only *gotva*.

Such an argument is uncalled for, say the *Mīmāṁsakas* for in their view, *gotvatva* will not come to be projected at all in the knowledge of import in respect of the word *go* or in the resultant verbal knowledge. They do not subscrive to the view that in the knowledge of import in respect of the word *go* to the effect—*gopadam gotva-śaktam, gotva* is to be apprehended as further qualified by *gotvatva* on the score that *gotva*–the *jāti* has come to be an *ullikhyamāna-jāti*. They argue that such an argument has no relevance in the present context. A *jāti*, they point out, when it comes to be related to its substantive through the relation of *samavāya*, stands the need of being further qualified. When, however, the relation involved is other than *samavāya* there is no proof whatsoever to call for the *jāti* involved being further qualified. In the present instance, *gotva* the *jāti* although *ullikhyamāna*, the knowledge of import being *'gopadam gotva-śaktam'*, the relation involved is *viṣayitā* and not *samavāya* and hence *gotva* is not to be held liable of being further qualified by *gotvatva*.[2] Not only that; the

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1. गोत्वत्वावच्छिन्नशक्ततत्वप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन तथात्वे च, लाघवाद् गोत्वावच्छिन्न शक्ताप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेनैव हेतुत्वम् । ibid., p. 82.

2. गोपदं गोत्वशक्तमित्याकारकज्ञानत्वेनैव हेतुतायां शुद्धस्यैव गोत्वस्य विषयितासम्बन्धेन शक्त्यंशे विशेषणत्वेन गोत्वत्वादिप्रवेशगौरवस्यासम्भवात् । न हि समवायान्यसम्बन्धेन जातेः प्रकारतायां धर्मावच्छिन्नत्व-नियमो मानाभावात् । श. श. प्र. p. 82.

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Mīmaṁsakas continue to say, the said rule that an *ullikhymāna-jāti* is to be apprehended only as what has come to be further qualified is found not to be observed in the case of the confirmatory knowledge which is of an inferential nature according to the Bhāṭṭas like *'gotvenāhaṁ jānāmi'*. The idea is that first there occurs a knowledge to be known as *vyavasāya* or first knowledge so to say to the effect—*ayaṁ gauḥ*. Subsequent thereto there occurs the confirmatory knowledge to be known as *anuvyavasāya* that comprehends the first knowledge, to the effect–*'ahamimaṁ gotvena jānāmi'*. The Mīmāṁsakas consider this confirmatory knowledge to be of the nature of an inferential judgement for knowledge according to them is a supersensuous (*atīndriya*) object and as such the knowledge that comprehends such an object i.e., an object not perceptible by nature, has to be inferential by nature. *Gotva* again could not be imagined to have been projected in the said confirmatory knowledge, by way of being further qualified by *gotvatva* for what did not come to project by way of a content in the first knowledge cannot be held liable to be so projected in the confirmatory knowledge. It is obvious that in the knowledge—*ayaṁ gauḥ*, the first knowledge, *gotvatva* has no relevance.[1]

The said confirmatory knowledge is not admitted to be of the nature of an inferential judgement by the logicians and as such the said argument does not cut much ice with them.

The Mīmāṁsakas, therefore, point out that even in the view of those who consider this confirmatory knowledge only as an instance of perception on the ground that it is nothing more than a perception of a perception (or apperception) as held by the Logicians, *gotvatva* would not come in to be projected in the said knowledge in view of the fact that in an extra-ordinary perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*) the prior knowledge of what

1. अयं गौरित्यादिव्यवसायोत्तरमिमं गोत्वेन जानामीत्याकारके तस्य ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमानेऽनुव्यवसाये वा व्यभिचाराच्च, प्रागनुपस्थित्या गोत्वत्वादेस्तत्रोपनयायोगात्। श. श. प्र. p. 82–83.

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is to be thus perceived is admitted by way of a cause even by the Logicians or those who advocate such a view in respect of the nature of the confirmatory knowledge.[1]

Such being the case, argue the Mīmāṁsakas, the view that a *jāti* when it is to be related by way of a feature to its substantive through the relation of *samavāya* is to be apprehended *per se* and not otherwise as a result of which *gotva* as such cannot be held liable to be projected by way of a feature against *śakti*, the Substantive, through the relation of *viṣayitā* or against *karmatā*—the meaning of the case-termination—(*am* in *gām* in *gām ānaya*) through the relation of *svā'śraya-vṛttitva* is lost because things have been found to be otherwise in the case of the confirmatory knowledge—*aham-imaṁ gotvena jānāmi*.[2]

If it so happens that a *jāti* when it is to be related by way of a feature through a relation other than *samavāya*, is liable to be apprehended *per se*, then a statement like *kālo gauḥ* (or *padaṁ gauḥ*) will come io be valid, it may be argued, *gotva* being related to *kāla* through the *kālika-sambandha* or to *pada* through *sva-śaktatva-sambandha*.

The followers of the Bhāṭṭa school repudiate all such charges on the ground that a sentence like *kālo gauḥ* does not give a valid kind of a verbal knowledge in as much as the knowledge projects *gotva per se* as the feature through the *kālika-sambandha* while the knowledge of *gotva* projected by

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1. ताद्दशनियमो भवन्मतेऽपि न सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रायेणाह–अनुव्यवसाये वेति। ननु तत्र गोत्वत्वेनैव गोत्वं भासते इति व्यभिचार इत्यत आह–प्रागनुपस्थित्येति तदलौकिकप्रत्यक्षं प्रति तज्ज्ञानहेतुत्वस्य भवद्भिः स्वीकारादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 83.

2. एतेन जातेर्निरवच्छिन्नप्रकारत्वस्य समवायसंसर्गावच्छिन्नत्वनियमात् केवलस्य गोत्वादेः शक्त्यंशे विषयितया सुबर्थकर्मत्वांशे च परम्परया प्रकारत्वायोग इत्यपि प्रत्युक्तम्। उक्तस्थले एव व्यभिचारात्। श. श. प्र. p. 83.

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way of a feature through such a *sambandha* could be held valid only if *gotva* were further qualified by *gotvatva.*[1] In other words, *kālo gotvavān* is to be regarded as of being capable of causing the valid kind of verbal knowledge.[2] The principle undertaken by the *Naiyāyikas* is that validity accrues to a knowledge of certain object, possessing an attribute, as possessing that attribute.[3]

Not only that : The right kind of relation has to be taken into account. Validity of a knowledge depends, therefore, virtually on three factors—the *prakāra*, the *viśeṣya* and *sambandha* (the feature, the substantive and the relation respectively). In other words, what is to be validly projected by way of the feature against a certain object through a particular relation, if it happens to be projected against that object through the said particular relation in a knowledge, such knowledge comes to be regarded as valid, not otherwise.[4] *Kālo gauḥ* cannot cause the valid kind of verbal knowledge for *gotva* as a feature *per se* does not abide in *kāla* through the relation of *kālika.* On the contrary, it is *gotva* qualified by *gotvatva* that abides in *kāla* through the said relation. As such, *kālo gotva-vān* comes to be regarded as an instance of the valid kind of a sentence not *kālo gauḥ*

According to the Mīmāṁsakas, however, *gotva per se* may be in *kāla* through the *kālika-sambandha* but the know-

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1, कालिकादिसम्बन्धेन गोत्वादेः प्रामाण्यस्य गोत्वत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रकारता-गर्भत्वेन ताद्दशमतेः प्रमात्वायोगात्। श. ब्र. प्र. p. 84.

2. तथा च कालो गोत्ववानित्यादिकमेव प्रमाणमिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 84.

3. तद्विशेष्यकत्वावच्छिन्नतत्प्रकारकत्वस्यैव प्रामाण्यरूपत्वादिति भावः। ibid., p. 84.

4. तत्सम्बन्धेन तद्वति तत्सम्बन्धेन तत्प्रकारकज्ञानसामान्यस्य प्रामाण्य-पदार्थत्वे इत्यर्थः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 84.

येन सम्बन्धेन यत्र यद् वर्त्तते तत्रैव तेन सम्बन्धेन तस्य तदवच्छिन्नस्य वा० प्रमोपगमः। रामभद्री p. 84.

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ledge thereof would be regarded valid only if were qualified by *gotvatva*.

In the view that *ghaṭatva* inheres or rather exclusively inheres in *saṁsthāna* (or the aggregation of the primary atoms that go to cause a *ghaṭa*,) and not in anything else, *saṁyogo ghaṭaḥ* causes the verbal knowledge viz, *svāśrayā'rabhyatva-sambandhā'-vacchinna - ghaṭatvā'cchinna - prakāraka - saṁyoga-viśeṣyaka*. And this is held to be a valid kind of verbal knowledge. But not so is the knowledge of *ghaṭatva* projected against *saṁyoga* through the relation of *samavāya*[2]. For the valid knowledge of *ghaṭatva* projected by way of the determinant or the feature through the relation *samavāya*, it is essential that *ghaṭatva* be qualified by *ghaṭatvatva*. Those who are of the opinion that *ghaṭatva* inheres in the aggregation of the primary atoms exclusively must admit that *ghaṭatva per se* is not there in *ghaṭa* through the *samavāya-sambandha*. In other words, *saṁyogo ghaṭaḥ* cannot give rise to a valid knowledge that would be *samavāyena- ghatatva-vat-saṁyoga-viśeṣyaka-samvāya - sambandha'-vacchinna-prakāraka*; for *ghaṭatva*, the feature has not been further qualified by *ghaṭatvatva*. A knowledge merely on grounds that it is *tadvati tatprakāraka-jñāna* cannot be held valid say the Mīmāṁsakas. Hence in order to be valid the knowledge of *ghaṭatva* posited as the feature, through the relation of *samavāya*, it is essential that *ghaṭatva* be further qualified by *ghaṭatvatva*.[3]

It is a peculiar situation, it may be argued. The knowledge *kālo gauḥ* is valid in case *gotva* comes to be quaiified by *gotvatva* notwithstanding the fact that the relation involved has come to be *kālika*. At the same time, the said knowledge

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1. तत्समवेतत्वम् तन्मात्रसमवेतत्वम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 84.
2. अन्यथा घटत्वादिजातेः संस्थानसमवेतत्वमते संयोगो घट इत्यादिप्रतीतेः समवायेन प्रमात्वस्य दुर्वारतापत्तेः । श. श. प्र. p. 84.
3. तथाच तन्मते समवायेन घटत्वप्रकारकज्ञानप्रामाण्यस्य घटत्वत्वावच्छिन्न-प्रकारतागर्भत्वनियमः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 84.

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is other than a valid kind of knowledge too for *gotva* per se is not liable to be apprehended by way of a feature, the relation involved being *kālika*, Thus the said knowledge comes to be a category by itself neither valid nor invalid. But such a position is not reasonable—for a synthetic knowledge has to be either valid or invalid.[1]

The Bhāṭṭas point out that there is no such contigency. For as in verbal knowledge so also in perception *kālo gauḥ* involves the idea that *gotva* is identical with *kāla*, which is but an error and thus an instance of an invalid kind of knowledge.[2] As such the charges levelled against them on the score of the said knowledge being valid do not gain ground. Hence the theory of *jāti-śakti-vāda* stands.

Jagadīśa observes that all such arguments are meaningless display of wit.[3] As even without the inference talked of, a sentence like *gām ānaya* successfully bears out the verbal knowledge of *ānayana* and so on in respect of an individual cow projected by way of an object thereof. There is no logic in undertaking a bewildering process in this matter.[4]

Moreover, in *gaur-gacchati* and similer other sentences, *gatimattva* or *gati* i.e., movement cannot be syntactically related to *śuddha-gotva* or *gotva* as such[5]. For a substantive of a verbal knowledge cannot be conceived of as not qualified by a determinant.[6] If held that *gotvatva* will come to be the said

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1. ननु विशिष्टबुद्धेर्भ्रमप्रमान्यतरत्वनियमेन भ्रमभिन्नाया कालो गौरितिबुद्धेः प्रमाभिन्नत्वानुपपत्तिः। रामभद्री p. 84.
2. शाब्दस्येव प्रत्यक्षस्यापि कालो गौरित्यादिबोधस्य नियमतो गवाद्यभेदावगाहित्वेनैवाप्रमात्वसम्भवाच्चेति भट्टमतानुवर्त्तिनः। श. श. प्र. pp. 84–85.
3. तन्मन्दम्। श. श. प्र. p, 85.
4. विनाप्याक्षेपं गामानयेत्यादितो गवादिकर्मताकत्वेनानयनादेरन्वयबोधस्य ऽऽनुभविकत्वात्। ibid., p. 85.
5. गौर्गच्छतीत्यादौ शुद्धगोत्वे गतिमत्त्वाद्यन्वयस्यानुभवेनास्पर्शात्। ibid., p. 85.
6. निर्धर्मितावच्छेदककशाब्दानभ्युपगमात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 85.

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determinant, then the trouble would be that as *gotvatva* had not been presented by way of a word-meaning at the stage of *śakti-graha* or the knowledge of import of the word *go*, it can not be held to be a content of the verbal knowledge occuring as caused thereby.[1]

Let the word *go* which is denotative of *gotva* as such, be held to imply in the present case, the meaning of 'what is qualified by *gotvatva* it may be argued. The verbal knowledge of *gatimatva* or *gati* then posited by way of a feature against *gotva* as qualified by *gotvatva*—the determinant of the substantive comes to be reasonably explained, it is pointed out.

But the question remains how would *gatimattva* come to be related to the individual cow ? The only plausible answer is that through inference and the syllogistic form would be *gaur gati-mān svāśraya-vṛttitva-sambandhena gatimattvāt* or rather *gauḥ samavāya-sambandhena gatimān svāśraya-vṛttitva-sambandhena gatimattvāt*. In other words, the individual cow comes to be inferred as of being possessed of movement close to the heels of the initial knowledge of its being possessed of movement through the relation of *svāśraya-vṛttitva*. It is to be noted that although it is *gati-mattva* that has come to be both the *hetu* and *the sādhya*, the syllogism does not get affected on that score for the *sādhyatā'vaccheda-sambandha* and the *hetutā'vacchedaka-sambandha* are not identical. But the reasoning is faulty, says Jagadīśa. For if *sva* in the *svāśraya-vṛttitva-sambandha* means *gotva* then the *āśraya* thereof comes to be *go* and *go-vṛttitva* in that case comes to be in *gatimatva* and as such it is *gotva* that comes to be possessed of *gatimattva* and not *go*. In other words the *hetu* viz, *gatimattva* fails to abide in the *pakṣa* and thus is there the fault of *svarūpā'siddhi*.

In case *sva* means *gatimattva*, then by the *āśraya* thereof, the individual cow should be understood in which case the

1. गोत्वत्वाद्यनुपस्थित्या च गोत्वं गच्छतीत्याद्यनुभवस्यासम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 86.

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tad-vṛttitva will be in *gotva*. In other words, through the said relation it is *gati-mattva* that will come to be in *gotva* and not in *gau*—the *pakṣa* to bring in the same fault again.[1]

Jagadīśa refers to Śrīkara in this connection. Śrīkara is stated to be of the view that in a sentence like *gām ānaya* the word *go*[2] denotes *gotva* and the verbal knowledge comes to be *gotva-prakāraka-karmatva-viśeṣyaka* (i.e., *gotva-niṣṭha-karmatā-nirūpakā' nayana* comes to be the form of the said knowledge). As for the relation through which the said *karmatva* is to be in *gotva*, Śrīkara suggests the *svāśraya-vṛttitva* relation, *sva* meaning *gotva*. The *āśraya* thereof is the individual cow or *go* and *tad-vṛttitva* being there, it is *gotva* that comes to be in *karmatva* through the said relation.

Śrīkara further suggests that subsquent to such a verbal knowledge, there occurs another knowledge which is equally verbal by nature and equally caused by the same sentence viz, *gām ānaya* to the effect that *karmatva* or the state being the object (of the verb to bring) is in respect of the individual cow (*karmatvaṁ gavīyam*).

The reason that calls for such a subsquent knowledge is that *karmatva* or the state of being the object of the verb 'bring' cannot reasonably be in respect of *gotva* unless it is in respect of *go* the individual cow.

The fundamental difference that Śrīkara poses in relation to the view held by the Bhāṭṭas is that in the view of the Bhāṭṭas the verbal knowledge occuring due to *gām ānaya* is only of *gotva*, the *jāti*, projected by way of the substantive and subsquent thereto there occurs an inferential knowledge of *karmatva* in respect of the individual *go*. But according to Śrīkara the primary verbal knowledge of *karmatva* in respect of *gotva* is followed by a subsequent verbal knowledge of *karmatva* in

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1. स्वाश्रयवृत्तित्वसम्बन्धेन गतिमत्त्वादिहेतुना गवादौ साक्षात्सम्बन्धेन गतिमत्त्वाद्याक्षेपस्य व्यभिचारादिदोषेण दुःशक्यत्वाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 85.
2. इति श्रीकरमतमप्यनादेयम्। ibid., p. 86.

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respect of the individual *go* duly supported by the kind of an implicatory kuowledge (*arthā'patti*) as referred to above.

Jagadīśa discards this view of Śrikara, on the ground that the knowledge of the state of being the object to the verb 'bring' in respect of the individual cow cannot occur by way of a verbal knowledge occuring due to the sentence *gām ānaya* subsequent to the verbal knowledge of *karmatva* or, the state of being the object to the verb 'bring' in respect of *gotva* having had occurred earlier thereto, by the same sentence. Nor could the subsequent knowledge be verbal and presumtive (or implicatory) or *arthā'patti* in view of the contradictary nature of the said two knowledges—one being caused by words and the other by the absence of reasoable grounds otherwise. In other words, as the *sāmagrī* or the collocation of conditions of inference is regarded an obstacle to the occurrence of verbal knowledge, so also the *sāmagrī* of *arthāpatti* is an obstacle to verbal knowledge and thus one and the same knowledge cannot be verbal and presumptive at the same time.[1]

Maṇḍana Miśra[2] holds that *śakti* or import of a word is invariably in respect to a *jāti* or universal; *vyakti* or an individual being liable of comprehension through *lakṣaṇā* or by way of the secondary meaning of a word. What is not capable of being apprehended otherwise alone is admitted liable of being denoted by a word and in admitting *jāti* as the denoted meaning of a word, the law of parsimony lends support. As for the *lakṣaṇā-bīja* or the basis that calls for *lakṣaṇā*, Maṇḍana suggests *mukhyārtha-bādha* or the incompatibility of the primary meaning of a word with the context.

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1. मिथो विरुद्धाभ्यां शाब्दस्वार्थपत्तित्वाभ्यामवच्छिन्नबोधस्याळीकत्वेन शब्दानुपपत्तिभ्यां सम्भूय तथाविधौपाद्दानिकबोधस्य जननायोगाच्च । श. श. प्र. p. 86.

   वस्तुतः स्वमते शाब्दं प्रति अनुमितिसामग्रया इव आपत्ति-सामग्रया एव प्रतिबन्धकत्वमित्यभिप्रायः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 86.

2. यदाहुर्मण्डनाचार्याः । श. श. प्र. p. 87.

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In *gāṁ paśya* then how could there be any *lakṣaṇā* in the word *go* for the *mukhyārtha* or the alleged primary meaning of the said word viz, *gotva* does not apparently come to be incompatible with the context. For it is capable of being syntactically related to the verb *paśya* through the relation of inherence-in-what-is-conjoined or *saṁyukta-samavāya-sambandha* it may be objected.

Maṇḍana says that although the primary meaning of the word in question in such an instance is not apparently incompatible yet the said meaning obviously crosses the path of the speaker's intention. Hence the possibility of the meaning aimed at being otherwise irrelevant is to be regarded by way of an additional factor in the matter of *lakṣaṇā*. In *gāṁ paśya* in spite of all hair-split attempts to suggest that *gotva* is capable of being syntactically related to the act of seeing, the meaning aimed at viz, 'see the cow' remains to be missed for it is the individual cow that has been intended to be the object of the act of seeing, by the speaker. Thus *lakṣaṇā* has every prospect in such instances too.[1]

Jagadīśa rejects the view of Maṇḍana Miśra outright.[2] He points out that the word *go* is never used to denote *gotva-jāti* by way of its primary meaning, leaving aside *go*—the individual and as such it is unreasonable to hold that *gotva* alone is the *mukhyārtha* or the primary meaning of the word *go*. Such being the case; *go*, the individual, cannot be held to be the secondary meaning thereof for what is related to the *śakyārtha* or the primary (denoted) meaning alone is held to be the secondary meaning of a word.[3]

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1. गौर्जायते गौर्नश्यति इत्यादौ सर्वत्र गोत्वादिजातिशक्तेनैव गवादिपदेन लक्षणया गोत्वादिविशिष्टा व्यक्तिर्बोध्यते, व्यक्तीनां बहुत्वेनान्यलभ्यत्वेन च तत्र शक्तेरकल्पनात् तात्पर्यानुपपत्तेरपि लक्षणायां बीजत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 87.
2. तदपि तुच्छम्। ibid., p. 87.
3. व्यक्तिं विनाकृतायां गोत्वादिजातौ गवादिपदस्य मुख्यप्रयोगाभावेन तन्मात्रस्याशक्यत्वे तद्वति गवादौ लक्षणाया वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्, शक्यसम्बन्धस्यैव लक्षणात्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 88.

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Maṇḍana tries hard to show that the word *go*, leaving aside the individual *go*, denotes *gotva-jāti* as in the instances like *'go ranyo mahiṣaḥ,'* meaning the 'buffalo is other than the cow'. He argues that the fifth case-termination in the word *goḥ* (in *go ranyaḥ*) denotes *avadhitva* or *prati-yogitva* and it is against such a meaning that *gotva*-the meaning of the word *po*, with *go*-the individual having been left aside, gets projected by way of the feature through the relation of *Śvāvacchedyatva-sambandha*[1] to give the verbal knowledge of *gotvā'-vadhika* or *gotva-pratiyogika-bheda.*

Jagadīśa discounts all such arguments. He points out that in such an instance *go*, the individual, could reasonbly be related to *avadhitva* or *prati-yogitva* with equal justice through the relation of *sva-niṣṭha-gotvā'vacchedyatva-sambandha.*[2]

If such a suggestion is not accepted, argues Jagadīśa, then *gotva* will come to be regarded as the primary meaning of the word *go* and *go*, the indlvidual, as the secondary meaning thereof and although through different relations both these meanings will admitedly have the capability of being related to one and the same meaning viz. *avadhitva* or *prati-yogitva*, by way of the feature. This would mean, Jagadīśa points out, that the two faculties of communication viz, *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā* are simulteniously in operation—a position not accepted in Semantics.[3]

Vide also लक्षणाशक्यसम्बन्धस्तात्पर्य्यानुपपत्तितः। कारिकावली का. 82.

1. (न च) 'गोरन्यो महिषः' इत्यादौ पञ्चम्यर्थेऽवधित्वे प्रतियोगित्वे वा स्वावच्छेद्यत्वसम्बन्धेन शुद्धस्य गोत्वादेरन्वयात्तथाविधस्थले एव जातौ मुख्यप्रयोगः। ibid., p. 88.

2. तत्र पञ्चम्याः स्वार्थेऽवधित्वादौ स्वनिष्ठगोत्वावच्छेद्यत्वसंसर्गेण प्रकृत्यर्थस्य गवादेरन्वयबोधकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 88.

3. अन्यथा गोगोत्वयोर्भक्तिशक्तिभ्यां गोपदेन बोधने वृत्तिद्वयस्य यौगपद्यापत्तेः। ibid., pp. 88–89.

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Jagadīśa, however, is fully aware that in a situation like *gaṅgāyām ghoṣa-matsyau staḥ*—the fact of both the faculties being in operation is well known. It may, however, be pointed out that no such instance could be cited as a parallel to the case in point. The situations are completely different. In *gor anyo mahiṣaḥ* both the primary and the secondary meanings are to be related to one and the same meaning viz, *avadhitva* or *pratiyogitva* while in *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣa-matsyau staḥ* two different meanings viz, *matsya* and *ghoṣa* are to be related severally with the primary and the secondary meanings of the word *gaṅgā* viz, *gaṅgā-pravāha* and *gaṅgā-tīra* respectively.

Not only that : In case the word go in *gor anyo mahiṣaḥ* is to mean *gotva* not further qualified by *gotvatva* and the like (i.e., *niravacchinna-gotva*) to be presented by way of the feature in the resultant verbal knowledge, then the difficulty will be that the verbal knowledge of *gotva* projected by way of the feature through the relation of *svāvacchedakatva* will never occur. For in Semantics, the accepted norm is that an unqualified *jāti* like *gotva* is to be projected by way of the feature of a verbal knowledge, only through the relation of *samavāya*.[1] In *dravyaṁ ghaṭaḥ* for example, points out Jagadīśa, *ghaṭatva* is projected by way of the feature against the substantive *ghaṭa* through the relation of *samavāya* and it could not be otherwise. Had the relation been other than *samavāya*, it may be pointed out, then the verbal knowledge to occur would come out be erroneous, as has been seen earlier. It is with this view in mind, says Jagadīśa, that *ghaṭatva* has been admitted to be of manifold nature. The idea is that *ghaṭatva* is there in *ghaṭa* where *kāncanatva* is wanting; while both are there in *kāñcana-ghaṭa* to bring in the fault of *sāṁkarya*, which to avoid it has been admitted that *kāñcantva-vyāpya-ghaṭatva*,

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1. वस्तुतस्तु शुद्धस्य गोत्वादेः शाब्दधीप्रकारतायाः समवायावच्छिन्नत्व-नियमात् तस्यावधित्वादौ स्वावच्छेद्यत्वादि-सम्बन्धेनान्वयो दुर्घट एव। श. श. प्र. p. 89.

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pṛthivītva-vyāpya-ghaṭatva, pāṣāṇatva-vyāpya-ghaṭatva and the like are all distinct *jātis* or universals.[1]

In the view of Prabhākara, the word *go* in the sentence *gām ānaya* is known to be denotative of *gotva* at the stage of *śakti-graha* or the knowledge of import or the denotative function thereof and it is the cause of the verbal knowledge of *go*, the individual, as qualified thereby i.e., the *gotva*. The *kāryatā'-vacchedaka* or the determinant of the effect, therefore, comes to be *gotva-prakāraka-go-viśeṣyaka-śābda-bodhatva*. In other words, the word *go* according to Prabhākara, through the knowledge of import in respect of itself, bears out the verbal knowledge of *gotva*, its denoted meaning, posited by way of the feature invariably against *go*, the individual. There is, therefore, absolutely no scope for the said word leading to a verbal knowledge of anything else than *gotva* projected by way of the feature against *go*, the individual, or of *gotva* projected by way of the feature against anything else than *go*, the individual.[2]

In that case, let *go*, the individual, too be regarded as the denoted meaning of the word *go* inasmuch as it has come out to be, like *gotva*, a content of the verbal knowledge being caused by the said word, it may be argued.[3]

Prabhākara disapproves such an explanation of *śakyatā*. To him *śakyatā* or the state of being the primary meaning of a word means the state of being the determinant of what has come to be the determinant of the causality in respect of the verbal knowledge to occur. In *gām ānaya* the causality (by way of *vyāpāra*) of the verbal knowledge of what the word *go*

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1. द्रव्यं घट इत्यादि-प्रतीतेः समवायेन प्रमात्वानुरोधाद् घटत्वादिजातेर्ननात्वोपगमादिति। ibid., p. 89.
2. प्राभाकारास्तु गोत्वशक्तत्वेन ज्ञातं पदं तादृप्येण गोशाब्दत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्येव हेतुः। अतो गोत्वशक्तिग्रहान्न गोत्वेन गवयादेः न वा द्रव्यत्वादिना गोरन्वयधियोऽतिप्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. pp. 90–91.
3. न हि गवादिपदस्य शक्यत्वं जन्यत्वमपि तु जन्यशाब्दधीविषयत्वं। तच्च गोत्वस्येव गोरप्यविशिष्टमिति। ibid., p. 91.

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is to mean is the *śakti-graha* or the knowledge of import of the word *go* of the kind, *go-padaṁ gotva-śaktam.* This knowledge may be described as *gopada-dharmika-gotva-śaktatva-prakāraka* and the most distinguishing feature of this knowledge is that *gotva-śaktatva* has come to be its content. It may, therefore, be said that the causality of the verbal knowledge of what the word *go* is to mean is in the knowledge that has the distinction of being characterised as what is qualified by the state of being a knowledge of *gotva-śaktatā.* Causality of the verbal knowledge involved being thus rooted in what has come to be *gotva-śaktatā-jñāna,* the determinant thereof is held to be *gotva-śaktatā* and the determinant of this determinant again is but *gotva.* The determinant of the determinant of the causality of the verbal knowledge concerned, therefore, turns out to be *gotva* to be known as the *śakyārtha* or the primary meaning of the word, *go.*[1]

The said *śakti-graha* or the knowledge of import of the word *go* might have been distinguished by way of being characterised as what is qualified by the state of being a knowledge of *go-śaktatva* i.e., the knowledge of import could fairly be '*gopadam gośaktam* (*gotvā'cchinna-śaktam*) instead of being *go-padaṁ gotva-śaktam* in which case following the principle laid down in respect of determining the primary meaning of a word *go,* the individual, would come out to be a competing contender, it may be argued.

Prabhākara, therefore, points out that in holding *go,* the individual, the primary meaning of the word *go,* the law of parsimony would be ostensively violated[2] in view of the fact

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1. गवादिपदधर्मिकस्वशक्तताज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नशाब्दधीजनकतावच्छेदकत्वेन गोत्वादिजातेरेव गवादिपदशक्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 91.

   तथाच शाब्दबोधनिरूपिता या गोत्वशक्तताज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नजनकता तन्निरूपितावच्छेदकतानिरूपितावच्छेदकत्वमेव गोपदशक्यत्वम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 91.

2. गोत्वशक्तत्वापेक्षया गोशक्तत्वस्य गुरुतया तज्ज्ञानत्वस्य गोशाब्दं प्रति जनकताऽनवच्छेदकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 92.

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that for the denotation of innumerable individuals, inumerable imports have to be imagined.[1]

Not only that. *Go*, the individual, could be regarded as the primary (denoted) meaning of the word *go* in case *gotvā-vacchinna-śaktatva-jñānatva* were admitted as the *janakatā-vacchedaka* of the verbal knowledge involved. But the difficulty is that *gotvā'-vacchinna-śaktatva-jñānatva* is more complex a concept (*guru-dharama*) than *gotva-śaktatva-jñānatva*.

It is further pointed out that so far as the view of Prabhākara is concerned, it could not be insisted that as *go*, the individual, has happened to be a content of the verbal knowledge concerned, it should be recognised to be have been denoted by the word *go*. According to Prabhākara, knowledge is self-illuminating or *sva-prakāśa*. Knowledge, in his opinion, cognises, the agent, the object and the knowledge itself. The knowledge to be caused by *ghaṭaḥ*, for example, is to cognise the agent of the knowledge to occur, the object of the said knowledge viz, *ghaṭa* and the knowiedge itself.

It obviously does mean that the agent of the said knowledge and the knowledge itself, two contents of the knowledge are presented as the so many denoted meanings of the word *ghaṭa*. There cannot, therefore, be any rule to the effect that whatever comes to be comprehended by a verbal knowledge is presented by a word by way of a denotated meaning thereof. Even if in the face of all this, any such rule is to be insisted upon, *go*, the individual, cannot be considered to be the primary or the denoted meaning of the word *go* in view of the fact that *gotvā'-vacchinna-śaktatva-jñānatva* is a more complex concept than *gotva-śaktatva-jñānatva* and *go*, the individual, could be the primary meaning of the word *go* only if *gotvā'vacchinna-śaktatva-jñānatva* were the *janakatā'-vacchedaka* of the verbal knowledge involved and that such a *janakatā'-vacchedaka*

1. गुरुतयेति व्यक्तिघटितत्वादिति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 92.

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could be conceived of only at the expense the law of parsimony, so argues Prabhākara.[1]

In case *gotva-śaktatā-jñāna* is held to be the *janakatā'-vacchedaka* of *gotva-viṣayaka-śābda-bodha*, the said *śābda-bodha* may be either *gotva-prakāraka-go-viśeṣyaka* or *go-prakāraka-gotva-viśeṣyaka* in which case the *kāryatā'-vacchedaka* would come to be both—*gotva-prakāraka-go-viśeṣyaka-śābdatva* and *go-prakāraka-gotva-viśeṣyaka-śābdatva*. This would call for two sets of *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* and thus *gaurava* again, it may be argued.

Prabhākara, therefore, says that let in that case the word *go* be regarded as the cause of the verbal knowledge of *gotva* by way of itself being known to have the potency to denote *gotva*. It must not also be argued, says Prabhākara, that due to the word being known to have been denotative of *gotva*, *go*, the individual, or anything else may come to be posited by way of the substantive for *gotva* as qualified by the *samavāya-sambandha* has come to be conceived of as the cause through the *viśeṣyatā-sambandha* of the said verbal knowledge. In other words *samavāya-sambandhā-vacchinnagotva* is the *prakāra* of the verbal knowledge in question in which case it is *go*, the individual, alone that is to be the substantive for *gotva* through the said relation is in *go*, the individual, alone.[2]

If that be the situation (i.e., if *samavāyena gotva* is admitted to be an additional cause) then the fault of *gaurava* or complexity is equally there in this view too, it may be pointed out.

Prabhākara, therefore, points out that the position is simpler (*laghu*) even then, for in considering *gotva-śaktatva-jñāna* and *samavāyena gotva* as the two independent causes of the verbal

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1. अतएवान्वयबुद्धेरात्मस्वात्माश्रयगाहित्वेऽपि न तेषां पदशक्यत्वम्। श. श. प्र. p. 92.
2. अस्तु या गोत्वादिशक्तत्वेन ज्ञातं पदं गोत्वादिशाब्दत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्येव हेतुर्विशेष्यतया तादृशशाब्दं प्रति समवायेन गोत्वस्य नियामकत्वकल्पनाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 92–93.

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knowledge of *gotva*—a single unitary knowledge, the *kāryatā'-vacchedaka* comes to be one. On the contrary, in the previous situation as it has been seen the *kāryatā'-vacchedākas* being two, two-fold cause-effect relation had to be admitted.[1]

As a matter of fact, all such arguments are uncalled for since *go*, the individual, has to be projected by way of the substantive in the verbal knowledge of *gotva* as occasioned by the knowledge of import in respect of the word *go* as of being denotative of *gotva*, in view of the fact that the Mīmāṁsakas repudiate any other possibility with their repudiation of error.[2]

Hence the fact is that for the verbal knowledge of *gotva*, the knowledge of import of the word *go* to the effect that it is denotative of *gotva* alone is considered to be the cause and not *gotva* in addition thereto.[3] As for the individual *go* being *ipso facto* comprehended by the verbal knowledge of *gotva*-the feature, Prabhākara advances the theory of *tulya-vitti-vedyatā* or the state of being liable of comprehension of both the *jāti* or the universal and the *vyakti* or individual by one and the same knowledge. It is the *jāti* like *gotva* that comes to be presented at the stage of what is called *padārtha-dhī* or the recollection of word-meaning, the knowledge of import of the word like *go* being that the said word is denotative of *gotva*. Therefore, as the *jāti* and the *vyakti* (*gotva* and *go*) are liable to comprension by one and the same knowledge, the individual *go* comes to be *ipso facto* comprehended by the said know-

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1. गोत्वादिना गवादेरिव गवावेगौत्वादिनाऽन्वयबोधत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्यपि विनिगमकाभावेन गोत्वादिशक्तिज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वमपेक्ष्य गोत्वशाब्दत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्येव गोत्वस्य, तच्छक्तत्वज्ञानस्य, च द्वयोः कारणतायामेव लाघवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 93.
2. गुरूणामन्यथाख्यात्यनङ्गीकारेण गोत्वेन गवयार्दर्भानस्यालीकतया तथाऽपादनं दुर्घटम्। रामभद्री. p. 93.
3. वस्ततस्तु गोत्वशाब्दं प्रति गोत्वशक्तिज्ञानमेव हेतु र्न तु गोत्वमपि। श. श. प्र. pp. 93–94.

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ledge i.e., knowledge of *gotva*. In other words, the *gotva-prakāraka-śābda-bodha* turns out to be *go-viśeṣyaka*.[1]

Anything else than *go* could not have the prospect of ever being projected by way the substantive of the verbal knowledge of *gotva*. For any such possibility has been ruled out by them with the theory of *auythā-khyāti* being repudiated by them. Snch a possibility is not held out even by perception and the like.[2]

Disputes, however, may arise in respect of the indeterminate kind of knowledge of *gotva*. For such a knowledge does not comprehend anything either by way of a feature or by way of a substantive. Similarly in an instance like *kālo gotvavān* what is to project by way of the substantive is *kāla* or time and not the individual *go*. Hence it becomes difficult to maintain that a *gotva-prakāraka-jñāna* must be *go-viśeṣyaka*, as a rule.

Prabhākara says that the theory of *tulya-vitti-vedyatā* does not take an indeterminate knowledge into consideration. The theory also does not apply to cases where *gotva* or the *jāti* involved is to be comprehended as being further qualified by *gotvatva* and the like.[3]

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1. जातिव्यक्तोस्तुल्यवित्तिवेद्यत्वनियमादेव गोव्यक्तीनां तद्विषयत्वसिद्धेः। ibid., p. 94.
2. प्रमाणविरहादेव गोत्वादिना गवयादिविषयत्वस्य तत्रासिद्धेश्च। ibid., p. 94.

   तथाच तैरन्यथाख्यात्यनङ्गीकारात्, तन्मते गोत्वशाब्दे गवयादिधर्मिकत्वसिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेनासम्भवात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 94.
3. यद्यपि जातेर्विषयत्वं तत्समवायिव्यक्तिविषयतानिरूपितमिति न व्याप्तिः, गोत्वाद्यलोचने कालो गोत्ववानित्यादिबोधे च व्यभिचारात्, नापि जातेर्निरवच्छिन्नप्रकारतायास्तथात्वनियमः। श. श. प्र. p. 94.

   (In कालो गोत्ववान्, गोत्व being an उल्लिख्यमान-जाति is not liable to be comprehended *per se* but as of being further qualified by गोत्वत्व)

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The theory of *tulya-vitti-vedyatā* also fails to cover an instance like *gotvenimaṁ jānāmi*—an instance of perceptnal judgement occuring close to the heel of the perception like *gaurayam*, in view of the fact that although the said knowled has come out to be *gotva-prakāraka*, it has failed to be *go-viśeṣyaka* for it is the meaning of the word *idam* or this that has come to be projected by way of the substantive in the said knowledge.

Prabhākara, therefore, seeks to limit the application of the said theory to the cases of verbal knowledge only. It is as a rule, he says, that the unqualified *gotva* or any other *jāti* could be projected by way of the feature of a verbal knowledge only against *go* or similar other relevant individual. Such a rule again comes to be confirmed by the fact that but for such an individual projected by way of the substantive, unqualified *gotva* or any other relevant *jāti* cannot get itself projected by way of the feature.[1]

It is to be noted that as *go*, the individual, as a rule, is to be projected as the substantive of the verbal knowledge of *gotva* and as none else can have the possibility of ever being thus projected, it is obvious that the relation that comes to arise out of syntax is none else than *samavāya*.[2]

The knowledge of import of the word *go* to the effect that it is denotative of *gotva*, therefore, having been found to be what reasonably and faultlessly occasions the verbal knowledge of *gotva* posited by way of the feature through the relation of

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1. तथाप्यन्वयबोधस्य निरवच्छिन्नगोत्वादिप्रकारकत्वं गवादिविशेष्यतानिरूपितमेवेतिव्याप्तिस्तादृशविशेष्यताकत्वं विना शुद्धस्य गोत्वादेरन्वयबोधेनास्पर्शनात्। श. श. प्र. p. 95.

2. अतएव गवाद्यंशे गोत्वादिप्रकारको बोधः समवायेनैव सम्बन्धान्तरेणापि तत्प्रकारकः स्याद्गोत्वशक्तिज्ञानस्य तदीयसम्बन्धभानं प्रत्युदासीनत्वादित्यपि प्रत्युक्तम्। शाब्दमतेः शुद्धगोत्वप्रकारतायां गोविशेष्यताकत्वस्येव समवायसम्बन्धस्यापि व्याप्तिबलेन सिद्धावपि तस्याः सम्बन्धान्तरावच्छिन्नस्य प्रमाणविरहेणासिद्धेः। ibid., pp. 95–96.

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samavāya against *go*—the individual, it is established that the word *go* is denotative of *gatva* only. For it is *gotva* alone that has been the *avacchedaka* or determinant of *śakti*, the *avacchedaka* or determinant of causality inherent in the *śakti-jñāaa* towards the aforesaid verbal knowledge, through the relation of *viṣayatā*—the *śakti* being *gotva-viṣayanī*, (i.e., *śakti* being known in respect of *gotva* only).[1]

If it be so held that the word *go* is denotative of *gotva* only then how is it that an expression like '*gaur go-pada-śakyā*' is also found to be used[2] ?

Prabhākara says in reply that such an expression is but metaphorical, *go*, the individual, being the locus of the state of the determinant (*gotva*) of the determinant of the causality inherent in the knowledge of *go-śaktatā*, towards the verbal knowledge of *gotva*—(the feature against *go*, the substantive, related through the relation of *samavāya*).[3]

Questions may arise in respect of the word like *gam*—the root-verb vis-a-vis the denotated meaning thereof. The said word may be argued to have the potency to denote *gatitva* and the comprehension of *jāti* may be held justified on similar grounds.

Prabhākara says that such an apprehension is totally unfounded in view of the fact that *gatitva*, in his view, is neither a *jāti* (like *gotva* for *jāti* is displayed only in configuration) nor is it an *akhaṇḍopādhi* or an unanalysable characteristic (like *ābhāvatva*) for *gatitva* is but the state of an act leading to the space and thus an analysable

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1. एवञ्च गोत्वादिशक्तिज्ञानत्वेन जनकतायां विषयतयावच्छेदकत्वाद् गोत्वादिरेव गवादिपदस्यार्थः । श. श. प्र. p. 96.
2. ननु गौत्वस्यैव गोपदशक्यत्वेन गौर्गोपदशक्येति कथं व्यवहारः ? कृष्णकान्ती. p. 96.
3. गवादौ तद्व्यवहारस्तु तादृशावच्छेदकधर्मवत्ताप्रयुक्तो गौणः । श. श. प्र. p. 96.

   तादृशेति । गोत्वशक्ताज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नशाब्दधीजनकतावच्छेदकतानिरूपितावच्छेदकताश्रयरूपशक्यसम्बन्धप्रयुक्त इत्यर्थः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 96.

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characteristic only while it is a *jāti* or an *akhaṇḍopādhi* alone that is liable to be comprehended *per se* and nothing else. As such, the comprehension of *gati* cannot be held to be caused by knowledge of import of the word *gam* to the effect that it is denotative of *gatitva* in the manner the comprehension of the individual go is explained.

It is imperative, therefore, argues Prabhākara that the word *gam* be held to be denotative of what is qualified by the state of an act (or *kriyā*) leading to the attainment of contact with the space ahead instead of what is qualified by the state of the state of an act leading to the attainment of the space ahead, in view of the simplicity involved in such an explanation.[1]

It is to be noted, however, says Prabhākara, that the root-verb *pat* is denotative of *patanatva*, an unanalysable characteristic. As for *patanatva* being recognised as an un-analysable characteristic, Prabhākara points out that otherwise the *kāryatāvacchedaka* of *gurutva* would come to be complex.[2]

In case *śakti* or import of a word is admitted to be in respect of an un-analysable characteristic too (i.e., if a word is held to be denotative of an *akhaṇḍopādhi*) then does not the theory that a word is denotative of *jāti* alone, get a jolt ?

Obviously it does not for : The spirit under-lying the said theory is that a word is not denotative of the individual.[3]

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1. गुरूणां गतित्वादेः संस्थानाव्यङ्गत्वेन जातित्वासम्भवात् उत्तरसंयोगाद्यवच्छिन्नक्रियात्वाद्युपाधिरूपे च तत्र स्वरूपतः शक्तिग्रहायोगात्, सखण्डस्य निरवच्छिन्नप्रकारकत्वाभावात्। निरुक्तक्रियात्वत्वावच्छिन्नशक्तत्वाज्ञानत्वेन हेतुतामपेक्ष्य लघुतया तादृशं क्रियात्वावच्छिन्नशक्तिमत्त्वज्ञानत्वेनैव तथात्वौचित्यात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 96-97.

2. गुरुत्वादिप्रयोज्यस्य पतनत्वादेरखण्डोपाधित्वे पत्यादिधातूनां तत्र शक्तत्वेऽपि चरित्यभावात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 97–98.

3. जातावेवेत्यवकारस्य व्यक्तिव्यवच्छेदमात्रफलकत्वात् अखण्डधर्मे शक्तिस्वीकारेऽपि तादृशसिद्धान्तव्याघाताभावादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 97.

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But what will happen in the case of a word iike *paśu* for *paśutva* is not a *jāti*.[1] Hence the said word has to be admitted to be denotative not only of *paśutva* that has turned out to be a mere trait signifying the state of having a tail with hair but also of what is possessed of such *paśutva*.

On the analogy of *jāti-vyakti-tulya-vitti-vedyatā*, *svāśraya-tulya-vitti-vedyatā* may, however, be conceived to explain the comprehension of the individual *paśu*, the *āśraya* or the locus of *paśutva* in respect of which, the word *paśu* has been known to be denotative. In other words, the knowledge of import of the word *go* is that the word *go* is denotative of *gotva*. Yet the individual *go* comes to be verbally comprehended ultimately. In the same way, the knowledge of import of the word *paśu* is that the said word is denotative of *paśutva* (which is although not a *jāti*). Yet the individual *paśu*—the *āśraya* thereof (*paśutva*) would be liable of the verbal comprehension.

But there is difficulty : In *loma-vallāngulavān deśaḥ*, *paśutva* or *lomavallāngula* or a tail with hair has come to be verbally comprehended while the locus or the *āśraya* viz, *paśu* has failed to be so comprehended. On the contrary, it is *deśa* or space that has been posited as the substantive with which *paśutva* or *lomavallāngula* has been related through the relation of *saṁyoga*. The theory of *svāśraya-tulya-vitti-vedyatā* cannot justify the situation. The analogy of *gotva-śaktatā-jñāna* vis-a-vis the verbal comprehension of the individual *go* could not be insisted upon for *gotva* is a *jāti*.[2] The word *paśu*, therefore, is held to be denotative of *pasutva* only. Thus concludes Prabhākara.

Jagadīśa disapproves this theory of Prabhākara. The theory has failed, points out Jagadīśa, to properly account

1. पशुत्वादेस्तेजस्त्वादिना साङ्कर्य्येण जातित्वाभावादिति। ibid., p. 97.
2. पश्वादिपदानामपि लोमलाङ्गुलादिपर्यवसिते पशुत्वादिमात्रे न शक्तिः, तस्य तत्र वृत्तिग्रहोत्तरं तन्मात्रस्यैवानुभवेन तदाश्रयस्यालाभात्; लोमादीनां स्वाश्रयतुल्यवित्तिवेद्यत्वस्य लोमवल्लाङ्गुलवान् देश इत्याद्यनुभवे व्यभिचारादिति प्राहुः। श. श. प्र. p. 98.

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for the verbal comprehension of the individual, *go*. It is logically untenable, he argues, to hold that the individual *go* is liable to be *ip so facto* comprehended with the comprehension of *gotva*—notwithstanding the fact that in the knowledge of import, the individual *go* did not figure. It almost amounts to saying that the verbal comprehension of the individual go is uncaused—an idea that militates against the law of causality.

Moreover, if in the case of verbal knowledge, it is accepted that the individual *go*, even without being posited in the knowledge of import, is liable to be verbally comprehended, there is every reason to hold that the *pakṣa* or the subject, without being ever posited in the *parāmarśa* or consideration, could be posited as the substantive of an inferential knowledge of the *sādhya*. The fact is that a *parāmarśa* has to be *pakṣa-dharmika* and *sādhya-vyāpya-hetu-prakāraka* so that *anumiti* could be *pakṣa-dharmika* and *sādhya-prakāraka*. In the case of verbal knowledge too, it is pointed out that *gotva-prakāraka-go-viśeṣyaka-śābda-bodha* could occur only in case the *śaktī-jñāna* comes to be *gotva-prakāraka-go-viśeṣyaka*.

It could be argued that the situation in an inferential knowledge is different on the ground that unless the *pakṣa* comes to figure in the *parāmarśa* no causal relation comes to be established between *parāmarśa* and *anumiti* on the score that for every individual case of inference the specific knowledge of the fact that the *pakṣa* concerned is possessed of what is con-comitant with the *sādhya* is essential. But Jagadīśa refutes the above argument. *Parāmarśa* is to occasion an inference in general by virtue of being a knowledge in general in view of the simplicity involved in respect of the determinant of causality, against *tat-pakṣa-tat-sādhya-vyāpya-vattā'vagāhi-niścayatva*. Only *jñānatva* should come out to be the said determinant. It could again be argued that unless the *pakṣa* figures in the *parāmarśa* (i.e., unless in the *parāmarśa* the *sādhya-vyāpya–hetu* or the *hetu* concomitant with the *sādhya* comes to form the content thereof by way of the feature against

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the *pakṣa*), the apprehension of the *sādhya* posited by way of the feature against the *pakṣa* by way of inference would be uncalled for. In an inference a well-determined *pakṣa* has to be posited against. For the rule is that the knowledge that occurs close to the heels of *parāmarśa* (or consideration) involving a subject alone could have the *sādhya* posited as the feature against that subject.[1] *Parāmarśottara-jñāna* means *pakṣatādi-sahakṛta-parāmarśottara-jñāna* and thus a *pratyakṣa-jñāna* occuring subsequent to *parāmarśa* is not regarded as a *parāmarśottara-jñāna.*

The Logicians further point out that in case the word *go* happens to be denotative of the *gotva-jāti* only, then a sentence like *gaur gacchati* will emerge as an unauthoritative statement in view of the fact that *gotva*—the denoted meaning cannot be syntictically related to *gatimattva*, the other word-meaning. On the contrary, a statement like *gaur nityā* comes to be regarded as an authoritative statement in view of the reasonableness involved in the syntactical relation of *gotva* and *nityatva.*[2]

To justify the validity of the statement *gaur gacchati*, the Mīmāṁsakas hold that *gati-mattva* is related to *gotva* through the relation of *svāśritā'śritatva* as in the view of Logicians in *gaur nityā*, *nityatva* is held to be related to *go*, the individual, held to be the denoted meaning of the word *go* through the relation of *svāśritā'śrayatva.*[3]

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1. तत्र ब्रूमः—शाब्दमतेर्गवादिव्यक्त्यवगाहित्वमवश्यङ्कारणप्रयोज्यं जन्यधी-विषयितायास्तत्प्रयोज्यत्वनियमादन्यथा पक्षधर्मिकसाध्याद्यवगाहितादेरपि परामर्शादिप्रयोज्यता न स्यादित्यनुमितिसामान्यं प्रत्येव ज्ञानत्वादिना हेतुत्वस्य लाघवेनौचित्यात्; पक्षतादिसहकृतपरामर्शाद्युत्तरज्ञानस्य तत्प्रकाश-स्यैव वा पक्षे साध्यावगाहित्वनियमादेवानुमित्यादेः प्रतिनियतपक्षाद्यवगाहित्व-सिद्धेः। श. श. प्र. pp. 99-101.
2. जातेरेव शक्यत्वे गौर्गच्छतीत्यादिवाक्यस्याप्रामाण्यं, प्रत्युत गौर्नित्या इत्यादिवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं स्यादित्यपि दोषः सम्भवति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 101.
3. Vide कृष्णकान्ती p. 101.

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As a result, it has to be conceded, argues Jagadīśa, that the word *go* cannot invariably lead to the verbal knowledge of *gotva* directly and as such it is not liable to be recognised as what is capable of denoting *gotva* inasmuch as a word is held to be capable of denoting a certain meaning only in case it bears out the direct verbal knowledge of the said meaning through the relation of immediate precedence[1]. The fact is that *gotva* is comprehended, subsequent to the verbal knowledge.

It must not also be argued, says Jagadīśa, that the word *go* denotes *gotva* by virtue of being endowed with what is known as *abhidhā*; for there is no reason to admit a distinct category like that.[2]

The idea of regarding the word *go* as denotative of *gotva* on the ground of its causing the knowledge thereof also is not reasonable. For the word *paṭa* while causing a synthetic kind of knowledge known as *samūhālambana-jñāna* as in *'gaur dravyaṁ paṭaśca rūpavān'* comes to cause the knowledge of *gotva* also. It cannot be held that the word *go* is denotative of *gotva* because it causes the knowledge in general of *gotva* as such. For the word *gotva* obviously does not mean *gotva* when comprehended as a *prameya*.[3]

The view that the word *go* is endowed with the *saṁketa* (or the conventional import) in regard to *gotva* in the sense that

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1. किञ्च गोशक्तत्वं न गोत्वसमर्थत्वं यस्य धीरन्वयधीहेतुरप्रसिद्धत्वात्। श. श. प्र. 101.

   समर्थत्वमव्यवहितपूर्वत्वसम्बन्धेन गोत्वान्वयबोधविशिष्टत्वम्। जनकत्वमित्यपि कश्चित्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 101.

2. नापि तद्बोधरमभिधानामकपदार्थान्तरम्, तत्र मानाभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 101.

3. न वा गोत्वानुभवजनकत्वं; पटादिपदस्यापि गोत्वशक्तत्वापत्तेस्तस्यापि गवादिपदाकांक्षासाचिव्येन गोत्वानुभवजनकत्वात्। न च गोत्वानुभवसामान्यं प्रति हेतुत्वं तथा, गवादिपदेऽप्यसरत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 101–2.

   Vide also कृष्णकान्ती pp. 101-2.

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there is a desire eternal or otherwise to the effect that may the word *go* bear out the cognition of *gotva (gopadam gotvā'nubhava-janakaṁ bhavatu)* is equally unreasonable, says Jagadīśa.[1]

Jagadīśa points out that parallel to the knowledge—*go-padaṁ gotvā'-nubhava-janakatayā saṁketitam* (or that the word *go* has been designed to bear out the knowledge of *gotva*) there may arise the knowledge *gopadaṁ-go-viśeṣyaka-gotvā'nubhava-janakatayā na saṁketitam* (or that the word *go* has not been designed to bear out the knowledge of *gotva* posited by way of the feature against *go*, the individual, posited by way of the substantive). There is no reason to hold that the knowledge of the word *go*, not being designed to bear out the knowledge of *gotva* posited by way of the feature against the individual *go*, would stand in the way of the knowledge that the said word is designed to bear out the knowledge of *gotva*. For the knowledge of the negation of something in particular does not run counter to the knowledge of its assertion in general. The knowledge of *Nīla-ghaṭā'bhāva* does not stand in the way of the knowledge of *ghaṭa-bhāva*.

Such being the case, the knowledge to the effect that the word *go* has been designed to bear out the knowledge of *gotva* would lead to the verbal knowledge of *gotva* posited by way of the feature against the individual *go*. The knowledge that the word *go* has not been designed to bear out the knowledge of *gotva* posited by way of the feature against the individual *go* would result in the verbal knowledge of the negation of *go*, the individual, with *gotva* posited by way of the feature thereof. Thus an absurd situation is created, points out Jagadīśa.

Hence it is but reasonable to hold that the knowledge of convention in respect of the word *go* should be that it is designed to bear out the knowledge of *gotva* posited by way of the feature against the individual, *go*.

As a result, the verbal knowledge of *gotva* comes to be rooted in the knowledge of import of the word *go*, in which

1. नापि गोत्वानुभवजनकत्वप्रकारकनिस्यसङ्केतवत्त्वं तादृशसङ्केतवत्त्वमात्रं वा गोशक्तत्वमिति साम्प्रतम्। श. श. प्र. p. 102.

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gotva and *go*, the individual, figure as contents. In other words, both *gotva* and *go*, the individual, are to be the determinants of causality (*janakatā'- vacchedaka*) inherent in the knowledge of import of the word *go*, towards the verbal knowledge of *gotva*. It is inevitable, therefore, concludes Jagadīśa, that *gotva-viśiṣṭa* or what is qualified by *gotva* (or the individual *go* as qualified by *gotva*) be regarded the denotated meaning of the word *go*.[1]

Word and the knowledge of its import :

All said and done, the question still remains as to how should the conventional import or rather the import of a word be initially apprehended ? Definitely not by way of an analogy or through a lexicon or by way of an exposition thereof or on the basis of its co-existence with a word of well-known meaning or through a supplementary statement, says Jagadīśa. For none of these ever exist by way of an aid to the uninitiated child, prior to the knowledge of the import in view of the fact that these are all rooted in the knowledge of import. to be caused by usage.[2]

In fact verbal knowledge works at the root of one's inclination (*pravṛtti*). Through the observation of one's inclination vis-a-vis the sentence subsequent to the listening of which one has been found to be thus inclined, one determines the conventional import of a word. The senior elder (*uttama-vṛddha*) utters the words or the sentence *gām ānaya* (bring the cow) and the child (*pṛthuka*) who is to be initated to the language observes that on hearing

1. गोपदं गोत्वेन गवानुभवस्य जनकतया न सङ्केतितमित्यादिग्रहेऽपि तस्य ग्रहाद् गोत्वेन गोरन्वयधीप्रसङ्गात्। किन्तु गोत्वेन गवानुभवस्य जनकतया सङ्केतितत्वं; तथा च पदधर्मिकतज्ज्ञानत्वेन गोत्वप्रकारकशाब्दं प्रति हेतुतायां गोत्वस्येव तद्विशिष्टस्य गोरपि विषयविधयाऽवच्छेदकत्वादवश्यं गोत्वादि-विशिष्टो गवादिर्गवादिपदस्यार्थः। श. श. प्र. pp. 102–3.
2. निरुक्तस्यैव सङ्केतस्य कुतः प्रथमतो ग्रहः? नोपमानान्न कोषान्न विवरणान्न प्रसिद्धार्थशब्दसामानाधिकरण्यान्नहि वाक्यशेषादमीषां शक्तिग्रहमूलकत्वेन पूर्वं पृथुकस्य कस्यापि तदसत्त्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 193.

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the said words or the sentence uttered by the senior elder, the junior elder (*madhyama-vṛddha*) proceeds to fetch the cow. In other words, the child observes that the junior elder physically moves to fetch the cow or that he is possessed of physical efforts (*ceṣṭā*) involved in the act of fetching a cow. The child thereupon starts inferring that the physical efforts on the part of the junior elder must be rooted in his cognition and the junior elder must have had a resolve to undertake the act.

He thinks to himself that the act of bringing the cow must have been undertaken by the junior elder because he has been inclined thereto. For it involves physical efforts like the act of his sucking the mother's breasts. He further goes on reasoning that the inclination on the part of the junior elder towards the act of bringing the cow is due to the knowledge of what-ought-to-be-done (*kāryatā-jñāna*) in respect of the act of bringing the cow. The idea is that the plan that the junior elder had decided upon had its roots in his desire to do the job and the correspondidg desire was rooted in the knowledge to the effect that he is capable of doing the job or that it is his duty to do the job. The whole thing, therefore, comes to be ultimately rooted in the knowledge by the junior elder, of the meaning of the sentence uttered by the senior elder The child realises that the *kāryatā-jñāna* (or the knowledge of what-ought-to-be-done) occuring to the-junior elder must have had a specific (*asādhāraṇa*) cause and he finds out that the sentence uttered by the senior elder is the said cause. For it readily presents itself as such and also because there is simplicity in admitting such a cause. It is a bewildering business to look for some other cause. The child, therefore, concludes that the said *kāryatā-jñāna* on the part of the junior elder to the effect that bringing the cow was a matter of duty for him (*gavānayanam mama kāryam*) has come to be caused by the sentence—'bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*) uttered by the senior elder.

But this is not enough. The child realises that but for a *vākya* or a sentence, no *vākhyārtha-jñāna* or the

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knowledge of a sentence-meaning ever occurs and but for words or *padas*, no *vākya* or sentence is formed. Not only that : The knowledge of import or the denotative function of a word is inevitable before the verbal knowledge or the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence occurs or that the meaning of a sentence is realised. The child thus discovers that in the process of a verbal knowledge, a word like *go* must present its meaning (*padārtha*) through the recollection of which verbal knowledge occurs. Therepon he argues within himself that as the verbal knowledge of the given *padārtha* occurs, consequent upon the use of a specific word, and that the said word not being in use results in the non-occurrence of the verbal knowledge of the said *padārtha*, the said word must have an intrinsic relation with the said *padārtha*. This relation is what is called *saṁketa* and the knowledge of *saṁketa* is considered to be the cause of verbal knowledge.[1]

Subsequently, however, the knowledge of import happens to be caused by analogy and the like. In analogy (*upamiti*) what happens is that one hears a statement of comparison like *go-sadṛśo gavayaḥ* or the species called *gavaya* is similar to *go* or the cow. One proceeds thereafter to a *gavaya*. He perceives the semblance of *go* in *gavaya*. This knowledge of the semblance (*go-sādṛśya-jñāna*), may be described as *go-pratiyogika-gvayānuyogika-jñāna*. Thereupon, one has the *smṛti* or recollection of the statement of comparison '*go-sādṛśo gavāyaḥ*' by way of *vyāpāra*—(the knowledge of semblanac—*sādṛśya-jñāna* being the cause or *karaṇa*). As a result of this *upamiti* viz, '*gavayo gavaya-pada-vācyaḥ*' or *gavaya* is the denoted meaning of the word *gavaya* occurs. The whole process reveals that *upamiti* is the result of the recollection of a sentence-meaning (or *vākyārtha-smṛti*) rooted in the *saṁskāra* born of an earlier knowledge of a sentence-meaning or *vākyārtha-jñāna* through the process of *śakti-graha*. Thus

1. Vide श. श. प्र. pp. 103–105.

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upamāna or analogy is said to be causing the knowledge of import, itself being the result of *śakti-graha.*[1]

It is to be noted that Jagadīśa does away with the chronology spoken of in the verse–*śakti-graham vyākaraṇopamāna-kośā'pta-vākyād vyavaharataś ca|vākyasya śeṣād vivṛter vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddha-padasya vṛddhāḥ||.*[2] He is of the opinion that the initial knowledge of import is due to usage or *vṛddha-vyavahāra,* as it is so called. *Upamāna* (or analogy) and the like are only the so many subsquent sources of such knowledge. The idea is that usage must initially bear out the knowledge of import of words. Without usage, anology and the like would be of no use. One must learn the language first before one could understand the technicalities involved in analogy and the like.

Some times from grammar[3] also, the knowledge of import occurs. In the *sūtras* like *karmaṇi dvitīyā* or *kartari parasmai-padam* and so on, *dvitīyā* is said to be denotative of *karmatva* or the *parasmaipada* kind of verbal termination of *kartṛtva* and so on.

From lexicons also sometimes the knowledge of import is caused. It is said that words like *śukla* is to be used in the masculine gender to give the sense of whiteness, the quality, But when such a word is used in the sense of what is possessed of such quality it takes to the gender of that which is so qualified. The word *śītam,* however, even when used in the sense of a quality (coldness) is used in neuter gender; while the words used to denote things possessed thereof are used in the masculine gender—*suśītmaḥ, śiśiraḥ* or *jaḍaḥ.* These are some instances in point. The word *kṣodaḥ,* used in the sense of dust (*cūrṇa*), takes to masculine gender.

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1. पश्चादेवोपमानाद्यैः शक्तिधोपूर्वकैरसौ । श. श. प्र. Kā. 20.
2. Vide न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली । p. 341.
3. क्वचिद् व्याकरणात्, यथा 'कर्मणि द्वितीया', कर्तरि परस्मैपदमित्याद्यनुशासनात् कर्मत्वादौ द्वितीयादेः । श. श. प्र. p. 106.

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So do the words *samutpiñja* and *piñjala* used in the sense of one who is bewilered to the extreme.[1]

Sometimes the knowledge of import is also found liable to be caused through or vivaraṇa, as it is called. The knowledge of import in respect of the verbal termination *ti* in *pacati* is achieved by way of an expository sentence like '*pacatipākam karoti*'. This brings out that '*ti*' is denotative of *kṛti*.[2]

The knowledge of import at times is caused by the co-ordinate use of a word with another word or words of well-known meaning. In '*nīrūpa-sparśavān vāyurnisparśaṁ mūrti-man manaḥ*' (the air is without colour with touch and mind is without touch of limited dimension), for example, the word *vāyu* and the word *mana* are known to be denotative of what are denoted by the words *nīrūpa-sparśavān* and *nisparsaṃ mūrtimat* respectvely, co-ordinately used with *vāyu* and *manas*.

Controverses are there in respect of *vāyu*. The knowledge of import is liable to occur through the co-ordinate use of a word only in case the situation cannot be explained otherwise. The word *vāyu*, it is argued, may give the knowledge of *vāyu* or air which is known by perception, as held by the elders.[3] Thc followers of Prabhākara also hold that *vāyu* is liable to perception and as such, the word *vāyu* should denote what is qualified by *vāyutva*, a *jāti*.[4] Hence is the other instance—*nisparśam mūrti-man manaḥ* cited.

Here again it is argued that the knowledge of import of the word *vāya* might be held to have occured by the

1. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 106.
2. क्वचिद् विवरणादपि, यथा पचति, पाकं करोतीति तुल्यार्थंकवाक्यात्. कृत्यादौ तिङादेः। ibid., p. 107.
3. ननु यत्र प्रकारान्तरेण शक्तिग्रहो न सम्भवति तत्रैव पदसान्निध्यस्य तथात्वं कल्प्यते, अत्र तु प्रत्यक्षतोऽपि शक्तिग्रहः सम्भवति, प्राच्यैर्वायोरपि प्रत्यक्षत्व-स्वीकारात् ? कृष्णकान्ती p. 107.
4. गुरुमते वायोरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वाङ्गीकारात् वायुत्वविशिष्ट एव प्रत्यक्षत एव शक्तिग्रहसम्भवात्। रामभद्री p. 107.

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very presence of the word *vāyu*, a word of wellknown meaning. But such argument is unfounded. For the word *vāyu* has no well-known meaning.[1] The *vāyutva-jāti* being a supersensuous phenomenon, says Jagadīśa, it cannot be held that anything qualified thereby *per se* in ever liable to be comprehended by way of the word-meaning of the word *vāyu*.[2] This is so although through the contact of a common feature like *prameyatva*, technically known as *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*, *vāyu* is liable to be apprehended by way of an extra-ordinary perception.[3] Similarly the knowledge of import of the word *manas*, is held to be caused by its co-ordinate use with the words *nisparśaṃ mūrtimat*.

Here also problems arise. It is argued that the knowledge of import of the word *manas* is liable to be caused in a direct way on seeing *truṭitva* for *manas* is but *truṭi*.[4]

In fact, says Jagadīśa, the relevant instance in reference to the knowledge of import through the co-ordinate use of a word should be—*sat-kṛtyā'laṁkaṛtāṁ kyāṁ dadānaḥ kukudaḥ smṛtaḥ*—(one who gives away one's daughter with (suitable) ornaments and having undergone the (relevant) religious performances, in mariage is known as *kukuda*). Here the knowledge of import of the word *kukuda* is caused by the use thereof co-ordinately with the clause '*satkṛtyā'laṁ-kṛtāṃ kanyāṃ dadānaḥ*.[5]

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1. वायुपदस्य प्रसिद्धार्थत्वमेव नास्ति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 107.
2. वाय्वादिपदस्य वायुत्वादिजातेरतीन्द्रियत्वेन स्वरूपतस्तदवच्छिन्नस्यानुपस्थित्या तत्र शक्तिग्रहायोगात् । श. श. प्र. pp. 107–8.
3. Vide कृष्णकान्ती p. 107.
4. ननु नव्यमते मनस एवाभावात् त्रुटावेव विश्रामात् त्रुटित्व-विशिष्ट एव प्रत्यक्षत एव शक्तिग्रहसम्भवात् नेदं युक्तम् ? रामभद्री p. 108.
   Vide also कृष्णकान्ती p. 108.
5. यथा वा 'सत्कृत्यालङ्कृतां कन्यां ददानः कुकुदः स्मृतः' इत्यादावुक्तरीत्या कन्यादात्रादिषु कुकुदादिपदस्य । श. श. प्र. p. 108.
   अत्र निरुक्तकन्यादातृत्वस्यैव कुकुदपदशक्यतावच्छेदकतया तस्यातीन्द्रियकालादिघटितत्वेना प्रत्यक्षत्वान्नप्रत्यक्षतः शक्तिग्रहसम्भवः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 108.

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The example given in this connection by the author of *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* viz, *'iha sahakārataraṇ madhuraṃ rauti pikaḥ'* is not accepted by Jagadīśa,[1] as a cogent instance of the knowledge of import of a word, to have been caused by its co-ordinate with another word or words of well-known meaning. In this example, if the knowledge of import of the word *pika* is to be caused by its co-ordinate use with the clause (*iha*) *sahakārataraṇ madhuraṃ rauti*, then in verbal cognition *pika* is to be understood as *sāhakārataraṇ mādhuraṃ ravānukulakṛtimān*. But in such an interpretation the meaning of a nominal will come to be related to the meaning of a verbal termination. This is against the norm of Semantics.

The argument of Jagadīśa is not very convincing. The theory that a verbal termination denotes *kṛtimān* is not accepted by the Logicians. In fact the said kind of verbal knowledge, objected to here has been endorsed by Jagadīśa, himself.[2]

Jagadīśa puts forward another argument in support of his view against the author of *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*. He says that the knowledge of import of the word *pika* is possible. *Kokilatva-jāti* is a matter of simple perception and what is qualified by the said *jāti* is regarded as the denoted meaning of the word *pika*. In comparison with the view that the knowledge of import of the word *pika* is due its co-ordinate use with the clause *sahakārataraṇ madhuraṃ rauti*, there is simplicity in the view that the word is known to denote the cuckoo through *jāti*, *kokilatva*—an object of simple perception.[3]

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1. इह सहकारतरौ मधुरं रौति पिकः इत्यादिकस्तु न युक्तमुक्त-क्रमेण शक्तिग्रहस्योदाहरणं तिङर्थे धर्मिण्यभेदेन नामार्थान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 108.

2. यो यः शूद्रस्यान्नं पचति सोऽतिनिन्दितः इत्यादौ तादृशबोधस्य स्वयं स्वीकर्त्तव्यत्वाच्च तादृशव्युत्पत्तिर्न सर्वसिद्धा—कृष्णकान्ती p. 108.

3. प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे कोकिलत्वजात्यवच्छिन्न एव लाघवेन पिकशब्दस्य शक्त्यवच्छेदाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 108-9.

लाघवेनेति। असिद्धार्थपदसान्निध्यस्य शक्तिग्राहकत्वमपेक्षयेत्यादिः। रामभद्री p. 109.

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Sometimes the knowledge of import of a word occurs through *vākya-śeṣa* or supplementary observation, as in the case of the word *yava*. The outlanders (*mlecchas*) use the said word in the sense of what is called *kaṅgu*, while the elites in the sense of the corn with long horns. As a result, it becomes difficult to ascertain the import of the said word in reference to a definite object. Nor is it reasonable to hold that a word could denote multiple things. There arises, therefore, a doubt as to the meaning it should denote. In the Vedic injunction–'*yava-mayaś carur bhāvati*' (—the *caru* or the oblation in the *iṣṭi* kind of a sacrifice is to be made of *yava*), therefore, the supplementary statement–*vasante sarva-saśyānām jāyate patra-śātanam|modamānās tu tiṣṭhanti yavāḥ kaṇiśa-śālinaḥ* // (in the Spring there occurs the fall or loss of leaves to all kinds of corn. Only the *yava* plants (*yavāḥ*) with their full-grown corn-flowers remain flourshing with their leaves in tact is taken into accout and the knowledge of import of the word *yavāḥ* is achieved in the process. The said word is held to mean the corn with long horns. The aforesaid supplementary statement is taken as an aid in ascertaining the denoted meaning of the said word *yava*.[1]

A similar instance of the knowledge of import through a supplementary statement is found in respect of the word *sva* in the Vedic injunction *svārājya-kāmo yajeta*. The word *sva* is said, by way of a supplementory observation, to mean a kind of pleasure not alloyed with misery or engulfed thereby at a later stage, and presented the moment it is thought of.[2]

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1. क्वचिद् वाक्यशेषादपि । यथा यवपदस्य कङ्गुप्रभृतौ म्लेच्छानां, दीर्घशूके च शिष्टानाम्, व्यवहारादेकमात्रे शक्तेः परिच्छेत्तुमशक्यत्वात्, नानार्थकस्य चान्याय्यत्वात्, यवमयश्चरुर्भवतीति श्रुतौ यवपदस्यार्थसन्देहे, वसन्ते··· इति विध्यर्थाकाङ्क्षया प्रवर्त्तमानाद्वाक्यशेषाद् दीर्घशूके एव यवपदस्य शक्तिग्रहः । श. श. प्र. pp. 109–110.

2. श. श. प्र. pp. 109–113.

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Prabhākara raises a problem : It has been found that verbal knowledge arising in the junior elder of *kāryatā* or the state of *what-aught-to-be-done* in respect of *gavānayana* or the act of bringing a cow is deduced syllogistically from the movement of the junior elder on his listening to the words *gām ānaya* uttered by the senior elder in the form of a sentence. The sentence again is understood by the junior elder to have been constituted of words of which one is denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*. The cause of the verbal knowledge, therefore, is found to be the word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* or at best the words expeectant of a word denotative of the state *what-ought-to-be-done*. The knowledge of import is an auxiliary cause of verbal knowledge. It takes shape only through the inference of the *kāryatā-jñāna* from *pravṛtti* or inclination.[1] As such, concludes Prabhākara, Lexicons, or expository statements (*vivṛti* or) even subsequent observations (*vidhi-śeṣa*) should not be regarded as the independent means of *śakti-graha* or the knowledge of import. Lexicon etc. are either words used individually or words un-expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* like the *arthā-vāda* kind of sentence. They are, therefore, incapable of causing verbal knowledge.[2]

Jagadīśa says in reply that at the initial stage, verbal knowledge may have been caused by the words expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*. Applying the methods of relation and difference, the *pṛthuka* or the boy or one who is yet to be initiated in the langnage deduces like this : Because of the words in the

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1. ननु व्यवहारादनुमिते गवाद्यानयनधर्मिककार्यत्वस्यान्वयज्ञाने पदानां प्रथमतः कारणत्वं साकांक्षपदत्वावच्छेदेन गृहीतमुपस्थितत्वादतस्तदुपपत्तये शाब्द-सामान्यं प्रत्यवश्यं कार्यतावाच्चिपदस्य तत्साकांक्षपदस्य वा हेतुत्वमुपेतव्यम् । श. श. प्र. p. 114.

2. तथा च कथं केवलकोषादितः शक्तिग्रहस्तस्य विध्यनाकाङ्क्षत्वेनार्थवादतया शाब्दबोधानर्जकत्वादिति । श. श. प्र. p. 114–15.

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sentence *gām ānaya* being expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*, that the verbal knowledge of the state of *what-ought-to-be done*, in respect of the act of bringing the cow has come to occur. But later, the boy himself comes to observe that but for such a word even verbal knowledge comes to occur. He has reasons, therefore, to discard his earlier view.[1]

It is no argument, says Jagadīśa, that once accepted, words expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*, could not be discarded as the cause of verbal knowledge; for such a con-comitance would lead to a dangerous situation. The image once reflected on mirror cannot be admitted to be there even after the mirror is taken away.[2]

Prabhākara argues that causality of verbal knowledge is to be acknowledged inherent in words expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be done* in view of the fact that the said causality has been found to be initially presented thus characterised. Jagadīśa refutes that there is not much of logic in it. In '*paṭa-janakaṁ deya–dravyaṁ*', for example, the cause of *paṭa* is *tantu* or thread or what is characterised by *tantutva*. In other words, *tantu* is the cause of *paṭa* by virtue of the fact that *tantu* is characterised by *tantutva* collocative with *deya-dravyatva*, and not by *deya-dravyaṭa*. This is so although in *paṭa - janakaṃ deya - dravyaṃ*, *deya-dravyatva* apparently presents itself as the characteristic of *tantu*, the cause of *paṭa*. It is no argument, therefore, concludes Jagadīśa, to hold that words are to be regarded as the cause of verbal knowledge by virtue of their being expectant of a word denotative of the state of

1. कार्यत्वस्यान्वयज्ञाने प्राग् गृहीतापि हेतुता।
पदानामर्थवादेभ्यः पश्चाद् बोधादुपेक्ष्यते॥ श. श. प्र. कारिका 21.
साकांक्षपदत्वावच्छेदेन कार्यताधीजनकत्वं पूर्वंगृहीतमप्युत्तरकालमर्थवादेभ्यः शाब्दबोधानुरोधादुपेक्ष्यते। ibid., p. 115.
2. पूर्वंगृहीतस्यापरिहार्यत्वस्यानियमात्, प्रतिबिम्बिते वस्तुनि व्यभिचारात्। ibid., p. 115.

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what ought-to-be-done on the plea that this way they have been presented as the cause of verbal knowledge.[1]

The association of *tantutva* with the causality in *tantu* could not be brushed aside saying that what is qualified by *deya-dravyatva* has been the cause of *paṭa* and that *deya-dravyatva* has come to be presented as the characteristic of what is denoted by the word *deya-dravya*. For *anyathā-khyāti* would have to be inevitably admitted in that case, quite contrary to the view held by Prabhākara.[2]

Prabhākara prefers to hold that as words expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* have once been found to be the cause of verbal knowledge, an *arthavāda-vākya* or a sentence comprised of words not expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*, cannot cause a verbal knowledge. He further sees reason to say that in the *artha-vāda* kind of a sentence, the sytactical relation of the word-meanings is not apprehended and the claim that the said word-meanings are not syntactically related is missed on the contrary and the apparent verbal knowledge as caused thereby is only a pious thinking.

Prabhākara further argues that if in addition to the words expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought to-be-done*, word expectant of words denotative otherwise, are admitted to be the cause of verbal knowledge, complexities would arise.

Jagadīśa replies. If on the basis of experience alone, it is so held that as words expectant of a word denotative of of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done* are the cause of verbal knowledge, so that words expectant of a word other than that are not the cause of verbal knowledge, then by contary logic one may hold the view that as verbal knowledge is found to be caused by words expectant of a word not

1. न चोपस्थितधर्मावच्छेदेनैव जनकत्वस्य ग्रहनियमः, पटजनकं देयद्रव्य-मित्यादौ तत्सामानाधिकरण्येनापि ग्रहात्। ibid., pp. 115-116.
2. अन्यथाऽन्यथाख्यात्यापत्तेस्तत्रैव दुर्वारतापत्तेः। ibid., p. 116.

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denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*, no verbal knowledge should occur due to words expectant of a word denotative of the state of *what-ought-to-be-done*.[1]

Saṁjñā (Noun) other than the occasional one :

Saṁjñā or Noun has been held to be of three kinds—*naimittikī* or the occasional, *pāribhāṣikī* or the current and *aupādhikī* or the conditional. Of these, the occasional kind has been discussed. It has been seen that it denotes what is qualified by a universal like *gotva*. The *pāribhāṣikī* kind of *Saṁjñā* or the current kind of Noun—on the contrary, denotes what is qualified by a characteristic that abides in only one category. The word *ākāśa*, for example, is the current kind of Noun. It denotes *ākāśa* or the sky that is qualified by *śabda* which inheres only in one single category viz, the *ākāśa* or sky. As for the *aupādhikī saṁjñā* or the conditional kind of Noun, it is pointed out that such a word denotes something which is qualified by what abides in many. Still it is different from the occasional kind of Noun in that what abides in the category denoted by it is only an *upādhi* or a general property other than a *jāti* or universal. In the case of the occasional kind of Noun, it is a *jāti* or a universal that comes to be apprehended.

Ākāśa, therefore, has come to be regarded as a current kind of Noun in that it denotes the sky or what is qualified by *śabda* or sound. Sound inheres in one. It does not inhere in more than one.[2]

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1. न च कार्यतासाकाङ्क्षपदान्तर्भावेनैव शब्दानामन्वयानुभवहेतुत्वस्य क्लृप्तत्वादर्थवादस्थले न शाब्दधीः, परन्त्वसंसर्गाग्रहमात्रमाकाङ्क्षान्तरकल्पने गौरवादिति दाक्ष्यम् । कार्यतानिराकाङ्क्षपदान्तर्भावेणैव शाब्दधीहेतुत्वस्य कल्पनया विधिस्थले न शाब्दधीरित्यस्यापि सुवचत्वात् ; उभयत्राप्यन्वयमतेरानुभाविकत्वेनैकशेषस्य दुष्करत्वादिति दिक्, श. श. प्र. p. 116–117.
2. उभयावृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नसंकेतवती संज्ञा परिभाषिकी, यथाऽऽकाशडित्थादि । श. श. प्र. pp. 118–119.

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It may be argued that the word *ākāśa* need not be held to denote the sky as what is qualified by *śabda* or sound that does not abide in more than one substance and that it denotes the sky (*gagana*) *per se*. If *ākāśa* is held to denote the sky *per se*, Jagadīśa refutes, the word *paṭa* for example also could denote *paṭa per se*. Thus the knowledge of import (*śakti-jñāna*) would be 'the word *paṭa* is denotative of *paṭa* or cloth' *per se* (*paṭa-padaṁ paṭe śaktam*). This might allow the knowledge to the contrary viz, 'the word *paṭa* is not denotative of what is qualified by *paṭatva* (*paṭa-padam paṭatvā'vacchinne ṇa śaktam.*) Once such a knowledge to the contrary happens, the word *paṭa* will not be in a position to denote *paṭa* qualified by *paṭatva*. For no knowledge can occur in the face of a knowledge counter to it, occuring earlier. It is not that at the stage of the verbal knowledge the word *paṭa* denotes *paṭa* per se. For in a verbal knowledge the state of a substantive (*viśeṣyatā*) or the state of a feature *prakāratā* must as a rule be qualified by what determines the said state of a substantive (*viśeṣyatā'vacchedaka*) and what determinates the said state of a feature (*prakaratā'vacchedaka*)[1].

Words like *bhūta* or *dūta* are instances of the *naimittiki saṁjñā* or the conditional kind of Noun. This is denotative of what is qualified by a general property other than a *jāti* or universal.[2] The word *bhūta* means what is qualified by *bhutatva* and the word *dūta* means what is qualified by *vārtāharakatva*. Both are *upādhis* only.

Bhūtatva, for example, means the state of being possessed of the special qualities (*viśeṣa-guṇas*) not abiding in the soul. Special qualities abide in *ātmā* and the five *mahā-bhūtas* only. A *bhūta* or *mahābhūta*, therefore, is one which being other than the soul is possessed of special qualities. *Śabda* or *Sound* in like manner, by virtue of its being an

1. न चाकाशादिपदस्य गगनादौ निरवच्छिन्नैव शक्तिः ? पटादिपदस्यापि पटादौ तादृशशक्त्यापत्तेः । श. श. प्र. p. 119.
2. या चानुगतोपाध्यवच्छिन्ने संकेतवती संज्ञा सा स्वौपाधिकी । ibid., p. 120.

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analysable property (*sakhandatva*), is liable to be recognised an *upādhi*. But *śabda* does not abide in many. The definition of the conditional kind of Noun does not, therefore, cover *ākāśa* denoting 'what is possessed of *śabda* or sound'.

Jagadīśa in this connection refers to the view of those who consider the word *ghaṭa* as of being denotative of what is qualified by the state of being a peculiar aggregation of primary atoms. They propose the idea of regarding the word *ghaṭa* as an instance of the conditional kind of a Noun in so far as it denotes something qualified by an *upādhi* (like 'the state of being possessed of a peculiar aggregation of primary atoms'). If, however, the word *ghaṭa* is taken to denote what is qualified by the state of being a peculiar aggregation of primary atoms indirectly (i.e., through *svāśraya-sambandha*) it may be regarded as an instance of the occasional kind of Noun. As a matter of fact, in a verbal knowledge when a feature like *jati* is comprehended *per se*, it is comprehended through the relation of *samavāya*, as it has been seen earlier. The question of the word like *ghaṭa* ever assuming the character of the occasional kind of noun presenting a meaning qualified by the state of being possessed of a peculiar aggregation of the primary atoms, does not arise.[1]

If a word like *caitra* denotative of what is qualified by *caitratva* and so is the instance of the current kind of Noun, Jagadīśa puts forward alternative definitions of all the different kinds of Noun.

The grammarians admit of *saṅketa* meaning *ichcā* and this *saṅketa* or *icchā* may be of two kinds *ādhunika-saṅketa* or the non-conventional import and *nitya-saṅketa* or the conventional kind of import. The word *caitra* for example, stands for the name given to a boy by his father and as such the word, being denotative of *caitra*, a single individual, is an instance of the current kind of Noun. The said

1. श. श. प्र. 121–22.

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word denotes what is qualified by *caitratva* a universal (*jāti*). This is the case with the *ādhunika-saṅketa* or the non-conventional import. The *nitya-saṅketa* or the conventional kind of an import, on the contrary is twofold—*jāti* and *upādhi*. The word that denotes what is qualified by a generic attribute which is universal (*jāti*) is a word of the occasional kind of Noun and the word denotative of what is qualified by a generic attribute other than an universal (*upādhi*) is the conditional kind of Noun. The word *go*, for example, denotes what is qualified by *gotva*, a universal (*jāti*) and as such it is an instance of the occasional kind of Noun. The word *ākāśa*, on the contrary, denotes what is qualified by *śabda* which is but an *upādhi* and as such it is an instance of the conditional kind of Noun.[1]

It will not be out of place to point out that to Jagadīśa *ādhunika-saṅketa* is merely a *saṅketa* as distinguished from *nitya-saṅketa* which is but *śakti*[2] and he finds support in Bhartṛhari in this context.[3]

Jagadīśa initiates a controversy in regard to the word *go*. He points out that the said word is liable to be designated as the current kind of Noun. It is denotative of what is possessed of *sāsnā* or *dewlap* along with *gotva*, a universal. The idea is that the *śakyatā'vacchedaka* or the determinant of what is denoted by the word *go* is two-fold—*gotva* and *sāsnā*. Through *gotva*, playing the role of *śakyatā'-vacchedaka*; the word *go* is the occasional kind of Noun. But that does not minimise the prospect of its being designated as the current kind of Noun through *sāsnā* as another *śakyatā'-vacchedaka*.

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1. यद्वाऽधुनिकसंकेतशालि स्यात् पारिभाषिकम्।
   जात्या नैमित्तिकं शक्तमौपाधिकमुपाधिना॥
   श. श. प्र. कारिका 23.
2. आधुनिकस्तु संकेतो न शक्तिर्नित्यस्यैव तस्य तथात्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 124.
3. Vide ibid.

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It may be argued, however, that in considering *sāsnā* the *śakyatā'-vacchedaka* a lot of complexities arises. For *sāsnā* is a *dravya* or a substance which cannot be comprehended *per se* (*svarūpataḥ*). *Gotva* on the contrary an *anullikhyamāna-jāti* or a universal not referred to verbally, is liable to be comprehended *per se*.

Jagadīśa reasonably anticipates that in case *sāsna* is not regarded as the *śakyatā'-vacchedaka*, the word need not be held to denote *go* or the cow as possessed of *sāsnā* or the dewlap. He argues that in view of the fact that cow as qualified by both *gotva* and *sāsnā* is comprehended by the word *go*, as a rule, *sāsna* too is to be regarded as determinant of the denotated meaning of the word *go*. He incidently refers to the view of the elders. He quotes the *Nyāya-sūtra jātyākṛti-vyaktayaḥ padārthaḥ* to justify that *sāsnā* (*ākṛti*) also should be denoted by the word *go*. The singular number in the word *padārthaḥ* in the said Sūtra also indicates that all the three *jāti*, *ākṛti* and *vyakti* (i.e., *gotva*, *sāsnā* and *go* the individual) are denoted by the word *go* through one and the same import. Had multiple imports been admitted in the word *go* to denote the three different meanings, the said meanings would have remained unrelated to one another. The import of the word *go* is in *viśiṣṭa-go* or the individual cow qualified by *gotva*, the universal. The word *go* does not denote *gotva* through one import and *go-vyakti* through another. For in that case the verbal knowledge of *gotva-viśiṣṭa-go* or the individual cow as related to *gotva*, the universal, would be impossible.

Moreover, in that case the word *go* would denote three different meanings through three different imports. Then it would no longer be necessary to imagine *lakṣaṇā* in the word *go* in *gaurnityā* or in *gaurguṇaḥ*.[1]

The Neo-logicians argue that the word *padārtha* in the aforesaid Sūtra of Gotama signifies that the word *go* is denotative of *gotvā'-vacchinna-go* or the individual cow

1. श. श. प्र. pp. 128-129.

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qualified by *gotva*, the universal. The *ākṛti*, however, they argue, come, to be comprehended as a denoted meaning of the word *go* at the stage of verbal knowledge by way of qualifying the *go-padārtha* or the individual cow. One might say that the word *go* be held to denote *ākṛti-viśiṣṭa-go* and that *gotva jāti* be the denotated meaning of the word *go* at the stage of verbal knowledge. *Gotva*, the *jāti*, abides in what is qualified by *gotva* through the direct relation of *samavāya* while *saṁsthāna* (*ākṛti*) through the indirect relation of *svāśraya-samavetatva*. *Śva* means *saṁsthāna* (special contact of the atoms producing *go*). Its substratum (*āśraya*) are atoms in which *go*, the individual, inheres (*samaveta*). The Neo-logicians further argue that *gotva*, a *jāti*, cannot be held a denotative meaning of the word for a denotated meaning is to be comprehended in terms of an attribute, as a rule. *Gotva*, therefore, cannot be denoted. The denoted meaning of *go*, therefore is cow, the individual, comperahended in verbal cognition in terms of pure and simple *gotva*, the universal.[1]

Jagadīśa discards[2] the views of both the elders and the Neo-logicians. He says that *puṣpavantau*, *rodasī* and the like are qualified by more than one attribute as *śakyatā'-vacchedaka* although the *śakti* involved is one and the same. The word *puṣpavantau*, for example, denotes the sun and the moon. Thus the *śakyatā'-vacchedakas* are two viz, *candratva* and *sūryatva* which are mutually unrelated, though the import is one and the same. The word *go* in the like manner, he argues, should denote cow or rather the *jātyā'-kṛti-viśiṣṭa-go* or the individual cow as qualified by *gotva-jāti* and *ākṛti* (*saṁsthāna*), two un-related *śakyatā'-vāccheda-kas*, through one and the same *śakti* or import.

As for the word *ākṛti* in the above *Sūtra* of Gotama, Jagadīśa says that it does not mean *saṁsthāna* but only *saṁsarga* between *jāti* or *gotva* and *vyakti* or the individual *cow*. It might be argued that the said *saṁsarga* could be comprehended

1. श. श. प्र. pp. 129-130.
2. ibid., pp. 131-132.

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through *saṁsargamaryādā* or *ākāṁkṣā* or expectancy (arising out of syntax). But such argument is of no avail in the present context, says Jagadīśa. *Saṁsarga* or relation is liable to be comprehended through *saṁsarga-maryādā* (or arising out of syntax) only where the relata are different things presented by different words. In the present case, the two relata are *gotva*, the *jāti* or universal and *cow* the individual. They are the meanings denoted by the same word *go*. As such the *samavāya-sambandha* is not liable to be comprehended by way of *saṁsarga-maryādā*. Thus *samavaya-sāṁsarga* must be provided for otherwise. That is the reason why the word *ākṛti* has been used in the *Sūtra*.[1]

A question may arise that in case *saṁsthāna* is not denoted by the word *go*, then the word *go* should never cause the verbal knowledge of *saṁsthāna-viśiṣṭa-go*. Jagadīśa, therefore, says that the verbal knowledge of *go* as qualified by *sāsnā*, the *dewlap* (*saṁsthāna*), may be justified on the ground of false knowledge of import of the word *go*, embracing *saṁsthāna*. He also argues that the false knowledge of import, if discarded on the ground of the *sāmagrī* or the collection of the causes thereof lacking, the verbal knowledge of cow as qualified by *saṁsthāna* may be held to have been due to *lakṣaṇā* in the word *go*.[2]

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1. सौत्रमाकृतिपदं न संस्थानपरं, परन्तु करणव्युत्पत्त्याऽऽकारनिरूपकं जातिव्यक्त्योः संसर्गपरमेव। श. श. प्र. p. 132.
2. जातिसंस्थानाभ्यां गवादेरवगमो गवादिपदस्य जात्याकृतिविशिष्टे शक्तिभ्रमेण लक्षणया वा सम्पाद्य इति पुनर्न्यायरहस्येऽस्मद्गुरुचरणाः। ibid., p. 132.

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CHAPTER IV

THE CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS AND THE FACULTY OF IMPLICATION

A word or *pada* is defined as what is *śakta* or denotative[1] (of a meaning). *Śakti*, however, does not entirely exhaust the *import* of a word. A word is capable of conveying two meanings. One is direct or primary and the other is secondary or implied. The *faculty* or *vṛtti*, therefore, by which a word signifies a particular thing is held to be twofold—*śakti* or import or expression and *lakṣaṇā* or metaphor or implication. The first is rooted in *saṅketa* or convention. The second operates when *śakti* is ineffective and is derived from and is entirely dependent on *śakti*. The definition of a *pada* or word, viz, what is *śakta* also accomodates *lākṣaṇika pada* as well. Unless a *pada* is *śakta*, it can never be *lākṣaṇika*.

Lakṣaṇā is, therefore, defined as *sva-śakya-sambandha* or *śakya-sambandha* or connection with the primary meaning of a word.[2] In *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, for an example, the primary meaning of the word *gaṅgā* is the stream of the river *gaṅgā*. But the word *gaṅgā* is to signify the bank of the said river. Bank is connected with the *Gaṅga* through *sāmīpya*. According to the ancients, the essential condition for *lakṣaṇā* is *anvayā'nupapatti* or incompatibility of the meaning of the sentence. In *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, for example, a hut or hamlet cannot stand on the stream or current of a

1. शक्तम् पदम् । Tarka-saṁgraha See 49.
2. लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धो । न्या. सि. मु. कारिका 82.

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river. So the primary meaning of the word *gaṅgā* is inapplicable. The meaning of the said sentence, thus being unsuitable makes room for *lakṣaṇā*. No such *anvayā'nupapatti* however, is involved in *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām* or in *yaṣṭhīḥ praveśaya* which by itself gives a sense without *lakṣaṇā*. But *lakṣaṇā* in such a case is still called for because the mere literal sense is not intended by the speaker. *Lakṣaṇā*, therefore, operates also when the primary sense does not conform to the intention of the speaker. *Tātparyā'nupapatti*, therefore, has been conceived of as *lakṣāṇā-bīja* or the base of implication.[1]

A word, says Jagadīśa, presents a meaning by implication (*lakṣaṇā*) where the implied meaning is clearly related to its primary meaning not conforming to the intention of the speaker. In other words, the meaning which is not the primary meaning of a word but closely connected there-with, is to be regarded as the implied meaning of that word.[2]

In *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, the word *gaṅgā* implies the bank of the river *gaṅgā* because the said meaning is not understood as the primary meaning (or the expressed meaning) of the word *gaṅgā*. Yet with this implied meaning, the primary meaning of the said word is closely connected.[3] The word like *saindhava*, on the contrary, does not yield the meaning of *turaga* or horse by implication. Because the said meaning is the primary or the expressed meaning of the said word.[4]

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1. लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धस्तात्पर्य्यानुपपत्तितः। न्या. सि. मु. का. 82.
2. यादृशार्थस्य सम्बन्धवति शक्तन्तु यन्नवेत्।
तत्र तल्लक्षकं नाम तच्छक्तिविधुरं यदि॥ श. श. प्र. का. 24.
यादृशनामार्थसम्बन्धवति यन्नाम सङ्केतितं तदेव तादृशार्थे लक्षकं यदि तादृशार्थे शक्तिशून्यं भवेत्। ibid., p. 133.
3. गङ्गाद्यस्तु तीरादावसङ्केतितास्तत्सम्बन्धिनीरादिशक्त्यवेन गृहीता एव तीराद्यन्वयं बोधयन्तीति तत्र ते लक्षका एव। श. श. प्र. pp. 134–35.
4. सैन्धवादयस्तु शब्दास्तुरगादिसम्बन्धिनि लवणादाविव तुरगादावपि शक्ता एव। ibid., p. 133.

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The knowledge of implication in respect of a word (*lakṣaṇā-graha*), according to Jagadīśa, is *tīrāśaktam gaṅgā-padaṁ tīra-sambandhini nīre śaktam* or the word *gaṅgā* is not denotative of the bank of the river *gaṅgā* but of *nīra* closely related to the bank of the said river. The *lakṣaṇā-graha* is thus a knowledge with the word *gaṅgā* as the substantive and the state of being denotative of what is related to the bank of the river *gaṅgā* as the feaure. The state of not being denotative of the bank of the said river is posited in such knowledge as the determinant of the substantive.

Jagadīśa, therefore, introduces *lakṣaṇā* as a faculty by virtue of which a word presents a meaning incapable of being presented by exprission (*śaktī*) in that word. Such meaning and *expressed* meaning or the primary meaning of the said word are however closely related.

Lakṣaṇā stands for a relation (*vṛtti*). Such relation could be described as *svānuyogi-saṅketa-vattva*, one of being possessed of the convention in respect of the *anu-gogin* or the substratum of such relation. *Lakṣaṇā* is *śakya-sambandha* or relation with the expressed or primary meaning, in so far as the *śakyā'rtha* is the *anuyogin* or the substratum and *lakṣyā'rtha*, the *pratiyogin* of the said relation. But in that case *lakṣaṇā* ceases to be a *pada-vṛtti-dharma* or a property of word. The relation, therefore, between *lakṣaṇā* and the *lakṣaka* word is conceived to be *svānuyogi-saṅketavattva sva* means *lakṣaṇā*; *tādanuyogin* is the *śakyā'rtha* or the primary meaning in respect of which the word concerned is endowed with convention (*saṅketa*). Thus *lakṣaṇā* may rest indirectly in the word.

According to Jagadīśa, *lakṣaṇā* as relation is *sva-viśiṣṭa-saṅketavattva*. *Sva* meaning *lakṣyārtha tad-viśiṣṭa* is the *śakyārtha*. For the *śakyārtha* is held to be *lakṣyārtha-sambandha-viśiṣṭa*. Such *śakyārtha* is the meaning of the word by convention (*saṅketa*).

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Lakṣaṇa may be viwed as the connection with the meaning of *tīra* which the word *gaṅgā* cannot denote. This view is not acceptable Jagadīśa. As seen earlier, some look upon *lakṣaṇā* as *sva-śakya-sambandha* i,e, connection with the primary meaning of the secondary meaning of the same word. To Jagadīśa, *lakṣaṇā* is *sva-sambandhi-śaktatva* or the state of denoting what is connected with the implied meaning. It is argued that in '*gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*' the word *gaṅgā* cannot express the meaning of *gaṅgā-tīra*. But to have a meaning of the sentence some sort of relation between the word *gaṅgā* and bank (*tīra*) has to be admitted. This relation is *lakṣaṇā*. Such a view has to concede that the word *gaṅgā* even if known to be related with *tīra* through *kālika-sambandha*. no verbal knowledge occurs.

In fact the word *gangā* should yield the verbal knowledge of *gangā-tīra* only if the said word were known to be related to the expressed meaning or its being known to be primarily denotative of something viz, *gangā-tīra*. But *śakti* stands for a direct relation of a word with its expressed meaning while *lakṣaṇā* is based on the relation of the expressed meaning of a word with its implied meaning. A relation of a word with a meaning in respect of which the said word is devoid of the faculty of import or denotation is not *lakṣaṇā*. So any implied meaning cannot be regarded a case of *lakṣaṇā*. Had that been so, the word *gaṅgā* related through *kālika* to *gaṅgā-tīra*, beyond the pale of the faculty of import or denotation, would result in the verbal knowledge of *gaṅgā-tīra*.[1]

Not only that. The said definition of *lakṣaṇā* would over-extend to an instance like *gangā-gangāyām* in *gangā-gangāyām ghosaḥ*. For the expression *gaṅgā-gaṅgā* is devoid of any power of denotation and *tīrasambandhi-tva* through the relation of is availed of in it.[2] In other words *lakṣaṇā* will come to be

1. कथञ्चित्तीरादिसम्बन्धित्वेन गृहीतादपि गङ्गादिपदात्तीरादेरन्वयाबोधेन तीराद्यशक्तत्वे सति तत्सम्बन्धितामात्रं न लक्षणा। श. श. प्र. pp. 136-37.
1. गङ्गागङ्गायां घोष इत्यादावपि गङ्गागङ्गेतिभागस्य निरुक्तलक्षणायाः सत्त्वेन वैयर्थ्याभावप्रसङ्गाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 137.

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admitted in a *vākya* or sentence much against the accepted opinion of the *Nyāya* school of thought.

With this, argues Jagadīśa, the view that *lakṣaṇā* is but the use of a word, to present a meaning not liable to be presented by the said word through the power of denotation but intended to be signified by the said word or that it goes to bear out comprehension of a certain meaning not presented through the power of denotation comes to be contradicted. The word *Gangā-gangā* for example, may otherwise be used to convey the meaning of the bank of the river—*Gangā* not liable to be presented thereby through the power of denotation, the said meaning being non-the-less intended to be signified thereby or that it bears out the comprehension of *tira-sambandhitva*.[1]

Jagadīśa further argues that the definiton of *lakṣaṇā* as suggested above would invest the *apabhraṁśa* words or words of a corrupt language with the faculty of implication.[2] For any such word may have a meaning devoid of denotation. One must not say let the words of a corrupt language have the faculty of denotation.[3] For in that case, being possessed of one of the two recognised faculties of communication, *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā*, it has to be recognised as an authentic word.[4] Such a blemish could not be brushed aside by the argument that a word of corrupt language does not bear out a verbal knowledge but a word with implied meaning may hold out such a prospect. The fact is that *lakṣaṇā* is considered the state of being the cause of a verbal knowledge of what is related to the expressed meaning of the word concerned. In other words, a word could be regarded implying a meaning only if it could produce a verbal knowledge of the primary meaning thereof.

1. एतेन तीरादेरशक्तत्वे सति तीरादिपरत्वं……तल्लक्षकत्वमित्यपि प्रत्युक्तम्। ibid., p. 137.
2. अपभ्रंशस्य लक्षकत्वापाताच्च। ibid., p. 137.
3. न चेष्टापत्तिः। ibid., p. 137.
4. शक्तिलक्षणाऽन्यतरवृत्तिमत्त्वे तस्य साधुत्वापत्तेः, पदसाधुनायां वृत्तिमत्त्वस्यैव तन्त्रत्वात्। ibid., pp. 137–38.

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It is in this context that an *apabhraṁśa* word or a word of a corrupt language is incapable of being treated as one that is possessed of the faculty of implication. For it has noprimary meaning.

Jagadīśa, examines the statements that a word is to be considered as having the faculty of implication in case it bears out the verbal knowledge of what is related to its expresed meaning. Does it mean that the said word be the operative cause (*phalopadhāyaka*) of the verbal knowledge of what is related to the expresed meaning or the potential cause thereof?

If it be the operative cause then, in an instance like *Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, the word *gaṅgā* will fail to imply a meaning. For the said word is not the operative cause of the verbal knowledge of the river-bank (*tīra*) its implied meaning. If it is regarded, on the contrary, the potential cause of the said knowledge, then the definition of *lakṣaṇā* would have to be admitted to a sentence like *gaṅgāyām*. For such a sentence has the potentiality of bearing out the verbal knowledge of *tīra* the implied meaning posited as the feature against *ādheyatā*', the meaning of the seventh case-ending.[1]

The Mimāṁsakas argue that a sentence too has the faculty of implication. How otherwise the compound *citragu* could imply the meaning. 'the master of varigated Cow' ? they ask. How could either the bank of the deep river comprehended due to *gambhīrāyām nadyām ghoṣaḥ* ? Obviously, the word *nadī* is not to imply the bank (*tīra*). For in that case, the said meaning (viz. *tīra*) would fail to be syntactically related to the meaning of the word *gambhīra*. Because the bank is not deep (*gambhīra*). Nor is the word *gambhīra* to imply the said meaning (viz, *tīra*). For in that case the said meaning

1. किञ्चानुभावकत्वं यद्यनुभवस्योपधायकत्वं, तदा घोषादिपदसाकाङ्क्षस्य गङ्गादिपदस्य तीरलक्षकता न स्यात्, तेन तीरसम्बन्धिनो नीरस्यानुभवानर्जनात्; स्वरूपयोग्यत्वन्तु गङ्गायामिति वाक्यस्य दुर्वारम्, तस्याप्याधेयतानिरूपकनीरानुभवं प्रति नीरार्थकनामोत्तरसप्तमीत्वेन तथात्वात्, नीराधेयत्वस्य च तीरसम्बन्धित्वानपायात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 138-39.

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would not be syntactically related to *nadī*. Because the bank (*tīra*) is not the river (*nadī*). Hence, a sentence has to be admitted, say the Mīmamsakas, to have the faculty of implication.[1]

Jagadīśa refutes.[2] In case *gambhīrāyām nadyām*, the words ending in declensional or rather nominal suffix are to imply *deep-river-baak*, the meaning of the word *ghoṣa* could not be syntactically related to such a meaning. For the relation involved is *ādheyatā*. The meanings of any two nominals (*nāmārtha*) cannot be related through a relation of difference (*bheda-sambandha*) except in the case of a compound.[3]

Even if the said two words viz. *gambhīrāyām nadyām* were taken to imply 'being on the *deep-river-bank*' (*gabhīra-nadī-tīra-vṛtti*), the situation does not improve. For the relation involved has to be other than that of identity (*abheda*). The meanings of any two nominals could call for tne relation of identity only if tne nominals were used collocatively except in the case of a compound.[4]

The part *gambhīrāyām nadī in gambhīrāyām nadyām ghoṣaḥ* cannot imply 'the *deep-river-bank*' (*gambhīra-nadī-tīra*). For in that case (*ādheyatā*) the meaning of the seventh declensional suffix would not be syntactically related to the said meaning. The part *gambhīrāyām nadī* is not the base or the radical (*prakṛti*), to which the said suffix has been added.[5] Nor could *gambhrāyām-*

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 140.
2. तन्न। ibid., p. 141.
3. गम्भीरायां नद्यामिति विभक्त्यन्तभागस्य तादृशतीरलक्षकत्वे घोषादावाधेयत्वेन तदन्वयानुपपत्तेः, समासादन्यस्य नामार्थयोर्भेदान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 141.
4. एतेन तादृशतीरवृत्तितायामेव तद्भागस्य लक्षणायामपि न निस्तारः, तादृशतीरवृत्तेश्च लक्ष्यत्वे घोषादावभेदेन तदन्वयायोगात्, समासाभिन्नस्थले नामार्थयोरभेदान्वये समानविभक्तिकत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात्। ibid., p. 141.
5. न च गम्भीरायां नदीतिभागस्यैव तादृशतीरलक्षकत्वम्, तदर्थे विभक्त्यर्थस्यानन्वयापत्तेः, न हि स भागः प्रकृतिर्येन तदर्थे विभक्त्यर्थस्यान्वयः स्यात्। श. श. प्र, p. 142.

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nadī be regarded a radical like *kaṇṭhe-kāla*. For in that case *gambhīrāyāṁ nadīm vraja* would come out to be a valid form of expression.[1] Not only that. In that case, the said part (viz, *gambhīrāyām nadī*) would cease to be a sentence.[2] It is imperative, therefore, that either the word *nadī* or the word *gambhīrā* should imply *deep-river-bank*, the other word being regarded only as a pointer to the speaker's intention (*tātparyya-grāhaka*).[3]

Caṭa-caṭa and similar words of imitation (*anukaraṇa-śabda*) or *huṁ-phaṭ*, *huvā* and the other pauses (*stobha*) used in Vedic recitation are devoid of the power of denotation and thus of implication too. These words however, are to present their meanings through the false notion of import, as happens in the case of a corrupt word.[4]

The elders admit of an additional faculty known as the faculty of figuration (*gauṇī vṛtti*). In *gaur vāhikaḥ*, the word *go* is held to mean, through this faculty, 'one possessed of the properties like idiocy (*jāḍya*) inherent in cow, the denoted meaning' to be syntactically related to ploughman (*vāhika*), by way of identity.

Jagadīśa observes that the said faculty should be included in implication only.[5] The said meaning is only implied by the word *go*. The *ālaṁkārikas* too lend support to Jagadīśa.

The *ālaṁkārikas* conceive another faculty called *vyañjanā* or suggestion. Faculty (*vṛtti*), according to them, is only a

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1. गम्भीरायां नदीं व्रजेत्यादितोऽपि गम्भीरनदीतीरकर्मत्वादिबोधापत्तेः। ibid., p. 142.
2. तद्भागस्य वाक्यादन्यत्वाच्च। ibid., pp. 142–143.
3. तस्माद् गम्भीरापदं नदीपदं वा तत्र गम्भीरनदीतीरलक्षकं, पदान्तरन्तु तत्र तात्पर्य्यग्राहकमिति सिद्धान्तविदः। ibid., p. 141.
4. चट-चटाद्यनुकरणस्य हुंफट् हुवा इदिस्तोभस्य च स्वानुभावकत्वमपभ्रंशानामिव शक्तिभ्रमादेव। ibid., p. 144.
5. गौर्वाहिक इत्यादौ तु शक्यार्थसदृशत्वावच्छिन्नबोधकतया गौणं गवादिपदं गोसदृशादौ लक्षकमेवास्तु, न तु लक्षकाद् भिद्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 144.

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function of a word (*kriyā* or *śabda-vyāpāra*). The faculty of denotation (*abhidhā*) is the normal function of a word. The other two viz, the faculty of implication and that of suggestion are only superimposed ones.

The faculty of implication is either conventional (*rūḍhā*) or *śuddhā*) or figurative (*gāuṇī*) otherwise known as occasioned (*prayojana-vatī*). *Kaliṅgaḥ sāhasikaḥ* and the like come under the category of the conventional kind of implication. The implication in all such cases solely rests on the incompatibility (or unsuitability) of the primary meaning (*mukhyārtha*). The occasioned kind of implication (*gauṇī lakṣaṇā*) is resorted to with a view to suggesting a third sense (*prayojana*). In *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, coolness (*śītatva*) and holiness (*pāvanatva*), the qualities of the river-current, have been superimposed on the river-bank by way of suggestion. The *ālaṁkārikas* point out that the word *gaṅgā* cannot imply coolness and holiness. Implication, they point out, operates only in case the primary meaning happens to be incompatible. The fact is that coolness and holiness are comprehended only after the word *gaṅgā* has through primary implication, presented the bank of the river (*gaṅgā-tīra*). In fact the primary implication has come to operate on the primary meaning of the word *gaṅgā* viz, the river-current being found incompatible. The alleged implication, therefore, through which the word *gaṅgā* is supposed to present coolness and holiness cannot be held to have come into operation on the primary meaning of the word being found incompatible. Nor could the meaning reached at through the primary implication be held to have been incompatible either to call for further implication. The word *gangā*, therefore, is admited to convey a third sense known as *prayojana* through a faculty called suggestion (*vyañjanā*).[1] Coolness and holiness cannot be held liable of being implied by the word *gaṅgā*. For there is no occasion (*prayojana*) to call for implication.

1. लक्ष्यं न मुख्य नाप्यत्र बाधो योगः फलेन नो ।
न प्रयोजनमेतस्मिन् न च शब्दः स्खलद्गतिः ॥ का. प्र. II. 16.

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In *mukhaṁ vikasita-smitam*, the word *vikasita* presents a secondary meaning viz. manifestation (*vistāra*). The said meaning again is occasioned by the desire of suggesting that the face is as fragrant and attractive as a lotus. This suggestion is conveyed, according to the *ālaṁkārikas*, through the faculty called *vyañjanā* or rather *lakṣaṇā-mūla-vyañjanā*.[1]

The word *vikasita*, the *ālaṁkārikas* point out, cannot be held to present the meaning, 'similar to the lotus', through convention or through the power of derivation. Nor could it imply the said meaning. For the root of implication viz, knowledge of incompatibility of the meaning presented i.e., manifestation (*vistāra*) is wanting.[2]

Jagadīśa refutes : The knowledge of incompatibility (of the primary meaning) cannot be regarded as the base of implication in the sense that it causes (*janaka*) implication. For implication is only a relation with the primary meaning of a word. Nor could it be the cause thereof in the sense that it signifies (*jñāpaka*) that. Because but for the knowledge of incompatibility of the primary meaning even, implication is found to be in oneration through other means of proof.[3] The word *gaṅgā* may will be understood to imply the river-bank through inference.[4] In view of such inconstancy again the

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1. मुखं विकसितमित्यत्र विकसितपदेन विस्तृतार्थलक्षणया मुखस्य प्रकटितस्मितवत्तामनुभाव्योत्तरकाले कुसुमतुल्यसौरभादिमत्त्वं तस्य लक्षणामूलव्यञ्जनया वृत्त्या बोध्यते रूढादिवद्व्यक्षकमपि शब्दान्तरमास्थेयम् । श.श.प्र. pp. 144-45.
2. न हि तत्र विकसितादिपदं कुसुमसदृशादौ रूढमसंकेतितत्वात्, नापि यौगिकं स्वावयववृत्त्या तदप्रापकत्वात्, न वा लक्षकम्, उपस्थितार्थान्वयानुपपत्तिधीरूपस्य लक्षणाबीजस्य तत्रासत्त्वादित्यालंकारिका वदन्ति । ibid., pp. 145–146.
3. तत्र अन्वयानुपपत्तिज्ञानस्य लक्षणाबीजत्वं हि न तज्जनकत्वं शक्यसम्बन्धात्मिकायाः लक्षणायास्तदजन्यत्वात्; नापि तज्ज्ञापकत्वं मुख्यार्थान्वयानुपपत्तिज्ञानमन्तरेणापि प्रमाणान्तरेण तद्ग्रहसम्भवात् । श. श. प्र p. 146.
4. गङ्गापदं तीरलाक्षणिकं तीरार्थकतया प्रामाणिकप्रयुक्तगंगापदत्वात् इत्याद्यनुमानसाम्राज्यादिति भावः । रामभद्री pp. 146–157.

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opinion that the knowledge of speaker's intention is the base of implication is rooted out. The implied meaning may well be deduced from the context.[1] In fact Jagadīśa does not regard the knowledge of speaker's intention a factor of verbal knowledge. As such, there is no point in regarding it a base of implication either.[2] In cannot be held that the knowledge of incompatibility of the primary meaning is the cause of the verbal knowledge of the implied meaning and on that score it should *ip so* facto be recognised as the base of implication. For such causality is found wanting in an instance like *yaṣṭīḥ praveśaya.* Nor is there any reason to admit any such causality.[3]

The *ālaṁkārikas* speak of another kind of suggestion called *abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā.* There are words of multiple meanings. A sentence formed of such words leads to one kind of verbal knowledge embracing the meaning initially expressed by such a word with the aid of context and similar other causes of verbal knowledge. Subsequently a man of critical faculty (*sahṛdaya*) finds out another kind of verbal knowledge embracing a different meaning expressed by the said word. The initial verbal knowledge is to be known as the verbal knowledge caused by word through the faculty of import (*abhidhā-janya-śābda-bodha*) and the subsequent one caused thereby through the faculty of suggestion based on the faculty of impovt (*abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā*).[4]

In *ayaṁ gauravito mahān,* for example, the initial verbal knowledge (viz. this great man is venerable) embraces the

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1. अतएव न लक्ष्यार्थतात्पर्य्यग्राहकत्वमपि प्रकरणादितोऽपि लक्ष्यार्थपरत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 146-147.
2. स्वमते तात्पर्य्यज्ञानस्य ज्ञाब्दबोधं प्रत्यहेतुत्वात् तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वस्य लक्षणाबीजत्वासम्भवादित्यपि बोध्यम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 147.
3. न च लक्षणाजन्यान्वयबोधं प्रति तस्याः कारणत्वमेव लक्षणाबीजत्वमिति साम्प्रतम्, 'यष्टीः प्रवेशये'त्यादौ व्यभिचारात्, तादृशहेतुतायां प्रमाणाभावाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 147.
4. अथास्ति नानार्थशब्दैः प्रकरणादिसाचिव्यात्क्वचिदेकविधानामर्थानामन्वयबुद्धेरनन्तरमप्यन्यविधानामन्वयानुभवः सहृदयस्य। श. श. प्र. p. 148.

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the meaning, 'honoured' expressed by the word *gauravitaḥ*. Subsequently, a verbal knowledge (viz, the cow is more valuable than the sheep) embracing the meaning, 'cow in comparison to sheep' (*gauḥ avitaḥ*) occurs. In this instance, it may be pointed out, the meaning comprehended later is derived from the constituents of the word *gauravitaḥ* against the meaning initially presented by the word *gauravitaḥ*. Hence is the need of another example.[1]

In *vayasthā nāgarāsaṅgād angānāṁ hanti vedanām*, the words *vayasthā* and *nāgara* are initially taken to mean myrobalan and ginger respectively. The verbal knowledge, therefore, comes out to be 'myrobalan mixed with ginger kills pain of the body'. Subsequently the said words are taken to mean a young woman and paramour respectively to give the verbal knowledge 'a young woman through union with her paramour kills the pain of her body'.[2]

Of the two instances given above, the first one viz, *ayaṁ gauravito mahān* is discarded by some as a cogent instance of suggestion based on the faculty of import. For *gauravitaḥ* is not a word (*pada*) as such. But in that case *vayasthā* too would fail to be a word (*pada*) on the same ground. In fact, the said suggestion is resorted to not because the multiple meanings happen to be presented by a word or words (*pada*) but by a *śabda* or *śabdas*. By *śabda* again, a *śabda* that presents multiple meanings is to be understood (*nānārtha-pratipādaka-śabda*). The said multiple meanings are not to be derived from a word through one and the same power of import. The word *ghaṭa*, therefore, although presenting *ghaṭa* and *ghaṭatva*, is not to be conceived as a word of multiple meanings. For the said two meanings are derived from the said word through one and the same power of import.

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1. एकशब्देनैकविधबोधानन्तरं तच्छब्दघटकानां प्रत्येकशक्त्या बोधान्तरजनन-स्थलमुक्त्वा एकशब्दस्यैव नानाशक्त्या नानाविधबोधस्थलमाह यथा वा वयस्थेति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 149.
2. यथा वा वयस्था नागरासङ्गदङ्गानां हन्ति वेदनामित्यादौ। श. श. प्र. p. 149.

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The *ālaṁkārikas* claim that the subsequent knowledge is more charming (*camatkārin*). But in the instance *ayam gauravito mahān*, it is to be pointed out, the initial knowledge excels the subsequent one.

The *ālaṁkārikas* argue that the subsequent knowledge is not an instance of verbal knowledge borne by knowledge of import. For in the case of verbal knowledge of the (primarily) denoted meanings of words involved, the knowledge of speakers intention or the knowledge of context leading thereto (the knowledge of speaker's intention) is admitted a cause. The idea is this. The verbal knowledge of a meaning presented by a word through the power of denotation, barring the verbal knowledge of another meaning equally presented by the same word through another power of denotation, calls for a special cause. The knowledge of the speaker's intention comes in that context. Its position, however, does not go unchallenged. The knowledge of context (*prakaraṇa*) that leads to the knowledge of speaker's intention can explain the situation. In admitting both as the causes of verbal knowledge, there is complexity. The knowledge of the context again is admittedly indispensable in case the knowledge of the speaker's intention is insisted upon as the cause of verbal knowledge.

There is nothing uniform leading to the knowledge of context, to the contrary. For it is found to be apprehended at times by contact (*sannikarṣa*), at times by inference and by words at other times. Hence no causality is likely to be ascribed thereto. Nor could the knowledge of context be regarded as operation (*vyāpāra*) of the knowledge of the speaker's intention and causality of verbal knowledge be ascribed to the knowledge of the speaker's intention. For the knowledge of the context is the cause of verbal knowledge. It is not an operation. Those who are of the view that the speaker's intention is the cause of verbal knowledge also do not consider the knowledge of context any way responsible for the verbal knowledge. The knowledge of context, therefore, cannot be regarded as the operation

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(*vyāpāra*) of the knowledge of the speaker's intention. In any case as no such knowledge is found to be at the root of the subsequent verbal knowledge,[1] it is not felt to have been caused by the knowledge of the power of denotation. So the *ālaṁkārikas* conclude. Nor could the said verbal knowledge be regarded to have been caused due to implication. For the word-meanings to be comprehended thereby are but the denoted meanings (*śakyārtha*). Implication has no bearing in respect of such meanings.[2]

The *ālaṁkārikas* conclude that such knowledge, therefore, has to be regarded as what is effected due an independent faculty of communication. This faculty is to be known as the faculty of suggestion based on the faculty of import (*abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā*).[3] Hence it is said that subsequent to the knowledge of a certain meaning of a word of multiple meanings, presented through the power of denotation aided by context and the like, a verbal knowledge of some other meaning occurs through the faculty of suggestion based on the faculty of import.[4]

Jagadīśa discards the above view of the *ālaṁkārikas*. The subsequent verbal knowledge is rooted in the knowledge of import (*śakti-jñāna*) and not in the knowledge of suggestion.

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1. स चायमनुभवो न शक्तिधीप्रभवः, शक्यार्थबुद्धौ तत्परत्वग्रहस्य, तद्ग्राहक-प्रकरणाद्यवगमस्य वा हेतुत्वेन तदसत्त्वात् । श. श. प्र. pp. 149–50.
   Vide also कृष्णकान्ती pp. 149–50.
2. नापि लक्षणाप्रयुक्तः, शक्यार्थे तदयोगात् । श. श. प्र. p. 150.
3. परन्त्वभिधामूलव्यञ्जनयैव सम्पाद्यः । ibid., pp. 150–51.
4. अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य प्रस्तावाद्यैर्नियन्त्रिते ।
   एकत्रार्थेऽभिधामूलव्यञ्जनाऽन्यस्य बोधिका ॥ ibid., p. 151
   Vide also अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।
   संयोगाद्यैरवाच्यार्थकृद् व्यापृतिरञ्जनम् ॥
   काव्यप्रकाश सू. 31.
   अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य संयोगाद्यैर्नियन्त्रिते ।
   एकत्रार्थेऽन्यधीहेतुर्व्यञ्जना साभिधाश्रया ॥
   साहित्यदर्पण II. 21.

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The argument that for a verbal knowledge that embraces the expressed meaning of a word the knowledge of the speaker's intention is the cause is not of much worth. It has been refuted earlier.[1]

With the knowledge of the speaker's intention being discarded as the cause of verbal knowledge, the knowledge of context too *ip so* facto stands cancelled. The idea is that in the context of the knowledge of the speaker's intention being admitted a cause of verbal knowledge, the knowledge of context is imagined as the cause thereof in view of simplicity. But in case the knowledge of the speaker's intention is discarded as a cause, there is no point in admitting the knowledge of the context as the cause thereof.[2] In fact context has no uniform nature. It varies with individual situations. Its presence or absence, therefore, hardly matters in verbal knowledge.[3]

It is not a fact that first a verbal knowledge of what the words involved present through a certain power of denotation gets effected and subsequent thereto another verbal knowledge of what the said words present through some other power of denotation occurs. With the appearance of the first knowledge the scope of any other verbal knowledge is ruled out. The first knowledge has come to occur because there was the knowledge that the words are not intended to convey any other meaning. This knowledge played the role of the absence of obstacles (*pratibandhakābhāva*) so to say. The subsequent knowledge is only an instance of mental perception brought about by a connection based on knowledge (*upanaya*). The pleasure that one with aesthetic sensibility (*sahṛdaya*), derives technically called poetic charm (*camatkāra*) imagined to be

1. श. श. प्र. pp. 24–27.
2. तात्पर्य्यज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वसिद्धौ सत्यां लाघवादावश्यकत्वाच्च प्रकरणज्ञानस्यैव हेतुत्वं कल्प्यते, तदसिद्धौ लाघवादिरूपयुक्तेरभावात्, प्रकरणज्ञानादेर्हेतुत्वासिद्ध्या तदसत्त्वस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 151.
3. तात्पर्य्यधियो हेतुत्वस्य पूर्वं परास्तत्वात्, अतएव प्रकरणादीनामननुगतानां क्वचिदसत्त्वेऽपि क्षत्यभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 151.

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rooted in verbal knowledge can be explained otherwise. For mental perception is as good a cause as verbal knowledge of such pleasure. Moreover in holding the view that the said pleasure is due to verbal knowledge, there is complexity. For suggestion is not a proven entity either. A syllogistic reasoning might be : This word is possessed of a faculty other than that of denotation, contributing to the verbal knowledge of what it does not denote; for it is a word that does contribute to the verbal knowledge of what it does not denote. There is the rule that a word possessed of a faculty for the appearance of a verbal knowledge does bear out the verbal knowledge. This also is not of much help. For in case 'contributing to' (*anukūlatva*), constituent of what is to be inferred (*sādhya*) means 'being embraced in the knowledge bringing about the word-meanings, that cause a verbal knowledge', the said reasoning falls through. For such *anukūlatatva*' is satisfied in implication too. The syllogism involves the fault of *siddha-sādhānatā.*

If it means 'the state of producing' (*janakatva*) becomes the faculty itself becomes the producer of verbal knowledge. The conclusion is not warranted by the premises in that case. For implication *per se* does not cause verbal knowledge.[1]

The *ālaṁkārikas* claim that in the case of the verbal knowledge of the denoted meanings, knowledge of the relation between the word and the meaning (*śaktigraha*) is indispensible. But in the case of the verbal knowledge of the suggested meaning such knowledge of suggestion is not necessary.

1. नन्वयं शब्द एतदर्थविषयकशाब्दबोधानुकूलशक्त्यन्यवृत्तिमान्, एतदर्थविषयकशाब्दबोधानुकूलशब्दत्वात्, शाब्दजनकवृत्तिमतः शब्दस्य शाब्दजनकत्वनियमादित्यनुमानादितरबाधसहकारेण व्यक्षना सेत्स्यतीति, एवं गौरवमपि फलमुखत्वान्न दोषायेत्यत आह स्वरूपसत्त्येति। ज्ञानाविषयतयेत्यर्थः। तथा चोक्तानुमाने साध्यघटकमनुकूलत्वं यदि शाब्दकारणपदार्थोपस्थितिजनकज्ञानविषयत्वरूपं तदा तादृशनुकूलत्वस्य लक्षणायामेव सत्त्वेन बाधापत्तेः। यदि च जनकत्वरूपं, तदा साध्याप्रसिद्धिः लक्षणायाः स्वरूपसत्त्या शाब्दाजनकत्वात्, व्यक्षनायाः स्वरूपसत्त्या शाब्दजनकत्वस्य भवन्मात्रसम्मतत्वात्, अन्यथा व्यक्षनात्वेनैव साध्यत्वोचितत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 154.

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The very existence of the pre-disposition is enough, words act only as a stimulus. The burglar does not grasp in consciousness the relation between the statement 'the sun has set' and the act of burglary. Suggestion *per se* (*svarūpasatī*) leads to the verbal knowledge of the suggested meaning.

Jagadīśa discards all these arguments. No faculty by itself is ever found to cause verbal knowledge without being known. He, therefore, finds no reason to admit of an independent faculty in addition to that of denotation and of implication.[1]

Implication, alaṁkarikas claim is of two kinds viz, conventional (*śuddhā*) and figurative (*gauṇī*). Such classification is based on the nature of relation between the primary and the secondary meanings. Through the conventional kind of implication, an object is connected with the denoted meaning through a relation other than that of similarity. In *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, for example, the bank of the river ganges is related to the stream of the said river through the relation of proximity. Through the figurative kind of implication, on the other hand, the relation involved is that of similitude. In *gaur vāhika*, for example, the ploughman is comprehended as similar to the bull in point of idiocy and dullness. *Agnir mānavakaḥ* is another instance in point. *Gauṇī lakṣaṇā* says Jagadīśa leads to the comprehension of the similarity of the primary meaning as the feature.[2]

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1. वस्तुतः शक्त्याद्युपस्थितानामेकविधानां पदार्थानामन्वयमतेरनन्तरं यद्यन्यविधानामन्वयबोधः स्यात्, स्यादपि तदनुरोधेन व्यञ्जनास्वीकारः। न चैवं; तत्तदर्थकशाब्दसामान्यं प्रत्येव तत्तदर्थनिस्तात्पर्यकत्वधियः प्रतिबन्धकत्वात्, तत्तदर्थानां यथाकथाञ्चिदुपनयवशेन मनसैव विशिष्टधीसम्भवात्, मानोरथिकसुखप्रभेदपर्य्यवसितं चमत्कारं प्रत्यपि शाब्दस्येव मानसस्यापि बोधस्य विशिष्य हेतुतायाः सुवचत्वात्, अतिरिक्तस्य व्यञ्जनाख्यपदार्थान्तरस्य स्वरूपसत्तया अन्वयबुद्धौ तद्धेतुत्वस्य च प्रमाणविरहेणासत्वाच्चेति संक्षेपः। श. श. प्र. pp. 152–54. vide also Literary Criticism of Ancient India, p. 166

2. (आदिना) शक्यसदृशत्वप्रकारेण बोधकतया गौण्युपगृह्यते, यथा अग्निर्माणवक इत्याद्यावह्निसदृशत्वादिना अग्न्यादिपदस्य। श. श. प्र. pp. 155–56. vide also Literary Criticism of Ancient India, pp. 142–43.

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Implication is classified into *jahat-svārthā*, *a-jahat-svārthā*, *nirūḍhā* and *ādhunikā*.[1]

An implication that bears out the verbal knowledge of a property not abiding in the denoted meaning of the word involved, by way of a feature is called *jahat-svārthā*. The implication in the word *gaṅgā* in *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, for example, leads to the verbal knowledge of *tīratva* posited by way of a feature against *tīra*.[2] It is to be argued that *tīratva* does abide in the stream of the *Ganges*, the denoted meaning, through the relation of *kālika*. There is no harm. For the said relation is other than the *lakṣyatā-vacchedaka-sambandha*,[3] which, in the present case, is *samavāya*.

In some cases implication may lead to the verbal knowledge of something qualified by what abides in both the primary and the secondary meanings or in the primary meaning only. This is known as the *ajahatsvārthā* implication. The word *ghaṭa*, for example, may, lead to the verbal knowledge of cloth (*paṭa*) qualified by the property viz, substancehood (*dravyatva*) common to *ghaṭa*, the primary meaning, and *paṭa*, the secondary meaning. The said word may also lead to the verbal knowledge of *nīla-ghaṭa*. In that case *nīla-ghaṭatva* is to be posited by way of the feature. It abides in *nīla-ghaṭa*, which is included in the primary meaning of *ghaṭa*.[4] A new addition to the family of implication is likely in that case. The dark *pitcher*, therefore, is to be understood as what is qualified by *nīla-ghaṭatva* the the property that abides in *pitcher* the

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1. श. श. प्र. का. p. 25.
2. काचिल्लक्षणा शक्यावृत्तिरूपेण बोधकतया जहत्स्वार्थेत्युच्यते। यथा तीरत्वादिनां गङ्गादिपदस्य। श. श. प्र. pp. 194-155.
3. शक्यावृत्तित्वञ्च लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन, अतस्तीरत्वस्य कालिकादि-सम्बन्धेन गंगावृत्तित्वेऽपि न क्षतिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 154.
4. काचिच्छक्यलक्षयोभयवृत्तिना शक्यवृत्तिना वा रूपेणानुभावकत्वादजहत्-स्वार्था, यथा द्रव्यत्वादिना नीलघटत्वादिना च घटपदस्य। श. श. प्र. p. 155.

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primary meaning of *ghaṭa.*[1] *A-jahat-svārthā* implication may be described as what causes the verbal knowledge of a property abiding also in the primary meaning, posited by way of the feature.[2]

An implication conventionally leading to the verbal knowledge of a property posited by convention, as the determinant of the secondary meaning is known as the *nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā* or frozen metaphor.[3]

In *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanā gavā somam kriṇāti*, for example, the implication in the word *aruṇā* conventionally leads to the verbal knowledge of a cow (heifer) qualified by redness (*āruṇya-viśiṣṭā gauḥ*).[4]

Implication at times bears out the verbal knowledge of an object qualified by a property not conventionally obtained by way of the determinant thereof. This is known as *ādhunikī lakṣaṇā.* The word *paṭa,* for example, may imply *pitcher* the object qualified by pothood not conventionally obtained as the determinant thereof.[5]

Words in respect of the aforesaid kinds of implication, therefore, are classified accordingly.[6]

Prabhākara argues : In *gaṅgāyaṁ ghoṣaḥ* the knowledge of the word *gaṅgā* to the effect that it has the power to indicate

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1. ननु नीलघटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नघटपदलक्षणाया अतिरिक्तत्वे विभागव्याघात इत्यत आह-शक्यवृत्तिनैव वेति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 155.
2. तथा च शक्यवृत्तिरूपावच्छिन्ना लक्षणा अजहत्स्वार्था। ibid., p. 155.
3. काचिल्लक्षणतावच्छेदकीभूतत्तद्रूपेण पूर्वं पूर्वं प्रत्यायकत्वान्निरुढा। श. श. प्र. p. 155.
4. यथा आरुण्यादिप्रकारेण तदाश्रयद्रव्यानुभावकत्वादरुणादिपदस्य। श. श. प्र. p. 155.
5. काचिच्च पूर्वं पूर्वं तादृपयेणाप्रत्यायकत्वादाधुनिकी, यथा घटत्वादिना पटादिपदस्य। ibid., p. 155.

   आदितात्पर्यमूलकतद्धर्मावच्छिन्नविषयकशाब्दबोधजनिका लक्षणा तद्धर्मावच्छिन्न आधुनिकीत्यर्थः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 155.
6. तदेवं विविधलक्षणावत्त्वाल्लक्षकं नामापि जहत्स्वार्थाऽजहत्स्वार्थादिभेदादनेकविधमित्यर्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 156.

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the bank of the river Gaṅges is not the Cause of the verbal knowledge of the bank of the said river. The definition of implication and the classification thereof or the classification of the words in respect of which implication is contemplated of are uncalled for. A word denotes a meaning related to the other (*itarānitva*). The other is the bank in the present context. It is signified by the word, *gaṅgā* through *lakṣaṇā*. Thereupon *lakṣaṇā* ceases to work. For *lakṣaṇā* does not cause verbal knowledge. *Abhidā* comes in. The erroneous knowledge of the word to the effect that it is denotative of the bank of the river ganges occurs. Instead of admitting an additional faculty as the cause and 'the state of being possessed of a state of faculty of communication' (*vṛttimatva*) a complex property as the determinant of causality of verbal knowledge, it is less harmful to resort to an erroneous knowledge to explain the situation.[1]

Prabhākara does not admit of error as such. Hence the knowledge of the word *gaṅgā* to the effect that it is denotative of the bank of the river ganges has no prospect with his school of thought. As such the verbal knowledge of the hamlet being situated on the bank of the river ganges due to the sentence *gangāyām ghoṣaḥ* can hardly be explained.[2]

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1. स्यादेतत्, यदि तीरादिलक्षकतया गंङ्गादिपदस्य ज्ञानं तीराद्यनुभवे भवेद्धेतुर्भवेदप्युक्तक्रमेण लक्षकाणां विभागः। न त्वेतदस्ति, तीराद्यन्वयबोधं प्रति तीरादिशक्तत्वेनैव पदज्ञानस्य लाघवेन हेतुतया लक्षकाणामननुभावकत्वात्। श श. प्र. pp. 156–57.

   लाघवेनेति। शक्त्यरिक्तवृत्त्यकल्पनप्रयुक्तलाघवेनेर्थः। न च यत्र न शक्तिभ्रमस्तत्र तीरान्वयबोधो न स्यादिति वाच्यम्। फलबलात् शक्तिभ्रमस्यैव तत्र कल्पनात्। न च भवतापि तादृशभ्रमस्य कल्पनात् न लाघवमिति वाच्यम्। वृत्तिमत्त्वरूपगुरुधर्मस्य विषयविधया जनकतावच्छेदकत्वकल्पनं वृत्त्यन्तरकल्पनश्चापेक्ष्य भ्रमकल्पने लाघवस्यानपायात्। कृष्णकान्ती pp. 156–57.

2. ननु मीमांसकैरन्यथाख्यात्यनङ्गीकारात्तन्मते तीरशक्तत्वेनैव गङ्गापदज्ञानमलीकमिति गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादौ तीरघोषाधारत्वप्रत्ययो दुर्घटः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 157.

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Prabhākara replies : The word *gangā*, though erroneously, is known to be denotative of the bank of the river ganges. Thereupon the meaning of the seventh case-ending gets related to the bank thus presented due to the non-comprehension of their being unrelated. The resultant verbal knowledge too in the said manner of the state of being located not known to be unrelated to the bank of the river ganges, posited by way of the feature against *ghoṣa* occurs.[1]

Jagadīśa refutes : The meaning of a suffix only qualified by the meaning of the base thereof is held capable of being syntactically related the other word-meaning involved. As such the state of being located (*ādheyatā*), the meaning of the seventh declensional suffix left unqualified by the bank of the river ganges, the meaning of the word *gangā*, the base of the said suffix cannot be syntactically related to the hamlet of the *ghoṣas* (*ghoṣa*), the other word-meaning.[2]

Prabhākara contends : The word having the power of denotation (*śakta-pada*) would bear out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of itself posited as the substantive, as related to the meaning presented by the word used as expectant thereto. The implied meaning would come to be comprehended thereby.[3]

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1. गुरूणाम् 'अग्नौ शैत्यं स्पृशेदि, त्यादौ शक्येन दहनादिनेव 'गङ्गायां घोष' इत्यादौ लक्षितेन तीरादिना सार्द्धमगृहीतासंसर्गकस्यैव सप्तम्यर्थाधेयत्वादेरन्वयबोधप्रविष्टत्वादिति। श. श. प्र. p. 157.

   तथा च यथा दहनादिना सार्द्धमगृहीतासंसर्गक-स्याधारत्वस्यान्वयबोध प्रविष्टत्वं तथेत्यर्थः। तथा च तन्मते भ्रमासत्त्वेऽप्यगृहीतासंसर्गकतीरशक्तत्वेन गङ्गापदग्रहात् अगृहीतासंसर्गकतीराधेयत्वप्रकारकघोषांदरन्वयबोधो, न तु वैशिष्टयावगाहीति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 157.

2. प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्नस्यैव प्रत्ययार्थस्य धर्म्यन्तरेऽन्वयबुद्धेर्व्युत्पन्नतया तीराद्यविशेषितस्य सुवर्थाधेयत्वादेर्घोषादावन्वयबोधायोगात्। श. श. प्र. p. 157–58.

3. शक्तपदस्यैव स्वसाकांक्षपदान्तरोपस्थाप्यार्थान्वितस्वार्थधर्मिकान्वयबोधं प्रति हेतुत्वादन्वयबुद्धौ लक्ष्यार्थस्याप्रवेशः। ibid., p. 158.

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In *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, therefore, the word *ghoṣa* is to cause the verbal knoweldge of the hamlet of the *ghoṣas* related to the bank of the said river, the meaning presented by the word *gangā* expectant of itself.[1]

Jagadīśa argues : The word *gangā* even then is admitted to have indicated the bank of the river ganges. A word of indication (*lakṣaka-pada*) in that case should not be held to be other than what causes verbal knowledge. For whatever word forms a content of the knowledge bearing out the recollection of the word-meanings that brings into effect verbal knowledge is held to be a cause of verbal knowledge (*anubhāvaka*).[2]

Prabhākara answers : The knowledge of a certain word having the power of denotation and the presentation of the other word-meanings no matter how these are presented are admitted to be the cause of verbal knowledge. The presentation of a meaning, therefore, by a word of indication although is a factor towards the verbal knowledge to occur, the knowledge of the said word is in no way responsible for the occurance of verbal knowledge. A word, on the contrary that happens to be a content of the knowledge bearing out the verbal knowledge alone is admitted to be a cause of verbal knowledge.[3]

Jagadīśa refutes : In *kuntāḥ praviśanti* the 'lances are entering', in that case the verbal knowledge should embrace the mean-

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1. तथा च 'गङ्गायां' घोषोऽस्तीत्यादौ घोषपदस्य स्वसाकांक्षगङ्गयापदोपस्थाप्य तीरान्वितघोषादिधर्मिकास्तित्वान्वयबोधं प्रति हेतुत्वान्न विशिष्टान्वयबोधानुपपत्तिरिति कुतो व्युत्पत्तिभङ्ग इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 158.
2. गङ्गादिपदेन लक्षणया तीरोपस्थायने भवन्मतेऽपि कथं लक्षकपदस्यानुभावकत्वं शाब्दजनकार्थोपस्थितिजनकज्ञानविषयत्वरूपस्यानुभावकत्वस्यैव तत्र सत्त्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 158.
3. अस्मन्मते शक्तत्वेन यत्किञ्चित्पदज्ञानस्य यथाकथञ्चित्सकलपदार्थोपस्थितीनाञ्चान्वयबुद्धौ हेतुत्वेन 'लक्षकपदजन्यार्थोपस्थितेर्हेतुत्वेऽपि लक्षकपदज्ञानस्यान्वयबुद्धावहेतुत्वेनाननुभावकत्वात् शाब्दजनकविषयस्यैवानुभावकत्वरूपत्वात्। ibid., pp. 158–59.

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ing of the verb (*dhātu*), posited as the substantive, related to the lances (*kuntadhara*) presented by the wor *kunta* used in expectance therewith. The verbal knowledge of the lances, the implied meaning posited as the substantive and comprehended as the agent of the act of entering would remain unexplained.[1]

The implied meaning viz, the lances being liable to be posited by way of the feature against the 'act of entering' (*praveśana*) the meaning of the verb (*ākhyātā*) the word of denotation, the meaning of the word *kuntaḥ*, the word ending in the first declensional suffix loses all prospect of being projected as ihe invariable substantive.[2]

Not only that. In *kumatiḥ paśuḥ*, a man of evil design is similar to an ahimal, no verbal knowledge should occur. For there is no word of denotation; the word *kumati* means *kumati-viśiṣṭa* and the word *paśu* means *paśu-sadṛśa*. But the verbal knowledge of these two implied meanings syntactically related is a matter of hard experience.[3] Hence Jagadīśa concludes that like the knowledge of a word of denotation, the knowledge of a word of indication too is to be admitted as what causes verbal knowledge.[4]

Prabhākara argues : If the causility of verbal knowledge is admitted to be in the knowledge of a word of indication then the knowledge of a word of denotation would fail to be the uniform cause of verbal knowledge. For in respect of the verbal knowledge occuring due to the knowledge of a word of

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1. कुन्ताः प्रविशन्तीत्यादौ लक्षयस्य कुन्तधरादेरन्वयविशेष्यत्वानुपपत्तेः। श. श. प्र. pp. 158-59.
2. तत्राख्यातपदेन स्वसाकाप्यकुन्तपदोपस्थाप्यकुन्तधरान्विताख्यातार्थधर्मिकान्वयबोधस्यैव जननात् कुन्तधरविशेष्यकप्रवेशनाश्रयत्वप्रकारकान्वयबुद्धिस्वस्य तत्कार्यतानवच्छेदकत्वेन तदाश्रयबोधस्योत्पादनासम्भवादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती pp. 159.
3. कुमतिः पशुरित्यादौ लक्षयार्थयोर्मिथोऽन्वयबोधस्याप्यानुभविकत्वाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 159.
4. तस्माच्छक्तेरिव भक्तेरपि ज्ञानमनुभावकं भवत्येव। ibid., p. 159.

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indication, it ceases to be the cause. A similar situation will arise with the knowledge of a word of indication.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : Causality of verbal knowledge is to be understood to subsist in the knowledge of a word of denotation and in that of a word of indication, the way causality of burning is admitted to be in straw (*tṛṇa*), wood (*araṇi*) and gem (*maṇi*).[2]

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1. ननु लक्षकत्वेन पदज्ञानस्यापि हेतुत्वे शक्तिप्रकारकज्ञानजन्ये शाब्दे लक्षणा-प्रकारकज्ञानस्य, लक्षणाप्रकारकज्ञानजन्ये च तत्र शक्तिप्रकारकज्ञानस्य, व्यभिचारः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 159.
2. कार्यतावच्छेदकस्य सङ्कोचाच्च न व्यभिचारः। श. श. प्र. p. 159.

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CHAPTER V

THE CLASSIFICATION OF NOMINALS— THE DERIVATIVE CONVENTIONAL KIND (YOGA-RŪḌHA)

The faculty of import or denotation of words operates through three different modes viz, derivation (*yoga*), convention (*rūḍhi*) and derivative convention (*yoga-rūḍhi*). Nominals, therefore, are divided into three viz, derivative (*yaugika*), conventional (*rūḍha*) and derivative-conventional (*yoga-rūḍha*).

Derivation (*yoga*) means etymology or the power of the component parts of a word. The derivative kind of nominals is what conveys its meaning through etymology. *Pācaka* is an instance in point. It means the agent of the act of cooking (*pāka-kartā*). It is formed of two parts viz, *paci*, a root-verb, and *ṇaka*, a primary suffix (*kṛt-pratyaya*). These two parts mean the act of cooking (*pāka*) and the agent (*kartā*) respectively.

Convention or conventional significance (*rūḍhi*) is the power of a word as a whole without any reference to the component parts thereof. The conventional kind of nominal is held to have etymology according to a powerful school of Grammarians. It has given up its original significance and has acquired a new sense. The word *ghaṭa* is conventionally used in the sense of jar.

Most of the simple words come under the category of the *yoga-rūḍha* kind of nominals. Its etymological sense is restricted by custom. The meaning that it presents,

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therefore, is conventional. The conventional kind of nominal has completely lost its etymological sense. But the derivative-conventional kind partly retains it. By etymology, the word *paṅkaja*, for example, means 'what grows in mud'. Custom restricts its use to the lotus only.

One more variety is added to the list viz, *yaugika-rūḍha*. It is denotative of two different independent meanings through two different modes viz, derivation (*yoga*) and convention (*rūḍhi*). The word *ud-bhid*, for example, denotes what shoots forth or a plant, through the power of etymology; and a sacrifice, through convention (*rūḍhi*). Such words may be regarded as derivative and conventional as and when these are used in the said senses independently.

Jagadīśa defines the derivative-conventional kind of nominal as what bears out the verbal knowledge of what it denotes by conventional significance, identically related to what is derived therefrom by etymology, none being comprehended in isolation.[1]

The word *paṅkaja*, for example, bears out the verbal knowledge of the lotus, its denoted meaning, identically related to what grows in the mud, etymologically derived therefrom, none of these being comprehended in isolation.[2]

The words *maṇḍapa*, *rathakāra* and similar other conventional kind of nominals denote their etymological and conventional meanings, one in exclusion of the other. In *maṇḍape śete*, for example, the etymological meaning of the word *maṇḍapa* viz, 'one living on scum' is not comprehended. In *maṇḍapaṁ bhojayet*, in like manner, the

1. स्वान्तर्निविष्टशब्दार्थस्वार्थयोर्बोधकृन्मिथः ।
योगरूढं न यत्रैकं विनाऽन्यस्यास्ति शाब्दधीः ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 26.
यन्नाम स्वावयववृत्तिलभ्यार्थेन समं स्वार्थस्यान्वयबोधकृत् तन्नाम योगरूढम् । ibid., pp. 160–61.

2. यथा—पङ्कजकृष्णसर्पाधर्मादि । तद्धि स्वान्तर्निविष्टानां पङ्कादिशब्दानां वृत्तिलभ्येन पङ्कजनिकर्त्रादिना समं स्वशक्यस्य पद्मादेरन्वयानुभावकं, पङ्कजमित्यादितः पङ्कजनिकर्तृ पद्ममित्यनुभवस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वात् । ibid., p. 161.

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conventional meaning viz, 'house' remains outside comprehension.[1]

The word *paṅkaja* or any other word of the derivative-conventional kind, through two different powers viz, the power of convention and that of etymology respectively, denotes the two different meanings identically related. It does not denote any of such meanings to the exclusion of the other because of semantic peculiarity.[2] In fact the etymological meaning is none other than the conventional one and the conventional meaning is only the etymological one restricted to certain objects. Jagadīśa, therefore, says that the conventional meaning is conveyed by the power of etymology and the etymological one by the conventional one.[3]

In *paṅkajaṁ kamudam* and in *bhūmau paṅkajam utpannam*, therefore, the word *paṅkaja* is to be understood to imply the meanings 'what grows in mud' and 'the lotus' the etymological and the conventional meanings respectively.[4]

Objections are raised : In *puṣpaṁ paṅkaja*, there being no verbal knowledge, the meaning of the word *paṅkaja* fails to be comprehended by way of the feature. In *paṅkaja-puṣpam*, on the other hand, the verbal knowledge of the word *paṅkaja* posited as the feature against the meaning of the word *puṣpa* occurs, although the word *paṅkaja* has been

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1. यद्रूढमपि मण्डपरथकारादिपदं योगार्थविनाकृतस्य रूढ्यर्थस्येवरूढ्यर्थविनाकृतस्यापि योगार्थस्य बोधकम्, 'मण्डपे शेते' इत्यादौ योगार्थस्य मण्डपानकर्त्तृदेरिव मण्डपं भोजयेदित्यादौ समुदितार्थस्य गृहादेरयोग्यत्वेनान्वयाबोधात्। ibid., pp. 162–63.
2. योगरूढन्तु पङ्कजादिपदमवयववृत्त्या रूढ्यर्थमेव समुदायशक्त्या चावयवलभ्यार्थमेवानुभावयति; न त्वन्यत् व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यात्तथैव साकांक्षत्वात्। ibid., p. 163.
3. अवयववृत्त्या रूढ्यर्थमेव समुदायशक्त्या चावयवलभ्यार्थमवानुभावयति ibid., p. 163.
4. अत एव पङ्कजं कुमुदमित्यत्र पङ्कजनिकर्त्तृत्वेन 'भूमौ पङ्कजमुत्पन्नमित्यादौ च पद्मत्वेन लक्षणयैव कुमुदस्थलपद्मयोर्बोधं इति वार्त्तिकम्। श. श. प्र. pp. 163–64.

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used uninflectedly, as in the previous instance. Hence it is held that for the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the word *paṅkaja* used uninflectedly, posited by way of a feature, it is essential that the other word-meaning be presented by a word following it. Similarly in view of the verbal knowledge of the word *paṅkaja* posited as a feature in *puṣpaṁ paṅkajam* duly occuring, it is held that for the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the word *paṅkaja*, used inflectedly, the other word-meaning is to be presented by a word used in apposition therewith. It is unreasonable, therefore, to hold that 'what grows in mud', a meaning of the word *paṅkaja* inflected or otherwise, is to be comprehended by way of a feature against the lotus not presented by a word used in apposition therewith or by a word following the word *paṅkaja* used uninflectedly.[1]

Jagadīśa refutes : Both the deductions are unwarrented. In *apaṅkaja-vṛttiḥ sattā* or in *skhalad-akṣara-saṁśobhi taruṇyā mukha-paṅkajam* (the faltering face-lotus of the young damsel holds out beauty) respectively, the said two principles are not found to be observed. In *apaṅkaja-vṛttiḥ sattā*, the meaning of the word *paṅkaja* used uninflectedly is posited as the feature against the other (*bhinna*), the meaning of a word preceding, and not against the meaning of the word *vṛtti* following itself. Similarly in *skhalad-akṣara-saṁśobhi taruṇyā mukha-paṅkajam*, *mukha* the other word-meaning has not been presented by a word used in apposition with the word *paṅkaja*.[2]

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1. ननु 'पुष्पं पङ्कजे'त्यादौ पङ्कजादेरन्वयस्याबोधात्, बोधाच्च 'पङ्कजपुष्पमि' त्यादौ निर्विभक्तिकेन पङ्कजादिपदेनोपस्थाप्यस्यार्थस्यान्वयधीसामान्यं प्रत्येव तादृशपङ्कजादिपदोत्तरशब्दोपस्याप्यत्वं तन्त्रम्। एवं च 'पुष्पं पङ्कजमि'त्यादौ अन्वयबोधदर्शनात्तदनुरोधेन सविभक्तिकपङ्कजादिपदोपस्थाप्यार्थान्वयबोधं प्रति स्वसमानविभक्तिकपदोपस्याप्यत्वञ्च। अतस्तदुपस्थापितस्य तस्य पङ्कजतादेः कथं पदान्तरानुपस्थापिते पद्मादावन्वय इति। ibid., pp. 164–66.

2. 'अपङ्कजवृत्तिः सत्तेत्यादौ', 'स्खलदक्षरसंशोभि तरुण्या मुखपङ्कजमि'त्यादौ च व्यभिचारात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 166–67.

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Jagadīśa points out that in the case of the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the word *paṅkaja*, used uninflectedly, posited by way of a feature, it is essential that another word-meaning be presented by some other word following it; provided the said knowledge is to be in the said word-meaning through the relation of *samudāya-śakyatāvacchedakāvacchinna-nāmārtha-niṣṭhatva-viśeṣitatva*, i. e., in case the other word-meaning happens to be other than the lotus (*padma*). Similarly for the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the word *paṅkaja*, used inflectedly, posited by way of a feature, it is not essential that the other word-meaning be presented by a word used in apposition therewith. It is enough that the said word be not suffixed with some other declensional termination.[1]

Objections are raised : The word *paṅkaja* is a conventional (*rūḍha*) kind of nominal. It means the lotus possessed of the agency of the act of growing in mud (*paṅkajani-kartṛtva-viśiṣṭa-padma*), like the word *dhenu* that means the cow possessed of the state of the object of the milking (*dhānā-karmatva-viśiṣṭa-gauḥ*).

Jagadīśa refutes : The word *paṅkaja* is composed of three words—*paṅka*, *jan* (*dhātu*) and the suffix, *ḍa*. Each of them is of well-known denotation : *Paṅka* means mud as in *paṅke matsyaḥ*; *jan*, the root-verb, means to grow (*jāti*) as in *ghaṭo jāyate* and *ḍa* the suffix means agency (*kartṛtva*) as in *vihaga*. It is unreasonable that these words when put together to form

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1. तथा च पङ्कजभिन्नवृत्तिसत्तेति बोधस्य निर्विभक्तिकपङ्कजपदोपस्थाप्यपङ्कजप्रकारकस्य विशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन नञर्थे भिन्ने तादृशपङ्कजपदोत्तरशब्दानुस्थाप्येऽप्युत्पत्तेः प्रथमकार्यकारणभावे व्यभिचार इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 166.
2. तथा च मुखस्य स्वसमानविभक्तिकपदोपस्थाप्यत्वाभावाद् व्यभिचार इति भावः। ibid., p. 166.
3. उक्तव्युत्पत्तेः सङ्कोचेनेति गृहाण। श० श० प्र० p. 167.
   सङ्कोचेन— समुदायशक्यतावच्छेदकानवच्छिन्ननामार्थनिष्ठत्वविशेषितत्वेत्यर्थः। द्वितीयनियमे च स्वसमानविभक्तिकत्वस्य विजातीयविभक्तिराहित्यार्थकत्वेनेत्यर्थः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 167.

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word *paṅkaja* should lose their individual powers of denotation and that the composite form alone should possess a faculty of its own instead. It is reasonable. on the contrary, that the component parts, by virtue of their mutual expectancy and the like, should mean 'what grows in mud' (*paṅka-jani-kartā*) and and the composite form the lotus (*padam*). In fact, in case the word *paṅkaja* is held to mean 'the lotus possessed of the agency of the act of growing in mud' (*paṅka-jani-kartṛtva - viśiṣṭa - padma*), the determinant of denotation (*śakyatā'vacchedaka*) will be the state of the lotus possessed of the agency of the act of growing in mud (*panka-jani-kartṛtva-viśiṣṭa-padmatva*). It is more complex a property in comparison to the state of the lotus (*padmatva*). Not only that. The meaning, the state of agency of the act of growing in mud (*paṅka-jani-kartṛtva*) is to be availed of otherwise. It is presented by the component parts of the word, *paṅkaja*. Hence it can no longer be regarded liable to be denoted by the word *paṅkaja* as a whole. For what can be availed of otherwise is not to be regarded as the meaning of a word.[1]

The opponents argue : The suffix *ḍa* should imply the meaning, the lotus, and that the part *paṅkaja* (i.e., *paṅka* and *jan*) is only a pointer to that. The said part is devoid of denotation. For what is availed of otherwise is not the denoted- meaning of a word. The meanings of the said suffix viz, the agent (*kartā*) and the lotus also should be syntactically related to each other to give the sense of the lotus that grows in mud, the way agency (*kṛti*) and presentness (*vartamānatva*), the two meanings of the verbal suffix *ti* are related.[2]

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1. न च धेनुपदस्य धानकर्मत्वविशिष्टायां गवीव पङ्कजादिपदस्यापि पङ्कजातत्वादि-विशिष्टे पद्मादौ रूढिरेवास्तु, न तु योगरूढ़रिति साम्प्रतम्। अन्यत्र क्लृप्त-शक्तिभ्यः पङ्कादिपदेभ्य एवाकांक्षादिसाचिव्येन पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वादेर्लाभसम्भवे तद्विशिष्टस्य पद्मस्य गुरोः समुदायाशक्यत्वादनन्यलभ्यस्यैव शब्दार्थत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 167–68.

2. (यद्यपि) कर्तृवाचकडप्रत्ययादेव पद्मत्वविशिष्टस्य लक्षणया भानसम्भवान्न पङ्कजभागस्य तत्र शक्तिरुचिता, प्रकारान्तरालभ्यस्यैव शब्दशक्यत्वमित्युक्त-

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Jagadīśa refutes : Even if the word *paṅkaja* is not known in terms of its power of etymology, the verbal knowledge of the existence of the lotus is found to be caused by *paṅkajam-asti*. To justify the situation, it is essential to admit that the part *paṅkaja* is possessed of the faculty of denotation to rouse the sense of the lotus. Similarly even if the part *paṅkaja* is known in terms of the power of etymology, the knowledge of the existence of the lotus is found to occur due to *paṅkajam asti* in the face of the knowledge of the negation of the relation of the meanings derived through etymology with the implied meaning, the lotus, even without the knowledge of implication. The part *paṅkaja*, therefore, in any case is to be admitted to be possessed of the faculty of denotation.[1]

Jagadīśa continues to say that even if it so happens that the suffix *ḍa*, through the faculty of implication, presents the meaning the lotus, the said meaning cannot be syntactically related to the other word-meaning, the meaning of the word *asti* in *paṅkajam asti*. For the rule is that the meaning of a suffix, only if qualified by the meaning of the base thereof, is capable of being syntactically related to another word-meaning involved.[2]

त्वात्, कृतिवर्त्तमानत्वयोरिवैकपदार्थयोरपि कर्त्तृपद्मयोर्मिथोऽन्वयस्य सम्भवित्वात्। ibid., p. 168.

1. तथाप्यवयवानां शक्तेरग्रहे ग्रहेऽपि वा पद्मादौ तदर्थस्यान्वयधीविरोधिधीदशायां पङ्कजमस्तीत्यादितः पद्मस्तीत्याद्यनुभवार्थमवश्यं पद्मत्वादिविशिष्टे पङ्कजादि-भागस्य रूढिरुपेया। ibid., pp. 168-169.

अवयवानां शक्तेरग्रहे पङ्कजमस्तीत्यादितः पद्मस्तीत्याद्यनुभवार्थमवश्यं पद्मत्वादिविशिष्टे पङ्कजादिभागस्य रूढिरुपेयेत्येका योजना। कृष्णकान्ती p. 168.

तदर्थस्य—अवयवार्थस्य; 'अन्वयधीविरोधीति' अन्वयः सम्बन्धः, तद्विरोधी अभावादिः, तज्ज्ञानदशायां-तथा च शक्यसम्बन्धाभावग्रहदशायां लक्षणाया अग्रहकालेऽपीति यावत्। ibid., p. 169.

2. इतरथा प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्नस्यैव प्रत्ययार्थस्य पदार्थान्तरेणान्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नतया उप्रत्ययोपस्थापितस्यापि पद्मस्यास्तित्वादिना सहाऽन्वयानुपपत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 169.

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One who does not have the knowledge of import in respect of the word *paṅkaja* cannot comprehend the existence of the agent, on hearing '*paṅkajam asti*'. The agent presented by the mere suffix (*ḍa*) does not have the expectancy of being syntactically related to any other word-meaning.[1]

Moreover, in case the suffix *ḍa* be held to imply the lotus, the words like *vaka*, *nakha* should likewise be admitted to be devoid of denotation. Any of the component letters of the said words being known to have been denotative, the letters like *ka* or *kha* may, through frozen metaphor (*nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā*), bring home the sense of what the said words mean.[2] (viz, crane or an animal with claws).

The opponents argue : In the case of words like *vaka*, *nakha*, in spite of the knowledge of import in respect of each constituent letter thereof severally, the knowledge of implication in respect of the letters might not come about due to some reason or other. For the comprehension of crane (*valākā*) or an animal with claws (*nakhara*) in such a situation, therefore, there is no harm in admitting the faculty of denotation in the word *vaka* or *nakha* as a whole.[3]

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1. अत एव पङ्कजादिपदागृहीतशक्तिकस्य पुंसः 'पङ्कजमस्ती'त्यादितो जात्वपि कर्त्तास्तीत्याकारको नान्वयबोधः, प्रत्ययमात्रोपस्थाप्यस्य कर्त्तुरन्यत्रान्वये निराकाङ्क्षत्वादिति वक्ष्यते । ibid., pp. 169–170.

2. किञ्चैवमेकाक्षरकोषावधृतशक्तिकानां कखादिप्रत्येकवर्णानामेव निरूढलक्षणया तत्तदर्थानुभावकत्वसम्भवाद्वकनखादिसमुदायस्यापि तत्तदर्थे शक्तिर्विलीयेत । ibid., p. 170.

3. कादिप्रत्येकवर्णस्य शक्तिग्रहं विनापि वकादिशब्दाद्वकादेरनुभवार्थं तत्र समुदाये शक्तिरिति । ibid., p. 170.

कादीति । शक्तिग्रहमिति । एकाक्षरकोषादित इत्यादिः । विनापीति । क—न—खादिवर्णानां वलाकानखरादौ लक्षणाया अग्रहकालेऽपीत्यर्थः । एतेन प्रत्येकवर्णानां शक्तिग्रहसत्त्वेऽपि कथञ्चिग्प्रतिबन्धकवशेन लक्षणाया अग्रहकालेऽपि वलाकाद्यनुभवार्थं समुदायशक्तिस्वीकार-सम्भवेऽपि न क्षतिः । कृष्णकान्ती pp. 170–71.

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Jagadīśa argues : In the case of absence of the knowledge of import of the suffix *ḍa* too, to explain the knowledge of the lotus due to the word *paṅkaja* it is imperative to admit the faculty of import in the word *paṅkaja* as a whole.[1]

The opponents contend : In the case of the absence of the knowledge of import in respect of the suffix *ḍa*, the lotus is not comprehended at all.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In the case of absence of the knowledge of the word *paṅkaja* being denotative of the lotus, the lotus is not comprehended at all.[3]

The grammarians argue : The compound word *citra-gu* (one having the variagated cow) or any other word for that matter should be admitted to have the power of denotation as a whole. The word *paṅkaja* also is a compound word.

Jagadīśa replies : In *citra-gu* or any compound word for that matter, on the knowledge of import in respect of the component parts, meaning happens to be comprehended. Hence in view of the knowledge of import or of implication being imperatively involved in such cases, it is reasonable that such words should come under the category of derivative nominals.[4]

The Mīmāṁsakas argue : The meaning of the word *paṅkaja* derived through the power of etymology and the meaning derived

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1. प्रकृतेऽपि समानम्, डादिप्रत्ययमात्रस्य पद्मादौ वृत्तिमत्त्वाग्रहेऽपि पङ्कजादिसमुदायात् पद्मादेरनुभवस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 171.
2. ननु डादेर्वृत्तिमत्त्वाग्रहकाले पङ्कजपदात् पद्मबोधो न प्रामाणिकः, तत्कुतस्तदनुरोधेन समुदायशक्तिरावश्यकी ? कृष्णकान्ती p. 171.
3. समुदायस्य वृत्तिमत्त्वाग्रहे केनापि तादृशबोधास्वीरान्मात्रपदम्। ibid., p. 171.
4. न च 'चित्रगु'रित्यादावपि चित्रगोस्वाम्यादौ समुदायस्य शक्तिप्रसङ्गः, समासत्वस्याविशिष्टत्वादिति वाच्यम्। अगृहीतावयववृत्तिकस्य पुंसस्ततोऽर्थानन्वितमेनावयवानां वृत्तेरवश्यापेक्षायां तेषामेव तथाविधार्थबोधकत्वौचित्यस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति। श. श. प्र. p. 171.

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through the power of conventional significance are held to be mutually expectant, as a rule. But it does not mean that the meaning of the said word derived through the power of etymology in exclusion of the meaning derived through the power of conventional significance (or the meaning derived through the power of conventional significance in exclusion of what is derived through the power of etymology) is never comprehended. It simply means that towards the comprehension of the etymologically derived meaning posited as a feature against what is other than the conventionally derived one, the knowledge of import of the said word in respect of the conventionally derived meaning works as an obstacle. In the absence of the knowledge of the said word in respect of the conventionally derived meaning, therefore, as in *paṅkajaṁ kumudam* and the like, the lily as what grows in mud is comprehended. Similarly when the said word is not known to be denotative of the etymological meaning as in *bhūmau paṅkajam utpannam*, the *hibiscus mutabilis* (*sthala-padma*) qualified by the state of the lotus (*padmatva*) may be comprehended. The word *taila*, for example, on similar ground in similar circumstances etymologically means what is produced from the seeds of seasamum-plants and through conventional significance a distinct variety of liquid. At the same time, the said word as a derivative-conventional kind of nominal denotes a leaf of the seasamum-plant or the mustard oil as in *tailaṁ patram* or *sarṣapasya taiam.*[1]

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1. पङ्कजादिपदेभ्यः केवलस्यैव योगार्थस्य रूढयर्थस्य वा बोधव्युदासार्थं तादृशार्थयोर्मिथः साकाङ्क्षत्वनियमो न कल्प्यते, परन्तु रूढयर्थभिन्ने योगार्थस्य बोधं प्रति रूढिधियः प्रतिबन्धकत्वम्, तेन रूढेरप्रतिसन्धानदशायामवयवशक्त्यैव 'पङ्कजं कुमुदमि'त्यादौ पङ्कजनिकर्त्तृत्वादिना कैरवादेरवगमः। तथा चावयवशक्तेरनुपस्थितौ समुदायशक्त्यैव 'भूमौ पङ्कजमुत्पन्नमि'त्यादौ पङ्कत्वप्रकारेण स्थलपद्मादेः; अत एव च तैलपदं योगेन तिलप्रभवं, रूढया च विलक्षणद्रवद्रव्यपर्यवसितं स्नेहं बोधयद्योगरूढमपि 'तैलं पत्रमित्यादौ, 'सर्षपस्य तैलमि'त्यादौ च शक्त्यैव प्रत्येकस्य बोधकमिति मीमांसकानां मतमुपन्यस्यति—

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The Logicians argue : The knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in respect of its conventional meaning (*paṅkaja-padaṁ padme śaktam*) is not an abstacle to the occurrence of the verbal knowledge of the state of being grown in mud, the etymological meaning posited as a feature against what is other than the lotus—the conventional meaning as such. For it is well observed that in *kardamajaṁ* (*kumudam*) despite such knowledge, the state of being grown in mud is comprehended as a feature against the lily.[1]

The Mīmāṁsakas reply : It is no argument. For the above knowledge occurs due to the word *kardamaja* and not due to the word *paṅkaja*. The point is that in the face of the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in respect of the conventional meaning is to be an obstacle to the occurrence of the verbal knowledge of the etymological meaning posited as feature against what is other than the conventional meaning of the said word in case the said verbal knowledge is to occur as caused by the word *paṅkaja* alone. The objections raised by the logicians, therefore, are out of mark.[2]

The logicians contend : It is a matter of bare experience that despite the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in respect of the lotus, its conventional meaning, the knowledge of the etymological meaning thereof viz, the state of being grown in mud posited as a feature against the lily occurs as in *paṅkajaṁ kumudam*. The word *paṅkaja* through implication might well bring home the comprehension of the lily as what grows in mud in that case.[3]

रूढयर्थभिन्ने योगार्थबुद्धौ रूढेर्विरोधिताम् ।
वदन्ति केचिदेकैकबुद्धिस्तैः क्वचिदिष्यते ॥ श. श. प्र. pp. 171–73.

1. पद्मान्यधर्मिकपङ्कजातत्वान्वयधीसामान्यं प्रति पङ्कजपदं पद्मशक्तमित्येवं रूढिज्ञानत्वेन न विरोधित्वम्, तादृशधीसत्वेऽपि कर्दमजादिशब्देभ्यस्तादृप्येण कैरवादेरवगमात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 173–74.
2. पङ्कजपदजन्यतादृशबोधं प्रत्येव तथात्वेन विरोधित्वम्। ibid., p. 174.
3. रूढिज्ञानदशायामपि समुदायस्य लक्षणया...पङ्कजपदात् पङ्कजातत्वेन कुमुदबोधस्य सर्वैरुपगमात्। श. श. प्र. p. 174.

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The Mīmāṁsakas argue : The said knowledge of import has been conceived as an obstacle to the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud posited as a feature against what is other than the lotus presented through the faculty of denotation. Hence if through such implication, any such knowledge occurs, there is no harm.[1]

The Logicians reply : The said knowledge might be effected due the word *paṅkaja* being wrongly known to be denotative of the lily (*paṅkaja-padam kumude śaktam*).[2]

The Mīmāṁsakas contend : The knowledge of import of the word in respect of its conventional meaning (*paṅkaja-padam padme śaktum*) is an obstacle to the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud posited by way of a feature against what is other than the lotus cognised through the power of etymology of the word *paṅkaja*. Hence if any such verbal knowledge occurs as caused by an erroneous knowledge of the said word in respect of its conventional meaning, there is no harm.[3]

In fact the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in respect of the conventional meaning to the effect that the word *paṅkaja* known as a word qualified by a meaning through the relation of denotation is possessed of the lotus through the relation of denotation is an obstacle and not that the word *paṅkaja* is with an import to bring home the comprehension of the lotus as lotus. As such even if due the knowledge of import of the said word in respect of the conventional meaning assailed by doubt or by error, the verbal knowledge of the lily as what grows in mud occurs, there is no harm.[4]

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1. पङ्कजपदजन्येत्यस्य पङ्कजपदशक्तिज्ञानजन्येत्यर्थस्तथा च रूढिज्ञानदशायां लक्षणाजन्यबोधसम्भवेऽपि न क्षतिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 174.
2. शक्तिभ्रमेण वा। श. श. प्र. p. 174.
3. तथाप्यवयवशक्त्या पङ्कजपदजन्यपद्मान्यधर्मिकपङ्कजातत्वान्वयबोधं प्रत्येव निरुक्तरूढिज्ञानत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वम्। ibid., p. 174.
4. वस्तुतः पदविशेष्यकं शक्तिसम्बन्धेनार्थप्रकारकं पङ्कजपदं शक्तिसम्बन्धेन पद्मवदित्याकारकम् यज्ज्ञानं तस्यैव विरोधित्वं लाघवात्, न तु पङ्कजपदं

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The Logicians argue : The verbal knowledge of the lily as what is qualified by the state of the lotus due to the word *paṅkaja* wrongly taken to be conventinnally denotative of the lily is a hard reality even in the face of the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in respect of the lotus as what is qualified by the state of the lotus.

The Mīmāṁsakas reply : Such a situation is not difficult to be explained. The verbal knowledge has come out to be of the lily, error notwithstanding, as what is qualified by the state of the lotus. The knowledge that has been held to be obstructed, on the contrary, is the knowledge of what is other than what is qualified by the lotus.[1]

The Logicians argue : One may have the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in respect of its conventional meaning to the effect that it is denotative of the lily too (*paṅkaja-padaṁ kumude'pi śaktam*). One may, therefore, through the knowledge of import of the said word in respect of its etymological sense and that in respect of its conventional meaning may have the knowledge of the state of growing in mud posited as a feature against the lily. The knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in respect of its conventional meaning viz, the lotus cannot obviously obstruct the knowledge of what is other than that (the lotus).

The Mīmāṁsakas reply : Such knowledge should not occur at all in the face of the knowledge of import of the word

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पद्मत्वेन पद्मानुभवजनकतया सङ्केतितमित्याकारकशक्तिप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन गौरवात् इति ध्येयम् । एवं चाप्रामाण्यज्ञानानास्कन्दिततादृशनिश्चयत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वं बोध्यम् । तेन रूढिज्ञानस्य संशयात्मकस्य भ्रमत्वज्ञानास्कन्दितस्य वा सत्त्वे पङ्कजातत्वेन कुमुदान्वयबोधोत्पादेऽपि न क्षतिः । रामभद्री pp. 174–75.

1. न च कुमुद एव पद्मत्वेन रूढिभ्रमदशायां तादृष्येण कुमुदस्य बोधो न स्यात् विरोधिन्या रूढिधिय सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम् । पद्मान्यधर्मिकेत्यनेन पद्मत्वानवच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकत्वस्योक्तत्वात् । श. श. प्र. pp. 174–75.

तथा च पद्मत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकतादृशबोधस्याप्रतिबध्यत्वात् तादृष्येण कुमुदादेर्बोधो नानुपपन्न इति भावः । रामभद्री p. 175.

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paṅkaja to the effect that it is denotative of the lotus as lotus.[1] But even if such knowledge be admitted, the knowledge to be obstructed has to be further qualified. The knowledge not brought about through the knowledge of the word *paṅkaja* to the effect that it is denotative of the lily too alone is to be obstructed by the knowledge that it is denotative of the lotus as lotus.[2]

The Logicians argue : The supporters of the view that the knowledge of speaker's intention is a cause of verbal knowledge would find it difficult to accept this. For the knowledge of speaker's intention may be delayed; in which case the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud posited as a feature against the lily should obviously not occur.

The Mīmāṁsakas reply : This is a welcome objection.[3]

The Logicians eontend : It may so happen that the word *paṅkaja* is wrongly taken to be incapable of effecting the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud (its derivative meaning) posited by way of a feature against the lotus as lotus (its conventional meaning). The verbal knowledge of the state of growing posited as a feature against the lotus obviously cannot happen in that case. Nor should the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud posited against the lily too should happen. For Mīmāṁsakas hold that the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in

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1. वस्तुतस्तु तयाविधरूढिज्ञानदशायां पङ्कजं कुमुदमिति ज्ञानानुदयेऽपि न क्षतिः। न हि तदानीं तादृशज्ञानं समकालाभियुक्तानुभवसिद्धं मानाभावादिति प्रतिबध्यदिशि विशेषणान्तरदानमनुचितमित्याशयेन 'स्वीकारेत्वि'त्युक्तम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 175.
2. पद्मस्येव कुमुदस्यापि समुदायशक्यत्वधीदशायामवयवशक्त्या (समुदायशक्त्या च पङ्कजमितिवाक्यात्) 'पङ्कजातं कुमुदमि'त्याकारकधीस्वीकारे तु कुमुदादिशक्तत्वज्ञानाजन्यत्वेनापि प्रतिबध्यं विशेषणीयम्। श. श. प्र. p. 175.
3. ननु तात्पर्य्यादिज्ञानासत्त्वदशायां पङ्कजातत्वेन कुमुदादेरपि बोधो न जायत एवेतीष्टापत्तिसम्भवादाह अयोग्यतेति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 175.

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respect of the conventional meaning (the lotus) should withhold the occurrence of such knowledge.

The Mīmāṁsakas reply : There is no cause of concern if no such verbal knowledge occurs under the circumstances related.[1] In case the knowledge of import of the word *maṇḍapa* in respect of its conventional meaning viz, house is effected, there is no reason that the sentence *maṇḍapaṁ bhojaya* should lead to the comprehension of one who lives on the scum of boiled rice due to the word *maṇḍapa* through the power of derivation.[2]

The Logicians argue : The fact is that under the circumstances related, the verbal knowledge of the state of growing posited as a feature against the lily is a matter of hard experience.[3]

The Mīmāṁsakas reply : The theory that the knowledge of import of the word like *paṅkaja* in respect of its conventional meaning is an obstacle to the verbal knowledge of its derivative meaning posited as a feature against what is other than the conventional meaning may in that case be further qualified. The said knowledge of import may be held to have the potency to obstruct the said kind of verbal knowledge in case it fulfils certain conditions. It must be free from the notion that the knowledge of import of the word in respect of its conventional meaning is an error. It must not also be vitiated by the notion of incompatilibity to the effect that the verbal knowledge that embraces the state of growing in mud

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1. न च यत्र तात्पर्य्यादिधीविलम्बादयोग्यताभ्रमादिना प्रतिबन्धाद्वा रूढ्योपस्थिते पद्मे योगार्थस्य पङ्कजनिकर्तृरनन्वयस्तत्रावयवशक्त्या पङ्कजातत्वेन कुमुदे पङ्कजपदशक्तिभ्रमेण च कुमुदादिबोधो न स्यात् विरोधिनो रूढिज्ञानस्य सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम् ? मीमांसकानामिष्टत्वात् । श. श. प्र. pp. 175–76.
2. ते हि 'मण्डपं भोजये'त्यादावपि गृहादौ रूढिधीसत्त्वे मण्डपादिपदानामवयवशक्त्या मण्डपानकर्त्तादेर्न मन्वते बोधम् । श. श. प्र. p. 176.
3. ननु रूढयर्थगोचरतत्तदयोग्यतानिश्चयदशायां पङ्कजातत्वेन कुमुदबोधस्यानुभवसिद्धस्यापलापापत्तिरित्यत आह·भ्रमत्वज्ञानेति । रामभद्री p. 176.

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as the feature cannot embrace the lotus as the substantive. Hence the knowledge of the lily spoken of above may come out to occur under the circumstances spoken of, without any harm to the theory.[1]

The Logicians argue : The word. *paṅkaja* through its power of conventional significance may present both the meanings viz, the state of growing in mud aud the lotus. The knowledge of import would be that the word *paṅkaja* conventionally denotes the state of growing in mud notwithstanding the error involved. Simultaneously there would occur the right knowledge of import that the word *paṅkaja* is conventionally denotative of the lotus. The verbal knowledge, therefore, would be of the lotus that grows in mud (*paṅkajātam padmam*).

The Mīmāṁsakas reply : Such verbal knowledge should not be regarded as valid. Even if such knowledge is regarded as valid, the knowledge of the lily as what grows in mud is not going to occur in any case.

The Logicians argue : It is the knowledge of the state of growing in mud, posited as the feature against what is other than the lotus brought out by the word *paṅkaja* through the power of derivation that has been held liable of being obstructed by the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* to the effect that it is denotative of its conventional meaning viz, the lotus. In the present case, the verbal knowledge is to occur due to the word *paṅkaja* presenting the meaning of the state of growing in mud through the conventional import. There is no reason, therefore, to hold that the knowledge of the import of the conventional meaning (viz, the lotus) should obstruct the comprehension of the lily or what is other than the lotus as what grows in mud.

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1. भ्रमत्वग्रहानास्कन्दितस्यैव रूढ्यर्थगोचरतत्तदयोग्यताज्ञानाद्यभावविशिष्टस्यैव रूढिज्ञानस्य विरोधितायाः सुवचत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 176.

तथा चायोग्यताग्रहकालीनरूढिज्ञानस्याविरोधितया तदानीं पङ्कजातत्वेन कुमुदादिबोधने बाधकाभाव इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 176.

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The Mīmāṁsakas reply : The knowledge to be obstructed instead of being held to be a knowledge brought out by the word *paṅkaja* through the power of derivation (*avayava-śakti*) is to be understood as what is caused by the power of denotation inherent in what constitute the word, *paṅkaja*. By what constitute the word *paṅkaja* again is to be understood the word itself too like the components of itself viz. *paṅka*, *jan*, and *ḍa*. For like the said components, the word itself too forms a content of the knowledge of import. Hence although through the erroneous knowledge of import that the word *paṅkaja* is conventionally denotative of what grows in mud, the lotus appears to be comprehended and the said comprehension is nonetheless a verbal knowledge brought out by the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* itself being a content of the said knowledge. There is no reason, therefore, that the said knowledge of import should bear out the knowledge of the lily as what grows in mud in the face of the knowledge of the said word that it is conventionally denotative of the lotus.[1]

The old school of the Mīmāṁsakas does not approve of such an elaborate and complex way of thinking. It holds that the verbal knowledge of the state of agency of growing in mud, the meaning etymologically derived from the word *paṅkaja*, posited as the feature against what is other than the lotus, the conventional meaning of the said word cannot be effected due to the word *paṅkaja* in the face of the knowledge of import of the said word in respect of the said conventional meaning. The said verbal knowledge has to embrace the

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1. यदि च समुदाय एव पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वेन पद्मत्वेन च शक्तेः प्रमाभ्रमाभ्यां 'पङ्कजातं पद्ममित्याकारको बोधः प्रामाणिकः, तदानीं च पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वेन कुमुदस्य नान्वयधीः, तदाऽवयशक्त्येत्यपहाय पङ्कजपदघटकशब्दशक्त्येति प्रतिबध्यकुक्षौ निक्षेपणीयम्, तद्घटकत्वञ्चेह तद्विषयिताकत्वमात्रं तदवयव इव तत्राप्यविशिष्टम्। श. श. प्र. pp. 176–77.

तथा च पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वेन शक्तिभ्रमेण पद्मबोधेऽपि तदानीं पङ्कजपदघटकशक्तिप्रयोज्यपद्मत्वानवच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकपङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वेन कुमुदबोधो न सम्भवतीति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 177.

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lotus as its substantive. For it is the state of the lotus (*padma-tva*) that is the cause of the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud, posited as the feature. The state of the lotus, the cause is in the lotus through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud too is in the lotus through the relation of the state of the substantive (*viśeṣyatā*). Or rather, it may be said that the verbal knowledge is in the state of the lotus itself through the relation of the state of the determinant of the substantive (*viśeṣyatā'-vacchedaka-sambandha*) and the state of the lotus in itself through the relation of identity (*tādātmya*). The verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud, posited as the feature against a lotus gone by or still to be, even would not be difficult to be explained.[1]

The opponents argue : The state of the lotus (*padma-tva*) in that case would fail to be recognised as what is called *prayogopādhi*. For it is the characteristic of the counter-positive of the negation that has come out to be an impediment that is regarded as such. Nor could it be held a welcome objection; for the state of the lotus has been held to be the *prayogopādhi* of the word *paṅkaja* by the elders. In the present case, the state of the lotus has been held to be the cause of the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud, posited as the feature. As such, the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud posited as the feature against the lily (*paṅka-jātam kumudam*) is not to occur. For the negation of the state of the lotus (*padmatvā'-bhāva*) has come out to be an impediment thereto and the state of the lotus, the counterpositive of the said negation. The state of the lotus, therefore, has obviously failed to be the *prayogopādhi* of the word *paṅkaja*. The view

1. स्वावयवशक्त्या पङ्कजपदजन्यं पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वेनान्वयबोधं प्रति पद्मत्वं हेतुः तत्र कार्यस्य विशेष्यत्वं तदवच्छेदकत्वं वा कारणस्य तु समवायस्तादात्म्यं वा प्रत्यासत्तिरित्येतावतैव योगार्थमर्यादया कुमुदादेर्बोधव्युदाससम्भवात् उक्तक्रमेण प्रतिबन्धकतायां मानाभावः। श. श. प्र. pp. 177–78.

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of the school of the Mīmāṁsakas in that case cannot be held to have made any improvement on the earlier view.[1]

The old school replies : The state of the lotus is held to be the *prayogopādhi* of the word *paṅkaja* in the sense that it is the cause of the verbal knowledge of the state of growing in mud (*prayoga*) and that it is an attribute (*upādhi*).[2]

Jagadiśa contradicts : In that case the verbal knowledge of the lily as what grows in mud through the knowledge of import of the word *paṅkaja* in respect of its etymological sense should not occur to one who does not have the knowledge of the import of the said word in respect of the conventional meaning thereof. Nor should it be regarded a welcome objection. For such a knowledge is found to occur under the said circumstances.[3]

The old school of the Mīmāṁsakas argues : The state of the lotus is to be regarded as the cause of the knowledge of the etymological meaning posited as the feature only in case the knowledge of the conventional import of the word *paṅkaja* has come to be effected. There is no harm, therefore, even if verbal knowledge of the lily as what grows in mud occurs due to the word *paṅkaja* in absence of the knowledge of the conventional import thereof.[4]

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1. ननूक्त्यरीत्या पद्मत्वस्य हेतुत्वे तस्य प्रयोगोपाधित्वं व्याहन्येत, प्रतिबन्धकीभूताभावप्रतियोगिधर्मस्यैव तयात्वात्, पङ्कजातं कुमुदमिति बुद्धौ पद्मत्वाभावस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वे उक्तप्रतिबन्धककल्पनापेक्षया लाघवस्य दुष्करत्वम्। न च तस्य प्रयोगोपधित्वविरहे का क्षतिरिति ? पद्मत्वं प्रयोगोपाधिरिति प्राचीनप्रवादासङ्गतेः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 178.
2. पद्मत्वं पङ्कजपदप्रयोगोपाधिरिति प्राचीनप्रवादस्याप्युक्तार्थ एव पर्य्यवसानात्—इति। श. श. प्र. p. 178.
   तथा च प्रयोगः = पङ्कजातत्वप्रकारकान्वयबोधजनकः; स एवोपाधिधर्म = इति तदर्थात् इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 178.
3. तत्तुच्छम्, पद्माग्रहीतशक्तिकस्यापि पुंस पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वेनावयवशक्त्या कुमुदस्य बोधानुदयप्रसङ्गात्। न चेष्टापत्तिरनुभवविरोधात्। श. श. प्र. p. 178.
4. न च रूढिज्ञानकालोनमेव योगार्थस्य बोधं प्रत्युक्तरीत्या पद्मत्वस्य हेतुत्वम् ? ibid., p. 179.

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The Logicians contend : In that case the verbal knowledge of the lily as what grows in mud should also occur due to the word *paṅkaja* to one having only the knowledge of the conventional import of the said word. For the general conditions calling for the said verbal knowledge in the absence of the knowledge of the conventional import of the said word are equally present to call for such a knowledge.[1] The absence of the knowledge of the conventional import again could not be imagined as an additional cause of the verbal knowledge of the lily as what grows in mud occuring in the absence of the said knowledge of import. For the knowledge of the conventional import being admitted as an impediment to such knowledge, the absence thereof need not be regarded as an additional cause of such knowledge.[2]

The old school of the Mīmāṁsakas replies : The knowledge of the conventional import is admitted as an impediment to the knowledge of the lily as what grows in mud. The absence thereof, therefore, is *ip so facto* admitted as the cause of the said verbal knowledge occuring in the absence of the knowledge of the conventional import. There is not much of difference in imagining the absence of the said knowledge of import as a cause. In conceiving the said knowledge of import an impediment, the determinant of what is to be effected (*kāryatā'-vaccheda ka* i.e., the *pratibodhyatā'vacchedaka*) happens to involve the state of the substantive not qualified by the state of the lotus. In considering the absence of the said knowledge of import a cause, on the contrary, the determinant

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1. तथा सति रूढिधीदशायामपि तदसमानकालीनस्य पङ्कजातत्वेन कुमुद-बोधस्य सामान्यसामग्रीमहिम्ना दुर्वारतापत्तेः । श. श. प्र. p. 179.

2. रूढिज्ञानासमानकालीनताद्दशबोधं प्रति विशेषतो हेत्वन्तरस्याकल्पत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 179.

रूढिज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वमते तस्यानावश्यकत्वादित्यर्थः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 179.

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of what is to be effected involves the state of occuring with the knowledge of the conventional import wanting.[1]

The Logicians argue : This involves complexities. The state of occuring with the knowledge of the conventional import wanting is more complex a property than the state of the substantive not qualified by the state of the lotus.[2] In fact in conceiving the state of the lotus as the cause of the verbal knowledge of the lotus as what grows in mud with the knowledge of the conventional import of the word *paṅkaja* being simultaneously in effect, complexities are involved.[3]

The grammarians hold that there is no such nominal known as the derivative conventional. A word like *paṅkaja* although it has the potency to denote 'what grows in mud', leads to the comprehension of the lotus as what is qualified by the state of the lotus and not as what grows in mud. For the knowledge of the conventional import of the word poses an obstacle to the comprehension as such of the lotus as what grows in mud presented through the power of derivation by the word *paṅkaja*. It is idle, therefore, to hold that the knowledge of the conventional import is an obstacle to the verbal knowledge of what is other than the lotus as what grows in mud. For such a view is fraught with complexities. The qualifying adjunct like 'what is other than the lotus' is provided for to

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1. ननु रूढिज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वे तद्भावस्य हेतुत्वं कल्पसमेव, परन्तु तन्मते पद्मत्वानवच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकत्वं कार्यतावच्छेदके निविष्टम्, एतन्मते रूढिज्ञानासमानकालीनत्वमिति विशेषः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 179.
2. तत्कल्पने चातिगौरवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 179.

   रूढिज्ञानासमानकालीनतादृशबोधं प्रति रूढिज्ञानाभावस्य हेतुत्वकल्पने चेत्यर्थः। पद्मत्वानवच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकत्वापेक्षया रूढिज्ञानासमानकालीनत्वस्यानेकपदार्थघटिततया गुरुत्वेन कार्यतावच्छेदकगौरवम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 179.
3. अधिकं पुना रूढिज्ञानसमानकालीनतादृशबोधं प्रति पद्मत्वस्य हेतुत्वकल्पनेनत्याशयेनोक्तमतिगौरवादिति। ibid. pp. 179–80.

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qualify what is to be obstructed, in addition.[1] A word like *yudhiṣṭhira* leads to the comprehension of the son of *kuntī* as qualified by the species *yudhiṣṭhira-tva* to the exclusion of the meaning of 'one unswayed in battles', etymologically derived from the said word.[2]

Jagadīśa contradicts : The sentence *paṅkajam asti* leads to the verbal knowledge of the lotus as what grows in mud (*paṅkajātam padmam asti*). The Logicians and the Mīmāṁsakas alike admit of it. The view of the Grammarians, therefore, is not of much worth. The complexities involved are to be tolerated; for otherwise the comprehension of the lotus as what grows in mud occuring due to the word *paṅkaja* in the situation referred to would remain unexplained.[3] If simplicity (*lāghava*) be the only consideration, then the knowledge of the conventional import should be held to pose an obstacle to the comprehension of the state of what grows in mud as the feature and not of the state of what grows in mud, presented through the power of derivation by the word *paṅkaja*. It would be no justification to say that this would militate against reality on the ground that to one having wrongly known the word to have been conventionally denotative of what grows in mud; the verbal knowledge of the state of what

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1. पङ्कजननकर्त्तृषु पङ्कजादिपदानां शक्तिसत्त्वेऽपि पङ्कजपदान्त तात्पर्य्येण पद्मस्य बोधः परन्तु पद्मत्वमात्रेण, योगार्थमर्यादया पङ्कजातत्वप्रकारकबोधसामान्यं प्रत्येव पद्मत्वविशिष्टे रूढिज्ञानस्य लाघवेन विरोधित्वात्; पद्मान्यधर्मिकत्वादे-र्गौरवेण प्रतिबध्य कोट्यप्रविष्टत्वदतो योगरूढं नामैव नास्ति। श. श. प्र. p. 180.
2. युधिष्ठिरादिशब्दादपि रणस्थिरत्वादिकं योगार्थं परित्यजयैव वैजात्यादिप्रकारेण कुन्तीपुत्राद्यवगमात्। ibid. pp. 180–181.
3. तदेतद्वैयाकरणमतं पङ्कजमस्तीत्यादित्तः पङ्कजातं पद्ममस्तीत्याद्यनुभवस्य न्यायमीमासादिसकलतन्त्रसिद्धत्वेन गौरवस्य प्रामाणिकत्वादनादेयम्। ibid., pp. 181–82.

रूढिज्ञानप्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदके पद्मान्यधर्मिकत्वनिवेशगौरवस्य प्रामाणिक-त्वात्—पङ्कजातं पद्ममित्याद्यनुभवान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती pp. 181–82.

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grows in mud posited as the feature occuring due to the word *pankaja* would remain unexplained. For reality of the situation has not been taken much account of while refuting the view uniformally held by others.[1]

The Grammarians argue : If the derivative meaning is to be posited as the feature against the conventional meaning in the verbal knowledge occuring due to what is called the derivative-conventional kind of nominal difficulties would arise in an instance like *dravye sarasi-jam asti*. It would lead to the verbal knowledge of the lotus as what grows in water the substance as the lotus abiding in substance. For both the nominals *dravya* and *saras* presenting the meaning substance and water are collocatively used to call for the syntactical relation of the said two meanings through identity.[2]

The Logicians reply : Such apprehension is unreasonable. For the word *sarasi* is only a part of the compound word *sarasija* (*aluk* compound). In the matter of the syntactical relation of the meanings of any two nominals on the contrary it is essential that such meanings must not be presented by any of the said two nominals collocatively used forming part of a compound.[3]

The celebrated anthor of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* argues : A word bears out the comprehension of the meaning of itself as related to the meanings that are compatible and are presented

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1. अन्यथा अवयवशक्तेरपिप्रतिबध्यतायामप्रवेशापत्तेर्लाघवेन पङ्कजातत्व-प्रकारकशाब्दसामान्यं प्रत्येव रूढिधियः प्रतिबन्धकत्वस्य सुवचत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 182.

   पङ्कजनिकर्त्तरि समुदायशक्तिभ्रमदशायां नेष्यत एव पङ्कजातत्व-प्रकारकबोधः अनुभवापलापस्य तुल्यत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 182.

2. नन्वेवं 'द्रव्ये सरसिजमस्ती'त्यादितो द्रव्यनिष्ठं सरोजमिव द्रव्याभिन्ने सरसि जातं पद्ममपि प्रतीयेत, नामार्थयोरभेदान्वये तन्त्रस्य नान्नोः समानविभक्ति-कत्वस्यानपायात् ? श. श. प्र. p. 182.

3. सत्यम्, सविभक्तिकनामार्थस्य नामान्तरार्थान्वये वृत्तिशब्दैकदेशान्येनैव समानविभक्तिकनामान्तरेण स्मारितत्वस्य तन्त्रतायाः स्वीकार्यत्वादिति। श. श. प्र. pp. 182–83.

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by mutually expectant words used in juxtaposition. The derivative meaning and the conventional one, therefore, when simultaneously presented (through the power of etymology and that of convention respectively), forthwith are to be comprehended as related to each other as called for by expectancy and the like. Neither the derivative meaning nor the conventional one, under such circumstances, is likely to be comprehended as related to anything else. At the same time, however, it is not that the syntactical relation of these two meanings is confined to themselves only. There is no reason either to hold that the knowledge of the conventional import of a word poses an obstacle to the comprehension of the derivative meaning as related to what is other than the conventional one.[1] Hence if the comprehension of the derivative meaning and the conventional one as related to each other does not come to be forthwith effected in view of the speaker's intention being otherwise or because of the knowledge of an impediment to their being mutually related, the lily comes to be comprehended as what grows in mud through the power of etymology and the ground-lotus (hibiscus mutabilis) as what is qualified by the state of the lotus through the power of convention.[2]

The claim that the knowledge of the conventional import of a word like *paṅkaja* is an obstacle to the verbal knowledge of the derivative meaning posited as the feature against what is other than the conventional meaning, is applicable to cases where the conditions of verbal knowledge favour the

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 184.
2. एवञ्च यत्र योगार्थरूढिलभ्यार्थयोस्तात्पर्याद्यग्रहाद्विरोधिसमवधानाद्वा न प्रथममन्वयधीस्तत्र योगार्थमर्यादया पङ्कजातत्वेन कुमुदादेः समुदायशक्त्या च पद्मत्वेन स्थल-क्रमलस्य बोधो भवेत्येवेति मणिकृन्मतं दर्शयति—। श, श. प्र. pp. 184–85.

समुदायशक्त्युपस्थापिते पदान्तरवृत्त्युपस्थापिते वा यत्र धर्मिणि अवान्तरवृत्तिलभ्यार्थस्य यदाकाङ्क्षा(दि) निश्चयादिस्तदैव तत्र तस्यान्वयबोध उत्पद्यते सम्भूतसामग्रीकत्वात्। ibid., pp. 185–86.

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projection of the derivative meaning against the conventional one.[1]

Jagadīśa disapproves of this view of the author of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*.[2] It is a matter of experience that the word *paṅkaja* does not lead to the comprehension of the lily as what grows in mud while giving rise to the verbal knowledge of the lotus as what grows in mud. For the comprehension of the lily as what grows in mud, the word *paṅkaja* has to be imagined to have been wrongly known to be denotative of the lily or to explain the non-occurrence of the said comprehension on the other hand it has to be imagined that the conditions favourable for the comprehension of the lily as what grows in mud are wanting. Neither way simplicity happens to be achieved. It is reasonable, therefore, to hold that in the face of the knowledge of the conventional import the comprehension of the lily or what is other than the lotus, the conventional meaning as what grows in mud does not occur.[3] In the face of the knowledge of the conventional import inspite of the speaker's intention being in thousands, the lily does not came to be comprehended. Hence the said knowledge of import has been conceived as an impediment.[4]

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1. रूढ्यर्थभिन्ने योगार्थस्यान्वयबोधव्युदासाय तु रूढेर्योगापहारिताग्रवादो रूढ्यर्थभात्रे योगार्थस्यान्वयबोधसामग्रीस्थलाभिप्रायक इति चिन्तामणिकृतां मतम् । ibid., p. 186.
2. मतं = सम्मतम् तच्चास्वरससूचनाय । कृष्णकान्ती p. 186.
3. स च पङ्कजातत्वेन पद्मबोधदशायां तादृप्येण कुमुदबोधवारणाय तत्र कारण विरहकल्पनस्यावश्यकत्वेन कुमुदबोधोपपादकशक्तिभ्रमकल्पनापेक्षया लाघव-विरहेणानुभवविरुद्धस्य रूढिज्ञानदशायां कुमुदादिबोधस्य स्वीकारोऽनुचित इति । ibid., p. 186.
4. सति रूढिज्ञाने कुमुदे तात्पर्यज्ञानादिसहस्रेणापि न कुमुदशाब्दधीरित्यनुभवेनैव तैः प्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकभावः स्वीक्रियते इत्यनुभवानुरोधेन क्लृप्तप्रतिबन्ध-काभावरूपकारणस्य लाघवानुरोधेन दूरीकरणे प्रायो जगति कार्यकारण-भावविलोपापत्तिरित्याशयेन 'मतमि'त्युक्त्वाऽस्वरसो व्यञ्जितः । रामभद्री p. 186.

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The derivative conventional Nominals are of two categories viz, what are formed of a compound (*sāmāsika*) and what are formed of a secondary suffix (*tāddhitika*). What are formed of a primary suffix (*kṛdanta*) come under the category of what are formed of a compound.[1]

Thc derivative Nominals are of three categories viz, what are formed of a compound, what are formed of a secondary suffix and what are formed of a primary suffix.[2]

This kind of Nominals bears out the verbal knowledge of what are presented by the component parts thereof through the power of derivation. The derivative conventional kind of Nominals, on the contrary, leads to the comprehension of what is presented thereby through the power of convention as qualified by what are presented by the component parts thereof i.e., through the power of derivation and not merely of what are presented by the component parts alone.[3] Instances of the *dvanda* compound come under the category of the derivative Nominals. For these lead to the comprehension of what are presented by the components thereof through the power of derivation.[4] The instances like *paṅkaja*, *vāsudeva*—the

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1. सामासिकं तद्धितान्तमिति तद्द्विविधम्भवेत्।
योगरूढं कृदन्तस्य समासत्वव्यवस्थितेः॥ श. श. प्र. का. 29.
तद् = योगरूढं; सामासिकं = ससासात्मकं; कृष्णसर्पादिः। तद्धितान्तं वासुदेवादि। कृदन्तस्य पङ्कजादियोगरूढस्य सामासिक एवान्तर्भाव इति नाधिक्यम्। ibid., p. 187.
2. तच्च = यौगिकं; त्रिविधं = समासः, तद्धितान्तं, कृदन्तञ्चेति। ibid., p. 187.
3. यन्नाम स्वान्तर्निविष्टशब्दानां योगलभ्यस्यैव यादृशार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति हेतुस्तन्नाम तादृशार्थे यौगिकम्; योगरूढन्तु कृष्णसर्पादिपदं योगेनावच्छिन्नस्य रूढ्यर्थस्य बोधकं, न तु तन्मात्रस्य। ibid., p. 187.
4. द्वन्द्वोऽपि समासः स्वघटकशब्दानामाकाङ्क्षया लभ्यस्य धवखदिराद्यर्थस्यान्वयबोधकतया यौगिक एव। ibid., pp. 187–88.

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so many compounds are not to be regarded as instances of the derivative kind of Nominals. For a compound other than what has been recognised as the derivative conventional kind of Nominals is to be regarded as such.[1] The words like *brāhmaṇī*, *śvasrū*, *śūdra* are to be known as the derivative Nominals, the feminine suffixes like *ṅīp* being denotative of femininehood. In case the said suffixes are to mean an abstract notion (*svarūpa*) only, the radical like *brāhmaṇa* meaning a brahmin possessed of femininehood and so on, the said words may come under the category of the derivative conventional Nominals.[2]

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1. सर्वत्रेदं रूढान्यत्वेन विशेषणीयम, नातः कृष्णसर्पादौ वासुदेवादौ पङ्कजादौ च योगरूढेऽतिप्रसङ्ग। ibid., p. 188.
2. ब्राह्मणी-श्वश्रू-शूद्रेत्यादौ ङीवादेः स्त्रीत्वाचित्वे तादृशं नाम यौगिकमेव; अन्यथा तु स्त्रीत्वादिमति तत्तदर्थे रूढमेव, नातो विभागस्य व्याघातः। ibid., p. 188.

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CHAPTER VI

COMPOUNDS : (SAMĀSA)

The word *samāsa* means abridgement (*samasana*) of two or more words into one (*ekapadī-bhāva*). Pāṇini does not provide any definition of *samāsa* as such. The introductory *sūtra* of his Grammar in the context of *samāsa* however, lays bare the fundamental principles involved in the process of the said abridgement and the result thereof. He thereby indicates the nature of *samāsa*. The *sūtra* reads *samarthaḥ pada-vidhiḥ*[1] and the word *samartha* is to be understood in a metaphorical sense. It means *smarthāśrita*. The *sūtra*, therefore, comes to mean *samarthāśritaḥ padavidhiḥ*. The word *samartha* again has twofold meaning viz, what (i.e., words) are mutually connected (*sāpekṣa*) and what (i.e., the compound) gives a combined sense (*saṁsṛṣṭārtha*). Any two or more words do not form a compound. The words involved are to be mutually connected. When thus combined, the meanings of the component words involved no longer remain liable to independent comprehension. Only in the combined sense the compounded from is to be used. *Samāsa*, therefore, has two aspects viz, mutually connected words (*vigraha*)likely to develop into a single syntactical unit and the said syntactical unit (*vṛtti*) as well. The mutually connected words prior to the formation of a syntactical unit are arranged in the form of a sentence (*vākya*) known as the analysis

1. Pāṇini II. 1.1.

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of compound (*vigraha-vākya* or *vyāsa-vākya*). In other words, the sentence that conveys the meaning of a syntactical unit (*vṛtti*) is called the sentence of analysis and the syntactical unit (*vṛtti*) is otherwise known as *pada-vidhi*.

Hence, as seen above, both the sentence of analysis and the syntactical unit are to be *samartha*. In the case of analysis what are mutually connected are to be known as *samartha* while in the case of the syntactical unit the word *samartha* means what is capable of conveying a combined sense. In other words, in case the sentence of analysis is constituted of mutually connected (*samartha*) words, the syntactical unit is proved to be capable of giving a combined sense (*samartha*). The state of being abridged into a single word–unit of two or more words (*ekapadībhāva*) results in the conveyance of a combined sense. The *sūtra*, therefore, provides that the mutually connected words alone are to be abridged into a single syntactical unit to be known as compound (*samāsa*) and the said single unit is to convey a combined sense. Words again are said to be mutually connected in case they are mutually expectant and are used in juxta-position and the meanings they present are compatible. Words, therefore, which are mutually expectant, and are used in juxta-position and present a well-co-ordinated meaning, are regarded capable (*samartha*) of developing into a single abridged form known as compound. In *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* a royal person is to be signified and for the said purpose both the words—*rājan* and *puruṣa* are equally needed. None of them severally could ever present the said meaning. They are thus mutually expectant to be regarded as capable (*samartha*) in the sense that the need of these two words is identically equal (*samaḥ = tulyaḥ; arthaḥ = prayojanam yayoḥ*). They are also to be used in juxta-position and the meanings that they present are compatible. In that way also they are mutually

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connected (*samartha*). The compound form—*rāja-puruṣa* conveys the combined sense of a man under a king and not of king or man severally. In *deva-dattasya bhāryā; puruṣaḥ rājñaḥ*, the words *bhāryā* and *puruṣaḥ*, used in juxta.position, are not mutually expectant, nor are the meanings they present compatible. Hence there is no scope of their being formed into a compound. Similarly, the words *devadattasya* and *rājñaḥ* are neither used in uxta-position nor are they mutually expectant. The meanings they present are not compatible. Thus they also rule out the possibility of forming into a compound. The words *devadattasya* and *puruṣa* or *bhāryā* and *rājñaḥ* although mutually expectant and the meanings they present are mutually compatible too, there is still no scope for a compound to be formed of these words. For they are not used in juxta-position. The words *devadattasya* and *bhāryā* or *puruṣaḥ* and *rājñaḥ*, however, are mutually expectant, are used in juxta-position and the meanings they present are compatible too, to provide a scope for a compound to be formed of *devadattasya* and *bhāryā* or of *rājñaḥ* and *puruṣaḥ*.

The Grammarians hold that such words when formed into a compound do not denote their individual meanings severally. On the contrary, they present a single meaning to be denoted by the compound thus formed. They further hold that the meanings to be presented by the compound word and the sentence of analysis (*vigraha-vākya*) are to be identical. The individual words, however, while forming the sentenee of analysis do denote their individual meanings. At that stage, therefore, each individual word may have a qualifying adjunct. The word *rājñaḥ* in the sentence—*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* may be qualified by the word *ṛddhasya*. All these three words are mutually expectant and thus capable of causing the verbal comprehension of well co-ordinated meanings. But once the compound viz, *rāja-puruṣa* has come into being, it is not possible that any of the components thereof be

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possessed of any qualifying adjunct. The word *ṛddhasya*, therefore, cannot be validily used with the compound, *rāja-puruṣa*. The reason is that the meaning presented by the sentence of analysis viz, *ṛddhasya rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* or the man of the affluent king and the meaning to be presented by *ṛddhasya rāja-puruṣaḥ* or the royal person of the affluent are not identical. What transpires from all this is that any two or more words of a *vigraha-vākya* constituted of three or more mutually connected (*sāpekṣa*) words cannot develop into a compound leaving any of the mutually connected qualifying word outside the compound. A compound cannot retain any such qualifying word exclusively related to an individual component thereof after the compound has been formed. In case, however, a compound formed leaving aside a word used in the sentence of analysis outside itself without putting any hindrance to the conveyance of the idea involved, there is no reason why the compound should not be validily effected. In *devadattasya gurukulam*, for example, the word *devadattasya* mutually connected (*sāpekṣa*) with the word *guroḥ* in the sentence of analysis—*devadattasya guroḥ kulam* is left out of the compound—*gurukulam*. Yet the said campound is held to be reasonably valid. For the idea to be conveyed by the said sentence concerned is effectively conveyed even after the compound. It is to be noted, however, that only a word denotative of possession (*sambandha-pada*) or of a case (*kāraka-pada*) could be left out of the compound in such a case. In *devadattasya gurukulam*, the word *devadattsya* is only a word denotative of possession (*sambandha-pada*) and in *rathāt patitasārathiḥ* or in *darbhaiḥ kīrṇa-vartmā*, the words like *rathāt* or *darbhaiḥ* are only the words denotative of cases (*kāraka-padas*).

The meanings of the words like *bandhyā* and *suta* or of *ākāśa* and *kusuma* are not compatible. But still the

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compounds like *bandhyā-suta* or *ākāśa-kusuma* are held to be valid. For these compounds, do convey a coherent idea; although something totally non-existant is signified thereby. Such expressions are different from *gauraśvaḥ puruṣaḥ* and the like. Words, therefore, could well develop into a compound in case these are found to signify what is intended to be signified. According to many, therefore, it may be pointed out, mutually expectant words used in juxtaposition could form into a compound irrespective of the compatibility of the meaning to be presented by the said words.

It will not be out of place to add a note on the word *pada-vidhi* used in the *sūtra—samarthaḥ pada-vidhiḥ*. It may be held that *sāmarthya* or the state of being mutually connected is demanded only in the context of the combination of words.

Pada-vidhi is otherwise known as *Vṛtti* or a syntactical unity. The sentence of analysis, developed into a syntactical unity, is called *vṛtti*. *Vṛtti*, thus analysed into a sentence is called *vigraha*. When two or more words mutually connected develop into a syntactical unity the said words forego their individual meanings. On the contrary, these words in that case present a combined or united sense.[1]

Mutually expectant words develop into a syntactical unity not only in *samāsa* but in four other situations as well viz, *kṛt*, *taddhita*, *ekaśeṣa* and the desiderative root-verbs and the like (*sanādyanta dhātus*). The use of the word *pada-vidhiḥ* in the present context indicates that unlike *samāsa* euphonic combinations (*sandhi*) are validly effected irrespective of the word-meanings involved being mutually connected or otherwise. In *tiṣṭhatu dadhyāśāna tvam śākena*—leave aside the curd, you better have your meal with vegetables the meanings of words *dadhi* and *aśāna*

1. परार्थाभिधानं वृत्तिः। सि. कौ. (सर्वसमासशेषः).

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are not mutually connected but still an euphonic combination of the letter *i* in the word *dadhi* and the letter *a* in *aśāna*[1] has been effected.

Jagadīśa reads *samāsa* or compounds under the category of what is known as *yaugika* or the derivative kind of nominals[2] although a limited number of instances thereof like *kṛṣṇa-sarpa* and the like come under the *yoga-rūḍha* or the derivative-conventional kind of nominals.

The word *kṛṣna-sarpa*, however although denotative of a special kind of snake, nonetheless means black snake (*kṛṣṇaḥ sarpaḥ*) and to that extent, it carries a derivative sense. The word *tri-bhuvana* means the collection of the three specific worlds through etymology—*tri* meaning the three specific worlds through implication (*lakṣaṇā*); the compound *tribhuvana* itself has no power of denotation as such.

A *mahā-vākya*, i, e unity of two or more words is a compound in the sense of what comes out to be posited as the feature in the verbal knowledge to be caused by a suffix like *tva* or *tal* added thereto against the meaning of the said suffix.[3]

The suffix *-tva* or *tal* when added to *nīlotpala*—a *mahā-vākya*, for example, bears out the verbal knowledge of lotus one with what is blue posited by way of the feature against the state of being (*bhāva*)—the meaning of the suffix itself. The *mahā-vākya—nīlotpala*, therefore, is to be recognised an instance of compound in the sense of the blue lotus or what the said *mahāvākya* has

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1. Vide सि. कौ. (Mukherjee) समासप्रकरण, p. 8.
2. यौगिकेषु समासं लक्षयति । श. श. प्र. p. 189.
3. यादृशस्य महावाक्यस्यान्तरस्त्वादिर्निजार्थके ।
यादृशार्थस्य धीहेतुः स समासस्तदर्थकः ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 31.
यादृशमहावाक्यस्योत्तरस्त्वतलादिः स्वार्थस्य यादृशार्थवच्छिन्नविषयता-शालिबोधे हेतुस्तादृशं तद्वाक्यं तथाविधार्थे समासः । ibid., p. 189.

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come to mean in the process.[1] By *mahāvākya* again, Jagadīśa seeks to mean a sentence composed of more than one nominal. The word *pācaka* is a sentence. *Tva* or *tal* if suffixed therewith is also likely to bear out the verbal knowledge of what the said sentence viz, *pācaka* means, posited by way of the feature against the meaning of the said suffix. But still it is not to be regarded as an instance of compound. For it is not a *mahāvākya* not being composed of more than one nominal.[2]

Opponents argue : The compound *upa-kumbha* comprises of only one nominal viz. *kumbha*.

Jagadīśa replies : The elders say that *nipātas* also come under the category of nominals or it may be so held that what being comprised of more than one *pada* or word other than a root-verb or verb is to be treated as a *mahāvākya*.[3]

Opponents argue : Even then the situation does not improve. For *nīla-ghaṭa-tva* would still come to be regarded as an instance of *mahākāvya* in that case.

Jagadīśa replies : In the present context a *mahā-vākya* should be understood as what does not cause the verbal knowledge of what a suffix means, as qualified by the meaning of the mere base thereof.[4]

Opponents argue : The definition of *mahāvākya* should be further shortened with the elition of the word *mātra*.

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1. नीलोत्पलत्वमित्यादौ नीलाभिन्नोत्पलस्य भाव इत्यन्वये नीलोत्पलादि-वाक्योत्तरत्वतलादिनिश्चयत्वेन हेतुत्वात् तादृशश्य नीलोत्पलादिवाक्यस्य नीलाभिन्नोत्पलाद्यर्थे समासत्वमानुपूर्वीज्ञानस्य तथैव हेतुत्वादेवंक्रमेण सर्वत्र लक्षणसङ्गतिः। रामभद्री p. 189.
2. पाचकादिकन्तु पाककर्त्राद्यर्थकं वाक्यमपि स्वघटकानेकनामलभ्यतादृशार्थक-त्वविरहान्न महावाक्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 189–90.
3. ननु निपातस्य नामत्वादिमते तत्र नाव्याप्तिः, तदस्वीकारपक्षेऽपि स्वघटकधातु-भिन्नानेकपदलभ्यत्वं महावाक्यलक्षणे निवेशनीयम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 190.
4. प्रकृत्यर्थमात्रावच्छिन्नप्रत्ययार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रत्ययोग्यत्वं वा प्रकृते वाक्यस्य महत्त्वं वाच्यम्, तेन उपकुम्भादौ नाव्याप्तिर्नवा नीलघटत्वमित्यादौ नील-घटत्वादिभागेऽतिप्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 190.

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For that would rule out the possibility of the sentences quoted above being regarded as *mahāvākyas*.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case the instances *kṣīra-pāyī* and the like would not be covered by the definition. For in these instances, the verbal knowledge is of what the suffix involved means, as qualified by the meaning of the base thereof. The provision of the word *mātra* eliminates all such risk. For in *kṣīra-pāyi* and the like the verbal knowledge is not of the meanings of the suffix as qualified by the meaning of merely the base; *kṣīra-pāyī* does not mean one in the habit of drinking as such (*pāna-sāmānya*) alone but one in the habit of drinking milk. In other words, the meaning of the word *kṣīra* goes to qualify the meaning of the suffix, *ṇiṇi* viz. the state of being in the habit of (*tācchīlya*) along with the meaning of the base (*prakṛtyartha*) viz, drinking as such (*pāna-sāmānya*).[2] So also are the cases in *kumbha-kāra* or *Odana-bhoktā* and so on.[3]

Opponents argue : The sentence *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* has to be admitted as an instance of compound. For it is a *mahā-vākya* as provided for in the definition thereof. The suffix *tva* or *tal*, also if added thereto, bears out the verbal knowledge of what the sentence means posited as a feature against the meaning of the suffix involved.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : The suffix, *tva* or *tal* if suffixed to *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* brings out the verbal knowledge of the

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1. ननु प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्नप्रत्ययार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रत्ययोग्यत्वमेव वाक्यस्य महत्व-मुच्यतामलं मात्रप्रवेशेन । रामभद्री p. 190.
2. क्षीरपायीत्यादिकस्तु प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्नकृदर्थस्यान्वयबोधे समर्थोऽपि न प्रकृत्यर्थ-मात्रावच्छिन्नस्य, ततः पानशीलसामान्यस्याप्रत्ययात् । श.श.प्र. p. 190–91
   ततः क्षीरपानोशीलस्यैव प्रत्ययात् क्षीरपायीत्याद्युपपदसमासस्य स्वप्रकृत्यर्थमात्रावच्छिन्नप्रत्ययार्थस्यान्वयबोधसमर्थत्वादेव नाव्याप्तिरिति भावः । रामभद्री p. 191.
3. आदिना ओदनभोक्तृकुम्भकारादिपरिग्रहः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 190.
4. ननु राज्ञः पुरुषेत्यादिभागेऽतिव्याप्तिः, तस्य निरुक्तमहावाक्यत्वात्, तदुत्तर-त्वतलादिप्रत्ययार्थधर्मिकस्वार्थप्रकारकबोधजनकत्वाच्च । कृष्णकान्ती p. 191.

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state of being a person (*puruṣa-bhāva*) in respect of the king and not of a royal person. For a secondary suffix brings out the verbal knowledge of what it itself means as qualified merely by the meaning of the base thereof. The apprehension that *rājnaḥ puruṣaḥ* should be regarded as an instance of compound, therefore, is unfounded.[1]

Opponents question the reasonableness of inserting a suffix like *tva* or *tal* in the definition of compound. They argue that compound has been defined as a *mahā-vākya* in the sense of what is posited as the feature in the verbal knowledge caused by a suffix like *tva* or *tal* added thereto, against the meaning of the suffix. But it is simpler to hold that a *mahā-vākya* is to be regarded as a compound in the sense of what is posited as the feature in the verbal knowledge caused by a word following itself (the *mahā-vākya*) against the meaning of the said word.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The *mahā-vākya—pāyaṁ pāyam* would have to be recognised as an instance of compound in that case. For the word *gacchati*, for example, following such a *mahāvākya* would reasonably cause the verbal knowledge of what the said *mahā-vākya* means as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb constituting the word *gaccati*. The insertion of a suffix like *tva* or *tal* in the definition of compound has ruled out such possibilities.[3]

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1. राज्ञः पुरुषत्वमित्यादितो राजन्येव पुरुषभावः प्रतीयते न तु राजपुरुषस्य भावः, तद्धितानां प्रकृत्यर्थमात्रान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वादतो राज्ञः पुरुषेत्यादिभागे न प्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 191.
2. ननु यादृशमहावाक्योत्तरशब्दो यादृशार्थावच्छिन्नविषयताशालिबोधे हेतुः तादृशार्थकतद्वाक्यत्वमेव तादृशार्थे समासत्वमित्येवास्तु कृतं त्वतलादेर्विशेषतो निवेशेन। रामभद्री p. 191.
1. पायं पायमित्यादिणमन्तभागस्तु स्वार्थावच्छिन्नस्य धात्वन्तरार्थस्यैवान्वयबोधको न तु त्वादिप्रत्ययार्थस्य। श. श. प्र. p. 191.

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Jagadīśa says *pra-sthā* is regarded as an instance of compound only in a secondary sense with a view to justifying the use of *lyap* to be suffixed therewith.[1]

The elder grammarians classify compounds into four viz, *avyayī-bhāva*, *tatpuruṣa*, *bahuvrīhi* and *dvandva*. The principle they resort to in the context of such classification is predominance of the meaning of a particular constituent of the compound. Predominance means to be comprehended by way of the invariable substantive. In case the meaning of the first constituent of a compound comes to be so comprehended, the said compound is to be known as *avyayī-bhāva*; in case the meaning of the last one it is *tat-puruṣa*; in case the meanings of all, it is *dvandva*; and in case something other than what are presented by the words that go to constitute the compound, it is *bahuvrīhi*. In *durbhikṣam*, for example, it is the meaning of the word *dur*—(the first constituent of the compound) viz, *abhāva* that is comprehended by way of the invariable substantive; in *rāja-puruṣa*, of the word *puruṣa* the last constituent, in *rāma-lakṣmaṇa-bharatāḥ*, of all the constituents thereof and in *pītāmbara* of what is other than what are presented by *pīta* and *ambara*, the two constituents of the said compound.

There are, however, exceptions to the rule set by the elders in this respect. In *sūpaprati* meaning a small bit of curry, (*sūpasya leśaḥ*), it is the meaning of the last constituent viz, *prati* (meaning a small bit) that is comprehended by way of the invariable substantive notwithstanding the fact that the compound is a recognised

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पायं पायं व्रजतीत्यादितः पुनः पुनः पानकृतिसमानकालीनत्वस्य व्रजनादौ बोधनात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 191.

1. प्रस्थायेत्यादौ समासव्यपदेशो ल्यबादिशब्दसंस्कार-प्रयोजको गौणः। श. श. प्र. p. 192.

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instance of *avyayī-bhāva*. So also is the case in the compound *unmatta-gangam*, another instance of the said compound (signifying the name of a country). Here the thing that is to be comprehended by way of the invariable substantive is other than what are presented by the constituents of the compound. In *atimālaḥ*, an instance of *tatpuruṣa*, in the sense of *mālām atī-krāntaḥ*, it is the meaning of the first constituent of the compound that is comprehended by way of the invariable substantive. In *dantoṣṭham*, in the like manner, an instance of *samāhāra-dvandva*, what is so comprehended is what may be called *anyārtha* viz, collection (*samaṣṭi*) a meaning presented by none of the constituents. So also in *ditrāḥ*, an instance of *bahuvrīhī* (in the sense of *dvau vā trayo vā*), the meanings of both the constituents are liable of being comprehended by way of the invariable substantives.

It is in view of exceptions to all the four kinds of compounds classified into so many categories on the basis of the predominance of the meaning of one constituent or the other, that Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita has discarded the above classification made by the elders and the principle underlying such classification. Bhaṭṭojī incidently refers to another school of opinion, according to which compounds are of six kinds with the addition of *karmadhāraya* and *dvigu*. But as *karmadhāraya* is but *uttara-padārtha-pradhāna*, it may well be enlisted as *tatpuruṣa*, says Bhaṭṭojī-dīkṣita. and *dvigu* is only a variety of *karmadhāraya*. The *karmadhāraya* compound is constituted of words related as the qualifying and the qualified. So also is the case with *dvigu*, points out Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita, with the only difference that in *dvigu* the qualifying word is denotative of a numeral.

It is, therefore, more reasonable, says Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita, to classify compounds into six categories in consonance with the fourfold division of words. Words are of four kinds viz, nominal (*prāti-padika* or *nāman*), root-verb (*dhātu*), *subanta* or what ends in a declensional suffix (*sup-vibhakti*),

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and what ends in a verbal suffix (i.e., verb). These four kinds of words give six different forms when combined with each other. Compounds, therefore, should be of six varieties in view of the six kinds of different combinations. The two words *rājñaḥ* and *puruṣaḥ*, each ending in a declensional suffix (*sup-vibhakti*), constitute the compound, *rāja-puruṣaḥ*. *Pari*, a word ending in a declensional suffix, and *abhūṣayat*, a verb, give the compound *paryabhūṣayat*. *Kumbhasya*, a word ending in a declensional suffix, and *kāra*, a nominal, give the compound *kumbahkāra*. *Kaṭam*, a word ending in a declensional suffix, with *pru*, a root-verb (*kaṭam pravate*), gives the compound, *Kaṭapru*. The two words, *khādata* and *modata*, each ending in verbal suffix, give the compound *khādata-modata*, *Kṛnta*, the word ending in a verbal suffix, with *vicakṣaṇa*, ending in a declensional suffix, gives the compound, *Kṛnta-vicakṣaṇā*.[1]

It is to be noted that Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita has only laid bare the way words are to combine together to constitute different kinds of compound. He has not suggested any nomenclature thereof. It is also to be noted that

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1. समासश्चतुर्विध इति प्रायोवादः। अव्ययीभाव-तत्पुरुष-बहुव्रीहि-द्वन्द्वाधिकार-बहिर्भूतानामपि सहसुपा (पा. २।१।४) इति विधानात्।

पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानोऽव्ययीभावः, उत्तरपदार्थप्रधानस्तत्पुरुषः, अन्यपदार्थप्रधानो बहुव्रीहिः, उभयपदार्थप्रधानो द्वन्द्वः इत्यपि प्राचां प्रवादः प्रायोऽभिप्रायः। सूपप्रति, उन्मत्तगङ्गम् इत्याद्यव्ययीभावे, अतिमालादौ तत्पुरुषे, द्वित्रा इत्यादिबहुव्रीहौ, दन्तौष्ठम् इत्यादिद्वन्द्वे चाभावात्।

तत्पुरुषविशेषः कर्मधारयः। तद्विशेषो द्विगुः। अनेकपदत्वं द्वन्द्वबहुव्रीह्योरेव, तत्पुरुषस्य क्वचिदेव इत्युक्तम्।

किञ्च—

सुपां सुपा तिङा नाम्ना धातूनाथ तिङां तिङा।
सुबन्तेनेति विज्ञेयः समासः षड्विधो बुधैः॥

सुपां सुपा—राजपुरुषः। तिङा—पर्यभूषयत्। नाम्ना-कुम्भकारः। धातुना—कटप्रूः (अजस्रम्)। तिङां तिङा—पिबतखादता, खादतमोदता। तिङां सुपा—कृन्तविचक्षणेति यस्यां क्रियायां सा कृन्तविचक्षणा। सि. कौ. सर्वसमासशेषः।

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the way the elders classify the compounds brings to light the difference of one kind of compound from another in terms of the meanings involved. In *pītāmbaram*, for example, the two words viz, *pīta* and *ambara*, each ending in a declensional suffix, go to constitute the compound. This, however, does not reveal the real nature of the compound. *Pītam ambaram* and *pītam ambaram yasya tam* do not carry the same meaning although the both the compounds viz, *pītāmbaram* and *pitāmbaram* are formed of words ending in declensional suffix. The classification, therefore, proposed by Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita appears to be inadequate. The classification based on the difference of the meaning involved, on the contrary, seems to be more plausible. In fact the classification made by the elders touch upon the nature (*prakṛti*) of a compound while that by Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita on the form thereof. One is complimentary to the other.

Jagadīśa classifies the compounds into six kinds viz, *Karmadhāraya, dvigu, tatpuruṣa, avyayī-bhāva, bahuvrīhi* and *dvandva*. If however, *upapada* is to be couted as a distinct category from *tatpuruṣa* then of course, compounds will be of seven kinds, says Jagadīśa,[1]

The *upa-pada-samāsa* causing the verbal knowledge of what are denoted by words like—*saṁkāśa, nibha, nikāśa* (all meaning 'similar to') or *kāra* and so on, (syntactically) related to what are meant by a word used previously thereto (*upa-pada*), is to be recognised as a distinct category.[2]

As for the classification made by the elders, Jagadīśa observes that as the said classification has been made on

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1. स चायं षड्विधकर्मधारयादिप्रभेदतः। यश्चोपपदसंज्ञोऽन्यस्तेनासौ सप्तधा मतः॥ श. श. प्र. का. 32.
2. सङ्काश-निभ-नीकाशादीनामिव कारादीनामपि शब्दानामुपपदार्थान्वितस्यैव स्वार्थस्य बोधकतया तथाविधनामान्तरत्वमेव चैतस्य समासान्तराद्विशेषः। श. श. प्र. p. 193.

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the basis of the difference of the meanings involved in different cases, there is no dispute.[1]

Jagadīśa speaks of the fivefold division of compounds according to the elders as against four-fold referred to by Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita. The kind of compound, he mentions in addition to what Bhaṭṭojī Dīkshita has referred is described as what is *madhyama-padārtha-pradhāna* as in *paṭā'nadhikaraṇa* meaning *paṭā'dhikaraṇa-bhinna* or in *pratiyogitān-vacchedaka* meaning *pratiyogitāvacchedaka-bhinna*. In all such cases, it is the meaning of the middle member of the compound viz, *bhinna* is comprehended by way of an invariable substantive (or is cognised predominant).[2]

Bhaṭṭoji-dīkshita is of the view that only *dvandva* and *bahuvrīhi* kinds of compound are constituted of more than two words.[3]

In *rāma-lakṣmaṇa-bharatāḥ*, an instance of the *dvandva*-compound, and in *matta-bahu-mātaṅgam* (*vanam*) or in *ārūḍha-bahu-vānaro* (*vṛkṣaḥ*), instances of *bahuvrīhi*, multiple words are found to have been constituents of the compounds involved.

In the present context Jagadīśa says that the instances like *paṭā'nadhikaraṇa* and *pratiyogitā'-navacchedaka* are to be regarded as instances of the *tat-puruṣa* compound. These are not to be understood as instances of the *bahuvrīhi* compound merely on the ground that these are constituted of more than two words. As to the claim that in case a compound happens to be constituted of more than two words, it is

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1. तदेवं पञ्च भेदानादायैव पञ्चविधत्वं प्राच्यैरुक्तमतो न विरोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 196.
2. कश्चिन्मध्यपदार्थधर्मिकधीजनकतयैव मध्यपदप्रधानो, यथा पटानधिकरण—प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकेत्यादिकस्तत्पुरुषः। ibid., p. 194.
3. अनेकपदत्वं द्वन्द्वबहुव्रीह्योरेव। सि. कौ. सर्वसमासशेषः।

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bahuvrīhi or *dvandva* and nothing else, Jagadīśa observes that the idea behind such a claim is that a compound formed of more than two nominals is to be regarded either as *bahuvrīhi* or as *dvandva* as the case may be.[1] It is also to be noted that Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita also has provided for the composition of the *tata-puruṣa* compound of more than two words.[2] The compound in *dvyahnajātāḥ*, as for example has been constituted of more than two words.

Compounds again are classified into — *nitya* or regular and *anitya* or irregular. As a matter of fact, a regular compound (*nitya-samāsa*) or an irregular compound (*anitya-samāsa*) is not a category by itself. Instances of regular (*nitya*) or irregular (*anitya*) compounds are to be found in all the compounds enumerated above. It is because of the irregularity of the analysis of a compounded form (*vigraha-vākya*) that the compound is regarded as regular (*nitya*). Such irregularity is found to have been due to the fact that either any such analysis is impossible or unusual. In *Kṛṣṇa-sarpaḥ*, for example, no analysis is possible in view of the fact that *kṛṣṇa-sarpaḥ*—the compounded form is enlisted under the *tat-puruṣa* (*Karmadhāraya*) compound and thus the analysis, if any, has to take the form *kṛṣṇaḥ sarpaḥ*. But the difficulty is that the meaning of the compound and that of the analysis thereof would come to be different. For, the compound would mean the *cobra*, a special kind of snake while the analysis thereof any kind of the black snake. The compound *kṛṣṇa-sarpaḥ*, therefore, is accepted as an instance of regular (*nitya*) kind of *tat-puruṣa* or *karmadhāraya* compound and it may be cited as an instance of the *a-vigraha-nitya-samāsa*.

Similarly in *vṛkṣāntaram*. the constituents of the compound are *vṛkṣa* and *antara* while the analysis of the

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1. बहुपदे बहुव्रीहिरेव (नेतरो द्वन्द्वान्यः समासः) इत्यस्य तत्पुरुषादेर्बहुनामगर्भत्वाभावे तात्पर्यमित्थम्रे व्युत्पाद्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 195.
2. तत्पुरुषस्य क्वचिदेवेवेत्युक्तम्। सि. कौ. सर्वसमासशेषः।

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said compound takes the form of *anyaḥ vṛkṣaḥ*. In other words, the compound is formed of words not all of which are found in the sentence of analysis of the said compound form. It is also a case of the regular kind of *tat-puruṣa* (or *karma-dhāraya*) compound. But it is slightly different from other regular compound in the sense that this compounded form is liable to be analysed and the analysis also bears out the identical meaning of the compound. This instance, therefore, is cited as an instance of the *asva-pada-vigraha nitya-samasa.*

Jagadīśa says that in case the meaning, to be conveyed by the compounded form, is conveyed by the constituent members thereof only with the declensional suffixes (*sup-vibhaktis*) inserted, the instance is to be regarded as a irregular (*anitya*) kind of compound and if otherwise regular (*nitya*) kind.[1]

In *kṛṣṇa-sarpaḥ* meaning *cobra*, for example, the meaning, to be conveyed by the compounded form, is not obtained by inserting the declensional suffixes with the component members thereof. *Kṛṣṇaḥ sarpaḥ* does not present the desired meaning and as such it is to be recognised an instance of the regular compound. In *nirmakṣikam* meaning *solitude*, in the like manner, the meaning to be conveyed by the compounded form is not availed of by the component members in the aforesaid manner i.e., with the insertion of the declensional suffixes in the form of *makṣikam niḥ*. In *asura* too, meaning an entity of beings known as demons, the same thing occurs, *na suraḥ* does mean what the compound means.[2]

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1. विभक्तिमात्रप्रक्षेणान्निजान्तर्गतनामसु । स्वार्थस्याबोधबोधाभ्यां नित्यानित्यौ समासकौ । श. श. प्र. p. 196.
2. स्वान्तर्गतनामसु विभक्तिमात्रप्रक्षेपेण यल्लभ्यार्थस्याबोध स नित्यः समासः । यथा कृष्णसर्पनिर्मक्षिकासुरादिः कृष्णः सर्पो, मक्षिकाया निः न सुरः इत्यादित-स्तल्लभ्यस्य वैजात्यादेरप्रहात् । श. श. प्र. pp. 196-97.

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Instances like *rāja-puruṣaḥ* or *pūrva-kāyam* are regarded as cases of irregular compound in view of the fact that the meaning to be conveyed by the compound concerned is equally conveyed by the component members thereof with the declensional suffixes added thereto giving the analysis of the form *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* and *pūrvaṁ kāyasya.*[1] It is to be noted that the verbal knowledge occuring due to the compound *rāja-puruṣa* formed of words (*rāja* and *puruṣa*) used in the given sequence is equally caused by the words *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* or the words ending in declensional suffixes used in the given sequence. All this is so keeping in view the idea that the meaning of a compound and that of the analysis therof ought to be identical. Had not there been such an idea that the said meanings are to be identical, *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* would not even mean *rāja-sambandhī puruṣaḥ* or what is conveyed by the compound—*rāja-puruṣaḥ.* As a consequence the definition of the irregular compound would get disturbed.[2] Conversely, it may be so said that the word *rājan* in the compound is to imply *rāja-sambandhin* or what is denoted by the word *rājñaḥ* in the sentence of analysis of the said compound, viz, *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ.* Thus the compound also bears the same meaning with the sentence of analysis thereof viz, *rāja-sambandha-viśiṣṭa-puruṣaḥ.* The argument may be that there is the rule that the meanings of two nominals (*nāmārthas*) cannot be syntactically related to each other through a relation other than that of identity. The meaning of the word

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1. यल्लभ्यस्य च बोधः सोऽनित्यसमासः। यथा—राजपुरुषपूर्वकायादिः, तल्लभ्यार्थस्य राज्ञः पुरुषः पूर्वं कायस्येत्यादिवाक्यादपि प्रतीतेः। श. श. प्र. p. 197.

2. तथा च यत्समासस्य स्वघटकानुपूर्वीप्रकारकज्ञानजन्यविषयकयादृशबोधं प्रति स्वघटकनामत्वव्यापकविभक्तिघटितानुपूर्वीप्रकारकज्ञानस्य तत्त्वेन हेतुत्वं, तादृशानुपूर्वीमत्समासस्तादृशार्थेऽनित्य समासः। इदं च व्याससमासयोस्तुल्यार्थकत्वमादृत्य, अन्यथा राजसम्बन्ध्यभिन्नपुरुषस्यबोधे राज्ञः पुरुष इत्याद्यानुपूर्वीप्रकारकज्ञानस्याहेतुत्वादव्याप्त्यापत्तेः। प्रतीतेरिति। तथा चोभयानुपूर्वीप्रकारकज्ञानमेव तादृशबोधे हेतुरिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 197.

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rājan in *rāja-puruṣa* could not be related to that of the word *puruṣa* in case the said word is to imply the said meaning. This is not true. For such a rule is applicable to cases other than a compound.[1] As a matter of fact, in *rāja-puruṣaḥ* the words *rājan* and *puruṣa* severally present the individual meanings of the king and the person respectively. But as *rāja-puruṣaḥ* is but a sentence, the relation of the said meanings, is to be comprehended out of syntax. The verbal knowledge occuring from the compound, therefore, would be identical with that of the sentence of analysis of the said compound.[2]

Difficulties arise with the instances like *sphurd-vāṇī*. For any such analysis of the said compound is inconceivable. The verbal knowledge occurring from *sphurantī vāṇī*, the supposed analysis, is to embrace what is meant by a word ending in the *śatṛ* (or *śānac*)—*pratyaya*, predicated against what is presented by a word ending in the first declensional suffix. Such kind of verbal knowledge is not admitted by the elders.[3]

The Logicians reply : It is not necessary that the meaning of the word, *sphurantī* or what ends in the gerundial suffix,

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1. न च नामार्थयोरभेदान्यसम्बन्धेनान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात् राजपुरुष इत्यत्र राजसम्बन्धिनि लक्षणाया आवश्यकतया विग्रहवाक्यतः समासलभ्यार्थस्याप्रतीरिति वाच्यम्। स्वमते 'राजपुरुष' इत्यादौ राजसम्बन्ध एव लक्षणाया व्यासससमासयोस्तुल्यार्थकत्वम्। नामार्थयोरित्यादिनियमे च निपातातिरिक्तत्वमिव समासातिरिक्तत्वं विशेषणीयम्, अत एव राजपुरुष इत्यत्र राजसम्बन्धे लक्षणेति शब्दमणिरिति भावः। रामभद्री p. 197–98.
2. राजपुरुषपादिपदाद्धि सम्बन्धस्य सम्बन्धिनश्च प्रतीतिर्जायते। प्रतीत्यनुसारेण सम्बन्धे सम्बन्धिनि च शक्तिः स्वीकार्या। परन्त्वनन्यलभ्यः शब्दार्थ इति न्यायेन सम्बन्धिमात्रे एव शक्तिः। राजपुरुषपदाद्विशकलितयोरपि राजपुरुषरूपयोरर्थयोरुपस्थितौ वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिन्यायेन तत्सम्बन्धस्य प्रतीतिसम्भवात्। Comm मीमांसा-न्यायप्रकाश p. 160.
3. ननूक्तक्रमेणानित्यसमासत्वे 'स्फुरद्वाणी'त्यादेस्तथात्वं न स्यात् शतृजर्थविधेयकप्रथमान्तोपस्थाप्यार्थविशेष्यकशाब्दस्य प्राचामनङ्गीकारात्, वर्तमाने

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śatṛ be comprehended as a predicate. The meaning of the said word may be comprehended as qualifying the subject, the meaning of the word ending in the first declensional suffix.

Opponents ask : What would then be posited as the predicate in the verbal knowledge from the compound, *sphuradvāṇi* or from *sphurantī vāṇi*, the sentence of analysis thereof ?

Jagadīśa replies : It is what is other than the determinant of the substantive that is to be posited as the predicate in such a case. In *rūpa-vān parvato vahniman*, for example, what is other than *rūpa*, the determinant of the substantive *parvataḥ*, i.e., *vahni* is posited as the predicate. If the determinant of the substantive were liable to be predicated then the confirmatory knowledge ought to have taken the form *parvate rūpamanminomi*. Therefore, in the case of the compound, *sphuradvāṇiḥ*, the singular number presented by the suffix is predicated against the meaning of the constituent words of the compound.[1]

The explanation given above does not pertain to wherever the meaning of a word ending in the gerundial suffix, *satṛ* is posited as a predicate. For otherwise, in view of the occurance of the verbal knowledge as suggested, in case of a word ending in the said suffix used with a word ending in the first declensional suffix, the prohibitory injunction, *aprthamā* and so on in the rule of Pāṇini[2], becomes irrelevant. Not

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शतृशानजावप्रथमेत्याद्यनुशासनात् 'स्फुरन्ती वाणी'त्यादेर्विग्रहत्वासम्भवात्। रामभद्री p. 198.

1. तथा च तादृशबोधे शतृजर्थस्योद्देश्यस्यदिशि निविष्टत्वेन विधेयत्वाभावात् धर्मितावच्छेदकादिष्यावृत्तविषयताया एव विधेयत्वात्, अन्यथा रूपवान् पर्वतो वह्निमानित्यादौ पर्वते रूपमनुमिनोमीत्यनुव्यवसायापत्तेः, अनुमित्यर्थकधातुयोगे विधेयत्वस्य विधेयित्वस्य वा कर्मप्रत्ययार्थत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 197.
2. ननु सूत्रेऽप्रथमेत्यादिना प्रथमान्तपदोपस्याप्यार्थविशेष्यकशतृजर्थप्रकारकबोधमात्रानभ्युपगमः सूचितः, अन्यथा उक्तरीत्या सर्वत्रैव तादृशबोधसम्भवेन निषेधवैफल्यात्। ibid., p. 197. Vide पा. III. 2. 124.

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only that. The explanation given does not hold good in the instance bearing out the verbal knowledge of *ekatva*, presented by the declensional suffix or what is other than the determinant of the substantive projected against one (meant by the word, *eka*) who is none other than who moves (*calada-bhinna-ekaḥ*).[1]

Jagadīśa, therefore, is of the view that the form of the sentences analysing the compound in *sphuradvāṇī* or *caladekaḥ* and so on are to be like *sphurantīm vāṇīm*, *calantamekam* and the like. In that case, it may be argued, the meaning of the compound would come to fall short of what is meant by the sentence of analysis thereof. For the meaning to be presented by the *pratyaya, am* in the sentence of analysis would remain beyond comprehension due to the compound. Jagadīśa, points out that any such difference does not cause any harm. For, it is not incumbent that the meaning of the sentence of the analysis be liable of comprehension occuring due to the compound. It is the meaning of the compound, on the contrary that is to get embraced, as a rule, by the verbal knowledge occuring due to the sentence of analysis thereof.

It is a matter of hard experience, he says, that number and gender, the objects of comprehension occuring due to the sentence of analysis are very often missed in the compound.[2]

Jagadīśa, however, points out that in case of what are called irregular compounds gender or number are embraced by the verbal knowledge occuring thereby in case there be a word to call for the comprehension thereof. In *jaratī-citragurjanaḥ* meaning a man possessing an old varigated

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1. चलदेक इत्यादेस्तथाप्यसंग्रहाच्च, चलदभिन्न एकत्वविशिष्टे एकत्वान्वये चलदेक इत्यादेर्निराकाङ्क्षत्वेन विग्रहत्वासम्भवात्। ibid., p. 197–98.
2. स्फुरन्तीं वाणीमित्यादिवाक्यस्यैव तत्र विग्रहत्वसम्भवाच्च, विग्रह एव समासलभ्यार्थस्य बोधकत्वं तन्त्रं न तु समासे विग्रहार्थस्य विग्रहलभ्ययोर्लिङ्गसंख्ययोर्व्यञ्जकवैधुर्येण प्रायशः समासाबोध्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 198.

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Cow, the word *jarati* not being transformed into its masculine form in view of the transformation of the feminine gender into the masculine being provided for only in respect of the subsequent constituent of a compound, femininity is to be comprehended due to the compound too.[1] So also in *priyatisā* meaning a man having thirty women as his beloved, femininity is to be comprehended, the substitute *tissa* (viz. *tisra*) having presented the said meaning.[2] Number too in the like manner is liable of comprehension due to compounds like *śalākāpari*, *akṣapari*, and so on. *Akṣapari* means *ekasya dyūtasya cālanam* and *śalākāpari* means *ekasyāḥ śalākāyāḥ cālanam* or playing one single die in the game of dice.[3] In or *ardhapippali pūrva-kāya* too in the like manner, *ekatva* is to be comprehended.[4] In instances like *priyayuvayā* meaning 'she to whom you two are loved' (or *priyāvoyoḥ* meaning to whom we two are loved) the number is comprehended.[5]

In *samāhāra-dvandva* compounds like *hastyaśvam* meaning an army comprising of the elephantry and the cavalary, plurality is comprehended.[6]

Opponents argue : Instances like *kaṇṭhekālaḥ*, *sarasijaḥ* would not come under the category of what are called regular compounds. For the knowledge of the sequence of letters comprising of the declensional suffix involved in such com-

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1. अत एव यत्र समासे तयोर्व्यञ्जकसद्भावस्तत्रावत्रमोऽपि, यथा जरतीचित्रगुर्जनः प्रियतिसा पुरुष इत्यादौ स्त्रीत्वस्य स्त्रीप्रत्यय-तिश्रादेशयोस्तदभिव्यञ्जकयोः सत्त्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 198-99.
2. त्रिचतुरोस्त्रियामित्यनुशासनात् तिस्रादेशस्यापि स्त्रीत्वाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात्। रामभद्री p. 199.
3. अक्षशलाकयोरेकत्व एवाव्ययीभावस्य (विधानात्)। श. श. प्र. p. 199.
4. पूर्वादेरर्द्धस्य च ङसर्थैकत्वमन्तर्भाव्यैवावयविना तत्पुरुषस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। ibid., p. 200.
5. प्रियुवया···इत्यादौ···युष्मदस्मदोर्द्वित्व एव युवावादेशस्य (विधानात्)। ibid., p. 199.
6. सेनाङ्गाना बहुत्व एव समाहारद्वन्द्वस्य विधानात्। श. श. प्र. p. 199.

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pounds equally bears out the verbal knowledge occuring due to the compounds *kaṇṭhakālaḥ* and *sarojaḥ*.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection.[2] In the view of those, however, who hold that a compound too is endowed with the power of denotation, the aforesaid instances come under the regular compounds. The declensional suffix involved, although, is there to denote a numeral, it is left out of comprehension.[3]

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1. ननु कण्ठेकाल–सरसिजाद्यलुकसमासे नित्यसमासत्वं न स्यात्, कण्ठकाल-सरोजेत्यादिसमासबोध्यार्थबोधे विभक्तिघटितोक्तानुपूर्वीप्रकारकज्ञानस्यापि हेतुत्वात्। कृष्णकान्तीं p. 200.
2. 'सरसिजादौ' 'कण्ठेकालादौ' चालुकसमासे सुपः संख्यावगमेऽपि न क्षतिः। श. श. प्र. p. 200.
3. तत्र व्यञ्जकसुपः सत्त्वेऽपि संख्यापि न बुध्यत इति तु समासशक्तिवादिनः पातञ्जलाः। ibid., p. 200.

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CHAPTER VII

CLASSIFICATION OF COMPOUNDS (KARMADHĀRAYA)

The *Karmadhāraya* kind of compounds, according to Pāṇini does not form an independent category. It comes under the classification known as the *tatpuruṣa*. The instances of the *tatpuruṣa* kind of compounds that involve collocation (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) are understood as the so many cases of *Karmadhāraya*.[1]

Compounds are broadly divided into two viz, collocative (*samānādhikaraṇa*) and non-collocative (*vyadhikaraṇa*). By collocative compounds are meant the compounds formed of words signifying an object in common. The non-collocative kinds of compounds, on the other hand, are formed of words signifying things severally. In the case of a collocative compound, therfore, the words in the sentence of analysis of the compound (*vigraha-vākya*) stand in apposition. In *nīlotpalam* for example, the sentence of analysis takes the form, *nīlam utpalam*. In *rāja-puruṣa*, on the contrary, the sentence is read as *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*.

Instances of the *tatpuruṣa* compound mostly are of the non-collocative kind. The instances of the *dvigu* and of the *karmadhāraya* kinds only hold out cases of the collocative one.

1. तत्पुरुषः समनाधिकरणः कर्मधारयः । पा. I. 2. 42.

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The instances of the collocative kind of the *tatpuruṣa* compound (*samānādhikaraṇa tatpuruṣa*) are constituted of a differentiating epithet and a word denotative of the object differentiated.[1] A word denotative of a numeral too is to form the *karmadhāraya* compound in association with another used in apposition therewith provided, however, it does not go to form the *dvigu* compound as called for by the aphorism, *taddhitārthottara-pada-samāhare ca*[2], as in *ekanāthaḥ*, *ekavīraḥ*, and the like.[3]

In *Karmadhāraya*, it is the differentiating epithet that goes to form the first constituent and the compound is sometimes regular as in *kṛṣṇa-sarpa* and sometimes irregular as in *nīlotpalam*, at times again, compound is not to be instituted at all as in *rāma jāmadagnyaḥ*.[4] In *khañja-kubjaḥ* or *Kubja-khañjaḥ* and the like although both the constituents are differentiating epithets, one of these two is taken to be denotative of the differentiated. Similarly in *kailāsādriḥ*, *rebānadī*, *candanataruḥ*, *vasantasamayaḥ*, *tarka-vidyā*, *bhoja-nṛpatiḥ* and the like although both the words are denotative of the differentiated (*viśeṣya*) one is taken to be a differentiating epithet to denote a thing in particular as against the other being denotative of a thing in general.

It is to be noted that in an instance of the *Karmadhāraya* compound one of the constituents or the other sometimes happen to be understood as the differentiating epithet as desired by the speaker. Pāṇini, therefore, in respect of certain words ordains that these cannot be used except as the first

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1. विशेषणं विशेष्ये च बहुलम्। पा. II. 1. 57 (सि. कौ. 736)
2. पा. II. 1. 51 (सि. कौ. 728)
3. दिक्संख्ये संज्ञायाम्। पा. II. 150.
4. पूर्वकालैक-सर्व-जरत्-पुराण-नव केवलाः समानाधिकरणेन। पा. II. 1. 49. सि. कौ. 726.

विशेषणं विशेष्येन–इति सिद्धे पूर्वनिपातनियमार्थं सूत्रम्। एकशब्दस्य 'दिक्संख्ये संज्ञायाम्' इति नियमबाधनार्थञ्च। सि. कौ. 726.

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constituents of the *Karmadhāraya* compound.[1] As provided for by the aphorism, *pūrva-kālaika*[2] and so on the word *eka* should form the first constituent of the compound *ekavīraḥ* while in accordance with the provision made in the aphorism *pūrvāpara*[3] and so on the compounded form is to be *viraikaḥ*. In fact the aphorism *pūrvāpara* and so on being a subsequent one overrides the aphorism *pūrvakālaika* and so on to give the form *viraikaḥ*. But as the word *bahulam* used in the aphorism *viśeṣaṇam viśeṣyeṇa bahulam*[4] is to be extended to the aphorism *pūrvāpara* and so on, the compounded form, *ekavīraḥ* too is held *justified*.[5]

The *Karmadhāraya* Compound also is formed of words denotative of a common attribute or of a subject and of the standard of comparison. This kind of *Karmadhāraya* compound is of three kinds—*upamāna-karmadhāraya*, *upamita-karmadhāraya* and *rūpaka-karmadhāraya*.

In *upamāna-karmadhāraya*, the compound is formed of the word denotative of the standard of comparison and that of the common attribute as in *ghana–śyāmaḥ*.[6]

In *upamita-Karmadhāraya*, the compound is formed of a word denotative of the subject of comparison and another (word) of the standard of comparison. The word denotative of the common attribute forms no part of the compound as in *puruṣa-vyāghraḥ*.[7]

In *rūpaka-karmadhāraya*, the compound is formed of a word denotative of the subject of comparison and that of the

1. पा. II. 1. 49. (quoted earliers)
vide also पूर्वापर-प्रथम-चरम-जघन्य-समान-मध्य-मध्यमवीराश्च। पा. II. 1. 58. सि. कौ. 737.
2. पा. II. 1. 49.
3. ibid., II. 1. 58.
4. ibid., II. 1. 57.
5. बहुलग्रहणाद् भविष्यति। सि. कौ. 737.
6. उपमानानि सामान्यवचनैः। पा. II. 1. 55. सि. कौ. 734.
7. उपमितं व्याघ्रादिभिः सम्मान्याप्रयोगे। पा. II. 1. 56. सि. कौ. 735.

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standard of comparison. In it the subject of comparison is metaphorically represented as identically related to the standard of comparison as in *mukha-candraḥ, krodha-vahniḥ* and so on. There is no provision for this kind of compounds in the system of Paṇini. But in view of the uses referred to being in vogue, such compounds are justified on the strength of the aphorism- *mayūra-vyaṁsakādayaśca*.[1] In other system, it is known as *rūpaka-karmadhāraya.*

According to Jagadīśa, the *karmadhāraya* compound is the couple of any two nominals used in juxtaposition bearing out the verbal knowledge of what the said nominals present as identically related to one another by way of the feature and the substantive in the order of their use.[2] In *nīlotpalam,* the nominals *nīlam* (meaning what is possessed of the quality of *nīlatva*) and *utpala* (meaning the lotus) are used juxtaposedly to bear out the verbal knowledge of what these two words mean as identically related by way of the feature and the substantive in the order of their use. The meaning of the word *nīla* is posited by way of the feature against the meaning of the word *utpala* through the relation of identity.[3] In *puruṣa-siṁhaḥ,* however, it is the implied meaning of the word *siṁha* that is of comprehended as the feature against what the word *puruṣa* means, through the said relation contrary to the order of the use of the said words. For the word denotative of the subject of comparison is to form the first constituent of the *karmadhāraya* compound comprised of words respectively denotative of the subject and the standard of comparison.[4]

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1. पा. II. 1. 72
2. क्रमिकं यत्नामयुगमेकार्थेऽन्यार्थबोधकम् ।
तादात्म्येन, भवेदेष समासः कर्मधारयः ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 34.
3. नीलोत्पलमित्यादावुत्पलमिपदस्यार्थे नीलादिपदार्थस्य तादात्म्येनान्वयः। ibid., p. 201.
4. तया 'पुरुषसिंह' इत्यादावपि पुरुषादावुत्तरपदलक्ष्यस्य सिंहसदृशस्य, 'पुरुषः सिंहः इव' इत्यादिविग्रहे 'प्रायेणापमेयस्योपमनैरिति" कर्मधारयानुशासनात्। ibid., pp. 201-202.

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The instances like *prabalam* (*prakṛṣṭaṁ balam*) *apadravyam* (*apakṛṣṭam dravyaṁ*) would also be covered by this definition. For by nominal (*nāma*) what is other than a root-verb is to be understood in this context.[1] This, however, does not mean that *upakumbha* is to be regarded an instance of the *karmadhāraya* compound. For the word-meanings here are not to be identically related.[2]

Opponents argue : In case nominal (*nāma*) implies a word other than a root-verb, the compound in *stoka-namrā* cannot be explained. For here the meaning of the *stoka* has been identically related to the meaning of the root-verb constituting the word *namra*.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : By nominal, in that case, a meaningful word is to be understood.[4]

The definition, however, would not extend to instances like *supacati*. For the general definition of compound as such rules out any such possibility.[5]

The definition of the *Karmadhāraya* would not over-extend to the sentence *nīlam utpalam* either although the word-meanings are identically related. For here the words viz *nīla* and *utpala* are not used in juxtaposition, a declensional suffix has come to intervene.[6]

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1. प्रबलमपद्रव्यमित्यादेः सङ्गृह्य नामपदस्य धातुभिन्नोपलक्षकत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 202
2. कुम्भस्य समीपमित्याद्यर्थकस्तूपकुम्भादिनं तादात्म्येनान्वयबोधकः । ibid., p. 202
3. ननु नामपदस्य धातुभिन्नपरत्वे स्तोकनम्रा स्तनाभ्यामित्यादौ कर्मधारयो न स्यात् तत्र नाम-(घटक)-धात्वर्थे एव स्तोकस्याभेदेनान्वयात् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 202
4. सार्थकसामान्यपदत्वेऽपि लक्ष्यभावात् । श. श. प्र. p. 202
5. सुपचतीत्यादौ शोभनादेः पाकादावभेदान्वयेऽपि तस्य समाससामान्यलक्षणाक्रान्तत्वेनातिव्याप्त्यभावात् । कृष्णकान्ती pp. 202–3.
6. नीलमुत्पलमित्यादिकन्तु समानविभक्तिकं नामद्वयं स्वार्थयोरभेदान्वयं बोधयदपि न क्रमिकं विभक्त्या व्यवधानात् । श. श. प्र. pp. 202–3.

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Opponents argue: For the comprehension of the meaning of the nominal *nīla* as what is related through identity, it is essential that the other word-meaning be presented by a nominal immediately following the nominal *nīla*. In *nīlam-utpalam*, therefore, the meaning of the nominal, *nīla* is not to be comprehended as what is related through identity. On the contrary, the meaning of the nominal *nīla* is comprehended as what is related to identity (*abheda*) presented by the declensional suffix added to the word *nīla* through the relation of *ādheyatva*. In *nīla ghaṭa-paṭau*, too, the meaning of the nominal, *nīla* is to be comprehended as what is related to *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* presented by words *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* formed into *dvandva* compound immediately following the nominal, *nīla*, through identity. In *stokaṁ pacati, dhānyena dhanam, prakṛtyā paṭuḥ* and the like, it is not that the meaning of the word *stoka* or *dhānya* or *prakṛti* is to be comprehended as what is related through identity to the meaning of the root-verb *pac* or of the word *dhana* or of *paṭu*. On the contrary, the meaning of the word *stoka* or of *dhānya* or of *prakṛti* is to be comprehended as what is related to identity the meaning of the declensional suffix through the relation of *ādheyatā*. The definition of the *Karmadhāraya* compound need not be overburdened with the insertion of the word (used in) juxtaposition.

Jagadīśa readily agrees to such a view.[1] But Kṛṣṇakānta points out that Jagadīśa's agreement is conditional and only half-hearted. For the declensional suffix added to a differentiating epithet does not ever denote identity. Nor is it reasonable to hold that the comprehension of the meaning of

1. यदि च तादात्म्येन नीलादिनामार्थस्यान्वयबुद्धौ नीलादिनामोत्तरनामोपस्थाप्यत्वं तन्त्रमतो न तत्राभेदसम्बन्धेन नीलादेरन्वयः, परन्तु विशेषणविभक्त्युपस्थापिते तादात्म्य एवाधेयत्वेन, नीलघटपटावित्यादौ च नीलपदाव्यवहितेन घटपटेत्येवं द्वन्द्वात्मकनाम्नैवोपस्थापिते पटे नीलस्य तादात्म्येनान्वयान्न व्यभिचारः, स्तोकः पचति, धान्येन धनं, प्रकृत्या पटुरित्यादावापि स्तोकादेर्न धात्वाद्यर्थे तादात्म्येनान्वयः, किन्तु द्वितीयाद्यर्थे तादात्म्य एवाधेयत्वेन इत्यादिकं विभाव्यते, तदा क्रमिकत्वमनुपादेयमेव। श. श. प्र. pp. 203–204.

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the nominal *nīla* and the like as what is related through identity, is occasioned by the other word-meaning being presented by a nominal closely following the said nominal. On the contrary, for the comprehension of the meaning of a nominal ending in a declensional suffix, by way of the feature as what is related through identity, it is essential that the other word-meaning be presented by a nominal not forming part of a compound, ending in the same declecsional suffix. In *dravye sarasijan*, the comprehension of the meaning of the nominal *dravya* as what is identically related does not occur. Hence in the view of the Neo-logicians the definition has to read the words 'used in juxtaposition'.[1]

Opponents argue : The definition of the *Karmadhāraya* compound would unwarrantedly over-extend to an instance like *rājapuruṣa*. For the meaning of the nominal *rājan* and that of *puruṣa* cannot be related through identity. The nominal *rājan*, therefore, is to imply the meaning, *rājasambandhin*. As a result, the meaning of the nominal *rājan* viz, *rāja-sambandhin* is to be comprehended by way of the feature related through identity to the meaning of the nominal, *puruṣa* used in juxtaposition therewith to fulfill the conditions laid down in the definition of the *Karmadhāraya* compound.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In *rājapuruṣa* admittedly holding out a case of the *tatpuruṣa* compound, the implied meaning of the nominal *rājan* is not to be comprehended by way of the feature against the meaning of the other nominal, viz, *puruṣa* as related through identity. For in that case the rule that the verbal knowledges occurring due to a compound and the

1. इदमापाततः, विशेषणविभक्तेरभेदार्थकत्वं न युक्तिसहमित्युक्तम्, निरूक्तोपस्थाप्यत्वमपि न तादृशबोधे तन्त्रम्, अपि तु सविभक्तिकनामार्थ-प्रकारकाभेदान्वयबोधे समानविभक्तिकवृत्तिशब्दान्यनामोपस्थाप्यत्वं तन्त्रमतो द्रव्ये सरसिजमित्यादावभेदेन नान्वयबोध इति नव्यमते क्रमिकत्वं देयमेवेति ध्येयम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 204

2. ननु राजपुरूष इत्यादितत्पुरुषेऽतिव्याप्तिः, नामार्थयोर्भेदान्वयस्याव्युतपन्नतया राजपदस्य राजसम्बन्धिनि लक्षणाया आवश्यकत्वेन राजपदार्थस्य राजसम्बन्धिनोऽभेदान्वयबोधजनकत्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 204

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sentence of its analysis are to be identical would be violated. In fact, *rāja-sambhandha*, the (implied) meaning of the nominal, *rājan* is to be comprehended as the feature against the meaning of the other nominal (*puruṣa*). Gaṅgeśa, the celebrated author of the Tattva'cintāmaṇi, supports this view.[1]

Opponents argue : In that case the meaning of the nominal, *rājan* is taken to be related to the meaning of another nominal, *puruṣa* through a relation other than that of identity in violation of the set rule that the meanings of any two nominals are not to be thus related.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : There is no harm even if in such a case the meanings of two nominals happen to be related through a relation other than that of identity.[3] In the case of an instance like *ghaṭo nāsti* the meaning of the nominal *ghaṭa* admittedly gets related to the meaning of the nominal *na* viz, negation (*abhāva*) through a relation other than that of identity (viz, pratiyogitva) to bear out the comprehension of negation in respect of *ghaṭa* (*ghaṭa-pratiyogitākābhāva*). To accomodate such a situation, it is admitted that the rule that the meanings of any two nominals are not to be related through a relation other than that of identity is applicable to cases where the nominals involved are other than particles (*nipātas*). Similarly to accomodate an instance like *rājapuruṣa* the rule is to be understood as applicable to cases other than those of the *tatpuruṣa* compound.[3]

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1. 'राजपुरुष, इत्यादिकस्तु तत्पुरुषो न पुरुषे पूर्वपदलक्षितराजसम्बन्धिनस्तादात्म्येनान्वयबोधकः, समासविग्रहयोस्तुल्यार्थकत्वहान्यापत्तेः, परन्तु राजसम्बन्धस्यैव, अतएव राजपुरुष इत्यादौ पूर्वपदे षष्ठमर्थसम्बन्धे लक्षणेति मणिकृदुक्तमपि सङ्गच्छते। श. श. प्र. p. 204,
2. ननु नानार्थयोर्भेदान्वयस्वीकारे सिद्धान्त-विरोधः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 204.
3. यथा च नामार्थयोर्भेदेनान्वयेऽपि न क्षतिस्तथोपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यते। श.श.प्र. p.204
4. तथा च नामार्थयोरित्यादौ निपातातिरिक्तत्वमिव तत्पुरुषातिरिक्तत्वमपि विशेषणं वक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः, अन्यथा घटो नास्तीत्यादौ प्रतियोगितासम्बन्धेनाभावे घटान्वयानुपपत्त्या तत्रापि लक्षणास्वीकारापत्तिरिति भावः। कृष्णकांती p. 205.

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Oppenents argue : It is simpler to conceive of *rāja-sambandhin* being implied by *rājan* in comparison to admitting any such relaxation to the rule in respect of the syntactical relation of the meanings of nominals.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : Even then the definition of the *karmadhāraya* compound will not over-extend to an instance like *rāja-puruṣa*. For the meaning of the nominal *rājan*, the first member of the compound *rāja-puruṣa*, (viz, *rāja-sambandhin*) is qualified by the meaning of a declensional suffix viz, *sambandha* further qualified by the denoted meaning of the nominal *rājan*. In the case of *Karmadhāraya* compound, on the other hand, the first member is to be understood as what is not thus qualified.[2]

In *pañcapuli* or in *dvigārgyam* in *dvigārgyam gacchatan* although the meaning of the first nominal viz, *pañca* or *dvi* happens to be related to the meaning of the other nominal through identity, the definition of the *Karmadhāraya* compound is not to over-extend to these instances. For the definition of the *Karmadhāraya* is to be further qualified with the clause 'being other than *dvigu* and *avyayībhāva*'.[3]

Oppenents argue : '*Mānuṣa-brāhmaṇaḥ* or *brāhmāṇa-māṇuṣa* should be regarded as valid instances of *Karmadhāraya* compound.[4]

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1. ननूक्तव्याप्तौ सामासातिरिक्तत्वविशेषणापेक्षया 'राजपुरुष' इत्यत्र पूर्वपदे राजसम्बन्धिनि लक्षणाऽस्तु तथा चातिव्याप्तिस्तदवस्थैवेति तुल्यविषयताशालिबोजजनकत्वादेव व्याससमासयोस्तुल्यार्थकत्वसम्भवात्। रामभद्री p. 205.
2. किञ्चिद्विशिष्टसुवर्थानवच्छिन्नस्यैव वा तादात्म्येनान्वयबोधकत्वमुक्तनिरुक्तौ निवेश्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 205.
3. न चैवमपि 'पञ्चपुल्यादिद्विगौ, 'द्विगार्ग्यं गच्छत' इत्यादिस्थलीये द्वितीयाद्यभिन्न-गार्ग्यादिबोधकाव्ययीभावे चातिव्याप्तिः तदन्यत्वेनापि विशेषणीयत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 205–6.
4. नन्वेवं 'ब्राह्मणमानुषः, मानुषब्राह्मण' इत्यादिकर्मधारयः कथं न स्यात्? कृष्णकान्ती p. 206.

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The elders reply : Such expressions are not used in language. In fact the *Karmadhāraya* compound is formed of words denotative of mutually exclusive things[1] viz, differentiator and the differentiated.

Opponents argue : *prameya-dhūmaḥ*, in that case would not be regarded an instance of the said compound. For the word *dhūma* obviously does not denote a thing exclusive of *prameya*.[2]

The elders reply : *Prameya-dhūmaḥ* is not an instance of the *Karmadhāraya* compound but of the *tatpuruṣa* one like *nara-śarīra* or *rāhu-śiraḥ* and the sentence of analysis is *prameyasya dhūmaḥ*, the sixth-declensional suffx meaning identity (*abheda*).[3]

The Neo-logicians holid a different view. Instances like *candana-taruḥ*, *vindhya-giriḥ*, *vasanta-samayaḥ* are validily used in language. For what is essential for the composition of the *Karmadhāraya* compound is that the differentiated object (*viśeṣya*) be exclusive of the differentiator (*viśeṣaṇa*). It is not essential that the differentiator too be exclusive of the differentiated.[4]

Opponents argue : *Brāhmaṇa-mānuṣa* in that case is to be regarded a valid instance of the *Karmadhāraya* compound.

Neo-logicians reply : It is a welcome objection. In fact *mānuṣa-brāhmaṇa* too is admittedly an instance of the *tat-puruṣa* compound.[5]

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1. अत्र च 'मानुषब्राह्मणो ब्राह्मणमानुष' इत्याद्यप्रयोगाद्विशेषणविशेष्ययोर्यत्र मिथस्तादात्म्येन व्यभिचारस्तत्रैव कर्मधारयः साधुः। श. श. प्र. p. 205.
2. ननु 'प्रमेयधूम' इत्यत्राव्याप्तिः, प्रमेयभेदाप्रसिद्धा तद्व्यभिचारप्रसिद्धेः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 206.
3. 'प्रमेयधूम' इत्यादौ 'नरस्य शरीरं. राहोः शिर' इत्यादाविव तादात्म्य सन्बन्धार्थकषष्ट्या तत्पुरुष एवेति वृद्धाः। श. श. प्र. p. 206.
4. चन्दनतरुर्विन्ध्यगिरिर्वसन्तसमय इत्यादिप्रयोगस्य प्रामाणिकत्वात् विशेष्यस्यैव विशेषणव्यभिचारितं (अत्र) तन्त्रं, न तु विशेषणस्यापि तद्व्यभिचारित्वम्। श. श. प्र. pp. 206–207.
5. न चैव ब्राह्मणमानुष इति प्रयोगः कर्मधारयत्वेन साधुः स्यादिति वाच्यम्। इष्टापत्तेः, प्रत्युत 'मानुषब्राह्मण' इत्यादिकमपि तत्पुरुषत्वेन प्रामाणिकमेव। कृष्णकान्ती p. 207.

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Opponents argue : In *puruṣottama*, the differentiated viz, the meaning of the word *uttama*, the repository of eternal knowledge is not exclusive of the differentiator or what the word *puruṣa* means.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The word *uttama* does not mean the repository of eternal knowledge. It only means 'one free from all error'. As a jar or any other object like that is to be availed of as what is free from all error exclusively of *puruṣa* (the repository of eternal knowledge), the differentiated is well found to be exclusive of the differentiator. At the same time, as *uttama* is exclusive of *puruṣa*, *puruṣa* too is exclusive of *uttama* to make room for the *Karmadhāraya* compound, *uttama-puruṣaḥ*.[2]

Pronouns like *yat*, *tat* and the like although found to signify objects like lotus are not to form the last constituent member of the *Karma-dhāraya* compound usually. There are exceptions to this general rule; *Pakva-yat*, *āma-tat*, *nīla-yat*, *kaṭu-tat* and the like other uses are well in vogue. Jumaranandin, the celebrated commentator on the *Saṁkṣipta-sāsa-vyākaraṇa* uses the word *parama-saḥ* (in the sense of *paramaḥ saḥ*) and *parama-tau* (in the sense of *Paramau tau*). The *tatpuruṣa* compound also is to be understood to follow the same principles. *Śivā-yat*, *śambhu-tat* and the like are the so many instances in point.[3]

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1. नन्वेवं 'पुरुषोत्तम' इत्यत्र विशेष्ये विशेषणव्यभिचाराभावात् कर्मधारयः कथम्। रामभद्री p. 207.
2. 'पुरुषोत्तम' इत्यत्र चोत्रमत्वं न नित्यज्ञानादिमत्त्वम्, किन्तु भ्रमविधुरत्वम्. अतएव तत्र पुरुषस्येव पुरुषेऽपि तस्य व्यभिचारसत्त्वात् 'उत्तमपुरुष' इत्यपि कर्मधारयः साधुरिति नव्याः। श. श. प्र. p. 207.

तथा च भ्रमविधुरे घटादौ पुरुषत्वस्य व्यभिचारसम्भवात् तादृशकर्मधारयो नाव्युत्पन्न इति भावः। रामभद्री p. 207.
3. तदाद्युत्तरपदकः कर्मधारयः प्रायशो नेष्यते, 'नीलतदस्ती' त्यादितो जात्वपि नीलोत्पलादेरस्तित्वाद्यप्रतीतेः। पक्वयद्भोजनं रम्यमामतद्भञ्जनं वृथा। नीलयद्रस आस्वाद्यः कटुतद्रूपमीक्षयते॥ इत्यादिप्रयोगात् क्वचिदिष्यतेऽपि, प्रयुक्तन्तु जुमरनन्दिना परमः स इत्याद्यर्थे परमसः 'परमता'वित्यादि। तत्पुरुषोऽप्येतेन व्याख्यातः। श. श. प्र. pp. 207–208.

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The Grammarians argue : The verbal knowledge of the meaning of a nominal, posited as the feature occuring through the relation of *viśeṣyatā* is as a rule caused by a suffix added to the said nominal, presenting the substantive (*viśeṣya*). The said rule also is not limited to cases other than those where the meaning of the nominal involved is qualified by the relation of identity. For the determinant of the state of the effect (*Kāryatā-vacchedaka*), in that case would come out to be a complex property. The meaning of the nominal *nīla* in *nīlotpalam* cannot be comprehended as the feature against what the nominal, *utpala* means viz. the lotus. In other words, the comprehension of the meaning of the nominal *nīla* posited as the feature through the relation of *viśeṣyatā*, against the lotus does not come about due to *nīlotpalam*. On the contrary, it is the meaning of the word *nīlotpala* that is to be posited as the feature against the meaning of a suffix added thereto. The word *nīlotpalam*, therefore, is not to be regarded as an instance of the derivative kind of nominal. It is on the contrary, an instanc of the conventional one meaning what is qualified by the state of the blue lotus.[1]

Oppenents argue : In case a compound is held to be endowed with the power of denotation, it could not be held to be a sentence. Nor has compound been ever recognised by any authority as the conventional kind of nominal.[2]

The Grammarians reply. It is a welcome objection. The compounded form is a distinct word. For it presents a mean-

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तथा च पादपद्मं शिवायद्धि, विधृतं शम्भुतद्धदि इत्यादि प्रयोगात् क्वचिदिष्यतेऽपीति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 208.

1. ननु विशेष्यतया नामार्थप्रकारकान्वयबुद्धिमात्रं प्रत्येव 'नामोत्तरविभक्तुयपस्थाप्यत्वं तन्तं, न तु तादात्म्यसम्बन्धानवच्छिन्नतत्प्रकारकबुद्धिं प्रति गौरवात्, अतो नामार्थयोर्नीलोत्पलयोरन्वयासम्भवात् कर्मधारयादिकः समासो न यौगिकः किन्तु नीलोत्पलत्वादिविशिष्टे रूढ एव। श. श. प्र. p. 209.

2. ननु समासे शक्तिस्वीकारे तस्य वाक्यत्वं न स्यात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 209.

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ing different from what the constituents thereof denote. As for an authority recognising a compound as the conventional kind of nominal, Bhartṛhari is to be referred to.[1]

Jagadīśa refutes : Instances like *nīlotpalam* even if not known to be denotative of its conventional meaning admittedly lead to the comprehension of the meanings severally presented by the constituents thereof, identically related. The determinant of the state of the effect obviously in that case comes out to be complex. But it has to be admitted. For complexity yielding the desired result does not militate against the law of parsimony. Otherwise a difficult situation would arise. As it is held that the substantive of a verbal knowledge of the meaning of a nominal posited as the feature, is to be presented by a suffix, it may also be said that the substantive of such verbal knowledge is to be presented by a nominal closely following the nominal, the meaning of which is to be posited as the feature. In *nīlamānaya* in that case the syntactical relation of the meaning of the nominal, *nīla* with the meaning of the declensional suffix, *am* (meaning *karmatva*) ,would not come about as it so happened in the case of *nīlotpalam* in the view of the Grammarians. *Nīlaṃ* in that case as a whole may be taken to conventionally mean *nīla-viśiṣṭa-karmatva*, the way *nīlotpala* was taken by the Grammarians to conventionally mean the blue lotus or *nīlotpalatva-viśiṣṭa*. This is an absurd situation which the Grammarians have to admit per force in case they refuse to accept that complexity yielding the desired result does not cause harm.[2]

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1. इष्टापत्तिमाह शब्दान्तरत्वादिति । योगेनार्थप्रतिपादकशब्दभिन्नत्वात् । ibid., pp. 209–210.

   तदुक्तं भर्तृहरिणा अबुधान् प्रत्युपायाश्च विहिताः प्रतिपत्तये । शब्दान्तरत्वादत्यन्तं भेदो वाक्य-समासयोः । श. श. प्र. p. 209.

2. तन्मन्दम् 'नीलोत्पलमि'त्यादौ समुदाये रूढ्यप्रतिसन्धानेऽपि नीलादिप्रत्येकपदोपस्थित्या तयोस्तादाम्येनान्वयबोधस्यानुभविकत्वेन गौरवस्य प्रामाणिकत्वात्, अन्यथा नामार्थस्यान्वयबोधसामान्यं प्रत्येव नामोत्तरनामोपस्याप्यत्वं तन्त्रमुररीकृत्य 'नीलमानये'त्यादौ नामार्थसुवर्थयोर्नान्वयबोधः, परन्तु

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The Grammarians argue : The sentence *nīlo dravyañca ghaṭaḥ* (jar is blue and a substance) leads to the comprehension of both 'blue' (*nīla*) and substance (*dravya*) identically related to jar (*ghaṭa*). In case compound is devoid of the power of denotation, *nīla-ghaṭo dravyam* (the blue-jar is a substance) too should identically result in the same kind of verbal knowledge.[1] It is only if compound is held to be endowed with the power of denotation that the sentence *nīla-ghaṭo dravyam* would unlike the sentence *nīlo dravyañca ghaṭaḥ* cause the verbal knowledge of the blue-jar as a substance.[2]

Jagadīśa refutes : Such apprehension is unwarranted. For as in the case of the verbal knowledge of the meaning of a nominal posited as the invariable substantive, the nominal is to end in the first declensional suffix to bear out the comprehension of the meaning of the said nominal posited as the predicate through the relation of identity.[3]

Opponents argue : No such rule is to be reasonably contemplated. For in *nīla-ghaṭo dravyam*, the meaning of the nominal *nīla* not ending in the first declensional suffix has well come to be posited as the predicate against jar (*ghaṭa*).[4]

Jagadīśa replies : Being posited as the predicate means being comprehended as the feature as distinguished from the

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सुबन्तभागस्य नीलाविशिष्टकर्मत्वादौ रूढिरेवेत्यपि किन्न रोचयेः। श. श. प्र. p. 210.

1. न च समासस्याशक्तत्वे 'नीलो द्रव्यञ्च घट' इत्यादाविव 'नील–घटो द्रव्यमित्यादावपि घटे धर्मिण्येकत्र द्वयमिति न्यायेन नीलद्रव्ययोस्तादात्म्येनान्वयापत्ति रिति वाच्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 210.
2. समासस्य शक्तत्वे तु नीलघटभागस्य नीलाभिन्नघटवाचकतया तादृशघट एव द्रव्यान्वय इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 210.
3. नामार्थस्य मुख्यविशेष्यताक इव तादात्म्यावच्छिन्नविधेयताकेऽपि बोधे नाम्नः प्रथमान्तत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात्। श. श्र. प्र. pp. 210–11.
4. ननु 'नीलघटो द्रव्यमित्यादौ नीलस्यापि तादात्म्येन विधेयत्वादुक्तनियमो व्यभिचारी। रामभद्री p. 210.

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determinant of the substative.[1] Hence although the meaning of the nominal, *nīla* has come out to be comprehended as the predicate, there is no harm. For the said meaning is but the determinant of jar (*ghaṭa*), the substantive.[2]

Opponents argue : In *paṭam,* too, the meaning of the nominal is comprehended as the predicate (feature) as distinguished from the determinant of the substantive against the meaning of the word *am* (viz. *kamatā*) although the said nominal does not end in the first declensional suffix.

Jagadīśa replies : There is no harm. For here the relation involved is *niṣṭhatva* and not identity.[3]

Opponents argue : The instance, *nīlopītotpalam* admittedly holds out a case of the *bahuvrīhi* compound. It leads to the comprehension of what is possessed of blue and yellow lotuses (*nīlam pītañcatpalam yatra*). The said instance should also be regarded an illustration of the *karmadharaya* compound to mean the lotus not other than what is blue and yellow (*nīlam pītañcatpalam*).[4]

Jagadīśa replies : By virtue of the maxim that in case multiple words are involved, an instance is to be treated as holding out the case of the *bahuvrīhi* compound and of no other compound than the *dvandva,* it is the *bahuvrīhi* compound that is regarded as the cause of the verbal comprehension of the meaning of a nominal constituting the compound, qualified by the meanings presented by the two nominals constituting

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1. विधेयतत्त्वन्तु विषयतावच्छेदकत्वान्यप्रकारत्वं प्रकारताभेदो वेन्यदेतत्। श. श. प्र. p. 211.
2. नीलस्य तत्र विशेष्यतावच्छेदकत्वात्। राममद्री p. 211.
3. पटमित्यादौ तु कर्मत्वादौ पटादिर्न तादात्म्येन विधेय इति न तत्र व्यभिचारः। श. श. प्र. p. 211.
4. ननु नीलं पीतञ्चोत्पलं यत्र इत्यर्थे 'नीलपीतोत्पलं सर' इत्यादिको बहुव्रीहिरिव, नीलं पीतञ्चोलमित्यर्थे नीलपीतोत्पलं पुष्पमित्यादिकः कर्मधारयोऽप्येकत्र द्वयमिति न्यायेन नीलपीताभ्यामवच्छिन्नोत्पलनिष्ठधर्मिताकधीजनकः, कथं न स्यादिति। श. श. प्र. p. 212.

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itself. Any other compound, therefore, is incapable of such kind of verbal knowledge.[1]

Opponents argue : In *nīlotpitotpale ramye,* the compound *nīlapītotpale* is found to be used in the sense of the lotus not other than what is blue and yellow. The causality of the verbal knowledge of what a nominal means, qualified by the two meanings presented by the two nominals constituting a compound cannot be restricted to the *bahuvrihi* compound only.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In *nīlapītotpale ramye, pīta-nilotpalamāśritaḥ* and the like, the verbal knowledge comes out to be 'the blue lotus and the yellow lotus are charming' and not 'the blue and yellow lotus is charming. The words *nīla* and *pīta* in such cases form into an instance of the *dvandva* compound viz, *nīla-pīte.* Thereupon, the words *nīla-pīte* and *utpala* constiute the compound *nīla-pītotpale.* The word *utpala* following the *dvandva* compound, *nīla-pīte* is to be read as associated with both *nīla* and *pīta* the constituents of the *dvandva* compound severally. The sentence of analysis of the compound in question, therefore, is to take the form *nīla-pīte ca utpale* and not *nīlam pītam ca tadutpalm.*[3]

Opponents argue : The maxim that in case multiple words are involved, an instance is to be regarded as what holds out a case of either *bahuvrīhi* or *dvandva* compound does not hold good in the instance *ghaṭānadhikaraṇam.*

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1. 'बहुपदे बहुव्रीहिरेव नेतरो द्वन्द्वादन्यः समासः' इत्यनुशिष्टबलेन बहुव्रीहेरेव स्वनिविष्टनामद्वयोपस्थाप्यार्थद्वयावच्छिन्नतात्पर्यनिष्ठविषयताकबोधं प्रति हेतुत्वेन समासान्तरस्य तादृशधियं प्रत्यसमर्थत्वात्। ibid. p. 212.
2. ननु नीलं पीतं च उत्पलं रम्यमित्याद्यर्थे 'नीलपीतोत्पले रम्ये' इत्यादिप्रयोगात् तादृशकारणतासङ्कोचो दुर्घटः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 212.
3. नीलोत्पले रम्ये, पीतनीलोत्पलाश्रितमित्यादौ तु नीलोत्पलं पीतोत्पलञ्च रम्यमित्याकारक एवान्वयबोधो, न तु नीलं पीतञ्च यदुत्पलं तद्रम्यमित्याकारः। अतएव द्वन्द्वात् परस्य प्रत्येकाभिसम्बन्धसूचनार्थं नीलपीते च ते उत्पले चेत्यादिकमेव तत्र विग्रहं वर्णयन्ति, न तु नीलं पीतञ्च तदुत्पलञ्चेत्यादिकम्। श. श. प्र. 212–13.

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Jagadīśa replies : By multiple words, multiple nominals are to be understood. In the present instance, *na* being only a (conjunctive) particle (*nipāta*), the compound does not involve multiple nominals. Hence there is no harm. It is an illustration of the *tatpuruṣa* compound. For it is the meaning of the middle member (*na*) that is to be comprehended as the invariable substantive.[1] In case, *na* too is regarded as a nominal there is no harm. The instance in that case would have to be admitted as an illustration of what is called *tripadabahuvrīhi*.[2]

Opponents argue : Compound if admitted to carry a conventional sense then in *vācaspatirmitāyāḥ*, the meaning of the word *mitā* does not run the risk of being syntactically related to *vāk* through identity. So also in *sa syāme kaṇṭhevraṇaḥ pumān*, the meaning of the word *śyāma* is not to be related with *kaṇṭha*. For *vāk* or *kaṇṭha* is only a part of a word-meaning. With a part of a word-meaning another word-meaning is not to be syntactically related since these are not mutually expectant. In *paśurapaśuḥ* or in *gaganam samavetam* for an example, *paśutva* a part of what the word *paśu* denotes viz, *paśutvāvacchinna* (or animal) cannot be related to the meaning of the word *apaśu* (or what is other than an animal) or *śabda*, a part of the meaning of the word *gagana* viz. *śabdāśraya* can not be related to the meaning of the word *samaveta*. Similarly in *patnyā dvijāti-svādhyāyaḥ, jaṭābhistāpasaspṛha* and so on the meaning of the word *patnyā* viz. being in company with wife (*patnīsahabhāva*) is not to be related with the meaning of the word *dvijātī* or the meaning of the word *jaṭābhiḥ* viz. being possessed of matted hair is to be related to the meaning of

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1. घटस्य नीधिकरणमित्यादिविग्रहे 'घटानधिकरणमित्यादिकस्तु मध्यपदप्रधानस्तत्पुरुषो न बहुनामगभेः। ibid., p. 213.
2. न वैकत्र द्वयमितिन्यायेन स्वार्थस्य बोधक इति सम्प्रदायविदः। श. श. प्र. p. 213.

एकत्र द्वयमित्यादिन्यायेन बोधकत्वानुरोधेन त्रिपदादिबहुव्रीहेरावश्यकत्वादिति स्वयं वचयमाणत्वादिति हृदयम्। रामभद्री p. 213.

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the word *tāpasa* or mendicant. But in case compound is held to be denotative of derivative sense, such syntactical relation cannot be ruled out. For the meanings of the words like *vāk* and the like would come out to be so many independent word-meanings in that case.[1]

Jagadīśa replies: Such an apprehension is uncalled for. A word-meaning is not to be syntactically related to what a contituent of compound or any other *vṛtti* denotes. For expectancy calling for such syntactical relation is wanting in that case. But this is only a general rule. There are two exceptions to it. In case the word-meaning likely to be related to what a constituent of compound denotes, happens to be presented by a case-ending (*kāraka-vibhakti*) or by the declensional suffix denotative of relation, such syntactical relation admittedly, occurs. In *catrasya gurukulam*, therefore, the word *guru* although is only a constituent of the compound, *gurukulam* the meaning of the sixth deelensional suffix in *caitrasya* viz. relation (*sambandha*) gets related therewith. So also in *śaraiḥ śātita-patrakaḥ*, the meaning of the third case-ending in *śaraiḥ* viz. instrumentality (*karaṇatra*) gets related to what *śātita*, a constituent of the compound, *śātita-patraka*.[2] In *pariṣkṛtāyāḥ satatam yastu vācaspatīyate*, the sixth declensional suffix is not denotative of relation.

Hence although *vācaḥ* is only a part of the syntactical unity (*vṛtti*) *vācaspati* (in the sense that it ends in the suffix *kyac*), the meaning of the said suffix is not to be syntactically related to the meaning of *vācaḥ*. In *sampadā jaṭayā vāpi putrīyati sa puruṣaḥ* also the meaning of the third declensional suffix is not to be related to the meaning of *putra*, a part of the syntactical unity (*vṛtti*), *putrīyati* (in the sense that it ends in *kyaṅ*).

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1. श. श. प्र. pp. 213–214.

1. वृत्त्यैकदेशपदस्यार्थे सम्बन्धस्य कारकस्य वा बोधकान्यविभक्तेः स्वार्थानुभावकतायां निराकांक्षत्वादेव तस्य निरस्तत्वात्, अतएव 'चैत्रस्य गुरुकुलं, शरैः शातितपत्रक' इलादौ गुर्वादिपदस्य वृत्त्यैकदेशत्वेऽपि तदर्थे षष्ठ्यर्थसम्बन्धस्य तृतीयाद्यर्थकरणत्वादेश्चान्वयः सर्वसिद्धः। श. श. प्र. pp. 214–15.

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For the said declensional suffix is not a case-ending.[1] So it is said by the grammarians that (the meaning of) no word other than what is denotative of what is related or rather relation or a case-relation is to be related to a part of a syntactical unity (*vṛtti*).[2]

Opponents argue: How then the syntactical relation of what is meant by the word *yogotha* (arising out of relation) with the meaning of *pāpā* (sin), a part of the syntactical unity, *pāpakṣaya* (eradication of sin) come about?

Jagadīśa replies: In the present case, the maening of the word *yogottha* means *yoga-prayojya* that gets identically related to what the compound *pāpa-kṣaya* means. Eradication of sin (*pāpa-kṣaya*) is occasioned by sin (*pāpa-prayojya*).[3]

Sin again is occasioned by the relation (of *rāhu* with the Sun or the Moon i.e. *yoga-prayojya*). Hence eradication of sin, as a matter of fact, is occasioned by yoga or the relation of *Rāhu* with the Sun or the Moon. The state of being occassioned by relation (*yoga-prayogyatva*), therefore, is said to be identically related to the state of eradication of sin. In other words, relation (of *Rāhu*) occasions the eradication of sin through sin, the counter-positive of the eradication of sin.[4]

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1. समासस्येव क्यजादिप्रत्ययान्तस्यापि वृत्तित्वात्—

परिष्कृतायाः सततं यस्तु वाचस्पतीयते।
सम्पदा जटया वापि पुत्रीयति स पुरुषः॥

इत्यादेरपि वागाद्यंशे परिष्कृतादेः पुत्राद्यंशे च सम्पदादेः सद्भावादेवोंधकतायां न सामर्थ्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 215.

2. अत एव—

प्रतियोगिपदादन्यद्यदन्यत् कारकादपि।
वृत्तिशब्दैकदेशार्थे न तस्यान्वय इष्यते॥

इत्यपि षठन्ति। ibid., p. 215.

प्रतियोगिपदात्=सम्बन्धात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 215.

3. कर्म चाण्डालयोगोत्थं कुरु पापक्षयं मम'त्यत्र च योगोत्थमित्यस्य योगप्रयोज्यमित्यर्थः, स चाभेदेन पापक्षयेऽन्वितः। श. श. प्र. p. 216.

4. तत्प्रयोज्यत्वञ्च प्रतियोगिद्वारा पापक्षये बोध्यम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 216.

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The question of the meaning of *yat* being syntactically related to the meaning of *rāśi*, a part of the compound *rāśi-gata* does not arise. For the use is not an authoritative one. If however, the verse be an authoritative one, it should read as *yasmin rāśau gata* and so on.[1]

Kṛṣṇakānta says that the verse should be taken to mean as follows : The evil phenomenon that has arisen due to the relation of *Rāhu* with the (Sun or the) Moon may well be eradicated.[2]

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1. यस्मिन् राशिगते सूर्य्ये विपत्तिं यान्ति मानवाः ।
तेषां तत्रैव कर्त्तव्याः पिण्डदानादिकाः क्रियाः ॥
इति वचनन्तु अमूलम्, समूलत्वे तु 'यस्मिन् राशौ गते सूर्य्ये' इत्येव तत्र पाठ इत्यास्तां विस्तरः । श. श. प्र. p. 216.
2. तथा च चाण्डालयोगोत्थं चन्द्रराहुसम्बन्धजन्यं दुरदृष्टं कर्म क्षयं ध्वस्तं कुरु इत्यर्थः—इत्यन्यापरिशीलितः पन्थाः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 216.

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CHAPTER VIII

CLASSIFICATION OF COMPOUNDS (DVIGU)

Compounds are of two kinds viz, collocative (*samānādhikaraṇa*) and non-collocative (*vyadhikaraṇ*), as it has already been seen. The instance of the *tatpuruṣa* compound usually come uneer the non-collocative kind of compounds. The instances of the *tatpuruṣa* compound that are of the collocative kind, however, are regarded as holding out cases for *karmadhāraya* or *dvigu.* The *dvigu* compound has been defined as what is formed of a nominal denotative of a number as its first constituent.[1] This however, does not mean that the instances of the collocative kind of the *tatpuruṣa* compound formed of a nominal denotative of a number as its first constituent in general, are to be regarded as the examples of *dvigu.* The instances like *saptarṣayaḥ, ekavīraḥ* and the like have well been seen to have come under the category of the *karmadhāraya* compound.

The compound formed of a nominal denotative of a number as its first constituent is to be regarded as *dvigu* under certain conditions.[2] If it so happens that a secondary suffix is to be further added to a nominal used in apposition with a nominal denotative of a number, then the said two nominals are to form into a compound called *dvigu,* The secondary suffix, *aṇ* for an example is to be added to the nominal *mātṛ* used in apposition witn the nominal *ṣaṭ* in *ṣaṇṇām mātṛṇāmapatyam pumān.* The two nominals viz, *ṣaṭ* and *mātṛ,* therefore, are to form into a compound viz, *ṣaṇ-mātṛ.* Thereupon, with the

1. संख्यापूर्वो द्विगुः । पा. II. 1. 52.
2. तद्धितार्थोत्तरपद-समाहारे च । पा. II. 1. 51.

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addition of the suffix, *aṇ*. *ṣaṇ-māturaḥ* is formed. This is known as the *taddhitārtha-dvigu* kind of compounds.

Similarly, in case a word is to further follow (as the last constituent) a nominal denotative of a number and an other used in apposition therewith are to form into a compound (*dvigu*). In *pañca gāvo dhanam yasya* for an example, the word *dhana* follows the nominals *pañca* and *go* as the likely last constituent of the compound to be formed of these three nominals. Hence the nominals, *pañca* denotative of the number five and *go* the nominal used in apposition therewith are to form into a compound (*dvigu*) viz. *pañca-gava*. But for the nominals, *pañca* and *go* forming into the said compound, the *tripada-bahuvrihi* compound, *pañca-gava-dhana* could not be effected. For the suffix, *ṭac* is provided for in the case of the *tatpuruṣa* kind of compound (including *dvigu*) only,[1] that helps bring the form *pañca-gava*. Without the said suffix, the form would come to be *pañca-go* to give the form of the *bahuvrīhi* compound, *pañca-godhana*, not used in language. The instance *pañca-gava*, therefore, comes under what is called *uttara-pada-dvigu* and this compound is to be regular.[2]

If not used in the sense of a name (*saṁjñā*) a compound is formed of a nominal denotative of a number and another used in apposition therewith to be known as *samāhāra-dvigu* as in *pañca-gavam*.[3]

Jagadīśa defines the dvigu compound as follows : A nominal closely following a word (nominal) denotative of what is qualified by a number and capable of bearing out the comprehension of the primary meaning thereof posited as the feature through the relation of identity against the meaning of itself is (to constitute) the *dvigu* compound in the sense of

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1. गोरतद्धितलुकि। पा. V. 4. 92. (सि. कौ. 729)
2. द्वन्द्वतत्पुरुषयोरुत्तरपदे नित्यसमासवचनम्। वार्तिक Vide सि. कौ. 729.
3. द्विगुरेकवचनम्। पा. II. 4. 1.
   द्विस्वर्थं समाहारः एकवत् स्यात्। ...पञ्चगवम्। सि. कौ. 731.

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what itself denotes, identically related to the primary meaning of the nominal, it closely follows.[1]

The nominal *vaṭa* closely following the word (nominal), *pañcan* denotative of five or what is qualified by the number *pañcatva* is capable of bearing out the comprehension of the primary meanig of the word *pañcan* viz, five posited as the feature through the relation of identity against what (*vaṭa*) itself means viz, the banyan tree (*vaṭa*). The nominal, *vaṭa*, therefore, is (to constitute) the compound, *pañcavaṭī* in the sense of the banyan trees identically related to the primary meaning of the word (nominal) *pañcān*, it closely follows, to be known as *dvigu*.

Instances like *tri-kaṭu*, *tri-bhuvana*, *catur-yuga*, *catur-varga*, *pañca-gavya*, *pañcā-mṛta*, *ṣaḍrasa*, *ṣaṭ-padārtha*, *saptarṣi*, *aṣṭa-nāga*, *aṣṭa-vasu*, *nava-graha*, *daśa-mūla*, *ekādasa-rudra* and *dvādaś'-āditya* come under the category, *karmadhāraya*. For in all these instances the first constituent of the compound present an implied meaning to be embraced by the verbal knowledge to occur.[2]

The nominal *tri* in the compound *tri-kaṭu*, for an example, does not denote the aggregate of any three spices (or pungent drugs). It implies the aggregate of the specific three spices viz, black pepper, long pepper and dry ginger. So is the case with all other instances given.

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1. संख्याशब्दयुतं नाम तदलचयार्थबोधकम् ।
अमेदेनैव यस्त्वार्थे स द्विगुस्त्रिविधो मतः ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 35.

संख्यावच्छिन्नशक्त्यपदोत्तरत्वविशिष्टं यन्नाम स्वार्थधर्मिकं तादात्म्येन तदलचयार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति समर्थं तन्नामोत्तरतापन्नं तन्नामैव तदलचयार्थाभिन्नस्वार्थे द्विगुरुच्यते । श. श. प्र. p. 21ā.

2. त्रिकटु, त्रिभुवन, चतुर्युग, चतुवर्ग, पञ्चगव्य, पञ्चामृत, षड्स, षट्पदार्थ, सप्तर्षि, अष्टनाग, अष्टवसु, नवग्रह. दशमूल, एकादशरुद्र, द्वादशादित्यादिकस्तु कर्मधारयः शुण्ठ्यादिपर्यायत्रित्वावच्छिन्नबोधकतया न पूर्वपदालचयार्थस्य बोधकस्त्रिकटुप्रभृतिभ्यः कटुत्रयादिसामान्याप्रतीतेः । श. श. प्र. pp. 217–18.

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The instance *pañcamūlī* holds out a case of the *dvigu* compound. For it leads to the comprehension of (the collection of) any five roots and not of (the collection of) five specific roots.[1] In other words, it is the primary meaning of the first constituent of the compound viz, the nominal, *pañcan* that is to be embraced in the verbal knowledge to occur and not the implied one as it so happens in the case of *karmadhāraya*.

The instances like *pañcamūlam* or *daśa-mūlam*, on the contrary, lead to the comprehension of five or ten specific roots The nominals *pañcan* or *daśa* imply such meanings. As such, these instances come under the *karmadhāraya* compound.[2] The compounded forms being used in the singular number do not indicate anything otherwise. For such use is authoritatively made in instances like *varṣākāle*, *maghar-kṣeṇa*, *trayodaśī* and so on. The idea is that the rainy seasons (*varṣākāla*) are not one. They are as many so the cycles of seasons are. So also *maghās* or each of the constellations, are as many as the monthly movements of the moon; *trayodaśīs* also are double the number of months of the moon. The singular number is only used to indicate the genus involved in such cases. In the present case too, the singular number is to be understood to carry the same idea.[3]

The instance, *dvi-rūpam* carries the sense of the colour of two (*dvayoḥ rūpam*). The meaning of the nominal *dvi*, therefore, is not comprehended as what is identically related to what the word *rūpa*, the other constituent of the compound, means.

Opponents argue : The compound *eka-ghaṭaḥ* leads to the comprehension of one (eka) or what is qualified by the number

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1. पञ्चमूलीत्यादौ तु मूलपञ्चकत्वेनैव न तु विशेषरूपेणापि मूलविशेषे तात्पर्य्यम् । श. श. प्र. p. 218.
2. पञ्चमूलं तदुभयं दशमूलमुदाहृतम् इत्यादिकस्ताद्रूप्येण बोधस्थलीयप्रयोगः । ibid., p. 218.
3. वर्षाकाले मघर्क्षेण युक्ता चापि त्रयोदशीत्यादिवदेक वचनस्य साधुत्वसम्भवात् । ibid. p. 218.

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ekatva or the primary meaning of the word *eka*, the first constituent of the compound, posited as the feature through the relation of identity against the meaning of the word, *ghaṭa* the other constituent. As such, it should be regarded as an instance of the *dvigu* compound.

Jagadīśa replies : In determining an instance holding out a case of the *dvigu*, the following conditions are to the considered :

(i) The first constituent of the compound is to be denotative of what is qualified by a number,

(ii) The meaning of the first constituent has to be syantactically related to that of the other constituent lhrough identity.

(iii) the meaning of the first canstituent is to be comprehended as the feature against the meaning of the other constituent.

(iv) the determinant of the feature is to be related to the feature through the relation of collective extensity (*paryāpti*) (i.e. the *prakāratāvacchedakatāvacchedaka-sambandha* is to be *paryāpti*).[1]

In *pañca-mūli*, for an example, the first constituent, *pañcaṅ* is denotative of five or what is qualified *pañcatva*, the number. The said meaning is syntactically related to the meaning of *mūla*, the other constituent through identity and it is posited as the feature thereagainst. The determinant (*pañcatva*) of the feature (*pañca*) is related to the feature (*pañca*) through the relation of collective extensity (*paryāpti*). The verbal knowledge that the compound leads to, therefore, embraces the roots, the meaning of the word *mūla* determined through the relation of identity, by five determined by the number, *pañcatva*, through the relation of collective extensity (*paryāpti*) (*paryāpti-sambandhā'vacchinna-pañcatva-niṣṭha-prakāratā'vacchedakatā-nirū-*

1. द्वयोः रूपमित्याद्यर्थे द्विरूपादिपदं नाभेदेन द्विप्रभृतेरनुभावकम् । श. श. प्र. p. 218.

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pitā-tādātmya-sambandhāvacchinna-pañcaniṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpita-mūla-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-śāli-śabdabadha).

The compound, *eka-ghaṭaḥ*, on the contrary, leads to the verbal knowledge that embraces the jar, determined through the relation of identity by one, (the denoted meaning of the first constituent) determined by the number, *ekatva* through the relation of inherence (*samvāya-sambandhā'vacchinna-ekatva-niṣṭha-prakāratā'vacchedakatā-nirūpitā-tādatmya-sambandhā-vacchinna-eka-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpitā-ghaṭa-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-śāli-śabdabodha*).

Hence in *eka-ghaṭa*, although the first constituent is denotative of what is qualified by a number and the meaning thereof is syntactically related to the meaning of the other constituent by way of the feature through the relation of identity, it is not an instance of the *dvigu* compound. For the determinant of the feature is related to the feature through a relation other than that of collective extensity (*paryāpti*).[1]

Opponents argue : But the difinition given does not lay down any such condition.

Jagadīśa replies : The definition observes that the first constituent of the *dvigu* compound is to denote what is qualified by a number. The thing, however, is to be qualified through the relation of collective extensily (*paryāpti*).[2]

The instance *dvitaya-ghaṭa* too, although it involves *paryāpti* as the relation through which the determinant of the feature is related to the feature, is not an example of the *dvigu* compound. For the first constituent viz, *dvitaya* (*dvi* × *taya*) is not a word but a sentence and thus devoid of denotation. The definition of the *dvigu* compound, on the other hand, lays it bare that the first constituent is to be denotative of what is

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1. एकत्वसंख्यया विशिष्टं बोधयदपि एकपदं न पर्याप्तिसंसर्गेण तदवच्छिन्नस्य बोधकम्। श. श. प्र. pp. 218–19.
2. संख्यावच्छिन्नेत्यत्र संख्यानिष्ठावच्छेदकत्वं पर्याप्तिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नं वाच्यमिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 218.

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qualified by a number.[1] The definition of *dvigu* compound, therefore, is not to over-extend to such instances.[2]

Opponents argue : In *saptadaśī paṭhytām*, the instance *saptadaśī* should not be regarded an example of the *dvigu* compound. For the primary meaning of the word *sapta*, the first constituent of the compound is not identically related to *śata* the meaning of the other constituent in view of the apparent contradiction. Seven is not hundred. Nor could it be so argued that 'multiplied by seven', the implied meaning of *sapta* is to be identically related to the other word-meaning. For the *dvigu* compound does not accomodate any such possibility.

Jagadīśa replies : It is with *śatatva*, a part of what the word *śata* denotes (i.e. the determinant of denotation of the word *śata*) that seven (*sapta*), the primary meaning of the word *sapta* is to be identically related. For the number, *śatatva* can well be seven.[3]

Opponents argue : The meaning of the word *sapta* cannot be related to *śatatva* which is only a part of the meaning of the word *śata* (i.e. *śatatvāvacchinnam*).

Jagadīśa replies : Due to semantic peculiarity such relation is to be admitted in the present case[4]

Opponents argue : *Śatatva*, has been said to be seven. This means *śatatva* is qualified by *śaptatva*. In other words, *saptatva* is in *śatatva*. But this is inconceivable. For both are qualities and one quality does not accomodate another.

1. द्वितयादिपदं पर्य्याप्त्या द्वित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रतिपादयदपि न तत्र शक्तं वाक्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 219.
2. अतो 'नैकघटद्वितयपटे'त्यादिककर्मधारयेऽति प्रसङ्गः। ibid , p. 219.
3. सप्तदशी पञ्चतामित्यादौ च यद्यपि शते धर्मिणि सप्तानामभेदेन नान्वयो बाधितत्वात्, नापि सप्तपदलक्षितस्य सप्तगुणितत्वस्य द्विगुत्वहान्यापत्तेः, तथापि शतपदार्थैकदेशे शतत्वसंख्यायां तस्याः सप्तत्वसम्भवादिति वदन्ति। ibid., p. 219.
4. व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण एकदेशान्वयस्वीकार इत्यावेदनाय वदन्तीत्युक्तम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 219.

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Jagadīśa replies : A quality does not accomodate another only through the relation of inherence. In the present case, the relation involved is that of collective extensity (*paryāpti*) and as such there is no harm.[1]

Opponents argne : As through the relation of inherence, a quality does not accomodate another quality, so also through the relation of collective extensity too.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, it may be so said that *śatatva* actually does not accomodate *saptatva*, the number (a quality), as such. *Śaptatva*, here, is only a content of the notion of addition (*apekṣā-buddhi*).[2]

Opponents argue : The definition of the *dvigu* compound as suggested by Jagadīśa should over-extend to the the instance *dvigārgyam* in *dvi-gārgyam gacchataḥ*. For it leads to the comprehension of the primary meaning of the first constituent, *dvi*, a nominal denotative of what is qualified through the relation of collective extensity, by a number, posited as the feature through the relation of identity against the meaning of the other nominal.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The definition of the *dvigu* compound is to be understood to have been qualified with the clause 'being other than *avyayībhāva*'.[4]

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1. ननु गुणानां गुणवृत्तित्वाभावात् कथमेतदिति वाच्यम्। समवायेनैव गुणानां गुणवृत्तित्वानङ्गीकारात् पर्य्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन तेषां तथात्वे बाधकाभावात्। ibid., p. 219.
2. अन्ये तु समवायेनेव पर्य्याप्तिसम्बन्धेनापि गुणानां गुणवृत्तित्वं नाङ्गीक्रियते, संख्यागतद्वित्वादिकन्तु अपेक्षाबुद्धिविशेषविषयत्वरूपं न तु संख्यारूपमिति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नमित्याहुः। ibid., p. 219.
3. ननु 'द्वौ गार्ग्यौ' इत्याद्यर्थे द्विगार्ग्यमित्यव्ययीभावेऽतिव्याप्तिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 219.
4. द्विगार्ग्यं गच्छत इत्याद्यव्ययीभाववारणन्तु पूर्ववत्। श. श. प्र. p. 219.

(न चैवमपि (पञ्चपुल्यादिद्विगौ) द्विगार्ग्यं गच्छत इत्वादिस्थलौये द्वितयाद्यभिन्नगार्ग्यादिबोधकाव्ययीभावे चातिव्याप्तिः, तदन्यत्वेनापि विशेषणीयत्वात्।) ibid., pp. 205–206.

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The *dvigu* compound is of three kinds viz. *taddhitārtha-dvigu*, *uttara-pada-dvigu* and *samāhāra-dvigu*.[1]

Taddhitārtha-dvigu, it has been seen earlier, is effected to make room for the use of a secondary suffix (*taddhita*) to give a certain desired sense as in the case of *ṣaṇ-māturaḥ*.[2]

Jagadīśa defines the *tadditārtha-dvigu* compound as what leads to the comprehension of the meaning of itself related to i.e. posited as the feature against the meaning of a secondary suffix following itself.[3] In *dvi-mudro vṛsaḥ*, the compound *dvi-mudrā*, for an example, leads to the comprehension of the meaning of itself viz. two rupees (*mudrā*) posited as the feature against (what is) 'bought' (in exchange of), the meaning of the secondary suffix *ṭhak* (gone elided), following itself. In *dvi-varṣā gauḥ*, the compound *dvi-varṣā* leads to the comprehension of the meaning of itself viz, two years posited as the feature against the meaning of the secondary suffix, *ṭhak* (gone elided) viz, 'of identical age' (*abhinna-vayaskatva*). The compound *dvidala* in *dvidalam pavitram*, causes the verbal knowledge of two bundles (*dvi-dala*) posited as the feature against what (*pavitra*) is made of, the meaning of the secondary suffix. The compound *dvi-guñja* in *dviguñjam svarṇam*, bears out the verbal knowledge of two red seeds posited as the feature against the meaning of the secondary suffix, what has been weighed. In *tri-kāṇḍaḥ puruṣaḥ*, in the like manner, the compound, *tri-kāṇḍaḥ* leads to the comprehension of three knots (*kāṇḍa*) posited as the feature against the meaning of the secondary suffix viz, what is of the size of. In

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यथा कर्मधारयलक्षणे तत्पुरुषान्यत्वं तथाऽत्रापि अव्ययीभावादन्यत्वस्य निवेश्यत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 220.

1. तद्धितार्थोत्तरपदसमाहारे च। पा. II. 1. 51.
स चायं द्विगुस्त्रिविधः—तद्धितार्थ उत्तरपद समाहारश्चभेदात्। श. श. प्र. p. 220.

2. तद्धितार्थान्वितस्वार्थस्तद्धितार्थद्विगुर्मतः। श. श. प्र. का. 36.
यो द्विगुः स्वोत्तरतद्धितार्थान्वितस्वार्थकः स तद्धितार्थद्विगुः। ibid., p. 220.

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pañca-kapalaścaruḥ, the compound *pañca-kapāla* leads to the verbal knowledge of five potsherds posited as the feature against the meaning of the secondary suffix (gone elided) viz. what has been purified (by virtue of being put in potsherds).[1]

Patañjali, the celebrated author of the *Mahā·bhāṣya* argues : In the instances cited, it is the last constituent that implies the meaning held to be presented by a secondary suffix imagined to have gone elided. By *taddhitārtha-dvigu*, therefore, is to be understood the kind of the *dvigu* compound, the last constituent nominal of which presents the meaning of a secondary suffix through implication.

Jagadīśa replies. : This is incorrect. For such a definition does not cover many instances admittedly holding out cases of the *taddhitārtha-dvigu* kind of compounds. In the instance, *pāñca-purūṣiḥ*, for an example, the meaning of the secondary suffix has been presented by the secondary suffix itself. So also is the case with *pañca-garga-rūpyaḥ* in *pañca-garga-rūpyo-gauḥ*.

Not only that. In *dvi-svarṇa-mūdraḥ paśuḥ* the compound *dvi-svarṇamūdrā* is formed of the constituents, *dvi* and *svarṇa-mūdrā*. The last constituent viz, *svarṇa-mūdrā* is a sentence and not a word. As such, it cannot have any power of denonatation and thus of implication to present the meaning of a suffix.[2]

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1. द्विमुदो वृष इत्यादौ द्वाभ्यां मुद्राभ्यां क्रीतस्य, द्विवर्षागौरित्यादौ द्वाभ्यां वर्षाभ्यामभिन्नवयस्कस्य, द्विदलं पवित्रमित्यादौ द्वाभ्यां दलाभ्यां निर्मितस्य द्विगुर्ज्ञं स्वर्णमित्यादौ द्वाभ्यां गुञ्जाभ्यां तुलितस्य, त्रिकाण्डः, पुरुषः इत्यादौ त्रिभिःकाण्डैः परिमितस्य पञ्चकपालश्चरुरित्यादौ पञ्चभिः कपालैः संस्कृतस्य बोधने लुप्तस्यैव ठगादितद्धितस्यक्रीताद्यर्थेभिधायकत्वात्। ibid., p. 220.

2. उक्तप्रयोगेषु द्विगोरन्तिमनाम्नैव क्रीतादिरूपार्थो लक्ष्यते, न तु लुप्तष्ठगादिरप्यपेक्ष्यतेऽतस्तद्धितार्थलक्षणिकस्वान्त्यनामको द्विगुरेव तद्धितार्थद्विगुरिति फणिभाष्यमतन्तु न युक्तम्, असर्वगत्वात् पाञ्चपुरुषिरित्यादौ पञ्चानां पुरुषाणामपत्यस्य पञ्चगर्गरूप्यो गौरित्यादौ पञ्चानां गर्गाणां भूतपूर्वस्य बोधने तद्धितेनैव स्वार्थस्यापत्यप्रभृतेरुपस्थापनात्। द्विस्वर्णमुद्रः पशुरित्यादावुत्तरपदस्य शक्तिविरहेण क्रीताद्यर्थे लाक्षणिकत्वायोगाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 221.

Vide also भूतपूर्वे रूप्यः। पा. V. 3. 54.

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Kṛṣṇakānta points out that in *pānca-purūṣiḥ* the word *purūṣa* may be held to imply *purūṣāpatya*. Thereupon, due to semantic pecularity, the primary meaning (viz., five) of the word *pañcan* may get syntactically related to *purūṣa*, a part of the said implied meaning. The secondary suffix involved may well be explained as what occasions the said implication.[1] The same is the case with *pañca-gaṛga-rūpyam* also. In *dvi-svarna-mūdraḥ* also, although *svarṇa-mudra* is devoid of the power of denotation because of its being a sentence, any of the letters constituting it may be taken to imply the meaning bought (in exchange of), There is no flaw, therefore, in the view of Patanjali[2].

By *uttara-pada-dvigu* is to be understood a compound that has fallen within a compound formed of the nominals constituting the said compound and another, expectant therewith.[3] The compound, *pañcagava* for an example, has fallen within the (*bahuvrihi*) compound, *pañca-gava-dhanaḥ* formed of the nominals viz, *pañca* and *gau* constituting the compound, *pañca-gava* and *dhana* a nominal expectant therewith.[4]

There is a third variety of the *dvigu* compound called *samāhāra-dvigu*. The last constituent of this componnd implies collection of what are denoted by the compound through the

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1. (ननु) उक्तस्थले लक्षणया पुरुषापत्यादेरूपस्यापनात् तदैकदेशे व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण पञ्चपदार्थस्थान्वयसम्भवादिणाप्रत्ययस्याकाङ्क्षासम्पादकत्वान्नान्याप्तिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 224.
2. तद्धटकवर्णानां शक्तिमत्त्वेन तदेकतरवर्णस्य लक्षणया क्रीतादेर्बोध-सम्भवात् फणिभाष्यकृतां मते न कोऽपि दोष इति तु विभावनीयम्। ibid., p. 221.
3. श. श. प्र. का. 37.

   यो द्विगुः स्वघटकनामभ्यां सह साकाङ्क्षनामान्तरेण समासस्यान्तर्गतः स उत्तरपदद्विगुः। ibid., p. 222.
4. यथा पंच गावो धनमस्येत्यादिविग्रहे 'पंचगवधनः पुरुषः' इत्यादौ बहुव्रीह्यादि निविष्टः पंचगवादिः। ibid., p. 222.

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power of etylogy.[1] In *pañcapuli*, the word *pula* implies the collection (*samāhāra*) of five *pulas* derived from the compound through the power of etymology.[2]

Opponents argue : The compound itself could be held to be denotative of the collection of five *pulas* (*pañca-pula-samāhāra*).

Jagdīśa replies : The compound cannot denote it. For what are not presented otherwise alone are held liable of denotation. Here the meaning *pañca-pula* are presented by the words *pañca* and *pula*. Hence it cannot be held liable of denotation by the compound, *pañca-puli*.[3]

Opponents argue : The compound could well denote the collection then.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case the collection of five *pulas* would remain beyond comprehension.[3] In fact, a compound is ouly a sentence. It is, therefore, *ipso facto* devoid of denotation.[5] As a result, it is devoid of implication too. For implication is but a relation with the denoted meaning. In case a word has nothing to denote, it cannot have anything to imply.[6]

Opponents argue : The compound *pañcapulī* should lead to the comprehension of five *pulas* and not also the collection thereof. Only then *pañcapulīm chinatti* could be validly used in langu-

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1. श. श. प्र. का. 38.

   स्वोपस्थाप्यार्थस्य समाहारलक्षको यदीयान्त्यशब्दः स द्विगुः समाहारद्विगुः। श. श. प्र. pp. 222–23.

2. 'पञ्चपुली'त्यत्र हि योगलभ्यानां पञ्चाभिन्नापुलानां समाहारः परस्यपुलशब्देन लक्ष्यते। ibid., p. 223.

3. न तु तत्रद्विगोः शक्तिरन्यलभ्ये शक्त्ययोगात्। ibid., p. 223.

   तदेकदेशपञ्चफुलादेः पंचफुलादिशब्दशक्यत्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 223.

4. समाहारमात्रे शक्तिस्वीकारे पञ्चपुलादेर्बोधासम्भवादिति भावः। ibid., p. 223.

5. इदमुपलक्षणम् वाक्यत्वादित्यपि बोध्यम्। ibid., p. 223.

6. अतएव न लक्षणापि शक्यसम्बन्धस्यैव लक्षणात्वेन वाक्ये तदसम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 223.

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age. For had it meant collection, such an expression would incur the fault of incompatibility. Because collection and cutting are not mutually compatible. The fact of the 'word' *pañcapulim* being usad in the singular number is only a grammatical formality. It could mean two or more *pulas*, it's being used in the singular number notwithstanding. Like the word *dārāḥ* although used in the plural form as a rule, means a wife.[1]

The Logicians counter-argue : If in *pañcapulī* or an instance of the *dvigu* compound as such, the *pulas* or the substances are to be comprehended as the invariable substantive and not the collection thereof, the last constituent of the compound formed of *pañca* and *khatti* could not end in the short vowel viz. *i*. For the word *go* or a feminine suffix, takes to a short vowel only in case it being the last constituent of a compound does not present the invariable substantive.[2]

Opponents argue : A separate provision in respect of a feminine suffix following an instance of the *dvigu* compouud taking to a short-vowel is to be contemplated.[3]

The Logicians counter-argue : The contemplation of a separate provision like that would go against the law fo parsimony.

The Opponents argue : It is in view of uses in vogue in the language that such a provision is contemplated and thus there is no harm.[4]

Not only that. The definition given fails to accomodate an instance like *pañca-pācakī*. For the last constituent viz.

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1. पञ्चपुलीत्यतः पञ्चानां पुलानामेव बोधो न तु तत्समाहारस्यापि, अत एव पञ्चपुलीं छिनत्तीत्यादिकः प्रयोगः प्रमाणम्, अन्यथा समूहात्मनः समाहारस्य च्छिदाद्यसम्भन्धेन तदयोग्यत्वापत्तेः पुलादेर्द्वित्वबहुत्वेऽप्येकवचनन्त्वानुशसनिकं दारादेर्बहुवचनवदुपपद्यते । श. श. प्र pp. 223-24.
2. गोस्त्रियोरुपसर्जनस्य । पा. I. 2-48.
3. समाहारसंज्ञकद्विगोरप्यन्तयस्य स्त्रीप्रत्यस्य पृथगेव ह्रस्वविधेर्वक्तव्यत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 224.
4. प्रयोगानुसारित्वात् कल्पनायाः । ibid., p. 224.

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pācaka is a sentence and thus devoid of the faculty of (denotation and of) implication.[1]

Jagadīśa concludes : It such arguments are put forward, then *samāhāra-dvigu* may be defined as the (*dvigu*) compound other than the two other kinds of the *dvigu* compound.[2]

Opponents argue : In case collection is not to be meant by what is called *samāhāra-dvigu*, it may well come under the category of the *Karmadhāraya* compound. For like the *Karmadhāraya* compound, the instance like *pañcapulī* would lead to the comprehension of *pulas* identically related to five (*pañcābhinna-pulas*).[3]

Jagadīśa replies : There is no harm.[4]

Opponents argue : compounds then could not be held to be six in number.

Jaganīśa replies : The six-fold classification of compounds would remain justified. For it is in view of the special characteristic of its causing the verbal knowledge embracing the meaning of a nominal denotative of what is qualified by a number, the *dvigu* compound will remain to be recognised as a distinct category.[5]

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1. पञ्चपाचकीत्यादावव्याप्तिश्च, तत्रोत्तरपदस्य वाक्यत्वेन लक्षकत्वायोगात्। ibid., p. 224.
2. यदि च·····इति सूचममीक्षते, तदा पूर्वनिरुक्ताभ्यां तद्धितार्थोत्तरपदद्विगुभ्यां भिन्नद्विगुरेव समाहारद्विगु-र्बोध्यः। ibid., pp. 223-224.
3. ननु पञ्चाभिन्नपुलमात्रबोधने समाहारद्विगुसमासस्य कर्मधारयत्वापत्तिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 224.
4. एवञ्च द्विगोः कर्मधारयान्तर्गतत्वेऽपि न क्षतिरिति तु विभावनीयम्। श. श. प्र. p. 224.
5. संख्यावाचिनामार्थविषयकबोधजनकत्वरूपोपाधिभेदमाधायैव षड्धा विभागोपपत्तिरिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 224.

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CHAPTER IX

CLASSIFICATION OF COMPOUNDS (TATPURUṢA)

According to the grammarians the *Karmadhāraya*, and the *dvigu* compounds come under a broad category called the *tatpuruṣa*, the determinative kind of compound. In most of the instances of it, one constituent (usually the first one) determines (or qualifies) the other (or the latter) constituent. Instances of the *tatpuruṣa* compound when put in the form of sentences of analysis exhibit the first member in a declensional termination different from that of the other. It is on the basis of the declensional termination of the first constituent, therefore, that such instances are classified into *dvitīya-tat-puruṣa, tṛtiyā-tat-puruṣa, caturthī-tatpuruṣa, pañcamī-tatpuruṣa, sāṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa* and *saptamī-tatpuruṣa*.

The first constituent, as a rule, does not retain the declensional termination. There are instances, however, where such termination is retained as in *alpānmuktaḥ stokānmuktaḥ antikādāgataḥ, dūrādāgataḥ*[1], *ojasā-kṛtam*[2], *manasāguptā*[3], *ātmanepadam*[4], *parasmaipadam*[5] and so on. These are also known as cases of *aluk-samāsa*.

1. पा. II. 1. 39. (सि. कौ. 701).
2. पा. IV. 3. 3.
3. ibid., IV. 3. 4.
4. पा. ibid., IV. 3. 7.
5. ibid., IV. 3. 8.

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Certain instances of the *tat-puruṣa* compound are dissolved into phrases and it is the first constituent of the compound that governs the other. *Pūrva-kāya* is dissolved into *pūrvaṁ kāyasya*[1], *madhyāhnaḥ* into *madhyaḥ ahnaḥ*[2] *prāpta-jīvika* into *prāpto jivikām.*[3]

In some other instances, the second constituent has a primary suffix (*Kṛt-pratyaya*) which is used in the compound only. As a result, the two constituents cannot be simply separated as in other instances. The instance *kumbha-kāra* cannot be simply separated into *kumbham kāraḥ* or *kumbhasya kāraḥ.* For *kāra* does not stand by itself. Hence to indicate the sense of the compound, it has to be dissolved into a phrase like *kumbham karotīti. Vṛtrahan* in the like manner, is dissolved into *Vṛtram hantīti.* Similarly *sarvajit* is dissolved into *sarvān jayatīti.* Compounds of this kind are known as *upa-pada* kind of *tatpuruṣa* compounds.[4]

In certain cases, the first constituent happens to be a preposition and when the compound is dissolved into a sentence of analysis, the sense of the said preposition in expressed by a particle as in *atimālaḥ* (*atikānto mālām*) meaning surpassing a gartand or in *niṣkauśāmbiḥ* (*niṣkrāntaḥ kauśambyāḥ*) meaning departing from *kauśāmbi-*[5]

Some instances of the *tat-puraṣa* compound comprise of the negative particle, *nañ* (transformed into *a* or *an*) as the first constituent thereof as in *abrāhmaṇa, anaśva.* This kind of compound is known as *nan-tat-puruṣa.*[6].

The *Karmadhāraya* and the *dvigu* compounds, it has been seen, are but the sub-classes of the *tat-puruṣa* compound.

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1. पा. II. 2. 1.
2. ibid., VI. 3. 110.
3. ibid., II. 2. 4.
4. पा. II. 2. 19.
5. अत्यादयः क्रान्ताद्यर्थे द्वितीयया (वार्त्तिक) vide सि. कौ. 780.
6. पा. II. 2. 6.

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The *tatpuruṣa* compound usually take the gender of the second constituent thereof.[1] In certain cases, the gender of the compound is determined by that of the noun that has to be understood or supplied for the comprehension of the meaning of the compound. The compound *atimālā, niṣkauśāmbi* or *prāpta-jīvika* take the gender of the noun, *puruṣa* to be understood. In these cases, the long vowels are shortened into short ones. The long vowel in *mālā*, or *kauśāmbī* are substituted by short ones (*atimālaḥ, niṣkauśambi*).[2]

Compounds ending in *rātra* (for *rātri*) and *ahna* or *aha* (for *ahan*) are mostly used in the masculine gender as in *pūrvāhnaḥ. madhyāhnaḥ* and so on.[3]

The adjective *mahat* when used as the first member of the *Karmadhāraya* compound transforms into *mahā* as in *mahā-devaḥ*.[4]

Corresponding masculine forms, substitute the feminine forms, when these appear as the first constituent of the *Karmadhāraya* compound. In *mahā-navamī, mahati* (*mahatī navamī*) is substituted by the form *mahat* (transformed into *mahā*); *brāhmani* by *brāhmaṇa* in *brāhmaṇa-bhāryah, kṛṣṇa* in *kṛṣṇa-caturdaśī* [5] and so on.

A number of nominal bases, that form the first constituent of the *tatpuruṣa* compound undergo a certain change of form. *Aṅguli* becomes *aṅgūla* as in *dvyaṅgula*[6] (two fingers long), *aham* becomes *aha* as in *saptāha* (an aggregate of seven days). *Ahan* also becomes *ahna* in words denoting parts of the day as in *pūrvāhnaḥ* when used after *sarva* and or indiclinables.

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1. पा. II. 4. 26.
2. द्विगु-प्राप्तापन्नालंपूर्वगतिसमासेषु प्रतिषेधो वाच्यः (वार्त्तिक). Vide दी. 812.
3. पा. II. 4. 29.
4. पा. VI. 3. 46.
5. पा. VI. 3. 42.
6. पा. V. 4. 86.

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Pathin[1] changes into *patha* as in *dharma-pathaḥ*, *Rājan* into *rāja* as in *mahārājaḥ Ratri* into *rātra*[2] if used atter cardinal numbers, indectinables, the words *sarva*, *puṇya* and words denoting parts of the night. *Sakhi* becomes *sakha* as in *priya-sakhaḥ* when, however, the first part of the compound is *su*, *kim* (implying censure) or the negative particle *nañ* (transformed into *a*) the above-mentioned changes usually do not take place as in *surājan* (nominative form being *surājā*) a good king, *kim-sakhi* (nominative form being *kiṁsakhā*), a bad friend.[4]

Some words are considered as the instances of the *tatpuruṣa* compound of a more or less irregular kind. These are, *uccanīcam* (high ahd low) *rājāntaram* (*anyo rājā*) *grāmāntaram* (*anyo grāmaḥ*), *akincana* (*nāsti kiṁcana yasya saḥ* a man who possesses nothing). *cinmātram* (*cideva* that which is intelligence only) *ahaṁpurvikā* (emulation *ahaṁ pūrvam aham pūrvamiti yasyām kriyāyāmabhidhīyate sā*). Such instances come under what are called *mayūra-vyaṁśakādi* kind of *tatpurnṣa* compounds.[5]

The range of the formation of the *tatpuruṣa* compound is very wide. There are certain restrictions too. The nominal bases in the suffixes, *tṛ* or *aka* denotions an agent are not to form into a compound with nouns ending in the sixth declensional suffix.[6]

Thus *apām sraṣṭā* does not lead to a compound like *apsraṣṭā*. Similarly, *odanasya pācaka* does not go to form a compound like *odana-pācaka*. There are exceptions to such a rule. *Devapūjaka* is the sense of *devānāma pujaka* is an instance in point.

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1. पा. V. 4. 88.
2. पा. V. 4. 87.
3. पा. V. 4. 91.
4. पा. II. 1, 64.
5. पा. II. 1. 72.
6. पा. II. 1. 15.

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The sixth declensional suffix used in the sense of *nirdhāraṇā* or superlative degree does not form into a compound.[1] The sixth declensional suffix conveying the sense of a case-relation too does not form into a compound.[2] The said suffix also does not form into a compound with words meaning ordinal number, quality, or with words ending *śatṛ* or *śānac*.[3] The said suffix also does form into a compound with a word ending in *kta* provided for by the rule *mati-buddhi*[4] (Pā. III. 2 188) or meaning a locus (*adhikaraṇa*).[5] The said suffix provided for by the rule *ubhaya-prāptau karmaṇi* does not form into a compound.[6]

According to Jagadīśa the compound potentially capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of a word constituting itself, qualified by what is likely to be conveyed by a declensional suffix in respect of what is denoted by another word constituting the compound is to be known as the *tatpuruṣa* kind of compound.[7]

The instance, *rāja-puruṣa*, for an example, bears out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the word *puruṣa* viz, person, qualified by relation (*sāmbandha*) or what is likely to be conveyed by the sixth declensional suffix in respect of king

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1. पा. II. 2. 10.
2. प्रतिपदविधाना षष्ठी न समस्यते (वार्त्तिक) vide सि. कौ. 739.
3. पा. II. 2. 11.
4. पा. II. 2. 12.
5. पा. II. 2. 13.
6. पा. II. 2. 14.
7. यदीयेन सुवर्थेन युतयद्बोधनक्षमः। यः समासस्तस्य तत्र स तत्पुरुष उच्यते। श. श. प्र. का. 39.

   यदर्थगतेन सुवर्थेन विशिष्टस्य यदर्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति यः समासः स्वरूपयोग्यः स तदर्थस्य तदर्थे तत्पुरुषः। ibid., p. 225.

   राजपुरुष इत्यत्र राजपदार्थगतसुवर्थसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नपुरुषपदार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति राजपुरुष इत्यानुपूर्वाः स्वरूपयोग्यतया लक्षणसङ्गतिः ततो राजसम्बन्धवान् पुरुष इत्येवं प्रतीतिः। रामद्री p. 225.

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(*rājā*) or what is denoted by the other word (*rāja*) constituting the compound in question.

Opponents argue : There is no declensional suffix whatsoever to convey 'relation' (*sambandha*) in respect of king (*rājā*).

Jagadīśa replies : The sentence of analysis of the compound, *rāja-puruṣa* is *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*. It leads to the comprehension of a person (*puruṣa*) having relation (*sambāndha*) with king (*rājā*). The verbal knowledges borne out by a compound and the sentence of its analysis are to be identical. Hence the word *rāja* is taken to imply the meaning, relation with king (*rāja-sambandha*).[1]

Opponents argue : Relation with king (*rāja-sambandha*) in that case, comes out to be the meaning of a nominal viz, *rāja*(*n*). As a result, it should not be syntactically related to 'person' (*puruṣa*) the meaning of another nominal viz, *puruṣa*. For the relation involved is other than that of identity, while the meanings of any two nominals are to be syntactically relation only through identity.

Jagadīśa replies : The rule that the meanings of any two nominals are to be syntactically related only throngh identity is applicable to cases other than those of *tatpuruṣa* compound[2] or of compounds in general.[3]

Opponents argue : The *tatpuruṣa* compound should be defined as what comprises of a nominal following another in respect of the meaning of which, what is likely to be conveyed by a declensional suffix goes to qualify the meaning of the said nominal.

Jagadīśa replies : Such a definition is too narrow. For it cannot accomodate the instances like *pūrva-kāya*, *ardha-pippali*

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1. स्वमते व्याससमासयोस्तुल्यार्थकत्वरक्षणाय राजपदस्य राजसम्बन्धे लक्षणास्वीकारात् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 225.
2. नामार्थयोर्भेदोन्वयस्य तत्पुरुषातिरिक्तस्थल एवास्वीकाराच्चासम्भवः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 225.
3. स्वमते नामार्थयोः समासादन्यत्र भेदेनान्वये निराकाङ्क्षत्वादिति भावः । रामभद्री p. 225.

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and the like, since in these instances what has been conveyed by the declensional suffix in respect of the following nominal qualifies the meaning of the preceding nominal.[1]

Opponents argue : In the instance *stoka'paktā*, it is the meaning of the adverb, *stakaṁ* and what is conveyed by a declensional suffix in respect of the meaning thereof that qualifies the meaning of the (*kṛdanta*) nominal, *paktṛ*. For the second declensional termination supposed to have been suffixed to the word *stokaṁ* is only a grammatical formality and thus non-denotative.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : It is an instance of the *Karmadhāraya* compound and not of the *tat-puruṣa* compound.

Opponents argue : The two word-meanings involved in the instance are not comprehended as what are related through identily. How could it hold out a case of the *Karmadhāraya* compound then ?

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning of the adverb, *stokaṁ* is identically related to a part (*ekadeśa*) of what the nominal, *paktṛ* means to bring about a case of the *Karmadhāraya* compound as happens in *mahākaviḥ* or in *mahā-vijñaḥ*. The meaning of the word *mahāt* in such instances gets identically related to a part of what the word, *kavi* (*kavana-śakti-viśiṣṭa*) or *vijña* (*jñāna-viśiṣṭa*) means.[3]

Opponents argue : The second declensional termination suffixed to an adverb is held to be denotative of identity by some school of thought. This identity again, is not to be com-

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1. न तु यन्नामोत्तरं यन्नाम यदर्थंगतसुवर्थावच्छिन्नस्य यत्स्वार्थस्य बोधकं तदुत्तरं तन्नामैव तदर्थयोस्तत्पुरुषः पूर्वकायोऽर्द्धपिप्लीत्यादावव्याप्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 225.
2. ननु स्तोकपक्तेत्यादिद्वितीयातत्पुरुषेऽव्याप्तिः तजन्यबोधे सुवर्थस्याप्रकारत्वादि (त्यत आह-स्तोकेत्यादि)। कृष्णकान्ती p. 225.
3. स्तोकपक्तेत्यादौ क्रियाविशेषणैः कर्मधारय एव, महाकविर्महाविज्ञ'इत्यादौ कविरित्वादाविव प्रकृतेऽप्येकनामार्थैकदेशे पचनादावपरनामार्थस्याभेदान्वय-बोधकतया तथात्वसम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 225–26.

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prehended as a relation. Hence the meaning of the adverb, *stokam* obviously, cannot be posited as the feature against the other word-meaning. On the contrary, it is the meaning of the second declensional termination suffixed to the said adverb that would be thus comprehended. How could it be held then an instance of the *Karmadhāraya* compound ?

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the said instance would come out to be an example of the *tatpuruṣa* compound.[2]

Opponents argue : A compound is never formed of an adverb and thus all such deliberations are of no value what so-ever.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : Such an objection is unreasonable. For poets like Kālidāsa have used words like *stoka-namrā*, a compound formed of the adverb, *stoka*.[4]

Opponents argue : In case *stoka-paktā* fails to be recognised an instance of the *tatpuruṣa* compound, it *if so facto* fails to be regarded an example of the *Karmadhāraya* compound. For the grammarians hold that the *Karmadhāraya* and the *dvigu* compounds are but the so many sub-divisions of the *tatpuruṣa* compound.

Jagadīśa replies : Such a deduction is uncalled for. The grammarians do not really mean that the *Karmadhāraya* and the *dvigu* compounds are the so many sub-division of the *tatpuruṣa* compound. What they mean in reading the said two

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1. क्रियाविशेषणपदोत्तरद्वितीयाया अभेदार्थकत्वमते कथं न तत्पुरुष····· तन्मते तादात्म्यस्यासंसर्गत्वेन तदर्थे तदर्थस्याप्रकारत्वेन कर्मधारयत्वासम्भवादिति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 226.
2. स्तोकं पक्केत्यादौ अमस्तादात्म्यवाचित्वे तु तत्पुरुषः सम्भवत्येव । श. श. प्र. p. 226.
3. ननु क्रियाविशेषणैः समास एव न स्वीक्रियते इत्यनर्थक एवैतावान् विचारः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 226.
4. क्रियाविशेषणैः समास एवाव्युत्पन्न इति न देश्यम्, स्तोकनम्रा स्तनाभ्यामि (मेघदूत 82)त्यादेः कालिदासादिभिः प्रयुक्तत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 226.

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compounds under the head rule, *tatpuruṣaḥ*[1] is that the same set of rules govering the *tatpuruṣa* compound is to be extend to the said two compounds as well.[2] But for such extension, the form *mahārāja* as instance of the *Karmadhārya* compound would not be effected.[3]

The *tatpuruṣa* kind of compound is of six-fold division in accordance with the difference of the meanings of the six declensional suffixes begining with the second one to be known as *dvītiyā-tatpuruṣa*, *tṛtīyā-tatpuruṣa* so on. In *grāma-gataḥ* for an example, the second declensional suffix means *karmatva* (*grāmam gataḥ*), in *caitra-nīta*, the third one means *Kartṛtva* (*caitreṇa nītaḥ*), in *bhrāmaṇa-dattaḥ*, the fourth one means *saṁpradānatva* (*brāhmaṇāya dattaḥ*), in *Vṛkṣā-patitaḥ*, the fifth one means *apādānatva* (*vṛkṣāt patitaḥ*), in *caitra-dhanam* the sixth one means *sambandha* (*caitrasya dhanam*) and in *gṛha-sthitaḥ*, the seventh one means *adhikaraṇatva* (*gṛhe sthitaḥ*). This six-fold division is held justified on the ground that six differentiating characteristics are in view (in the instances cited). The six different kinds of the *tatpuruṣa* compound severally bears out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the following nominal qualified by what the six different declensional suffixes convey in respect of the meaning of the preceding one (nominal) constituting the compound.[5]

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1. पा. II. 1. 22.
2. द्विगौ कर्मधारये च शाब्दिकानां तत्पुरुषत्वव्यपदेशः पदसंस्कारार्थो गौणः। श. श. प्र. p. 226.
3. अन्यथा प्रागुक्तो विधिस्तत्पुरुष एवेति नियमात् महाराजेति कर्मधारयसमासेऽदन्तता न स्यादिति भावः। रामभद्री p. 226.
4. द्वितीयादिसुवर्थस्य भेदादेव च षड्विधः। श. श. प्र. का. 40.
   ग्रामगतः, चंत्रनीतः, ब्राह्मणदत्तः, वृक्षपतितः, चैत्रधनं, मैत्रगतिः, गृहस्थितः इत्यादौ द्वितीयादिसुवर्थस्य कर्मत्वकर्तृत्वादेर्बोधभेदादेतस्य द्वितीयातृतीयादितत्पुरुषत्वेन षड्भेदाः। श. श. प्र. p. 227.
5. स्वघटकैकपदार्थनिष्ठद्वितीयार्थावच्छिन्नापरगतार्थबोधकसमासादेर्धमषट्कस्य सुवचत्वात्। ibid., p. 227.

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Jagadīśa further points out that the declensional suffix involved in the *tatpuruṣa* compound is to be usually denotative of a case (relation).[1] It is only in case the compound is provided for by a specific rule that a declensional suffix not denotative of case (relation) goes to form the compound. Hence *pīṭham paritaḥ, puṇyena sukham, śamāya vidyā, daṇḍād ghaṭaḥ, gavām kṛṣṇā sampanna-kṣīrā, tileṣu tailam* do not form into compounds.[2] But *varṣa-sukhī* meaning happy throughout the year (*varṣam vyāpya sukhī*), *loṣṭa-kāṇaḥ* meaning binded by a stone (*loṣṭeṇa kāṇaḥ*), *kuṇḍala-hiraṇyam* in the sense of gold (meant) for the ear-ring (*kuṇḍalāya hiraṇyam*), *ghaṭānya* in the sense of what is other than a jar (*ghaṭādanyaḥ*), *Kubera-bali* in the sense of oblation to *Kubera* (*kuberāya baliḥ*), *Karma-kuśalaḥ* in the sense of one skilled in action (*karmaṇi kuśalaḥ*) and the like other instances are regarded as the so many valid instances of the *taipuruṣa* compound. For the compound in such cases have been provided for by specific rules.[3] It may well be deduced, therefore, that but for a specific provision otherwise, the *tat-puruṣa* compound is to be formed only in case the

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1. क्रियान्वयी द्वितीयादेरर्थः प्रायोऽत्र योजितः। श. श. प्र. का. 40.
2. इयांस्तु विशेषो यदेतेषु धात्वर्थान्वय्येव द्वितीयादेरर्थः प्रायो घटकः, पीठं परितः, पुण्येन सुखं, शमाय विद्या, दण्डाद् घटः, गवां कृष्णा सम्पन्नक्षीरा, तिलेषु तैलमित्यादिविग्रहे तत्पुरुषस्यासाधुत्वात्। ibid., pp. 227–28.

   पीठं परित इति। कर्मप्रवचनीययोगे द्वितीया, सा च न कारकविभक्तिरिति भावः। पुण्येन सुखमित्यत्र हेतौ तृतीया, शमाय विद्या इत्यादौ तादर्थ्ये चतुर्थी, तथा च एतासां कारकविभक्तित्वाभावात् न तदर्थमादाय तत्पुरुषः साधुरिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती pp. 227-228.

3. The द्वितीयातत्पुरुष in वर्षसुखी is provided by the rule अत्यन्तसंयोगे च. पा. II. 1. 29 (सि. कौ. 691), the तृतीयातत्पुरुष in लोष्टकाण by the rule कर्त्तृकरणे कृता बहुलम, पा. II. 1. 32 (सि. कौ. 694), the चतुर्थी-तत्पुरुष in कुण्डल-हिरण्यम् by the rule चतुर्थीतदर्थार्थबलिहित सुज-रक्षितैः, प. II. 1. 36. (सि. कौ. 698), the सप्तमी-तत्पुरुष in कर्मणि कुशलः by the rule सप्तमी शौण्डैः, पा. II. 1. 40 (सि. कौ. 717). The षष्ठी-तत्पुरुष in राजपुरुष, it may be pointed out is provelд for by the rnle षष्ठी. पा. II. 2. 8. (सि कौ. 720).

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declensional suffix happens to be a case-ending[1] and that a specific provision is to be looked for in case the compound in a particular instance is found to have been effected of a declensional suffix other than a case-ending.[2]

Opponents argue : In instances like *grāmagataḥ*, *rājapuruṣaḥ* and so on no declensional suffixes are in view to present the meaning of *karmatva* or of *sambandha* in respect of *grāma* and *puruṣa* respectively. Nor is it reasonable to hold that the declensional suffixes that have gone elided are recollected to present the said meanings in such cases. For the verbal knowledge embracing the said meanings in such cases occurs to one not knowing of any such elition.[3] As a matter of fact, there is no reason to hold the declensional suffixes that have not been contents of direct knowledge (*anubhava*) are to be recollected.[4]

Not only that. In *samṛddham grāmagataḥ* the meaning of the word *samṛddham* would be related to that of the word *grama(m)* through identily[5] as it so happens in *samṛddham grāmam gataḥ*.

The Logicians contend. The words *samṛddham* and *grāma* cannot be held to have been used in apposition. For the declensional suffix in *grāma* is not in view. Hence there is no reason as to why the meanings thereof be identically related.

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1. तथा च विशेषविधिं बिना कारकविभक्त्यन्तर्भावेणैव तत्पुरुष इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 228.
2. विशेषविधिश्च प्रयोगानुरोधित्वात् कल्पनीय इति द्रष्टव्यम्। रामभद्री p. 228.
3. ननु 'ग्रामगत' इत्यत्र गतौ ग्रामकर्मत्वस्य, 'राजपुरुष' इत्यत्र च पुरुषे राजसम्बन्धस्यावगमो न ग्राभादिपदेभ्यो लुप्तसुपः स्मरणात्, तल्लोपमजानतोऽप्यन्वयबोधात्। श. श. प्र. p. 228.
4. ग्रामादिपदोत्तरत्वेन सुपोऽनुभवरहितस्येत्यर्थः, स्मरणहेतुभूतानुभवविरहेण स्मरणायोगादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 228.
5. समृद्धं ग्रामगत इत्यादितः समृद्धग्रामयोरभेदान्वयधीप्रसङ्गाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 228.

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The opponents argue : In that case, the meaning of the word *sampanna* should not be identically related to that of *dadhi* in *sampannam dadhi paśya* for the declensional suffix in *dadhi* is not in view.[1]

The Logicians contend : The word *grāma* (in *grāmagatāḥ*) may well imply the meaning *grāmakarmatva*. Therefore, the said meaning viz. *grāma-karmatva* should be related to *gati*, a part (*ekadeśa*) of what the word *gataḥ* means through the relation of *anukūlatva*.

The opponents argue : For the comprehension of the meaning of a nominal, posited as the feature through a relation other than that of identily, it is essential that the substantive be presented by either a declensional suffix or a nominal suffix added to the said nominal. In *ghaṭam*, for an example, the meaning of the nominal *ghaṭa* is to be comprehended as a feature through the relation of *niṣṭhatva* against *karmatva*, presented by a declensional suffix (viz. *am*). So also in *pautraḥ putra* gets posited as a feature through the relation of *janakatva* against *apatya* presented by the nominal suffix (*an*). In the present instance, such conditions are wanting. For the meaning of the nominal *grāma* is to be comprehended as a feature through the relation of *anukūlatva*, (a relation other than that of identily) against *gati*, a part of what is presented by another nominal viz, *gata* and not by either a declensional suffix or a nominal suffix.[2]

The elders contend : The word *grāma* (in an instance like *grāmagataḥ*) is to imply *grāma-karmaka* and the said implied meaning is to be identically related to *gati*.

The opponents argue : In that case, the instance would come out to be an example of the *Karmadhārya* kind of com-

1. सम्पन्नं दधि पश्येत्यादाविव तत्रापि नामार्थयोरभेदान्वयबोधोपयुक्तस्य नाम्नोः समानविभक्तिप्रतिसन्धानस्याविशिष्टत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 228–229.
2. नापि ग्रामादिपदस्य ग्रामकर्मत्वादिलक्षकत्वात्, अभेदान्यसम्बन्धेन नामार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रत्यनुकूलस्य नामोत्तरविभक्त्युपस्थाप्यत्वस्य ताडशप्रत्ययोपस्थाप्यत्वस्य वा गत्यादावसत्त्वात्। ibid., p. 229.

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pound. Not only that. The verbal knowledge occuring due to the compound, *grāmagataḥ* would be different from that occurring due to the sentence of analysis thereof viz, *grāmam gataḥ*.[1] For *grāmagataḥ* would lead to the verbal knowledge of *grāma-karmaka-gatimān* while the sentence of analysis thereof viz. *grāmaṁ gataḥ* to *grāma-niṣṭha-karmatva-nirūpaka-gatimān*.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The rule that the substantive is to be presented either by a declensional suffix or by a nominal suffix added to the nominal, the meaning of which is to be comprehended as a feature related to the meaning of the said suffix through a relation other than that of identity is applicable to cases where the nominal concerned happens to end in such a suffix. In the present case, the nominal, *grāma* has happened to be the first constituent of the compound, *grama-gataḥ*. As such, it cannot end in any such suffix. The aforesaid rule, therefore, also is not to be applied in the present case. Hence there is no bar to the implied meaning of the nominal, *grāma* viz, *grāma-karmatva* being related to *gati*, a part of what the nominal, *gata* means, through a relation other than that of identity[3] (i.e. *anukūlatva*) arising out of syntax.

Opponents argue : In *gato grāma* too, then *grāma-karmatva*, the implied meaning of the nominal *grāma* (without inflection)

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1. न च ग्रामादिपदलक्षितस्य ग्रामकर्मकादेरेव तत्र गत्यादौ तादाम्येनान्वय इति साम्प्रदायिकानां मतमेव साम्प्रतम्। तत्पुरुषस्यापि समस्यमानपदार्थयोरभेदान्वयबोधकत्वे कर्मधारयत्वापत्तेः। ग्रामं गतः, राज्ञः पुरुष इत्यादिविग्रहस्य समासस्तुल्यार्थकत्वहान्यापत्तेश्च। श. श. प्र. pp. 229–30.
2. तथाच ग्रामं गत इत्यादौ ग्रामकर्मत्वादेर्ग्रामगत इत्यादौ ग्रामकर्मकादेः प्रकारतया भानान्न तयोस्तुल्यार्थत्वमिति भावः। रामभद्री p. 230.
3. प्रत्ययान्ततत्तन्नामार्थस्यैव भेदेनान्वयबोधं प्रति तन्नामोत्तरप्रत्ययोपस्थाप्यतायास्तन्त्रत्वोपगमेन ग्रामगत इत्यादौ ग्रामादिपदलक्षितस्य ग्रामकर्मत्वादेर्गत्यादौ भेदेनान्वये बाधकाभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 230.
समासघटकनाम्नः प्रत्ययान्तत्वाभावादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 230
तथा च समासे ग्रामादिपदस्य प्रत्ययान्तत्वाभावादेव तादृशान्वये बाधकाभावात् नासम्भवः। रामभद्री p. 230.

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should be syntactically related to *gati*, a part of the nominal, *gataḥ* through a relation other than that of identity.

Jagadīśa replies : Snch an apprehension is altogether unfounded. For only towards the verbal knowledge as such of what is presented by a nominal other than what ends in a suffix, by way of a feature, the state of the substantive being presented by a nominal following such a nominal is the usual cause.[1]

In other words, the verbal knowledge of the meaning of a nominal posited as the feature through a relation other than that of identity in general occurs only in case the nominal presanting the said feature is other than what ends in a suffix and is followed by a nominal ending in a suffix. The situation in *gato grāma* is completely otherwise and as such, it, unlike the compound, *grāma-gataḥ* does not bear out the said kind of verbal knowledge.

It is to be noted, says Jagadīśa, that the aforesaid rule is a general one. There are exceptions to it. The verbal knowledge of the meaning of a nominal other than what ends in a suffix, posited as the feature may not always happen to be caused by a nominal alone ending in a suffix and following the said nominal (presenting the feature). In *ardha-pippali* in *ardha-pippali-cchedaḥ* for an example, it is the meaniug of the nominal *pippali* following (and not followed by) the other nominal viz, *ardha* that happens to be comprehended as the feature i.e. the said verbal knowledge has not been caused by a nominal ending in a suffix and following the nominal *pippalī*. So also in a *ghaṭa-paṭa-maṭhānām*, the verbal knowledge of jar, the meaning of *ghaṭa*, a nominal other than what ends in a suffix, is posited as the feature against the meaning of

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1. न चैवं गतो ग्रामेत्यत्रापि ग्रामपदलक्षितस्य ग्रामकर्मत्वादेर्गत्यादौ भेदेनान्वयबोधप्रसङ्गः, प्रत्ययान्तान्यतत्तन्नामोपस्थाप्यार्थस्यान्वयबोधसामान्यंप्रत्येवोत्सर्गतस्तादृशतत्तन्नामोत्तरनामोपस्थाप्यत्वस्य हेतुत्वेन तदसम्भवात् । श. श. प्र. p. 230.

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the sixth declensional suffix, syntactically related thereto, in view of the said suffix being added to an instance of the *dvandva* compound and not against the meaning of any nominal ending in a suffix and following itself. In other words, the verbal knowledge of the meaning of a nominal not ending in a suffix, posited as the feature has not been caused by a nominal ending in a suffix and following itself. In *bahu-guḍo drākṣā* in the like manner, it is the meaning of the nominal, *guḍa* that happens to be comprehended as the feature against the meaning of the suffix, *bahuc* preceding the said nominal i.e. the verbal knowledge of *guḍa*, a nominal not ending in a suffix, posited as the feature has not been occasioned by a nominal ending in a suffix and following the said nominal.[1]

Opponents argue : If the meanings of any two nominals are admitted to be capable of syntactical relation through difference, then let *grāma* only in *gramagataḥ* be related *gati* through the relation of *karmatva.* There is no need to hold that the word *grāma* is to imply *grāma-karmatva.*[2]

Jagadīśa replies : It is true. But it is with a view to maintaining the idea that a compound and the sentence of analysis thereof are to bear out the identical kind of verbal knowledge that the word *grāma* in the compound *grāmagatah* is conceived of as implying *grāma-karmatva.*[3]

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1. अतएवार्द्धपिप्पलीच्छेद इत्यादौ पूर्वपदप्रधानत्वेनानुशिष्टस्य तत्पुरुषादेरन्त्यपदार्थानां पिप्पलीप्रभृतीनामर्द्धार्थे घटपटमठादीनामित्यादौ च सर्वपदप्रधानत्वेन द्वन्द्वस्यानन्त्यपपदार्थानां घटादीनां सुवर्थेऽन्वयः, तथा बहुगुड़ो द्राक्षेत्यादौ गुड़ादीनामपि बहुजर्थे प्रकृत्यर्थस्येषदसमाप्तौ (अन्वयः) नाम्नः प्राग्बहुचो विधानादिति। श. श. प्र. pp. 230–231.
2. ननु यदि नामार्थयोरपि भेदेनान्वयो व्युत्पन्नस्तर्हि 'ग्रामगत'इत्यादौ कर्मत्वादिससंसर्गेण ग्रामादेरेव गत्यादावन्वयोस्तु, कृतं ग्रामादिशब्दस्य ग्रामकर्मत्वादिलक्षणया। श. श. प्र. p. 230.
3. सत्यम्, विग्रहवाक्यानां समाससमानार्थकत्वरक्षणाय तत्र लक्षणास्वीकारात्। श. श. प्र. p. 231.

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Opponents argue : In *pācaka-dhana, pācaka* being a sentence cannot be held to imply.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : Let not the word *grāma* in *grāmagataḥ*, in that case, imply *grāma-karmatva*. The denoted meaning of the said word i.e. *grāma* may well be related to *gati* through the relation of *karmatva*.[2]

Opponents argue : In that case, the knowledges from a compound and the sentence of analysis thereof would differ. For the compound *grāmagataḥ* would bear out the verbal knowledge of *grāmakarmatva* related to *gati* through *nirūpakatva*.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : No. In the case of the sentence of analysis of the said compound, viz *grāmam gatah* too, *grāma* would come to be syntactically related to *gati* through *karmatva* as occasioned by the second declensional suffix, denotative of *karmatva*, in use. The verbal knowledges, therefore, occuring due to the compound, *grāmagataḥ* and the sentence of analysis thereof, *grāmam gatah* would be identical.[4]

Opponents argue : The definition of the *tatpuruṣa* compound given by Jagadīśa in that case does not hold good.

Jagadīśa replies : The definition given does not envisage that the meaning of the declensional suffix involved is to be comprehended as a feature. It merely says that the meaning of the declensional suffix would form a content of the verbal knowledge occuring.[5]

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1. पाचकधनमित्यादौ पाचकादिशब्दस्य वाक्यत्वेन लक्षणायोगात् अव्याप्तिः। रामभद्री p. 231.
2. माऽस्तु वा ग्रामादिपदस्य तत्कर्मत्वादौ लक्षणा, कर्मत्वादिसंसर्गेणैव ग्रामादेर्गत्यादावन्वयसम्भवात्तथापि न क्षतिः। श. श. प्र. p. 231.
3. नन्वेवं व्याससमासयोस्तुल्यार्थकत्वं व्याहन्येत। रामभद्री p. 231.
4. ग्रामं गत इत्यादिविग्रहस्यापि कर्मत्वार्थकद्वितीयाद्यनुसन्धानवशादेव कर्मत्वादिसंसर्गेण गत्यादौ ग्रामाद्यन्वयबोधकतया समाससमानार्थकत्वसम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 231.
5. लक्षणे सुवर्थप्रकारत्वस्यानिवेशात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 231.
   एवं च लक्षणे सुवर्थावच्छिन्नत्वं सुवर्थविषयतामात्रं न प्रकारतापर्यन्तमित्यवधेयम्। रामभद्री p. 232,

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Opponents argue : In that case, the second declensional suffix ceases to denote *karmatva*.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : No. In *grāmam* and the like the second declensional suffix would remain to denote *karmatva* to bear out the verbal knowledge thereof posited as the (invariable) substantive.[2]

Jagadīśa further points out that the view that the meaning of the declensional suffix involved in an instance of the *tatpuruṣa* compound is to form a content only, has its merits. For it is because of such a view that the instances iike *agaṭaḥ* in the sense of 'what is other than a jar' (*ghaṭa-bhinnaḥ*), *asurah* in the sense of antagonistic to gods (*sura-virodhī*), *anikṣu* in the sense of 'like the sugar-cane' (*ikṣu-sadṛśa*) *abrāhmaṇa* in the sense of a debased' *brahmin* (*apakṛṣta-brahmaṇa*), *anudara* in the sense of one having a slender waist (*svalpodara*) could come under the category of the *tatpuruṣa* compound.[3]

Odponents argue : The instances cited of the *tatpuruṣa* compound formed of the negative particle, *nañ* pertain only to cases of what is called exclusive injunction (*Paryudāsa*). The said particle is also used to denote negation (*niṣedha*) or what is called *prasajya-pratiṣedha*.[4]

The elders reply : The negative particle—*nañ* used in the sense of negation when formed into a compound, makes out a case of the *avyayībhāva* compound. Hence the compound formed of the said particle with the word *paṭa* takes the form,

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1. नन्वेवं कर्मत्वार्थकत्वं द्वितीयाया अफलम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 231.
2. ग्राममित्यादौ कर्मत्वादिधर्मिकान्वयबोधानुरोधेन द्वितीयादेः कर्मत्वाद्यर्थकत्वात् । श. श. प्र. 231–232.
3. अतएवाऽघटः पटः इत्यादावन्यस्य असुरो दैत्य इत्यादौ विरोधिनः अनिक्षुः शर इत्यादौ सदृशस्य अब्राह्मणो वार्द्धुषिक इत्यादावपकृष्टस्य, अनुदरमुदरन्तरुण्या इत्यादौ स्वल्पस्य वाचकेन नञ्निपातेन स्वार्थे प्रतियोत्यादिसन्बन्धेनैव घटादेरनुभावेऽपि तत्रत्यतत्पुरुषे नाव्याप्तिः । श. श. प्र. p. 232.
4. ननु नञर्थस्य षड्विधत्वात् कथं पञ्च प्रयोगा दर्शिता । कृष्णकान्ती p. 232.

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apaṭam meaning negation of *paṭa*.[1] It does not come under the *tatpuruṣa* compound for it is, as a rule, to take to the gender of the last constituent.

Not only that. The meaning of the declensional suffix if admitted to occasion the comprehension of only the relation involved in the case of the *tatpuruṣa* compound too, then the definition of the said compound would unwarrantedly over-extend to the cases of the *avayībhāva* compound too.[2]

Opponents argue : The *avyāyibhāva* compound is what has the first constituent, an indeclineable and what does not take to the feminine gender. The definition of the *tatpnruṣa* compound as it has taken shape, therefore, may fairly over-extend thereto. Hence to arrest such over-extension, the definition of the *tatpuruṣa* compound has to be further qualified with the clause 'being other than *avyayī-hhāva*'. The rule spoken of by the elders that the *tatpuruṣa* compound is to take to the gender of the last constituent does not help much. For in an instance like *akāraṇam*, the last constituent being of the neuter gender, the nature of the compound can hardly be determined on that score.[3]

Pakṣadhara Miśra contends : The negative particle, *nañ* even used in the sense of negation is to form into the *tatpnruṣa* compound and not *avyayībhāva*. For *tatpuruṣa* overrides *avyayī-bhāva*. There is no reason, therefore, to further quality the definition of the *tatpuruṣa* compound with the clause 'being other than *avayībhāva*'.[4]

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5. पटस्याभाव इत्यर्थे—नञा अव्ययीभाव एव समासः प्रमाणम्, तेना'पटं वर्त्तत'इत्याद्येव तत्र प्रयोगः। तत्पुरुषस्योत्तरपदलिंगकत्वनियमादिति वृद्धाः। श. श. प्र. p. 232.

1. अपटमित्यव्ययीभावेऽतिव्याप्तिस्तत्रापि सम्बन्धविधया प्रतियोगित्वस्य भानात्। रामभद्री p. 232.

2. ननु अव्ययपूर्वभागकत्वे सति खीलिङ्गरहितसमासस्यैवाव्ययीभावत्वात् अपटमित्यव्ययीभावेऽतिव्याप्तिरेवेति तद्वारणायाव्ययीभावान्यत्वं लक्षणे निवेशनीयम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 233.

3. प्रसज्यनञाऽप्यपट इत्यादिकस्तत्पुरुष एव साधुर्नाव्ययीभावः, नञ्तत्पुरुषविधेस्तदपवादकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 233.

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Opponents argue : The rule that the *tatpuruṣa* compound takes to the gender of the last constituent is to be discarded then.

Pakṣadhara replies : The rule has no relevance in case the *tatpurnṣa* is made room for. Nor does the rule help mueh in an instance like *akāraṇam*, it has alrcady been seen.[1]

This is the reason, Pakṣadhara Miśra points out, that Bardhamana Upādhyāya in his *kiraṇāvali* has read (*vādinām avivādaḥ* instead of *avivādam.*[2]

To Jagadīśa, the view of Pakṣadhara Miśra appears to be more reasonable.[3]

Jagadīśa concludes : The view that the meaning of the declensional suffix lnvolved in an instance of the *tatpuruṣa* compound is to be comprehended by way of a syntactical relation is more reasonable.[4] In case such a view is not admitted of, the pronoun *tat* used in the verse-*daśaite rāja-mātaṅgāstasyaivāmī turangamāḥ|caitro grāmagatastatra maitraḥ kiṁ kurute'dhunā||* as a substitute of the word, *rāja* and *grāma* severally should signify *rāja-sambandha* and *grāma-karmatva* (or *karmatva* only). For the words viz *rāja* and *grāma* were held to imply the said meanings respectively. For a pronoun is to signify what has been presented earlicr by a word through a recognised faculty of communication as a substantlve.[5]

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1. न चैवं तत्पुरुषस्योत्तरपदलिङ्गकत्वनियमो भख्येतेति वाच्यम्। नियमभङ्ग-भयस्य तत्पुरुषत्वस्थितावबाधकत्वात्, अकारणमित्यस्योभयात्मकत्वे बाधका-भावाच्च। कृष्णकान्ती p. 233.
2. अत एव वादिनामविवाद इत्यादिः किरणावल्यादौ पुंसि प्रयोगः इति तु पक्षधरमिश्राः। श. श. प्र. p. 233.
3. तथा च वृद्धमतापेक्षया एतन्मतस्य सौष्टवदर्शनेन स्वस्यापि मिश्रमते निर्भरो व्यञ्जित इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 233.
4. युज्यते चोत्तरः कल्पः। श. श. प्र. p. 233.
   कर्मत्वादेः सम्बन्धविधया द्वितीयादितत्पुरुषे भानकल्प इत्यर्थः। रामभद्री p. 233.
5. न चेदेवं दशैते·····इत्यादौ राजसम्बन्धादे राजादिपदलक्षकत्वे तदेकदेशस्य राजादेस्तदा परामर्शो न स्यात्, विशेष्यविधया वृत्त्या पूर्वोपस्यापितस्यैवार्थ-स्य परामर्शकत्वात् तदादिशब्दानाम्। श. श. प्र. p. 234.

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In case the word, *rāja* or *grāma* present *rāja-sambandha* or *grama-karmatva* then *raja* or *grāma* would happen to be presented by way of the feature. The pronoun *tat* could not signify *rāja* or *grāma* in that case. For what are presented as a featnre earlier by a word is not signified by a pronoun[1]. Hence it is more reasonable to hold that the word, *rāja* or *grāma* means only *rāja* or *grāma*, the the meaning of the declensional suffix involved being comprehended by way of a syntactical relation. Jagadīśn incidently enlists the support of some Śrīpati in this context.[2] A pronoun like *tat*, says Śripati, is not to signify *bhrātā* or *maṇi or* a part of the word-meaning like *bhrāṭṛ-jāya* or *nīla* (*guṇa*)—*viśiṣṭāmaṇi* presented earlier as the substantive.[3]

It is to be noted that what Jagadīśa seeks to suggest is that if something is presented through a recognlsed faculty of communication (*śakti* or *lakṣaṇā*) by way of the substantive at the stage of the knowledge of import (*vṛtti jñāna*) of a word, the pronoun used later as a substitute thereof cannot signify a part, thereof.[4] He however, does not mean that what in view of a positive purport has been presented to one's mind by way of a substantive is not to be signified by a pronoun. The pronoun, *tat*, it is pointed out referes to *paṭola* in *paṭolapatram pittaghnam nāḍi tasya kaphāpahā* under such circumstance.[5]

Opponents argue : In case the *tatpuruṣa* compound does not thus involve implication, the view of the Mīmāṁsakas in respact

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1. विशेषणविधया पूर्वोपस्थापितस्य परामर्शकत्वं नानुभवसिद्धम्। रामभद्री pp. 233–34.
2. अत्र श्रीपतिसंवादमाह न हीति। कृष्णकांती p. 234.
3. न हि प्रजावतीयं मे त्वं तस्यै देहि कम्बलम्।
नीलो मणिर्गुणः सोऽत्र आत्रादिर्बोध्यते सदा॥ श. श. प्र. p. 234.
4. तदादिशब्दानां पूर्वोपस्थापितस्य पदार्थैकदेशस्य परामर्शकता नास्तीत्यभिप्रायः कृष्णकान्ती। p. 234.
5. तच्छब्दस्य बुद्धिस्थत्वोपलक्षितधर्मावच्छिन्नशक्ततया तात्पर्यादिसत्त्वे तत्र तत्र तादृशबोधो भवत्येव, अन्यथा पदोलपत्रं पित्तघ्नं नाड़ी तस्य कफापहा इत्यादावसङ्गत्यापत्तेर्दुरुद्धरत्वात्। ibid., p. 233.

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of the nature of the compound in *niṣāda-sthapatiḥ* in the vedic injunction *'niṣādasthepatiṁ yājayet'* turns out to be unfounded. It is with a view to avoiding the implication involved in the *tatpuruṣa* compouud that the Mīmāmsakas hold that the said instance holds out a case of the *karmadhāraya* compound and that the *niṣādas* have the limited right to perform only the sacrifice involved by virtue of the very injunction cited above. Right to perform a vedic rite involves right to study of the vedas too. Hence to accomodate the *niṣādas*, the Mīmāṃsakas have gone so far to hold that the prohibitory injunction—*'strī-śūdrau nādhīyetām'* is to be understood in a limited sense. It is the study of the vedas other than that on the section of *agnyādhāna* that is to be understood that has been prohibited, they conclude. Hence if the *tatpuruṣa* compound too, like *Karmadhāraya* does not involve implication, it is more reasonable to hold that the instance cited is an example of the *tut-puruṣa* compound. For the instance would mean an architect (*sthapati*) belonging to three upper castes of the *niṣādas* and thus all imaginations of limiting the application of the prohibitory injunction based on the idea of the *niṣāda's* having right to the performance of a vedic rite and to the study of the relevant partion thereof could be dispensed with.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : All such arguments are unreasonable.[2] For the implication in the word *niṣāda* in the compound *niṣāda-sthapati* cannot be avoided in any case. It is a settled

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1. नन्वेवंरीत्या निषादस्थपतिं याजयेदितिश्रुतौ (मै. स. II. 2. 4.) निषादानां स्थपतिरिति व्युत्पत्त्या न तत्पुरुषः, परन्तु निषादः स्थपतिरित्यर्थे कर्मधारय एवेति सिद्धान्तो व्याहन्येत, तत्पुरुषे भक्तिभिया हि तत्र कर्मधारयस्वीकारस्तन्मूलको निषादस्याधानेऽपूर्वविद्याप्रयोगश्च कल्प्यते, कल्प्यते च निषादीयतत्तदध्ययनेऽपूर्वनिषेधविधिबाधात् स्त्रीशूद्रौ नाधीयेतामिति श्रुतौ तत्तदध्ययनेतराध्ययनपरत्वं धातोः, शूद्रपदस्य त्रैवर्णिकान्योपलक्षकत्वात्। यदि च कर्मधारय इव तत्पुरुषेऽपि न लक्षणा, तदा तत्पुरुष एव तत्रोचितस्तैवर्णिकस्यैव निषादीयस्थपतित्वेन प्राप्तावपूर्वविद्याप्रयुक्तेस्तन्मूलकनिषेधविधिसङ्कोचस्य चाकल्प्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 235-36.

2. इति चेन्न। श. श. प्र. p. 235.

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fact in view of the comprehension of an architect of the *niṣādas* being universally caused by the said compound through the power of etymology inherent therein. It is not a matter of imagination. It is no logic, therefore, that with a view to avoiding the imagination of implication in the word *niṣāda*, the said instance is to be regarded an example of *Karmadhāraya* in preference to *tatpuruṣa*.[1]

Mīmāṁsakas argue : The expression *niṣāda-sthapati* is totally devoid of the expectancy involved in causing the comprehension of an architect related to the *niṣādas*.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the instance fails to hold out a case of the *tatpuruṣa* compound. As a result, the arguement that it is an example of the *Karmadhāraya* compound in view of the implication involved in its being recognised a case of *tatpuruṣa* falls through.[3]

Mīmāṁsakas argue : It is only the primary meaning of a word that is sought to be authoritatively conveyed by the vedas, but for an obstacle and not the implied one, if not settled elsewhere. For according to Mimāṁsakas, it is the primary meaning of a word that has the excellence thereof in view of its alone being conveyed thereby as occasioned by purport and the like.[4]

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1. तत्पुरुषे लक्षणापक्षेऽपि किमिति कर्मधारय एव तत्राभ्युपेयते न तु तत्पुरुषः, निषादानां स्थपतिरिति व्युत्पत्त्या निषादस्थपतिपदान्निषादसम्बन्धवत्त्वेन स्थपत्यनुभवसहस्रस्य सर्वसिद्धेन तदनुरोधाल्लक्षणायाः क्लृप्तत्वेन तत्कल्पनाभयस्यासम्भवात्। ibid., p. 236–237.
2. ननु तादृशबोधे निषादस्थपतिपदस्य निराकाङ्क्षत्वात् न कुत्रापि तादृशबोधः सम्भवतीति किमनुरोधेन उक्तलक्षणाया आवश्यकत्वम्। कृष्णकान्ती pp. 236–237.
3. न हि निषादस्थपत्यादिपदं निषादिसम्बन्धवत्त्वया स्थपत्यादिबोधने निराकाङ्क्षम, तथा सति निराकाङ्क्षत्वादेव तत्पुरुषत्वासम्भवेन लक्षणापक्षेस्तद्बाधकतयोपन्यासानौचित्यात्। श. श. प्र. p. 237.
4. अथवा बाधकं विना मुख्यार्थं एव श्रुतीनां प्रामाण्य न तु प्रमाणान्तराविषयेऽपि लक्ष्यार्थे, मुख्ये हि शब्दस्वरसः इत्यादिमीमांसया तथैव सम्प्रतिपत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 237.

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Jagadīśa replies : On occasions, however, words in the vedas too are admitted by the Mīmāṁsakas themselves to imply. In '*japa-hamau ca gaṅgāyām ananta-phala-dāyakau*' for an example, the word *gaṅgā* has been held to imply the bank of the river, Ganges.[1]

Mīmāṁsakas argue : Words are admitted to imply in case the primary meanings concerned are found incapable of being syntactically related in a certain situation and in case the word is known to have the power of implication in respect of the said (implied) meaning in certain other cases. The word, *gaṅgā*, for example, is known to have the power of implication in respect of the bank of the river Ganges in *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The word *niṣāda* too, is fairly known to have the power of implication in respect of the meaning, 'an architect of the *niṣādas*' in view of the verbal comprehension thereof, being universally caused by the compound *niṣada-sthapatiḥ*.

Mīmāṁsakas argue : But the word *niṣāda* is not known to have the said power of implication in respect of the said meaning any other case. Hence the situation in the word *niṣāda* is quite different from that in the word *gaṅgā*. There are reasons, therefore, to discard the view that the instance *niṣāda-sthapatiḥ* in an example of the *tatpurnṣa* compound which involves implication.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : All such arguments are devoid of logic. For in that case, the Mīmāṁsakas are to admit that but for an obstacle, all compounds in the vedas are of the *Karmadhāraya* kind and not of *tatpuruṣa* if not settled elsewhere since

1. जपहोमौ च गंगायामित्यादौ गङ्गापदलक्षयार्थे तीरेऽपि श्रुतीनां प्रामान्यादसंगतिरिति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 237.
2. तथा च गङ्गापदस्य तीरलक्षणायाः गङ्गायां घोषः प्रतिवसति इत्यादावेव बलवत्त्वादिति भावः। ibid., p. 237.
3. तथा च तत्पुरुषे लक्षणापक्षे हृदमेव तत्त्यागे बीजमिति भावः। ibid., p. 237.

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Mīmāṁsā holds that any other compound is weaker than *Karmadhāraya* is view of purport and the like.[1] Hence it is deduced that illogical popular sayings like those that are advanced above are not to be honoured. It is more reasonable, therefore, to hold that the instance, *niṣāda-sthāpatiḥ* is an example of the *tatpuruṣa* compound. For otherwise, a host of imaginations in respect of the *niṣādas* having access, limited although, to the study of the vedas and the right to perform the vedic rite called *agnyādhāna*.[2]

Opponents argue : In that case, the view that the *bahuvrīhi* compound is a weaker one in comparision to *tatpuruṣa* in view of the fact that *bahuvrīhi* involves implication in all its constituents while *tatpurnṣa* in one, viz, the first one, would lose ground.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : This view is also unsound. For it rests on a similar illogical saying. Moreover, it is also not a fact that all the instances of the *bahāvrīhi* compouud involve implication in all the constituents, *citrguḥ* is an example in point.[4]

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1. तर्हिबाधकासत्त्वे कर्मधारयविधयैव वेदानां ग्रायाण्यं न तु प्रमाणान्तराविषयेऽपि तत्पुरुषविधया, कमंधारयात् समासान्तरस्य दोर्बल्यमित्यादिमीमांसया तथैव सम्प्रतिपत्तेरित्यपि किञ्च रोचयेः। श. श. प्र. pp. 237-38.
2. तथा च तेषां निर्युक्तिकप्रवादस्याश्रद्धेयत्वात् अपूर्वविद्याप्रयुक्त्यादिकल्पनागौरवाच्च तत्पुरुष एव उचित इति गूढ़ाभिप्रायः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 238.
3. नन्वेवं भवन्मते तत्पुरुषाद्बहुव्रीहेर्जघन्यत्वे सर्वपदलक्षणाबीजं न स्यात्। ibid., p. 238.
4. तस्माद्बहुव्रीहेर्जघन्यत्वमित्याद्याप्युक्तैव रीतिरनुसर्तव्या, न हि बहुव्रीहौ समस्तपदानां लांक्षणिकत्वादेव ततो दुर्बलत्वम्, एकमात्रपदलक्षणयापि बहुव्रीहेर्व्यवस्थाप्यत्वादित्यास्तां विस्तरः। श. श. प्र. p. 238.

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CHAPTER X

CLASSIFICATION OF COMPOUNDS (AVYAYĪBHĀVA)

Compounds are classified into four begining with *avyayī-bhāva* by the elders as it has been seen earlier. The basis of the said classification, it has been seen, is the predominance of one of the word-meanings or of the other. Bhaṭṭoji-diksit has brought in a different kind of classification based on the nature of the words constituting a compound. Words are of four kinds, nominals (*nāma*), verbs (*dhātu*), words ending (declensional suffixes (*suvanta*), and words ending in verbal suffixes (*tiṅanta*). These four kinds of words involve six kinds of syntactical relation. Compounds therefore, are of six kinds, says Bhattoji. But inspite of this classification, Bhattoji-dīkṣit has not abandoned the scheme of the elders. He also starts discussions on compounds begining with *avyayī-bhāva*. For the classification done by the elders Is more widely accepted and is also supposed to be more deflecting the view of Pāṇini.

The *avayībhāva* compound, according to the elders is that kind of compound that leads to the comprehension of the meaning of the first constituent as the invariable substantive.[1] The aphorism that provides for the fomation of the aryayī-bhāva compound in the system of Pāṇini reads as follows : *avyayam vibhakti-samīpa-samṛddhi-byṛddhyarthābhāvātyayāsampratiśabda-prādurbhāva-paścād-yathānnpūrvya-yaugapadya-sādṛśya-sampatti-sākalyānta-vacaneṣu.*[2] An indeclipnable (*avyaya*) indicative

1. पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानोऽव्ययीभावः। vide दी on सर्वसमासशेष।
2. पा. II. 1. 6. (सि. कौ. 652).

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of a declensional suffix (*vibhakti*), or proximate-(*samīpa*) or prosperity (*samṛddhi*) or adversity (*byṛddhi*) or absence of a substance (*artha-bhāva*) or destruction (*atyaya*) or unsuitability (*asamprati*) or celebrity or descredit (*śabda-prādurbhāva*), or subsequent (*paścāt*) or suitability, pervasion (repetition) non-transgresston, resemblance (*yathā*) sequeuce (*anupūrvya*) or simultaneity (*yaugapadya*) resemblanee (*sādṛśya*) or proper development (*sampatii*), or throughness (*sākalya*) or completion (*anta*) in association with a word ending in a declensional suffix, forms into an instance of the *avayībhāva* compound.

In the rules of compounds again, the word that ends in the first declensional suffix is called *upasarjana*[1] and an *upasarjana* is to form into the first constituent of the compound.[2] As such, it is the indeclinable concerned that is to form into the first constituent of the *avayībhāva* compound. For the word, *avyaya* has happened to end in the first declensional suffix in the aphorism that provides for the said compound. As for the other constituent of the *avayībhāva* compound, it is to be pointed out that the aphorism *saha-supā*[3] is to be understood to have been repeated to give the sense that an indeclinable in association with a (*samartha*) word ending in a declensional suffix (*suvartha*) is to form into the *avayībhāva* eompound.

The aphorism that provides for the *abhyayībhāva* compound, however, does not make any room for the compound, *apadiśam* in the sense of 'in between the two directions' (*diśayoḥ madhyam*). For the indecclinable, *apa*, in this instance, is used to indicate the sense of 'in between' (*madhyam*), not read in the said aphorism.

The aphorism, therefore, has to be split into two, based on the idea of what is called *yoga-vibhāga*.[4] The two aphorisms

1. प्रथमानिर्दिष्टं समास उपसर्जनम् । पा. I. 2. 43. (सि. कौ. 653.).
2. उपसर्जनं पूर्वम् । पा. II. 2. 30. (सि. कौ. 654).
3. पा. II. 16.
4. अव्ययम् इति योगो विभज्यते । दी on II. 1. 6. (सि कौ. 652).

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are to read *avyayam* and *avyayaṁ vibhakti* samīpa and so on respectively. The first aphorism would mean that an indeclinable in association with a (*samartha*) word ending a declensional suffix is to form into the *avyayibhāva* compound;[1] the word *supā* being repeated from the earlier aphorism—*saha supā*. The compound, *apadiśam*, is thus explained. It may also be pointed out that in this compound, the indeclinable, *apa* is not treated as the *upāsarjana*. On the contrary, the word, *diśā* is to be regarded as such. There is the provision that the word used in the sentence of analysis of the compound the declensional suffix in respect of which does not alter is to be treated as the *upasarjana*.[2] Such *upasarjana*, however, is not to lead in a compound.[3] Hence the position of the indeclinable in regard to its being used as the first constituent of the *avayībhāva* compound or causing the verbal knowledge of the meaning thereof posited as the invariable substantive remains unassailed. The sole purpose of recognising the said kind of a word as *upasarjana* is only to bring out a form like *apadiśam*. But for such a provision *apa* and *diśā* would bring in the form *apadiśā* with the declensional suffix added to *diśā* gone elided. It is with the said word being given the stamp of *upasarjana* and with the final vowel therof being provided for to be shortened on that score[4] that the form *apadiśam* has been effected aided by the aphorism *avyayībhāśca*.[5]

Pāṇini reads the aphorism—*avyayibhāvaśca* twice.[6] The compound form of the *avyayībhāva* kind is to be treate d as an indeclinable (*avyaya*), be means of the initial reading of the said aphorism, This is the general characteristic of the *avayībhāva* compound. But instances of this compound ending in

1. अव्ययं समर्थेन सह समस्यते। सोऽव्ययीभावः। ibid.
2. एकविभक्तिचापूर्वनिपाते। पा. I. 2. 44.
3. न तु तस्य पूर्वनिपातः। vide दीक्षित on ibid.
4. गोस्त्रियोरुपसर्जनस्य। पा. I. 2. 48. (सि. कौ. 656).
5. पा. I. 2. 41. (सि. कौ. 451).
6. पा. I. 4. 41; पा. II. 4. 15.

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the vowel, *a* display variation. Declensional suffixes added to an indeclinable go elided. But in an instance of the *avayī-bhāva* kind ending in the vowel, *a*, the declensional suffix involved is not to be elided. On the contrary, the declensional suffix other than the fifth one is replaced by *am*.[1] Hence the compounded form remains to be *apadiśam* in case it is to end in any of the six declensional suffix other than the fifth one. With the addition of the fifth declensional suffix however, the compound form in found to take the shape—*apadiśāt*, *apadiśā-bhyām apadiśebhyaḥ* like the word *phala* or a word of the neuter gender ending in *a*. Pāṇini provides for such formations by the subsequent reading of the aphorism *avyayī-bhāvaśa*.[2]

Jagadīśa defines the *avyayībhāva* compound as one, thc first constituent of which is an indeclinable (*avyaya*), the meaning of which is to be comprehended as the invariable substantive related to the meaning of the word (nominal) following itself.[3] He further points out that the *avyayī-bhāva* compound is not to be used in either the masculine or the feminine gender.[4] The indeclinables like *niḥ* or *upa* in the instance like *nirmakṣikam* or *upakambham* have been used as the first constituents to bear out the comprehension of the negation of flies (*makṣikā*) or of a jar (*kumbha*) as the invariable substantive related to the meanings of *makṣikā* or *kumbha*, the words following the said indeclinables.[5]

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1. नाव्ययीभावादतोऽमत्वपञ्चम्याः । पा. II. 4. 83. (सि कौ. 657).
2. अयं नपुंसक स्यात् । दी on पा. II. 4. 15. (सि. कौ. 658).
3. उत्तरार्थान्वितस्वार्थाव्ययपूर्वस्तु यो भवेत् ।
   समासः सोऽव्ययीभावः····· ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 41.
   यः समासः स्वोत्तरपदोपस्थाप्येन यदर्थेनान्वितस्य यदर्थस्य बोधकाव्ययपूर्वभागकः स तदर्थस्य बोधनेऽव्ययीभावः । ibid., p. 239.
4. स्त्रीपुंलिङ्गविवर्जितः । ibid., का. 41.
5. गृहे निर्मक्षिकम् उपकुम्भमित्यादौ हि मक्षिकायाः अभावः, कुम्भादेश्च सामीप्यादिर्मक्षिकादिपदप्राग्वर्त्तिना निराद्यव्ययेनानुभाव्यते । ibid. p. 239.

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In the instance, *ardhaśariram*, the first constituent is not an indeclinable and hence inspite of its bearing out the comprehension of the meaning of the first constituent as the invariable substantive related to the meaning of the word following is not an example of the *avyayībhāva* compound.[1]

Similarly, the instances like *nir-makṣikā bhūmiḥ* or *nir-manuṣyo deśaḥ*, the examples of the *tatpuruṣa* and the *bahuvrīhi* kinds of compounds are not to be covered by the definition of the *avyayībhāva* compound in spite of their bearing out the comprehension of the negation of flies and the like. For the said instances are used in the feminine or in the masculine gender.[2]

Opponents argue : The definition of the *avyayībhāva* compound given is too narrow to cover the instances like *akṣapari*, *śalākā-pari* meaning wrongly playing a dice and so on. For although these instances are constituted of the indeclinable, *pari*, the said indeclinable has not formed into the first constituent.[3] Similarly, the instances like *dvi-gārgyam* in *dvī-gārgyam gacchataḥ*, meaning two children of *garga*, *dvidaṇḍi* in *dvi-daṇḍi praharati*, meaning with two stalves (*daṇḍa*), *tri-yamunam* in *tri-yamunam snāti* meaning the confluence of three *yanunās*, *lohita-gangam deśaḥ* meaning where the Ganges is red, *daṇḍā-daṇḍi* in *daṇḍā-daṇḍi raṇam* in the sense of a battle of stick against stick, *keśā-keśi* in *Keśā-keśi yuddham* in the sense of a fighting 'hair by hair', *khale-yavam* meaning the time corns are in the threshing floor (*khala*), *saṁhatayavam* meaning the time when corns are collected, *tiṣṭhadgu* meaning the time when

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1. अर्द्धशरीरमित्यादौ उत्तरपदार्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकमप्यर्धपदं नाव्ययम् । ibid., p. 239.
2. निर्मक्षिका भूमिः, निर्मनुष्यो देश इत्यादौ तु मक्षिकादेरभाववन्तं बोधयन्नपि निर्मक्षिकादिस्तत्पुरुषो न तादृशार्थे स्त्रीपुंलिङ्गकार्य्यविधुर इति तत्र न प्रसङ्गः । श. श. प्र. pp. 239-40.
3. नन्वेकस्याक्षस्य शलाकाया वा द्यूतेऽन्यथापातनमित्यर्थे 'अक्षपरि, शलाकापरि' इत्यव्ययीभावेऽव्याप्तिस्तस्याव्ययगर्भत्वेऽपि तत्पूर्वकत्वाभावात् । ibid. p. 240.

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cows are in, are not to be covered by the said definition. For none of these instances are formed of an indeclinable.[1]

Pāṇini has provided for the compound *akṣapari*, *śalākā-pari* and the like by an independent aphorism.[2] For the compound like *dvi-gārgyam* also he has given another aphorism.[3] *Keśa-keśi*, *daṇḍā-daṇḍi* and the like are similarly provided for. Any two identical words ending in the seventh declensional suffix or in the third declensional suffix referring to what is gripped or some weapon implying reciprocity, form a compound.[4] *Keśeṣu keśeṣu* give the form *Keṣākeśa* of the *bahuvrihi* compound, on the declensional suffix having gone elided and the final vowel in the first half of the double form (*keśa keśa*) being lengthened.[5] Next the *samāsānta*, ic being provided for[6], *Keśa-keśi* is formed and the whole comes to be treated as an instance of the *avyayībhāva* compound.[7] The compound *dvi-daṇḍi* too in the like manner has been formed with *ic* being provided for by an independent aphorism.[8] The compounds like *tiṣṭhadguḥ*, *khaleyavam*, *saṁhata-yavam* are only irregularly obtained (*nipātyante*).[9] Pāṇini has provided for numerals optionally forming into an instance of the *avyayībhāva* compound with words denoting rivers.[10] The author of the *vārtika* has extended the said rule in case of aggregation (*samāhara*) too.[11] The compounds *lohita-gaṅgam* or *unmatta-gaṅgam* are

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1. श. श. प्र. pp. 240-41.
2. अक्ष-शलाका-संख्याः परिणा। पा. II. 1. 10. (सि. कौ. 664).
3. संख्या वंश्येन . पा. II. 1. 19. (सि. कौ. 673).
4. तत्र तेनेदमिति सरूपे। पा. II. 2. 27. (सि. कौ. 846)
5. अन्येषामपि दृश्यते। पा. VI. 1. 137. (सि. कौ 3539).
6. इच् कर्मव्यतिहारे। पा. V. 4. 127. (सि. कौ. 866).
7. तिष्ठद्गुप्रभृतिषु इच्-प्रत्ययस्य पाठात् अव्ययीभावस्वमव्ययत्वञ्च। दी. on पा. II. 2. 27.
8. द्विदण्डादिभ्यश्च। पा. V. 4. 128 (सि. कौ. 867),
9. तिष्ठद्गु-प्रभृतीनि च। पा. II. 1. 17. (सि. कौ. 671).
10. नदीभिश्च। पा. II. 1. 20. (सि. कौ. 674).
11. समाहारे चायमिष्यते (वार्त्तिक)। vide सि. कौ. 675.

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provided for to signify a proper name (*saṁjñā*) of something not denoted by the constituents thereof formed of a word ending in a declensional suffix (*suvanta*) with words denoting rivers.[1] It is an instance of the regular compounds (*nitya-samāsa*) and it poses an exception to the view that the meaning of the first constituent is to be comprehended as the invariable substantive.

Jagadīśa solves the problem in a different way. He suggests an alternative definition of the *avyayībhāva* compound. The sixth declensional suffix visibly added to which compound, does not bear out the comprehension of what the compound means posited as the feature against the meaning of the said suffix is to be known as the *avyayībhāva* compound.[2]

As it has been seen earlier that in an instance of the *avyayībhāva* compound that is other than what ends in the vowel, *a* (*adanta*), the declensional suffixes added thereto get elided as in *tiṣṭhadgu*. In the case of what ends in the vowel *a*, the declensional suffixes other than the fifth one are substitued by *am*[3] as in *nirmakṣikam*. The fifth declensional suffix added to to an instance of the *avyayibhāva* compound remains unaltered as in *upakumbhāt*. The third and the seventh declensional suffixes too are optionally[4] substitued by *am* as in *upakumbhena*, *upakumbham*; *upakumbhe*, *upakumbham*.

Instances of all other compounds bear out the comprehension of the meaning of the compound posited as the feature against the meaning of the sixth declensional only if visibly

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1. अन्यपदार्थे च संज्ञायाम् । पा. II. 1. 21. (सि. कौ. 675)-
2. अमादेशं विना श्रूयमाणा षष्ठी व बोधिका।
   स्वार्थे यदर्थस्य यद्वामोऽव्ययीभाव इष्यते ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 42.
   अमादेशं विना श्रूयमाणा षष्ठी स्वार्थे यत्समासार्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रत्यसमर्था स एव बाऽव्ययीभावः । ibid., pp. 241-42.
3. नाव्ययीभावादतोऽमत्वपञ्चम्याः । पा. II. 4. 83. (सि. कौ. 657).
4. तृतीया-सप्तम्योर्बहुलम् । पा. II. 4. 84. (सि. कौ. 658).

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added thereof.[1] The instance *nīlotpala*, for an example, with the sixth declensional suffix only if visibly added thereto bears out the comprehension of the 'blue lotus' or what is meant by the compound. posited as the feature against 'relation' (*sambandha*) or the meaning of the said suffix and not otherwise.

Opponents argue : In the instance *nilotpala-rūpam*, it is the sixth declensional suffix, added to the compound *nīlotpala* and subsequently elided (and thus not visibly added) that bears out the comprehension of the meaning of the said compound posited as the feature against the meaning of the said suffix (not visibly added to the said compound).

Jagadīśa replies : It is the word *nilotpala* that implies the meaning, *nilotpala-sambandha*. There is no question, therefore, of the sixth declensional suffix gone elided bearing out the said comprehension.[2] In the case of an instance of the *avyayi-bhāva* compound, on the other hand. it is the sixth declensional suffix that has gone elided only, bears out the comprehension of the meaning of the compound posited as the feature against the meaning of the said suffix.

In *Kṛtayorkṣapari vyarthatvam*, for an example, it is the sixth declension suffix that had been added to the compound, *akṣapari* and has subsequently gone elided only bears out the comprehension of the relation (*sambandha*) of casting (*patana*) in the course of bearing out the verbal knowledge of the 'fruitlessness of (due to) wrongly casting of a die on both the occasions'.[3]

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1. श्रूयमाणैव षष्ठी स्वार्थं समासान्तरार्थस्थान्वयबोधने सभर्था न तु लुप्तापि। श. श. प्र. p. 242.
2. नीलोत्पलरूपमित्यादौ हि लुप्तषष्ठीतस्ततसम्बन्धानुभवात् नीलोत्पलसम्बन्धादि-लक्षणयैव तदुपपत्तेरिति, तथा च समासान्तरव्यावर्त्तनाय श्रूयमाणत्वं निवेशितमिति भावः। रामभद्री p. 242.
3. कृतयोरक्षपरि व्यर्थत्वमित्यादौ स्वव्ययीभावार्थस्य लुप्तापि कृतयोरेकाक्षान्यथा-पातनयोर्निष्फलत्वमित्यन्वये लुप्तषष्ठ्यैव पातनस्य सम्बन्धप्रत्यायनात्। श. श. प्र. p. 242-43.

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Opponents argue : There is no need to contemplate that the sixth declensional suffix that has gone elided is to cause the comprehension of the relation referred to *Akṣapari-vyarthatvam* might be taken a compound as a whole and *akṣapari* could be held to imply the said relation on the contrary.[1]

Jagadīśa argues : There is no such scope in the present case. For the word *kṛtayoḥ* is used as expectant with the compound *akṣapari*.[2]

Opponents argue : The sixth declensional suffix visibly used in *kṛtayoḥ* may well be taken to present the relation to be verbally comprehended. Hence inspite of the qualifying adjunct 'the sixth declensional suffix visibly in use' provided for in the definition, the situation does not improve. The definition remains too narrow to cover the instance, *akṣapari*.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The said suffix is added to *kṛtayoḥ* which is only a qualifying adjunct to the compound *akṣapari*. In semantics, it is the meaning of a suffix qualified by the meaning of the base thereof that is held liable of comprehension. An such although, the sixth declensional suffix added to the said qualifying adjunct is likely to present relation qualified by the meaning of the word *kṛta*, the base thereof, it nonetheless fails to present relation qualified by the meaning of the compound *akṣapari*.[4]

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1. अक्षपरि-व्यर्थत्वमित्यस्य समस्तत्वेन लक्षणयैव तत्सम्बन्धप्रत्यायनात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 242.
2. तत्र श्रूयमाणत्वनिवेशव्यावृत्तिर्न सम्भवतीति भ्रमनिरासाय कृतयोरिति। तदुक्तौ तु एकदेशान्वयस्वीकारात् तादृशभ्रमो न सम्भवतीति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 242.
3. कृतयोरिति षष्ठ्यापि सम्बन्धप्रत्यायनात् श्रूयमाणत्वनिवेशेऽपि अक्षपरिभागेऽव्याप्त्यापत्तेरिति भावः। ibid., p. 242.
4. तदशुद्धं, विशेषणविभक्तेर्निरर्थकत्वात्। विशेषणषष्ठ्या कथञ्चित् सम्बन्धार्थकत्वेऽपि तत्र विशेष्यस्यान्वयासम्भवात् प्रत्ययस्य प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तेः। ibid., p. 242.

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Opponents argue : But in *snigdhasya upagaṅgam pāvitryam* leading to the verbal comprehension of holiness of the soothing proximate (region) of the Ganges, the sixth declensional suffx visibly added to the qualifying adjunct of the compound *upagaṅgam* has been admitted to be potentially capable of presenting the meaning, 'relation'. The definition of the *avyayībhāva* compound, therefore, should not cover the instance *upagaṅgam.*

Jagadīśa replies : The said suffx visibly in use is potentially capable of presenting the meaning, relation for ultimate verbal comprehension, because it has the support of *am*, the substitute. The definition reads that but 'for the support of *am*, the substitute, the sixth declensional suffix visibly in use is not to present its meaning to be verbally comprehended as the substantive of the meaning of the *avyayībhāva* compound. There is no reason, therefore, as to why the definition of the *avyayībhāva* compound should not go to cover the instance, *upagaṅgam.*[1]

Kṛṣṇa-kāṇṭa, the commentator on Jagadīśa's *Śābda-śaktiprakāśikā* is of the view that the provision of the clause 'but for the support of *am*, the subtitute' is uncalled for. For in present case or in any other such case it is the qualifying adjunct with which the sixth declensional suffx is visibly in use and not with the compound involved that remains to be without the said suffix visibly added thereto. Hence the ordinary provision that the compound, the meaning of which does not go to posit as the feature against the meaning of the sixth declensional suffix in the verbal knowledge borne out by the said suffix visibly added thereto is enough.[2]

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1. स्निग्धस्योपगङ्गं पावित्र्यमित्यादौ स्निग्धस्य गङ्गासमीपस्य पवित्रत्वमित्यान्वये समीपादेः सम्बन्धः श्रूयतेऽप्यमादेशवशादेव षष्ठ्यानुभाव्यते इति न तत्रोपगङ्गाद्यव्ययीभावेऽव्याप्तिः। श. श. प्र. p. 243.
2. इदन्त्वधातव्यम्–विशेषणपदोत्तरषष्ठ्यास्तादृशबोधस्वरूपायोग्यत्वादव्ययीभावोत्तरषष्ठ्याः श्रूयमाणत्वाभावादव्याप्तिरेव न सम्भवतीत्यमादेशं विना इत्यनर्थकमिति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 243.

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Jagadīśa argues : Even a part of an expression is admitted to be potentially capable of bearing out a synthetic verbal knowledge. As such the sixth declensional suffix added to the qualifying adjunct (or the differentiating epithet) with the support of *am*, the substitute, is to be regarded as potentially capable of bearing out a synthetic verbal knowledge. For had it been so held that even with the support of *am*, the substitute, the sixth declensional suffix added to the qualifying adjunct is not potentially capable of bearing a synthetic verbal knowledge, the expresson *snigdhasyopagaṅgam pāvitryam* would in no case cause the verbal knowledge of the relation between the meaning of the compound, *upagaṅgam* and that of the word *pāvitryam.*[1]

Kṛṣṇa-kānta refutes : The definition would be too narrow to cover the instance *upavadhū* in *sundarasya upavadhū pūtatvam*, despite the said provision made in the definition. For the sixth declensional suffix visibly in use in *sundarasya*, the qualifying adjunct to the compound *upavadhū*, bears out the verbal comprehension of relation between the meaning of the compound, *upavadhū* and that of the word, *pūtatva* without the support of *am*, the substitute.[2]

He concludes that the sixth declensional suffix visibly in use would be held liable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of what is meant by what has been used as immediately preceding itself, posited as the feature against the meaning of itself. The said suffix added to the qualifying adjunct of a compound does not bear out, therefore, the meaning of the compound, posited as the feature against the meaning of itself. There is no contingency, therefore, in respect of the definition being two narrow to cover an instance like *upagaṅgam* in

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1. यदि चैकदेशस्यापि विशिष्टान्वयस्वरूपयोग्यत्वात् विशेषणषष्ठ्या अपि तादृशबोधानुदयेन अमादेशसहकृतषष्ठ्यास्तादृशबोधास्वरूपायोग्यत्वादित्युच्यते । कृष्णकान्ती p. 243.
2. तदा सुन्दरस्य उपवधूपूतत्वमित्यत्र उपवधूभागेऽव्याप्तिस्तदुपादानेऽपि दुर्वीरा इति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 243.

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snigdhasyopagaṅgam pāvitryām even if the provision *amādeśam vinā* is not made in the definition given.[1]

In *anugaṅgena sañcāraḥ upagaṅgeṣu pūtatvam, upakumbhādānītāḥ* and the like the third, fifth and the seventh declensional suffixes visibly in use with the instances of the compound bear out the comprehension what the compound means posited as features against the meanings of the said suffixes. The definition, therefore, refers to the sixth declensional suffix as what does not bear out such verbal knowledge.[2]

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1. स्वार्थधर्मिकयाद्दशानुपूर्व्यवच्छिन्नार्थप्रकारकबोधत्वावच्छिन्नजन्यताया एव लक्षणघटकत्वस्यावश्यकत्वेन विशेषणषष्ठ्या अतथात्वेन निरुक्ताव्याप्त्यसम्भवात् 'अमादेशं विना'इत्यस्य व्यर्थताया दुर्वारत्वात् इत्यत पल्लवितेन। कृष्णकान्ती p. 243.
2. अनुगङ्गेन सञ्चारः, उपगङ्गेषु पूतत्वम्, उपकुम्भादानीतमित्यादावमादेशं विनापि श्रूयमाणाभिस्तृतीयासप्तम्यादिसुबभिरव्ययीभावार्थस्य करणत्वाधिकरणत्वादिकं बोध्यत इति षष्ठीपर्यन्तानुसरणम्। श. श. प्र. pp. 243-44.

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CHAPTER XI

CLASSIFICATION OF COMPOUNDS
(BAHUVRĪHI)

The *bahuvrīhi* compound is the attributive or possessive kind of compound. For it generally expresses an attribute belonging to something else than what are expressed by the constituent words thereof. Amongst the constituent words again, it is the first one that determines (qualifies) the following one.

This compound, therefore, requires to be resolved by means of a relative clause. The relative pronoun again used in the said clause is to appear in a case other than the nominative. The constituent words of the compound, however, are, as a rule usually stand in the same case i.e. the nominative one.

Pāṇini has primarly defined this compound with the aphorism (head rule) *śeṣo bahuvrīhiḥ.*[1] The word, *śeṣa* in the aphorism, means the particular triad of the declensional suffix in respect of words ending in which no compound has been specifically provided for. In respect of words ending in the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh declensional suffixes, specific compounds have been mentioned. The word, *śeṣa*, therefore, means words ending in any of the triad of the first declensional suffi.. The aphorism thus hints at the idea that the compound

1. शेषो बहुव्रीहिः । पा. II. 2. 23. (सि. कौ. 829).
2. अधिकारोऽयम् । द्वितीयाश्रिता (पा. II. 1. 24. सि. कौ. 686) इत्यादिना यस्य त्रिकस्य विशिष्य समासो नोक्तः सः शेषः, प्रथमान्तमित्यर्थः । दी on ibid.

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formed of word ending in the first declensional suffix is to be known as the *bahuvrīhi* compound.

Opponents argue : Words ending in the first declensional suffix are found to form into the *Karmadhāraya* compound also. The words, *ṇīlam* and *utpalam* bring in the compound, *nīlamutpalam.*

Grammarians reply : Even then the definition of the *bahuvrīhi* compound does not over-extend to the *Karmadhārya* compound. For the said compound has been provided for by a specific aphorism[1] without any reference to the first declensional suffix. As a matter of fact, it is in this context that Pāṇini has introduced another aphorism—*anekamanyapadārthe.*[2] It means that several mutually related words ending in the first deciensional suffix, form into the *bahuvrīhi* compound to signify what is meant by some other word than the constituents of the compound.[3] In other words, the thing, an attribute of which the compound is to express is to be presented by a word (i.e. the relative pronoun to be used in the relative clause by means of which the compound is to be resolved) not ending in the first declensional suffix. As a result, the *bahuvrīhi* compound turns out to be a compound of collocated (*samānādhikaraṇa*) words ending in the first declensional suffix carrying the sense of a word other than the constituent of the compound, ending in a declensional suffix other than the first one.[4] The instance, *nīlotpalam* meaning blue-lotus although formed of collocated words ending in the first declensional suffix is not an example of the *bahuvrīhi* compound. For it does not carry the sense of a word other than the constituents of the compound and ending in a declensional

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1. विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलम्। पा. II. 1. 57 (सि. कौ. 736).
2. पा. II. 2. 24 (सि. कौ. 830).
3. अनेकं प्रथमान्तमन्यपदार्थे वर्त्तमानं वा समस्यते, स बहुव्रीहिः। दी on ibid.
4. अप्रथमाविभक्त्यर्थे बहुव्रीहिरिति, समानाधिकरणानामिति च फलितम्। दी op. cip.

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suffix other than the first one. The said compound meaning a pond (*nīlam uṭpalam yatra*) is of course an instance of the *bahnvrīhi* compound. For it fulfilts the said conditions.

Opponents argue : If *bahuvrīhi* is held to be a compouud of collocated words only ending in the first declensional suffix ; then *Kaṇṭhe-kālaḥ* could not be regarded an instance of the said compound. For here the compound has been formed of the word, *kaṇṭhe* ending in the seventh declensional suffix and the word, *kālah* in the first one, (*kaṇṭhe kālaḥ yasya saḥ*).

Grammarians reply : It is an instance of what is called *Vyadhikaraṇa-bahuvrīhi* compound or what is formed of words used non-collocatively. The instance, *kaṇṭhe-kāḷaḥ* has been held justified by the followers of Pāṇini on the strength of the aphorism—*saptāmī-viśeṣaṇe bahuvrīhau.*[1] Although Pāṇini has not referred to any such compound known as *Vyadhikaraṇa-bahuvrīhi* but this aphorism is taken to be a rule suggestive (*jñāpaka*) of the said compound.[2] *Cakra-pāṇi*, (*pāṇau cakraḥ yasya*), *śarajanmā* (*śareṣu janmaḥ yasya*) are some other instances in point. The compound, *saputraḥ* too, in *saputraḥ āgacchati* may be held justified on the ground that it has been provided for by an independent aphorism.[3]

Opponents argue : But Bhaṭṭoji-dikṣit has pointed out that words, used not in apposition are not to from into an instance of the *bahuvrīhi* compound as in *pañcabhirbhuktamasya.*[4]

Grammarians reply : In an instance of the *bahuvrīhī* compound, the thing, the attribute of which the compound is to express is related to the meaning of the verb involved in the sentence of analysis as a case or is related to the meaning of a constituent as the gentive. In *prāptodako* (*grāmaḥ*), *ūḍha-*

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1. पा. 2. 35 (सि. कौ. 898).
2. अतएव ज्ञापकात् व्यधिकरणपदो बहुव्रीहिः। दी on ibid,,
3. तेन सहेति तुल्ययोगे। पा. VI. 3. 82 (सि. कौ. 849).
4. व्यधिकरणानामपि न। पञ्चभिर्भुक्तमस्य। op. cip.

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rathaḥ (*anadvān*), *upahṛtapaśu* (*rudraḥ*) *uddhṛtaudanā* (*sthāti*), and *vīra-puruṣakaḥ* (*grāmaḥ*), village (*grāma*), and the like the attributes of which the compounds involved are to express, are related to the meaning of the verbs concernd as cases : *prāptam udakam yam, ūḍhaḥ rathaḥ yena, upahṛtaḥ paśuḥ yasmai, uddhṛtaḥ adanaḥ yasyaḥ, vīrāḥ puruṣāḥ yasmin.* In *pītāmbarah hariḥ, hari* or an attribute of whom, the compound, *pītāmbaraḥ* is to express is related to *ambara*, a constituent thereof, as the genitive.

When such a situation is wanting, the *bahuvrīhi* compound is not effected as in *vṛṣṭe deve gataḥ.*[1] It is in this context that the formation of the *bahuvrihi* compound of words not used in apposition has been prohibited. The idea is that in case the thing. an attribute of which, the compound is to express does not stand related to the verb involved in the sentence of analysis as a case or to the meaning of a constituent of the said compound as the genitive, words not used in apposition, also are not to form into an instance of the *bahuvrīhi* compound. In *pañcabhirbhuktamasya*—'this man's share has been eaten up by five', this man although referred to by the relative pronoun '*asya*' does stand related as a case with the meaning of the compound if any, *pañca-bhuktam* or as genitive with the meaning of its constituents.

Jagadīśa, a logician cannot subscribe to the view that a compound should present its meaning through an independent faculty of denotation. He, therefore, holds that in the *bahuvrīhi* compound, one of the constituents presents through frozen metaphor (*nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā*), a part of what the compound is to mean. He, therefore, defines the *bahuvrīhi* compound as what being a compound is formed of such a word as is likely to signify through frozen metaphor, a part of what it means and is (thus potentially) capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of what is embedded in the meaning of itself

1. प्रथमार्थे तु न। वृष्टे देवे गतः। दी. on पा. II. 2. 24.

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as of being related (*sambandhi*)[1] (to what is qualified thereby).

In *ārūḍha-vānaraḥ vṛkṣaḥ*, the exposition (*vyutpatti*) of the compound *ārūḍha-vānaraḥ* is *āḍhūro vanaro yam*, what a monkey has climbed on. The compound is formed of the word *vanara* which through forzen metaphor signifies a part of what the compound is to mean viz. what is related to a monkey (*vānara-sambandhi*). The word, *ārūḍha* means the agent of the act of climbing on what is to be comprehended as the object of the said act (*sva-karmakā'rohaṇa-kriyā-kartā*). Thereupon, the meaning of the word *ārūḍha* gets syntactically related to 'a monkey' a part of what the word, *vānara* signifies. The whole thing viz, the agent of the act of climbing on to what is to be comprehended as the object of the said act who is none other than a monkey (*svakarmakā'rohaṇa-kriyā-kartrabhinna-vānaraḥ*), thus, is comprehended as of being related to the tree (*vṛkṣa*) or what the compound qualifies, the meaning of a word not constituting the compound (*anya-padārtha*).

In *pīta-payaskām pātram*, the exposition is *pītam payo yena*. The compound is formed of the word *payas* that signifies what is related to water, a part of what the compound is to mean. The word, *pītam* means the instrument of the act of drinking what is to be comprehended as the object of the said act. The meaning of the word, *pītam* thereupon, gets related to water, a part of what the word, *payas* signifies. Thereupon, the whole thing viz, the instrument of the act of drinking what is to be comprehended as the object of the said act which is none other than water gets comprehended as of being related to

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1. बहुव्रीहिः स्वगर्भार्थसम्बन्धित्वेन बोधकः।
निरूढया लक्षणया स्वांशज्ञापकशब्दवान्॥ श. श. प्र. का. 43.

समास इति प्रकृतम्, तथा च स्वांशस्य निरूढलक्षणया ज्ञापकेन शब्देन घटितः स्वगर्भस्य यादृशार्थस्य सम्बन्धितत्वप्रकारेणान्वयबोधं प्रति समर्थः समासः स्वगर्भतादृशार्थसम्बन्धिबोधने बहुव्रीहिरित्यर्थः। ibid., p. 244.

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pot, the meaning of a word not constituting the said compound.

In *pakvastaṇḍulaścaitraḥ*, the exposition of the compound is *pakvastaṇḍulo yena*. In it the word *taṇḍula* signifies what is related to rice (*taṇḍula-sambandhi*) or a part of what the compound is to mean. The word, *pakva* means the object of the act of cooking done by one who is to be comprehended as the agent of the said act. The meaning of the word, *pakva* is to be related to rice or a part of what the word, *taṇḍula* signifies. The whole thing, thereupon, is to be comprehended as what is related to *caitra*, the meaning of the word, *caitra* not constituting the said compound.

In *datta-dakṣiṇo dvijaḥ*, the exposition is *dattā dakṣiṇā yasmai*. In the compound, *datta-dakṣiṇā*, the word *dakṣiṇā* signifies what is related to present a part of what the compound is to mean. The word, *datta* means the object of the act making a present to one who is to be comprehended as the dative case (*saṁpradāna*) of the said act. This meaning of the word, *datta* gets related to 'a present', a part of what the word *dakṣiṇā* signifies. Thereupon, the whole things gets comprehended as what is related to *brahmin* or what is meant by a word not constituting the said compound.

In *patita-patra-staruh*, the exposition is *patītam patram yaṣmāt*. The compound, *patita-patraḥ* is formed of the word *patra* that signifies what is related to leaves, a part of what the compound is to mean. The word *patita* means the locus of the act of falling from what is to be comprehended as the ablative case (*apādāna*) of the said act. This meaning of the word, *patita* is related to 'leaves' a part of what the word *patra* signifies. The whole thing, thereupon, gets comprehended as of being related to tree or what the word, *taru* not constituting the said compound means.

In *citraguścaitraḥ*, the exposition is *citrā gauryasya*. The compound *citraguḥ* is formed of the word *go* that signifies what is related to the cow of oneself (*sva-go-sambandhī*), a

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part of what the compound is to mean. The word, *citrā* means variagated and this meaning is related to the cow of oneself, a part of what the word, *go* signifies through identity. The whole thing, thereupon, gets comprehanded as what is related to *caitra*, the meaning of the word, *caitra* not constituting the said compound.

In *rakta-pataḥ kāyah*, the exposition is *raktam patam yasya*. The compound, *rakta-pataḥ* is formed of the word, *paṭa* that signifies what is related to the cloth worn by oneself (*sva-vṛtti-paṭa-sambandhi*), a part, of what the compound is to mean. The word, *rakta* means red and this meaning of the word, *rakta* gets related through identity, to the cloth warn by oneself, a part of what the word, *paṭa* signifies. The whole thing, thereupon, is comprehended as what is related to one's body or what is meant by the word, *kāya* not constituting the said compound.

In *bāṇa-cchinna-karo naraḥ*, the sentence of analysis of the compound, *bāṇa-cchinna-karaḥ* is *bāṇena cchinaḥ karo yena yasyavā*: The word, *kara* forming into the said compound signifies what is related to hand of oneself, a part of the meaning of the compound. The expression, *baṇena chinnaḥ* means the object of the act of cutting with an arrow by one who is to be comprehended as the agent of the said act. In case the exposition reads *yasya ca baṇena cchinnaḥ* is to mean the object of the act of cutting by an arrow of one who is to be comprehended as one whose hand has been cut off. The said meaning is then to be related with hand, a part of the word, *kara* signifies. The whole thing, tnereupon, gets comprehended as of being related to man, the meaning of the word, *nara* not constituting the compound.[1]

In instances like *dakṣiṇa-pūrvā*, *pūrvottarā*[2] and like holding out cases of what are called *vidig-bahuvrīhi*, the expositions are

1. Vide श. श. प्र. pp. 245-246.
2. दिङ्नामान्यन्तराले। पा. II. 2. 26. (सि. कौ. 845).

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like this : *dakṣiṇayā purvā yasyāh, pūrvāyā uttarā yasyāh* so on. In the compound, *dakṣiṇa-pūrvā*, the word, *purvā* signifies what is related to the east (*pūrva-sambandhi*), a part of what the compound is to mean. The word, *dakṣiṇa* means associated with the south of itself. This meaning of the word, *dakṣiṇa* is to be related to the east, a part of what the word, *pūrvā* signifies. The whole thing, thereupon, gets comprehended as of being related to the south-east corner direction (*agni-koṇa*). Similar is the case wiih *pūrvottarā* and the like.[1]

In *astikṣhirā gauh* the exposition is *asti kṣiram yasyāh*. The compound, *asti-kṣirā* is formed of the word, *kṣira* that signifies what is related to the milk of one-self. The word, *asti* means 'existent' (*astītvavat*). This meaning of the word, *asti* is related to 'the milk of oneself' a part of what the compound is to mean. The whole thing, thereupon, gets comprehended as of being related to the cow, the meaning of the word, *gauh* not forming into the compound.[2]

Incidently, Jagadīśa notes that the word, *asti* in an instance like *astikṣirā* is considered as a verb by many while by many others, it is regarded an indeclinable only having the semblence of a verb.[3]

The compound, *upadaśāh* in *upadaśāh śakunayah* when analysed in the form of a sentence is to read *upa samīpe daśa yeṣām*. In it the word, *daśa* signifies through frozen metaphor what is related to the counted nember ten and *upa* means

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1. दक्षिणपूर्वा पूर्वोत्तरेत्यादिविदिग्वहुव्रीहिस्थले दक्षिणया पूर्वा यस्या इत्यादिविग्रहेण स्वपार्श्वस्थदक्षिणसहितपूर्वसम्बन्धित्वादिना आग्नेयी-प्रभृतीनां विदिशां बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 246.
2. अस्तिक्षीरा, नास्तिक्षीरा गौरिति क्षीरं यस्या इत्यादिविग्रहेणास्तित्ववत्स्वक्षीरसम्बन्धित्वादिप्रकारेण गवादेरवगतिः। श. श. प्र. pp. 246-47.
3. इयांस्तु विशेषः यत्तत्रैकेषां मतेऽस्तीत्यादिकं तिङन्तमन्येषां तत्प्रतिरूपकाव्ययमिति। ibid., p. 247.

   Vide also अस्ति इति विभक्तिप्रतिरूपकमव्ययम्। अस्तिक्षीरा गौः। सि. कौ. 830.

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what is close to what is qualified by the compound. The meaning signified by the word *daśa* i. e. ten the counted number (*daśa*) gets related to what is close to what is qualified by the compound. Thereupon, the whole thing i.e. 'ten (*daśa*) the counted number close to what is qualified by the compound gets comprehended as of being related to (a group of) nine or eleven birds, the meaning of the word, *śakanayah*, not constituting the compound.[1]

According to Durgasimha, the celebrated commentator on *Saṁkṣiptasāra-vyākaraṇa*, the word, *daśa* signifies through frozen metaphor (the state of the number, ten (*daśatva*) and the word *upa* means what is counted close to the number that the thing to be qualified (by the compound) exclusively abide. Then the meaning of the word, *upa*, ie. what is counted close to the number that the thing to be qualified (by the compound), exclusively abide gets related to (the state of) ten the number (*daśatva*). Thereupon, the whole thing i.e. ten, the number counted close to the number that the thing to be qualified (by the compound) exclusively abide gets comprehended as of being related to (a group of) nine birds the meaning of the word, *śakunayah*, not constituting the compound.[2]

The compound, *adhika-daśāḥ* in the instance, *adhtka-daśāh puruṣāh* in the sense of 'persons out-numbered by ten' leads to the comprehension of persons nine or so in number, related to ten, the exciusive locus of the number (*daśatva*) inherent in ten that outnumbers the number that the thing to be qualified by the compound exclusively abides.[3] In it the word, *daśa*

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1. उप समीपे दश येषामिति समीपगणितार्थकषष्ठया विग्रहात् उपदशाः शकुनय इत्यादौ स्वसमीपगणितदशसम्बन्धित्वेन नवानामेकादशानाञ्च पक्षिणामवगमः। श. श. प्र. p. 247.
2. तत्र दशशब्दस्य दशत्वलक्षणया सवर्थ्याप्तसंख्यासमीपगणितदशत्वसम्बन्धित्वेनैव नवादेबोध इति दुर्गाप्रभृतयः। ibid., p. 247.
3. अधिका दश येषामित्यादिविग्रहे 'अधिकदशाः पुरुषाः' इत्यादावपि स्वपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकदशवृत्तिसंख्यापर्य्याप्त्यधिकरणदशसम्बन्धित्वेन नवाविपुंसां प्रत्ययः। श. न. प्र. p. 247.

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is to signify through frozen metaphor what is related to ten, the exclusive locus of the number (*daśatva*) inherent in ten, and the word, *adhīka* is to mean what outnumbers the number that the thing to be qualified by the compound exclusively abides.

According to Pāṇini, indeclinables, numerals and the words *āsanna*, *adūra* and *adhika* are to form into the *bahuvrīhi* compound with numerals that indicate 'what is counted'.[1]

The compound, *upadaśa* gives the comprehension of 'what is close to number ten'[2] when in reference to crows in a tree it is said 'there are ten crows on the tree', it is the crows that are counted. The number, ten (*daśatva*) in that case obviously is inherent in the crows that are counted. In case one leaves the group or one more comes to form somewhere else and unites with the group making the number of the crows nine or eleven, the crows are described as 'what are close to the number ten' (*upadaśāh kākāh*). Although formed of an indeclinable, the compound is not an instance of *avayībhāva*. For here the indeclinable, *upa* does not mean proximate (*samīpa*) but in proximity (*samīpe*). It is an instance of the *bahuvrīhi* compound. For the chief characteristic of the said compound viz. the meaning of a word other than what constitute the compound is comprehended as the invariable substantive. Such a compound cannot be covered by the previous aphorism. Hence Pāṇini has provided another aphorism for the purpose.[3]

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1. संख्ययाव्ययासन्नादूराधिकसंख्याः संख्येये। पा. II. 2. 25. (सि. कौ. 843).
2. संख्येयार्थया संख्यया अव्ययादयः समस्यन्ते स बहुव्रीहिः। दशानां समीपे ये सन्ति ते उपदशाः। नव एकादश वा इत्यर्थः। दी० on ibid.,
3. नामव्ययीभावस्यापवादो बहुव्रीहिः। अव्ययीभावस्तु समीपमित्यर्थे भवति इह समीपे इत्यर्थः। तेनाव्ययीभावप्रसङ्गो नास्ति। दशानां समीपे ये ते उपदशाः इत्यत्र बहुव्रीहिलक्षणमन्यपदार्थता अस्ति। समस्यमानानां प्रथमान्तता तु नास्ति। किञ्च 'ये ते' इति प्रथमार्थे समासः। एवं पूर्वेणा' प्राप्ते अयं विधिः। मितभाषिणी on ibid.

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The compound *dvitrāh* in the instance; *dvitrāḥ pavitrāh paramāh* in the sense of those that are two or three in number (*dvau trayo vā yeṣām*) bears out the comprehension of either two or of three *pavitras* (*kuśa*—bleades bound up) related to the number exclusively inherent therein the *pavitras* or what is to be qualified by the meaning of the compound, the exclusive locus of two or of three.[1]

Opponents argue : The sentence of analysis of the compound, *dvitrāḥ* reads the word, *vā* (*dvau trayo va yeṣām*) and as such, it should be read in the compound i.e. it should form a part of the said compound.

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning to be presented by the word *vā* has well been presented by either the word *dvi* or *tri*, the constituents of the compound through frozen metaphor. As such, there is no reason as to why the said word should form a part of the compound.[2]

Opponents argue : How could the word, *vā* be understood to mean 'one of the two' (*anyatara*) ?

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *vā* has been known to be denotative of the said meaning in an instance like *paṭe ghaṭe vā ghaṭatvam.*[3]

Śrīpati[4] observes : The word, *vā* in the sentence of analysis *dvau vā trayo vā yeṣām* denotes one side of a question in dispute (*saṁśaya-koṭi*). As such, the *bahuvrīhi* compound, *dvitrāh*

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1. द्वौ त्रयो वा येषां इत्यन्यतरार्थकवाशब्देन विग्रहे द्वित्राः पवित्राः परमा इत्यादौ द्वित्रान्यतरपर्य्याप्तस्वपर्य्याप्त-संख्यासम्बन्धित्वेन द्वयोस्त्रयाणां वा पवित्राणां बोधः। श. श. प्र. pp. 247-248.
2. तस्य च वृत्तौ गतार्थत्वादश्रुतिः। ibid., p. 248.
तस्य वाकारस्य, वृत्तौ = निरूढलक्षणायां, गतार्थत्वात् = निविष्टार्थत्वात्, तत्र द्वित्रान्यतरशब्दस्य निरूढलक्षणया द्वित्रान्यतरपर्य्याप्तसंख्यासम्बन्धिन एव बोधादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 248.
3. पटे घटे वा घटत्वमित्याद्यनुरोधेन वाकारस्यान्यतरार्थकतया व्युत्पाद्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 248.
4. श्रीपतिमाह परेत्विति। रामभद्री p. 248.

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formed thereof should leads, to verbal comprehension of two (*dvi*) or of three (*tri*) as the substratum, as of being relatep to duality (*dvitva* or of trinity, *tritva*), the numbers not known for certain in respect of *pavitras* or what are to be qualified by the meaning of the said compound.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case all such *bahuvrihi* compounds would lead to doubtful verbal comprehension. For even if two or three happen to be comprehended as suggested above, as of being related to duality (*dvitva*), or trinity (*tritva*), not known for certain, there is room for doubt in respect of what are to be comprehended as the substratum of duality or of trinity (*tritva*). It may be one.[2]

Śrīpati argues : The word, *dvi* and *tri* in the compound are to be understood to imply two and three or what are related as the exclusive substratum of (the state of) two (*dvitva*) or of three (*tritva*).[3]

Jagadīśa replics : Neither of the two numbers viz, duality two (*dvitva*) of trinity (*tritva*) ever exclusively inheres in two (*dvi*) or three (*tri*) alone and hence such comprehension would be erroneous.[4]

Śrīpati argues : In that case the words, two and three are to be taken to imply what are related to either of duality (*dvitva*) or trinity (*tritva*) exclusively.

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. Because in the sentence of analysis there is no such word (in your opinion)

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1. परे तु द्वौ वा त्रयो वा येषामित्यादिविग्रहे वाशब्दस्य संशयकोट्यर्थकतया 'द्वित्रा' इत्यादिबहुव्रीहेः स्वधर्मिकसंशयकोटिापन्नद्वित्रिसम्बन्धित्वेन द्विप्रभृतिबोधकत्वमाहुः। श. श. प्र. pp. 248-49.
2. आहुरित्यस्वरससूचनाय,स च तादृशबहुव्रीहिमात्रस्यापि बोधापत्तिरूपस्तद्धर्मिकस्यापि द्वित्वादिसंशयस्य सम्भवात्तादृशसंख्याश्रयत्वस्यापि तत्र सत्त्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 249.
3. न च स्वपर्य्याप्तद्वित्वादिसम्बन्धिनि लक्षणास्वीकाराच्चैषो दोष इति वाच्यम्। ibid., p. 249.
4. द्वयोस्तिषु वा द्वित्रिसंख्ययोरुभयोरपर्य्याप्तत्वात् तादृशबोधस्य भ्रमत्वापत्तेः। ibid. p. 249.

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as is likely to denote 'one of two' (*anyatara*). For the rule is that a word in a compound denotative of what is presented thereby while used in the sentence of analysis, as the invariable substantive in the verbal knowledge to occur as caused thereby, alone could imply something as of being related to what is to be embraced as the invariable substantive by the verbal knowledge to occur due to the compound.[1]

The compound, *dvitrāh* used in the sense of what are three multiplied by two (*dvistrayo yeṣām*) as in *dvitrāh rasah* would lead to the verbal comprehension of six, the number as of being related to the number inherent in *rasa* or whnt is to be qualified by the compound, the cxclusive substratum of what is the multiple of two and three, the word, *dvi* meaning multiplied by two.[2]

Jagadīśa incidently points out that on the analogy of *dvitrāḥ*, a compound carrying the sense of three multiplied by two, *pañcadaśa* is not to be recognised as a an instance of valid compound carrying the sense of five-fold (*pañca-kṛtva*) ten. For of the words ending in secondary suffix (*taddhitā-pratyayas*), it is only those that end in *suc* that are admittedly used in the sentence of analysis likely to develop into a compound and non else. The word, *pañca-kṛtva* ends in *kṛtvasuc* and as such there is no reason as to why the said instance should be regarded an example of valid compound.[3]

The compound, *sva-dhana-sambandhī* in *sva-dhana-sambandhī Caitraḥ* is an instance of the *tatpuruṣa* although it leads to the

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1. द्वित्वत्रित्वान्यतरस्मिन् स्वपर्याप्तस्य व्यासेऽन्यतरबोधकपदाभावेन निवेशासम्भवात् । व्यासवाक्यात् स्वघटकयत्पदास्थापितयादृशार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकशाब्दबोधो भवति समासस्थतादृशबोधकपदस्यैव स्वघटिततादृशार्थसम्बन्धिलक्षणाया एव निरूढत्वात् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 249.
2. द्वित्रयो येषामितिविग्रहे तु द्विशब्दस्य द्विगुणितवाचित्वेन द्विगुणितत्रिपर्य्याप्तस्ववृत्तिसंख्यासम्बन्धित्वेन 'द्वित्रा रसा' इत्यादौ षण्णामवगमः । श. श. प्र. p. 249.
3. सुजन्तभावेनैव विग्रहस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात् पञ्चकृत्वो दश येषामित्यर्थे 'पञ्चदशा' इत्यादिको न समासः । श. श. प्र. p. 249.

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comprehension of *caitra*, (the meaning of a word not constituting the compound or what is qualified by the meaning of the compound) as of being related to the meaning of the word *sva-dhana* or what is embeded in the meaning of the compound itself. For none of constituent members of the compound presents a part of its meaning through frozen metaphor as provided for in the definition of the *bahuvrihi* compound.[1]

Similar is the case with the instance *paṭa-sambandhī*. Although the word *paṭa* implies clothes of self (*sva-paṭa*), the implication is not a frozen one.[2]

In the instance, *mātṛ-bhakta*, the word, *mātṛ* through frozen metaphor signifies 'mother of oneself', a part of the meaning of the compound. But still the said instance is not an instance of the *bahuvrihi* compound. For the state of being related (*sambandhitva*) of the mother of one-self does not come out to be posited as feature against what is to be qualified by the meaning of the said compound in the verbal knowledge to occur.[3] Because the meaning of the word, *mātṛ* gets related to the meaning of the root-verb through the relation of *viṣayitā*[4].

Opponents argue : The definition of the *bahuvrihi* compound unwarrantedly over-extends to *dvi-muni* (*vyākaraṇam*), *tri-muni* (*vyākāraṇam*) and the like other instances of the *avyayībhāva* compound and to *mātṛ-sambandhi* and the like other instances of the *tatpuruṣa* compound. For each of these instances is formed

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1. स्वधनसम्बन्धी चैत्र इत्यादौ स्वधनस्य सम्बन्धीति व्युत्पत्त्या स्वगर्भार्थस्य सम्बन्धित्वेन चैत्रं बोधयन्नपि तत्पुरुषो न स्वांशस्य निरूढलक्षणया प्रत्यायकपदेन घटितः। ibid., pp. 249-50.
2. तथा आधुनिकलक्षणया स्वपटबोधकेन पटपदेन गर्भितः पटसम्बन्धीत्यादिरपि। ibid., p. 250.
3. मातृभक्त इत्यादिकस्तु तत्पुरुषः स्वमातृत्वेन निरूढलक्षणया बोधकेन विशेषितोऽपि न तत्सम्बन्धित्वेन बोधकः। श. श. प्र. p. 250.
4. तत्र भजधात्वर्थभक्तौ विषयितासम्बन्धेन मातुरन्वयात् तत्सम्बन्धिनि लक्षणाया अनावश्यकत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 250.

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of a word likely to signify through frozen metaphor a part of what the compound means and what is embedded in its meaning, gets comprehended as of being related to what the meaning of the compound is to qualify.[1] Because *dvi-muni* or *tri-muni* leads to the comprehension of the two or three sages who are none other than the expounders of what is to be qualified by the meaning of the compound as of being related to what is to be thus qualified, the word *muni* signifying sages thus qualified. Similarly the compound, *mātṛ-sambandhi* leads to the comprehension of one's own mother as of being related to one or what the meaning of the compound is to qualify, the word, *mātṛ* signifying one's own mother.

Jagadīśa replies : The definition of the *bahuvrīhi* compougd is to be further qualified with the clause 'being other than *avyayībhāva* and *tatpuruṣa*.'[2]

It is now a matter of consideration, says Jagadīśa as to which constituent member of a compound like *citraguḥ* is to signify its meaning through frozen metaphor. In *citraguarasti*, for an example, the compound *citraguh*, as a whole cannot be hetd to imply 'what is related of the variagated cow of oneself.' Because it is a sentence and thus devoid of the faculty of denotation and *ip so facto* dcvoid of the faculty of implication too. Nor could a sentence be held to have the faculty of implication as admitted by the Mīmāṁsakas. For such a view has already been repudiated.[3] It could not also be so held that word, *citrā* alone could imply the meaning 'one related to the variagated cow of oneself' and that the word, *go* is only a pointer to the speaker's intention (*tāt-parya-grāhaka*).[4]

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1. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 250.
2. तदन्यत्वेनापि विशेषणीयत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 250.
3. इदमत्रापधातव्यम्—'चित्रगुरस्ती'त्यादौ चित्राभिन्नस्वगोसम्बन्धिप्रमृतीनां प्रतीत्यर्थं न चित्रगुसमुदायस्य लक्षणा, तस्य वाक्यत्वेन लक्षकत्वायोगात्, वाक्ये लक्षणायाः प्रागेव परास्तत्वात्। ibid., p. 250.
4. न च चित्रपदमेव तत्र चित्राभिन्नस्स्वगोसम्बन्धिलक्षकं, गोपदन्तु तादृशार्थे तात्पर्य्यग्राहकं। श. श. प्र. pp. 250–251.

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For the knowledge of speaker's intention is no factor in the matter of verbal knowledge.[1] Nor could it be so held that the said word is only indicative of the fact that the metaphor, involved in the word, *citrā* is a frozen one.[2] For in that case the word, *citrā* would assume prominence to call for the syntactical relation of the meaning of the word, *asti* with that of itself. But that is not possible. For the said word does not end in the first declensional suffix and it is the meaning of the word that ends in the said suffix that is to be comprehended as the substantive of agency (*bhāvanā*), the meaning of the verbal snffix in general (or rather as the invariable substantive),[3] unless such a rule is admitted of, the meaning of the word, *asti* in *rājapuruso'sti* would have to admitted liable of syntactical relation with 'king' the meaning of the word *rājan*.[4] Not only that. Semantics demands that the numeral denoted by a suffix, be related to the meaning of the base thereof. Oneness (*ekatva*), therefore, meaning of the first declensional suffix added to the word *go* in *citraguh* should be related to the meaning of the word, *go* or what is the base of the said suffix and not to what is presented by the word, *citrā*. In other words, oneness in that case cannot be related to what is related to the varigated cow of one-self.[5]

Gangeśa argues : The word *go* in the instence *citragah* is to imply one who is related to the variagated cow

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1. तात्पर्यज्ञानहेतुतायाः स्वयमनङ्गीकारात्। (Vide श. श. प्र. p. 24). कृष्णकान्ती p. 251.
2. लक्षणाया निरूढत्वसम्पादकं वेति वाच्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 251.
3. चित्रपदस्य प्रथमान्तत्वाभावेन तदर्थेऽस्तित्वाद्यन्वयस्यानुपपत्तेः, प्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्यस्यैव भावनाविशेष्यत्वात्। ibid., p. 251.
4. अन्यथा राजपुरुषोऽस्तीत्यादावपि राजसम्बन्धित्वान्वयप्रसङ्गात्। ibid., p. 251.
5. प्रकृत्यर्थं एव सुपः संख्याबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तेः, गोपदोत्तरप्रथमया चित्रपदोपस्थाप्ये चित्राभिन्नगोसम्बन्धिन्येकत्वबोधनायोगाच्च। ibid., p. 251.

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of oneself and the word, *citra* is only a pointer the speaker's intention (*tātparyya-grāhaka*).[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This view is untenable. Because in that that case the shortening of the letter *o* in the word *go* in *citraguh* could not be justified. For the shorteniug of the letter *o* in the word *go* is provided for only in case the meaning of the said word comes out to be expectant of the meaning of the word preceding thereto and thus dependent (*upasarjana*) thereon. If the word, *go* alone is to present the whole meaning and the word, *citrā* is held to be only a pointer to speaker's intention, then the meaning of the word, *go* remains no longer expectant of the word *citrā* or remains dependent thereon to call for the shortening of the vowel, *o*. Unless such a rule is admitted the vowel, *o* in the word, *go* in the instance, *gaurasti* should also be shortened.[2]

Opponents argue : The rule providing for the shortening of the vowel, *o* in the word *go* operates only in case the meaning the word, *go* comes out to be eclipsed due to its being used with a nominal preceding thereto. There is no reason, therefore, to apprehend that the vowel, *o* in the word, *go* in *gaurasti* should be shrotened.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the vowel, *o* in the word, *go* in the instance, *citragavo'sti*, an example of the *karmadharaya*

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1. गोपदमेव तादृशगोसम्बन्धिबलक्षकं, चित्रपदन्तु तत्र तात्पर्य्यादिग्राहकम् इति मणिकाराद्युक्तम्। श. श. प्र. p. 251.

2. तन्न युक्तम्—पूर्वपदार्थसाकाङ्क्षस्यैव स्वार्थस्योपसर्जनतायां गोपदस्य ह्रस्वविधानात् चित्रपदार्थेन समं तदर्थस्यानन्वये तदनुपपत्तेः, अन्यथा गौरस्तीत्यादावपि चित्राभिन्नस्वगोसम्बन्धित्वेन गोपदस्य लक्षणायामुदन्तत्वापत्तेः। ibid., p. 251.

Vide also गोरप्रधानस्यान्त्यस्य स्त्रियामादादीनाञ्चेति ह्रस्व इति सूत्रेऽन्त्यशब्देनैव पूर्वपदार्थसाकांक्षस्वार्थकत्वप्रतीतेरिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 251.

3. न च नामोत्तरवर्तिन एव गोवदस्य स्वार्थोपसर्जनतायां ह्रस्वविधिः। श. श. प्र. p. 251.

Vide also गोस्त्रियोरुपसर्जनस्य। पा. I. 2. 48. (सि. कौ. 656.)

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compound should be shortened. For one related to the variagated cow of oneself, the meaning implied by the word, *go* used with the nominal, *citrā* preceding thereto being related to what the word, *citra* means through identity is well eclipsed.[1]

Opponents argue : The rule providing for the shortening of the said vowel in the word, *go* operates only in case the meaning of the said word happens to be eclipsed due to its being signified through a frozen metaphor.[2]

Jagadīśa observes : The fact is that in an instance like *kṛta-pākaścaitrah* none of the constituents can ever be held to imply one related to the act of cooking or what has been the object of one's action. For the constituent viz, *kṛta* or *pāka* are but sentences. Because these are formed of more than one word. A sentence is devoid of the faculty of denotation and thus *ip so facto* devoid of the faculty of implication too.[3] Hence the idea that in *citraguḥ*, either the word, *citra* or *go* should imply one related to the varigated cow of oneself and that the other be only a pointer to speaker's intention is not convincing.

Opponents argue : The letter *ka* in the word, *kṛta* that has the potency to denote what is qualified by the state of *ka* may well be held to imply the said meaning viz one related to the act of cooking or what has been the object of one's action. The rest of the letters are only to indicate that the implication involved is only a frozen one.

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1. यत्र गोपदेन लक्षणयोपस्थापिते चित्राभिन्नस्वगोसम्बन्धिन्यभेदेन चित्रपदस्यान्वयस्तत्र चित्रगवोऽस्तीत्यादिकर्मधारयेऽपि गोपदस्य ह्रस्व-प्रसङ्गात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 251-52.
2. ननु निरूढलक्षणया स्वार्थोपसर्जनतार्था ह्रस्वविधानान्नैष दोषः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 252.
3. वस्तुतः कृतपाकश्चैत्र इत्यादौ स्वकृतिविषयपाकसम्बन्धित्वादिना चैत्राद्यवगमः पूर्वपदस्य परपदस्य वा लक्षणया न सम्भवदुक्तिकस्तयोरशक्तत्वेन तद्भक्तत्वायोगात्। श. श. प्र. p. 252.

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Jagadīśa replies : The meaning of the word, *kṛta* in that case is to be held liable of verbal comprehension despite its not being presented by itself.

Opponents argue : The nominal suffix, *ghañ* (in *pāka*) in that case may be held to imply the said meaning. For it has the potency to denote what is qualified by the state of *ghañ*.

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning presented by *ghañ* or a nominal suffix not qualified by the meaning of the base thereof cannot be semantically related to another word-meaning to bear out a verbal comprehension.[1]

It is reasonable, therefore, concludes Jagadīśa to hold that in *citraguḥ*, it is the word, *go* that signifies 'one related to the variagated cow of oneself' through a frozen metaphor and that with a part thereof, viz, cow the meaning of the word, *citrā* gets related through identity.[2]

Opponents argue : In case the meaning of the word, *citrā* is sought to get related to a part of the meaning of the word, *go* through identity, the verbal knowledge to occur as a result thereof is to embrace the said meaning of the word, *go* as a substantive. But such a verbal knowledge is possibie only if the said meaning happens to be embraced by the knowledge of import (*vṛtti-jñāna*) too, as the substantive. Hence semantics does not accomodate relation of a word-meaning with a part of another word-meaning. Knowledge of import of the word, *go* has happened to embrace what is related to cow and not to cow as the substantive. There is no scope, therefore for the

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1. न च तत्र कादिवर्णस्य स्वरूपशक्तस्य घञादिप्रत्ययस्य वा स्वकृतिविषयपाक-सम्बन्धिनि लक्षणा, तन्निरूढत्वसम्पादकञ्च शब्दान्तरमिति साम्प्रतम्। कृतादि-पदेभ्यः स्वार्थानुपस्थितावपि तदन्वयबोधप्रसङ्गात्, घञादिमात्रस्य नामत्वा-भावेन तन्मात्रोपस्थाप्यार्थे सुवर्थान्वयायोगात्, प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्नस्यैव कृदर्थस्य पदार्थान्तरेऽन्वयबुद्धेर्व्युत्पन्नत्वाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 252.

2. तस्माच्चित्रगुरित्यत्र गोपदं स्वगोसम्बन्धिलक्षकं तदेकदेशे च गवि तादाभ्येन चित्रपदस्यान्वयः। श. श. प्र. pp. 252-53.

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meaning of the word, *citrā* getting related to cow, a part of what the word, *go* is sought to imply. For otherwise in *citra-vrajo'sti* too, the meaning of the word, *citra* would be related to cow, a part of what the word, *vraja* means[1] i.e. (cow-) pasturage (*go-sthāna*).

Jagadīśa replies : In an instance of the *tatpurusa* compound like *ghaṭa-śūnyam* or *caitranaptā*, the meaning of the word, *ghaṭa* or *caitra* gets syntactically related to non-existence (*abhāva*) or to daughter (*duhitṛ*), a part of what the other constituent means viz. non-existent (*abhāva-vat*) or daughter's son (*duhitṛ-putra*) through difference. In an instance of the *bahuvrihi* compound like *citraguḥ* in the like manner the meaning of constituent word gets related to a part of what the other constituent word means, posited as the substantive, through identity due to semantic pecularity. A theory rests on the actuality of the situation.[2] According to the elders (Grammarians) even in an instance like *sundara-rāja-puruṣaḥ*, the meaning of the word, *sundara* is related to a part of what *rāja-puruṣa* means through the relation of identity.[3]

Opponents argue : The word, *go* in *citraguḥ* may well be held to imply the cow of oneself (*sva-go*) and 'one who is related' (*sambandhī*) through two-fold power of implication. The meaning of the word, *citrā*, then may be related the cow of oneself, a meaning of the word, *go*. Thereupon, the whole thing i.e. the variagated cow of oneself (*citrābhinna-sva-go*)

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1. (न च) गोधर्मिकान्वयबुद्धौ तद्धर्मिकवृत्तिज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वात् पदार्थैकदेशे गवि चित्रस्यान्वयो दुर्घटः, 'चित्रव्रजोऽस्तीत्यादौ गोस्थानरूपस्य व्रजस्यैकदेशे गवि चित्रस्यानन्वयेन तादृशशब्दोत्पत्तेरावश्यकत्वादिति वाच्यम् । ibid., p. 253.
2. 'घटशून्यं चैत्रनप्ते'त्यादितत्पुरुषे भेदेनेव चित्रगुप्रभृतिबहुव्रीह्यवयवभेदेन पदार्थैकदेशधर्मिकान्वयबोधस्य शब्दोत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण सम्भवात्; फलानुरोधित्वात् कल्पनायाः । श. श. प्र. p. 253.
3. प्राच्यैरपि 'सुन्दरराजपुरुष' इत्यादावभेदेन सुन्दरादेः पदार्थैकदेशे राजन्यन्वयबुद्धेः स्वीकाराच्च । ibid., p. 253.

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may be related to one who is related (thereto, *sambandhi*) which is equally a meaning of the word, *go*. There is, therefore, no contingency of a word-meaning getting related to a part of another word-meaning.[1] There is nothing wrong in imagining a word having the two-fold power of implication either. For the older sole of Logicians hold, that a word has threefold power of denotation to denote genus (*jāti*), individual (*vyakti*) and configuration (*ākṛti*) severally.

Jagadīśa observes : It is not reasonable to hold that the cow of oneself, a meaning of the word, *go* should be syntactically related to one who is related (thereto), another meaning of the said word.

Opponents point out : A verbal suffix is held by the logicians themselves to be denotative of agency (*krti*) and the present tense (*vartamānatva*) mutually related.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The argument is not convincing. For in that case, the pronoun, *tat* in an instance like *citraguh puruṣastasya sañcāro'timanoharah* should call the cow of oneself, (the meaning presented by the primary power of implication) to mind (*parāmarśaka*). To the opponents, *citraguh* is a single word. As such, the cow of oneself (*svago*) has to be admitted as a part of what the said word meaas. In semantics, on the contrary, a pronoun like *tat* is not admittedly capable of calling a part of a word-meaning to mind in any case.[3]

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1. यत्तु गोपदं तत्र स्वकीयगोत्वेन सम्बन्धित्वेन च लक्षकमतश्चित्रस्य गोपदार्थे एव स्वकीये गवि, तस्य च सम्बन्धिनि अन्वयान्न पदार्थैकदेशान्वयित्वम्। श. श. प्र. p. 253.
2. एकपदार्थयोश्च मिथोऽन्वयः कृतिवर्त्तमानत्वयोरिव नाव्युत्पन्नः। ibid., pp. 253–54.
3. तन्मन्दम्, तथा सति 'चित्रगुः पुरुषस्तस्याः सञ्चारोतिमनोहर' इत्यादौ तदादेस्वकीयगवादिपरामर्शकत्वापत्तेः, पदार्थकदेशस्यैव परामर्शकतायास्तदादावाव्युत्पन्नत्वादिति। ibid., p. 254.

Vide also विशेष्यविधया वृत्त्या पूर्वोपस्थापितस्यैवार्थस्य परामर्शकत्वात् तदादिशब्दानाम्। ibid., p. 234.

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Opponents argue : According to the Neo-logicians too, the pronoun, *tat* in the instance cited admittedly calls to mind the cow of one-self or what is a part of what the word signifies.

Jagadīśa replies : There is nothing wrong in it. For they admit of such syntactical relation[1] at least in an instance of the *tatpuruṣa* and the *bahuvrihi* compounds.[2] Otherwise in an instance like (*paṭola-patram pittaghnam nāḍī tasya kaphāpahā*) (the *paṭola*-leaves cure the derangement of the billous humor and the tubular stalk thereof removes *phlegm*), the pronoun, *tat* would never call to mind, *paṭola*, a kitchen vegetable.[3] As a matter of fact, the pronoun, *tat* calls to mind a part of a word-meaning. For it is potentially denotative of marked by the casual characteristic of being in the mind of the speaker i.e. implicitly sought to be conveyed by the speaker, and there is no hard and fast rule to the effect that it should call to mind only what has been presented by a nominal as a substantive.[4]

In the instance, *ārūḍha-vānaro* (*vṛkṣa*), says Jagadīśa, the word, *vānara*, therefore, signifies through a frozen metaphor 'what is related to monkey' (*vānara-sambandhī*), a part of what the compound is to mean; the root-verb means the act of climbing on what is the object of the said act and the word,

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1. अस्मन्मते च गवादेरेकदेशत्वान्त तत्परामर्शकत्वापत्तिरिति भावः। कृष्णकांती p. 254.
2. तत्पुरुषबहुव्रीह्यघटक पदार्थः पदार्थ एवान्वेतीति व्युत्पत्तेः स्वीकारादितिभावः। ibid., p. 253.
3. तत्पदस्य बुद्धिस्थत्वोपलक्षितधर्मावच्छिन्नशक्तत्वादेकदेशपरामर्शकत्वमस्त्येव, कथमन्यथा—

   पटोलपत्रं पित्तघ्नं नाड़ी तस्य कफापहा।
   फलं तस्य त्रिदोषघ्नं मूलं तस्य विरेचकम्॥

   इत्यत्र तत्पदस्य पटोलपरामर्शकत्वमिति (भवन्मते तदापत्तिः समाना, समानं समाधानञ्चेति।) ibid., p. 254.
4. तदादेर्बुद्धिस्थत्वोपलक्षितधर्मावच्छिन्नशक्तिवादिनां नव्यानां मते तु पूर्वोपस्थित्यादेरनपेक्षणात्। ibid., p. 234.

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kta means the agent of the said act. Thereupon, as called for by expectancy and the like the verbal knowledge of a tree as related to a monkey that is none other than the agent of the act of climbing what is the object of the said act occurs.[1]

Opponents argue : The compound, *ārūḍha-vānaraḥ* may well lead to the comprehension of a village related to a monkey, the agent of the act of climbing a tree thereof, the exposition being *ārūḍho vānaro yasya vṛkṣam.*

Jagadīśa replies : This is true. But in that case it will no longer be regarded an instance of the *bahūvrīhi* compound.[2] For the exposition suggested does not *go* to form a sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrihi* (or of any other) compound.[3] The sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrīhi* compound has a definite structure, points Jagadīśa : one of the constituent word of the *bahūvrīhi* compound is to end in the first declensional suffix and together with the other constituent words ending in declensional suffixes it is to be expectant with the word, *yat* ending in a declensional suffix denotative of difference (i.e. not ending in the first declensional suffix).[4] In *ārūḍho vānaro yasya* or *yam* the word, *yat* although it ends in a declensional suffix, is expectant with the word, *Vṛkṣa* only and not with any of the words constituting the compound involved.[5]

The exposition, *āḍhuro vānaro yaḥ* too is not to be regarded as a valid instance of the sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrīhi*

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1. एवञ्चारूढवानरो वृक्ष इत्यादावपि रूहधातुना स्वकर्मकारोहणस्य क्त्रेन कर्त्तुः वानरपदेन च वानरसम्बन्धिन उपस्थापनादमीषामाकां क्षादिधीसाचिव्यादेव स्वकर्मकारोहणकर्त्रभिन्नवानरसम्बन्धित्वादिना वृक्षादेबोध इत्यास्तां विस्तरः। श. श. प्र. p. 254.
2. न चारूढो वानरो यस्य वृक्षमित्यादिविग्रहादारूढवानरपदं स्वकीयवृक्षारूढ़-वानरसम्बन्धित्वेन ग्रामादिकं बोधयदपि बहुव्रीहिः स्यात्। ibid., p. 254.
3. अतस्तादृग्वाक्यस्य विग्रहत्वं खंडयन्नाह। ibid., p. 254.
4. अस्यैकं ग्रथमान्तं सत् सुवन्तैरितरैः सह।
पदा भेदसुवन्तेन साकांक्षं नाम विग्रहः॥ श. श. प्र. का. 44.
5. न चोक्तवाक्ये तथा, सुवन्तस्यापि यदस्तत्र वृक्षपदेनैव साकांक्षत्वात्। ibid., p. 253.

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compound. For the word, *yat* in this instance does not end in a declensional suffix denoting difference (a suffix other than the first one)[1]

Opponents argue : *Patitasya dhanam yasya, daṇḍāt ghaṭo yasmāt* and the like are valid instances of a sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrihi* compound. For it is formed of a word like, *dhnam* that ends in the first declensional snffix and it together with the other word is expectant with the word, *yat* ending in a declensional suffix denotative of difference.

Jagadīśa replies : The sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrihi* compound is not to involve two declensional suffixes denotative of things or ideas identical, The instances cited involve two such suffixes viz, the sixth declensional suffixes in *patitasya* and *yásya* or the fifth declensional suffixes in *daṇḍāt* and *yasmāt* expressive of the same thing.[2] The definition of the sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrīhi* compound may well be qualified by the clause 'not comprising of two declensional suffixes expressive of things or ideas identical'.

Opponents argue : The sixth declensional suffix added to the word, *patita* and the said suffix added to the word, *yat* do not express identical ideas. For the said suffix added to the word, *patita* is not expressive of possession (*svāmitva*), the idea expressed by the said suffix added to the word, *yah.*[3]

Jagadīśa argues : By the expression 'two declensional suffixes expressive of things or ideas identical' is meant two suffixes added to two different words signifying the same thing. The word, *patita* and the word, *yat* in the instance cited signify the same individual.[4]

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1. आरूढो वानरो य इत्यादौ तु यच्छब्दो न भेदार्थकसुबन्त इति न तादृशस्यापि वाक्यस्यार्थे बहुव्रीहिः । ibid., p. 255.
2. पतितस्य धनं यस्य, दंडाद् घटो यस्मादित्यादिकस्तु समानार्थकसुबद्वयीमन्तर्भाव्य न बहुव्रीहिविग्रहः. सम्प्रदायविरोधात् । श. श. प्र. p. 255.
3. तथा च समानार्थकसुबद्वयाघटितत्वमपि लक्षणविशेषणमिति भावः । कृष्णकांती p. 255.
4. तदर्थश्च तुल्यार्थकशब्दोत्तरत्वमतः पतितस्येत्यादौ पतिवपदोत्तरषष्ट्याः स्वामित्वार्थकत्वविरहेऽपि न क्षतिः । ibid., p. 252.

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Opponents argue : In the sentence of analysis of the compound, *nīlotpalam* (*saraḥ*) viz, *nīlam utpalam yasmin*, two declensional suffixes are found to have been added to two different words viz. *nīla*, and *utpala* signifying the same thing.

Jagadīśa replies : The *bahuvrīhi* compound known as *samānādhikaraṇa-bahuvrīhi* or what is formed of collocative words inevitably involve two first declensional suffixes. As such what is meant is that the sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrīhi* compound is not to involve two declensional suffixes other than the first one added to two different words signifying the same thing. [1]

Opponents argue : In *caitrasya dhānam yasmāt*, two declensional suffixes or rather three such suffixes viz., the sixth one and the fifth and the first have been involved.

Jagadīśa argues : No. two of the said declensional suffixes are either denotative of the same idea nor are these added to words signifying the same thing.[2]

Opponents argue : In that case *ghaṭena* (*saha*) *paṭo yatra* should be regarded as a valid instance of the sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrīhi* compound.

Jagadīśa replies : No For the third declensional suffix denotative of co-existence (*sahabhāva*) is not to be involved in the sentence of analysis of the said compound.[3]

Opponents argue : But *dakṣiṇayā* (*saha*) *pūrvā yasyāḥ* is regarded as the valid form of the sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrīhi* compound, *dakṣiṇa-pūrvā*.

Jagadīśa replies : It has been provided for by a special injunction.[4]

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1. न च समानाधिकरणबहुव्रीहियोग्यत्वाक्यमात्रस्यैव समानार्थकप्रथमाद्वयघटितत्वात् तत्राव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम्। प्रथमान्यतादृशसुबद्वयाघटितत्वस्यैव निवेश्यत्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 255.
2. चैत्रस्य धनं यस्मादित्यादिविग्रहेऽव्याप्तिवारणाय समानार्थकेति सुबद्वयविशेषणम्। ibid., p. 255.
3. एवं घटेन पटो यत्रेत्यादिकः सहाद्यर्थमन्तर्भाव्यापि। श. श. प्र. p. 255.
4. न च दक्षिणया पूर्वा यस्या इति विग्रहेऽव्याप्तिर्विशेषविधानादिति मामकीनोऽभिनवः पन्थाः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 255.

Vide also दिङ्नामान्यन्तराले। पा. II. 2. 26. (सि. कौ. 845)

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Opponents argue : What should be the sentence of analysis of the compound, *saputraḥ* then ?

Jagadīśa replies : It should be *saha putro yena* and not *putreṇa saha*. For otherwise the meaning of a word other than those that constitute the compound would not come to be comprehended as what is qualified by the said compound.[1] In *saghaṭo deśaḥ* too, the sentence of analysis is *saha ghaṭo yena*, the word, *saha* meaning the state of being possessed of and not collocativeness.[2]

As a matter of fact, the same old argument may be advanced in this case too.[3] For it also has been provided for by an independent aphorism. Incidently, it may be mentioned that Gadādhara in his *vyutpatti-vāda* has taken recourse to such a device with certain innovations of his own.[4]

Opponents argue : The definition of the sentence of analysis of the *bahuvrīhi* compound suggests that a word ending in the first declensional suffix together with other words ending in declensional suffixes is to be expectant with the word, *yat ending* in a declensional suffix other than the first one. But in *na ghaṭo yatra* the sentence of analysis of the compound *aghaṭo* (*deśaḥ*), the word *na* (being an indecli-

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1. 'सपुत्र' इत्यादौ तु सह पुत्रो येनेत्यादिरेव विग्रहो, न तु पुत्रेण सहेत्यादिरन्यपदार्थाप्राप्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 255.
2. 'सघटो देश' इत्यादौ च सह घटो येनेत्यादिविग्रहे सहार्थो वैशिष्ट्यं, न तु सामानाधिकरण्यम्, घटे देशस्य तद्बाधात्। श. श. प्र. p. 255.
3. तेन सहेति तुल्ययोगे। पा. II. 2. 28. (सि. कौ. 848)
4. सपुत्र आगच्छतीत्यस्य पुत्रेण सहागच्छति य इति विग्रहात् प्रथमान्तान्यपदार्थ एव पुत्रागमनकालान्वयो न तु क्रियायामिति न समासानुपपत्तिः। न चान्यपदार्थपुरुषालाभः। न चैवं समासलभ्यस्य पुत्रागमनकालावच्छिन्नस्य पुंसो विग्रहवाक्येनापि प्रतिपादनाद बहुव्रीहिमात्रस्यैव नित्यसमासत्वमिति भज्येतेति वाच्यम्। बहुव्रीहिमात्रस्य तथात्वानियमात्। प्रथमान्तानुपस्थाप्यान्यपदार्थबोधकबहुव्रीहेरेव तथात्वाभ्युपगमात्। अत्राचान्यपदार्थस्य प्रथमान्तोपस्थाप्यत्वात्। न च 'वृष्टे देवे गत' इतिवत् प्रथमार्थे बहुव्रीहेरसाधुत्वमिति वाच्यम्। अनेकमित्याद्यनुशिष्टबहुव्रीहावेव तन्नियमात्। अत्र च सूत्रान्तरेण तद्विधानात्। व्युत्पत्तिवाद p. 166.

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nable) obviously does not (visibly) end in a declensional suffix.

Jagadīśa replies : What the definition means is that the words other than the one, ending in the first declensional suffix, are to bear the semblance of what ends in a declensional suffix.[1]

Opponents argue : What should be the form of the sentence of analysis of the compound, *jivatpitṛko* (*naraḥ*). Obviously, it cannot be *jīvan pitā yasya* (or *yasya pitā jīvan*). For in semantics, the meaning of a word, ending in the primary suffix *śan* (i.e. *śānac*) or *tṛṅg* (*śatṛ*) is not admitted liable of comprehension as the predicate of a proposition, against the meaning of a word, ending in the first declensional suffix.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The sentence of analysis in the instance, is *jīvad-abhinnaḥ pitā yasya* and not *jīvan pitā yadīyaḥ*. The meaning of the word, *jivat*, the word ending the gerundial suffix, *śatṛ* becomes the determinant of the subject of the proposition and not the predicate thereof.[3]

Jagadīśa further observes : If in a sentence of analysis, the relative pronoun, *yat*, ending in a declensional suffix is likely to be expectant with a verb, the *bahuvrīhi* compound, formed, leads to the comprehension of what embraces the meaning of the said verb, related to the meaning of the pronoun, but for a provision otherwise. In *gantavyo grāmo yasya*, the relative pronoun, *yat*, ending in the sixth declensional suffix, is likely to be expectant with movement (*gati*), presented by

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1. सुबन्तैरिति सम्भवाभिप्रायम्, तेना'घटो देश' इत्यादिबहुव्रीहेर्नघटो यत्रेत्यादिविग्रहेण नञादेः सुबन्तत्वाभावेऽपि नाव्याप्तिः । श. श. प्र. p. 255.

2. ननु प्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्यार्थधर्मिकशनृतृङन्तपदार्थविधेयकबोधानङ्गीकारात् जीवन् पिता यस्येति विग्रहो न सम्भवति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 255.

3. 'जीवत्-पितृक' इत्यादेस्तु जीवन् पिता यस्येति विग्रहो यस्य च पिता जीवन् इत्येवं जीवद्विधेयकान्वये निराकांक्षोऽपि जीवदभिन्नः पिता यदीयः इत्यन्वयः एव साकाङ्क्षः । श. श. प्र. pp. 255–56.

तथा च जीवत उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकत्वेन विधेयत्वाभावाज्ञानुपपत्तिगन्धोऽपीति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 256.

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the verb, *gam*, constituting the word, *gantavya*. For the said suffix has been provided for in the sense of agency.[1] Hence the *bahuvrihi* compound, *gantavya grāmścaitraḥ* is to give the comprehension of *caitra*, related to the village, the object of movement of *caitra*.[2] In view of speaker's intention, however, the said compound may also lead to the comprehension of *caitra*, related to the village of himself, (that is) none else than where he is to go.[3]

In case, however, the relative pronoun *yat* ending in a declensional suffix be not likely to be expectant with a verb, the *bahuvrihi* compound formed, bears out the verbal knowledge of what, embracing the meaning of the nominal, is apprehended as the invariable substantive from the sentence of analysis, related to the meaning of the said pronoun ending in a declensional suffix. *Dhanī dāso yasya* gives the comprehension of one whose servant is rich. The relative pronoun has no prospect of being related to a verb and it is the meaning of the nominal, *dāsa* that is comprehended as the invariable substantive. The compound, *dhanidāsako'yam*, therefore, does not give the comprehension of one, related to the servant who has gone rich with one's wealth, but of one related to the rich servant of oneself.[4]

The sentence of analysis, *candraścūḍāyāṁ yasya* does not bear out the comprehension of 'whose moon (*candra*) is in the crest, although the relative pronoun, *yat* in this case too,

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1. कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति । पा. II. 3. 65.
2. यत्र विग्रहवाक्ये सुबन्तयदः क्रियासाकाङ्क्षत्वसम्भवस्तत्र तदर्थान्वितक्रियागर्भित एवार्थे विना बाधकं बहुव्रीहिर्व्युत्पन्नः । तेन गन्तव्यो ग्रामो यस्येति विग्रहे गन्तव्यग्रामश्चैत्र इत्यादितः स्वकर्तृकगतिकर्मग्रामसम्बन्धित्वेनैव चैत्रादेरौत्सर्गिको बोधः । श. श. प्र. p. 256.
3. कदाचित्तु-तात्पर्यादिवशाद् गन्तव्याभिन्नस्वकीयग्रामसम्बन्धित्वेन । ibid., p. 256.
4. यत्र तु यदस्तत्साकांक्षत्वासम्भवस्तत्र विशेषविध्यसत्त्वे यन्नामार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको विग्रहवाक्यात् बोधः, सुबन्तयदर्थान्वितत्तन्नामार्थगर्भित एवार्थे, अतएव धनी दासो यस्येत्यर्थे यदीयधनवान् दासस्तस्य 'धनिदासकोऽयमि' त्यादितो नावगमः किन्तु धनवत्स्वदाससम्बन्धिन एव । श. श. प्र. p. 256.

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is devoid of all expectancy with a verb. On the contrary, it means 'on whose crest, there is the moon'. For the *bahuvrīhi* compound formed of a word like *indu* (meaning the moon) with a word, ending in the seventh declensional suffix has been specially provided for to convey such a sense.[1]

Hence the compound, *candra-cūḍaḥ* (*śivaḥ*) gives the comprehension of *Śiva* as of being related to the moon (*candra*) resting on the crest of Himself and not of the sky (*gagana*) as what is related to the moon of itself (the sky), resting on the crest or of *Śiva* as of being related to the moon of Himself, resting on the crest.[2]

When a word-meaning that is expectant of a counter-correlative (*pratiyogin*), as a rule, is to be comprehended as an attribute, the *bahuvrīhi* compound is to mean what involves the said word-meaning, related to the meaning of the relative pronoun, *yat* ending in a declensional suffix. Hence in *caitraḥ putrakṛtotarṣaḥ* and the like, *caitra* is comprehended as one gifted with the fortune due to the birth of a son to himself and not as one gifted with fortune due to the birth of a son to somebody else.[3]

The *bahuvrīhi* compound has been found to be two kinds, collocative (*samānādhikaraṇa*) and non-collocative (*vyadhīkaraṇa*). Although Pāṇini has not directly provided for the non-collocative kind of the *bahuvrīhi* compound, he has indicated it in the context of giving rules for the constituents

1. चन्द्रश्चूडायां यस्येत्यादिकस्तु विग्रहो न यदीयश्चन्द्रश्चूड़ायामित्यर्थकः, किन्तु यदीयचूड़ायां चन्द्र इत्यर्थकस्तादृशार्थ एव सप्तम्यन्तेनेन्द्वादेर्विशेषतो बहुव्रीहिविधानात्। ibid., p. 256.

   Vide also पा. II. 2. 35; as also अवर्ज्यो बहुव्रीहिर्व्यधिकरणो जन्माद्युत्तरपदः (वामन)।

2. तेन 'चन्द्रचूडः शिव' इत्यादौ स्वचूड़ावृत्तिचन्द्रसम्बन्धित्वेन शिवस्यावगमो न तु चूड़ावृत्तिस्वकीयचन्द्रसम्बन्धित्वेन तस्य गगनादेर्वा बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 256.

3. ससम्बन्धिकपदार्थस्य विशेषणस्थले तु सुबन्तयदर्थान्वितत्वेन तादृशपदस्यार्थेन गर्भितेऽपि, अत एव 'चैत्रः पुत्रकृतोत्कर्ष' इत्यादौ स्वपुत्रकृतोत्कर्षवानेव चैत्रादिः प्रतीयते, न त्वन्यदीयपुत्रकृतोत्कर्षाश्रयः। ibid., pp. 256–57.

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leading the said compound.[1] At the same time, later grammarians have amply demonstrated the validity of the said kind of compounds being recognised in the system of Pāṇini.[2]

The Grammarians speak of another classification of the *bahuvrīhi* compound viz, *tad-guṇa-samvijñāna bahuvrīhi* and *atad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna bahuvrīhi*.

The *taḍ-guṇa-samvijñāna* kind of the *bahuvrīhi* compound leads to the verbal comprehension of the meaning of a constituent of the said compound as of being invariably associated with what is qualified by itself. In *trilocana Śivaḥ* or *lambakarṇa puruṣaḥ*, *locana* or *karṇa* the meaning of a constituent of the compound involved, is comprehended as of being invariably associated with *Śiva* or *puruṣa* or what is qualified by the compound, concerned.

The *ataḍ-guṇa-samvijñāna* kind of the *bahuvrīhi* compound does not bear out any such verbal comprehension. In *hata-kaṁsaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ* or in *dṛṣṭa-samudraḥ puruṣaḥ* the meaning of the constituent word *kaṁsa* or *samudra* is not liable of comprehension as of being associated with *Kṛṣṇa* or *samudra* or what is qualified by the compound involved.

Jagadīśa explains the said two kinds of the *bahuvrīhi* compound spoken of by the Grammarians as follows : The *tadguṇa-samvijñāna* kind of the *bahuvrīhi* compound is potentially capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of a constituent of itself posited as the feature against what is related to the meaning of the compound itself (as the substantive).

In *lamba-karṇaṁ ānaya* or in *hāra-grīvaṁ paśya*, for example, the *bahuvrīhi* compound, *lambakarṇa* or *hāragrīva* leads to the comprehension of the meaning of *karṇa* or *hāra*, a constituent of the compound involved, posited as the feature against the state of

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1. सप्तमीविशेषणे बहुव्रीहौ। पा. II. 2. 35.
   अतएव ज्ञापकात् व्यधिकरणपदो बहुव्रीहिः। दी on ibid. (सि. कौ, 898).
2. अवज्यों बहुव्रीहिव्यधिकरणो जन्माद्युत्तरपदः (वामन) vide सि. कौ. समासप्रकरण p. 317.

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being the object (*karmatva*) or what is related to the meaning of the compound (as the substantive). With the man (*puruṣa*) or what is qualified by the compound, *lambakarṇaḥ* or *hāra-grīvaḥ* as one related to the long ears of one's own or one related to the neckless round the long neck of oneself, comprehended as the object of the act of bringing in or eyeing, the ear (*karṇa*) or the necklace (*hāra*) turns out liable of comprehension as the object of the said act in the instances cited viz., *lamba-karṇam ānaya*, or *hāra-grīvam paśya*. In instances like *dṛṣṭa-sāgaraṁ ānaya*, an instance of *atad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna bahuvrīhi*, such a situation does not arise, the ocean (*sāgara*) is not to be comprehended as the object of bringing in of the person who has seen the ocean.[1]

The concept of *tad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna bahuvrīhi* comes very close to the idea of *upādāna-lakṣaṇā* as in *kuntāḥ praviśanti*, of the *ālaṁkārikas*, it may be pointed out.

According to Jagadīśa, the said two kinds of *bahuvrīhi* should mean thus : The *bahuvrīhi* compound that leads to the verbal comprehension of what has come out to be comprehended as the substantive due to the sentence of analysis, posited as the substantive is the *tad-guṇa-saṁvijñāna* kind of *bahuvrīhi*. The sentence of analysis, *ghaṭaḥ svarūpam yasya* gives the verbal knowledge of a jar posited as the substantive. The compound *ghaṭa-svarūpaḥ* (*padārthaḥ*) while causing the verbal knowledge of a jar posited as the substantive is to be regarded as the *tad-guṇa-saṁvijnāna* kind of *bahuvrīhi*. The

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1. यः स्वार्थघटकार्थस्य स्वार्थान्वयिनि बोधने ।
अनुकूलो बहुव्रीहिः स तयोरथवाऽऽदिमः ॥ श. श प्र. का. 46.

यो बहुव्रीहिः स्वार्थस्यान्वयिनि स्वार्थघटकस्यार्थस्यान्वयबोधने समर्थः स तयोस्तदतद्गुणसंविज्ञानयोरादिमः । 'लम्बकर्णमानय' हारग्रीवं पश्ये'-त्यादौ हि बहुव्रीहिर्लम्बत्वकर्णसम्बन्धिनः, स्वग्रीवावृत्तिहारसम्बन्धिनश्च स्वार्थस्यान्वयिनि कर्मत्वादौ स्वार्थघटकीभूतस्य तादृशकर्णहारादेरपि व्युत्पत्ति-वैचित्र्येणान्वयबोधने समर्थ इत्येवंविध एव तद्गुणसंविज्ञानस्तदभिन्न एव चार्थादतद्गुणसंविज्ञानः, यथा दृष्टसागरमानय इत्यादीति प्राचां मतम् । ibid., p. 258–259.

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sentence of analysis, *ghaṭasya svarūpam yasmāt*, on the contrary, leads to the verbal knowledge of the constitution (*svarūpa*), posited as the substantive. Thus the compound, *ghaṭa-svarūpaḥ* (*padārthaḥ*) while leading to the comprehension of the stick (*daṇḍa*), employed in the constitution or the making of a jar, posited as the substantive, is to be regarded as the *atad-guṇa-saṃvijñāna* kind of *bahuvrihi* compound.[1]

The *bahuvrīhi* compound is also classified into *dvipada-bahuvrihi*, *tripada-bahuvrihi*, *catuspada-bahuvrīhi* and so on, in accordance with the number of nominals involved in the formation of the compound concerned.[2]

The instance, *citraguḥ* holds out a case of the *dvipada-bahuvrīhi* in view of only two nominals viz, *citrā* and *gauḥ* being involved in it. In *mahan-nīlotpalam*, three nominals viz, *mahat*, *nīla* and *utpala* are involved. It is, therefore, recognised an instance of what is called *tripada-bahuvrihi*.

Opponents argue : It may be so held that *nīla* and *utpala* first form the *karmadhāraya*, *nīlotpalam*. Thereupon, *mahat* and *nīlotpalam* form the *bahuvrīhi* compound. Hence the said instance should be regarded an example of *dvipada-bahuvrīhi*.

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *mahat* gets its final letter changed into *ā* (i.e. *mahat* turns into *mahā*), if a collocative

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1. तदतद्गुणसंविज्ञानौ द्वौ भेदौ, तदादिमः ।
विग्रहस्य विशेष्यो यस्तद्विशेष्यकबोधकृत् ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 45.

तत्र विग्रहवाक्यस्य विशेष्यविधया प्रत्याय्यो योऽर्थस्तद्विशेष्यकबोधकृद्बहुव्रीहिः तयोरादिमस्तद्गुणसंविज्ञानः, तवस्य सार्थगुणीभूतस्य सम्यग् विशेष्यविधया विज्ञानं यस्मादिति व्युत्पत्त्या स्वान्वयसंज्ञाकत्वात्, तद्भिन्नश्चातद्गुणसंविज्ञानश्चरम इत्यर्थाद् गम्यते । 'घटस्वरूपः पदार्थः' इत्यादितो हि घटः स्वरूपं यस्येति विग्रहस्थले स्वरूपाभिन्नघटसम्बन्धित्वेन घटाभिन्नस्वरूपसम्बन्धित्वेन वा विग्रहविशेष्यं कलसमेव विशेष्यविधया बोध्यते । घटस्य स्वरूपं यस्मादिति विग्रहे च विग्रहस्य यद्विशेष्यं ततोऽन्यदेव स्वजन्यस्वस्वरूपाभिन्नघटसम्बन्धित्वेन । ibid., pp. 257–58.

2. स्वान्तर्निविष्टद्वित्र्यादिनामभिर्विग्रहात् पुनः ।
बहुव्रीहिर्बहुविधो द्विपद-त्रिपदादिकः ॥ ibid., का. 47.

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(or the affix *jātīya*) follows.[1] The form of the compound, therefore, would be *mahā-nīlotpalaṁ* (and not *mahan-nīlotpalaṁ*).

Jaratī-citraguḥ is another example of the *tripada-bahuvrīhī*. It cannot be so held that firstly the words, *citrā* and *gauḥ* form the compound, *citra-gavī* and thereupon the words, *jaratī* and *citragavī* form the compound, *Jaratī-citra-guḥ*. For the first member of a *bahuvrīhi* compound, if it happens to be a word of feminine form derived from a corresponding masculine form by means of a suffix other than *ūng* and if the ultimate member is a word, not read under the *priyādi* class of the feminine form and does not end in an ordinal termination, resumes the masculine base.[2] The compound, therefore, should take the form *jarat-citraguḥ* and not *jaratī-citraguḥ*.

Opponents argue : The word, *mahat* is to have its final letter changed into *ā* or the word, *jaratī* would resume its masculine base only in case these are followed by the ultimate member of a compound. In the instances cited, the first member viz, *mahat* or *jaratī* has been intervened by the word *nīla* or *citrā*. As such, there is no reason as to why *mahat* in *mahannīlotpalam* or *jaratī* in *jaratī-citraguḥ* should change into *mahā* or *jarat*. It is enough that in *jaratī-citraguḥ*, the word, *citrā* has resumed its masculine base on that score.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The fact is that being a compound, *nīlotpala* or *citragavī* is to be admitted as a single member constituting the compound to be regarded as the ultimate member (*uttarapada*). Hence the change of the final letter

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1. आन्महतः समानाधिकरणजातीययोः। पा. VI. 3. 46. (सि. कौ. 807)
   Vide also श. श. प्र. pp. 259–60.
2. स्त्रियाः भाषितपुंस्कादनूङ् समानाधिकरणे स्त्रियामपूरणीप्रियादिषु। पा. VI. 3. 34. (सि. कौ. 831)
   Vide also श. श. प्र. 259–60.
3. ननु चित्रापदनीलपदयोरपि स्वापेक्षयोत्तरत्वमस्त्येविति तत्स्वीकारेऽपि कथन्नप्रसङ्गः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 260.

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in *mahat* or the word, *jaratī* resuming the masculine base is obviously called for.[1]

Opponents argue : The word, *mahat* is to get its final letter changed into *ā* or the word, *jaratī* is to resume its masculine base only if followed by a nominal, not forming part of a *Karmadhāraya* compound.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : This would mean that the meanings of the word, *mahat* i.e. the big and of *nīla* i.e. the blue or the meanings of the word, *citrā* i.e. the bridled and of *jaratī* i.e old are to be comprehended as what are predicated against the lotus (*utpala*) or the cow (*go*), respectively through identity.

But the difficulty is that this kind of a syntactical relation is not admitted of. For the word, the meaning of which is to be comprehended as what is predicated through identity has to end in the first declensional suffix. In the instances cited, neither *nīla* (in *nīlotpalam*) nor *citrā* (in *citragavī*) ends in the said suffix.[3]

Bhaṭṭoji dīkṣita in his *siddhānta-kaumudī* has referred to the opponent's view. According to some, he says, *citrā jaratī gauryasya* gives the compound—*citrā-jaratī-guḥ* meaning a person having an old bridled cow. For the ultimate member (*uttara-pada*) viz. *go* used collocatively with the word, *citrā* is separated therefrom by an intervening word viz, *jaratī*. The word, *jaratī* too, is not to resume

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1. समासान्तपदस्य चोत्तरपदत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 260.
2. ननु कर्मधारयाघटकनामान्तराव्यवहितोत्तरनाम्नि तयोर्विधानं वक्तव्यम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 260.
3. एकत्र द्वयमिति न्यायेन गवि चित्रजरत्योरभेदानुभवस्योक्तरीत्या सम्पादयितुमशक्यत्वेन तदर्थमेव त्रिपदादिबहुव्रीहेरावश्यकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 260.

Vide also नामार्थस्य मुख्यविशेष्यताक इव तादात्म्यावच्छिन्नविधेयताकेऽपि बोधे नाम्नः प्रथमान्तत्वस्य तंत्रत्वात्। ibid., pp. 210–211.

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its masculine base. For it is not the first member (*pūrva-pada*) of the compound cited.[1]

According to Bhaṭṭoji dīkṣita, however, the penultimate member viz, *jaratī* should resume its masculine base to give the compound, *citrā-jarad-guḥ*. For by the expression, *pūrva-pada*, a preceding member is to be understood. Because it is the expression, *uttara-pada* alone that is to convey a technical sense and not the expression, *pūrva-pada*.[2]

Hence a *bahuvrihi* compound, even if it involves a *dvandva* compound, as in *citrā-jaratyau gāvau yasya*, one having a bridled and an old cow, is to take the form *citrā-jarad-guḥ*. But if the first member is a *Karmadhāraya* compound as in *jaraccitrā gauryasya*, one having a cow that is old and bridded, the form of the compound would be *jarad-citra-guḥ*. If again, the ultimate member is a *Karmadhāraya* compound as in *citrā jaradgavī yasya*, one having an old cow which is brided, the form is to be *citra-jarad-gavīkaḥ*.[3]

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1. चित्रा जरती गौर्यस्येति विग्रहे अनेकोक्तेर्बहुनामपि बहुव्रीहिः। अत्र केचित्-चित्राजरतीगुः-जरतीचित्रागुर्वा । एवं दीर्घातन्वी जङ्घः-तन्वीदीर्घाजङ्घः । त्रिपदे बहुव्रीहौ प्रथमं न पुंवत् उत्तरपदस्य मध्यमेन व्यवधानात् । द्वितीयमपि न पुंवत् पूर्वपदत्वाभावात्। उत्तरपदशब्दो हि समासस्य चरमावयवे रूढः, पूर्वपदशब्दस्तु प्रथमावयवे इति वदन्ति। दी on पा. VI. 3. 34. (सि. कौ. 831)
2. वस्ततस्तु नेह पूर्वपदमात्त्विष्यते--'आनङृतो द्वन्द्वे' (पा. VI. 3. 25. सि. कौ. 921.) इत्यत्र यथा। तेन उपान्त्यस्य पुंवदेव-चित्राजरद्गुः इत्यादि। ibid.
3. अतएव चित्राजरत्यौ गावौ यस्य इति द्वन्द्वगर्भेऽपि चित्राजरद्गुः इति भाष्यम्। कर्मधारयपूर्वपदे तु द्वयोरपि पुंवत् जरच्चित्रगुः। कर्मधारयोत्तरपदे तु चित्रजरद्गवीकः। ibid.

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CLASSIFICATION OF COMPOUNDS (DVANDVA)

Two or more nouns connected otherwise by 'and' (*ca*), syntactically related, form into a compound known as *dvandva* or the copulative kind of compound.

Pāṇini provides for this compound by the aphorism, *cārthe dvandvaḥ*.[1] The word, *śeṣaḥ* from the aphorism, *śeṣo bahuvrīhi*[2] and the word, *anekam* from the aphorism, *anekamanya-padārthe*[3] are to be understood to have been repeated in this context. The present aphorism, therefore, takes the form, *anekam śeṣaḥ cārthe dvandvaḥ*.

The word, *śeṣaḥ* implies that the *dvandva* compound is formed of words ending in the first declensional suffix. The word, *anekam* indicates that two or even more words form this compound.

The word, *ca* has four-fold meaning viz. collection (*samuccaya*), adding an object of secondary importance to the main object (*anvācaya*), inter-connection (*itaretarayoga*) and aggregation (*samāhāra*).[4]

Collection means predication of the same thing against several mutually independent matters.[5] In *īśvaram guruñca bhajasva* (worship God and preceptor), the act of worship has

1. पा. II. 2. 29. (सि. कौ. 901).
2. पा. II. 2. 23. (सि. कौ. 829).
3. पा. II. 2. 24. (सि. कौ. 830).
4. समुच्चयान्वाचयेतरेतरयोगसमाहाराश्चार्थाः । दी (सि. कौ. 901)
5. परस्परनिरपेक्षस्य अनेकस्य एकस्मिन्नन्वयः समुच्चयः । ibid.

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been predicated against both God and preceptor who are mutually independent. Worship of both of them is not simultaneously possible. They are to be related to the act of worship severally. As such, God and preceptor being the object of worship to be severally performed, are not syntactically related to call for the formation of a compound.

In *bhikṣāmaṭa gāñcānaya*, (go out to beg and bring the cow), the going out to beg is enjoined to the beggar as his principal object. The act of bringing a cow is only a secondary one. As a result, the said two objects are not syntactically related to bring in the formation of any compound.[1]

Inter-connection (*itaretara-yoga*) means predication of the same thing against several objects being mutually dependent by virtue of their simultaneous relation with a substance (*dravya*), an act (*kriyā*) or an attribute. *Rāma* and *śyāma* are two independent individuals. The words, *rāma* and *śyama*, therefore, denotative of these two individuals, as such, cannot call for the formation of a compound. For in view of expectancy wanting, these two words are not syntactically related. But if a verb is involved as in *rāmaśca syāmaśca gacchataḥ* or an attribute as in *rāmaśca śyāmśca sundarau* or a word denotative of substance in *ghaṭaśca paṭaśca dravye*, the compound *rāma-śyamau* or *ghaṭa-paṭau* is formed. The tress of *dhava* and *khadira* although independent of each other, come out to be syntactically related through the act of being seen (*dhava-khadirau dṛśyete*) to call for the compound, *dhava-khadirau*[2], known as *itaretara-dvandva*. Aggregation (*samāhāra*) implies the sense of a group; it conveys a single idea. In this also two or more words, denotative of objects (otherwise independent), being mutually dependent in the like manner are to call for the formation of the *dvandva* compound known as *samāhāra-dvandva*. *Pāṇi ca pādau ca* gives the compound,

1. तत्र 'ईश्वरं गुरुञ्च भजस्व' इति समुच्चये, भिक्षामट गाञ्चानय इत्यन्वाचये च न समासः, असामर्थ्यात्। दी. (सि. कौ. 901).
2. धवखदिरौ। ibid.

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pāṇi-pādam (*sundaram*). For the words, *pāṇi* and *pāda* although are denotative of hands and feet (that are otherwise independent) respectively, are mutually dependent (*sāpekṣā*) through the attribute, *sundaram*; hands and feet are simultaneously handsome.

In the case of a compound in the sense of inter-connection (*itaretara-yoga*), the meanings of the constituents thereof are severally related to the predicate. In the case of a compound in the sense of aggregation, on the other hand, the said meanings taken together are thus related. The speaker's intention determines the kind of relation involved. As such, but for a specific rule in favour of a compound being provided for in the sense of aggregation, the *dvandva* compound optionally takes the form either of *itaretara* or *samāhāra*; *vadhūśca varaśca* may yield both *vadhū-varau*, *vadhū-varam*. But *pāṇi ca pādau ca* are to give the form *pāṇi-pādam* only. For the compound is to carry the sense of aggregation as provided for by a special injunction.[1] Instances of *dvandva* compoundoptionally taking the form of the *itaretara* kind despite special injunctions otherwise, however, are not wanting. *Mukha-nāsikābhyām yo niṣkrāmati so vāyuḥ, grīva-kukṣi-lalāṭeṣu nityaṁ svedaḥ praśasyate, cakṣu-caraṇairlohitāḥ sitāḥ* are the instances in point.[2] Even Pāṇini himself has used *nāsika-stanayordhmādheṭoḥ*.[3]

Jagadīśa defines the *dvandva* compound as what being formed of two or more nominals used in strict chronology and being known to have been thus formed, is capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of the individual meanings, severally presented by the said nominals posited as features.[4]

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1. द्वन्द्वश्च प्राणितूर्य्यसेनाङ्गानाम्। पा. II. 4. 2. (सि. कौ. 906).
2. सि. कौ. Mukherjee p. 422.
3. पा. III. 2. 29.
4. यद्यदर्थकयन्नामव्यूहो यद्यत्प्रकारके।
बोधे समर्थः स द्वन्द्वः समासस्तावदर्थकः॥ श. श. प्र. का. 48.

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The compound, *pāṇi-pādam* in *pāṇi-pādam vādaya* or *dhava-khadirau* in *dhava-khadirau cchindhi* is formed of the nominals *pāṇi* and *pāda* or *dhava* and *khadira* severally presenting the individual meanings, hands and feet or *dhava* (a kind of tree) and *khadira* (a kind of tree) and being known to have been thus formed, is capable of bearing out the comprehension of the said individual meanings posited as features against *karmatva*, the meaning of the declensional suffix involved viz, *a.m̀*[1]

Grammarians argue : In an instance of the *samāhāra-dvandva* compound like *pāṇi-pādam*, the ultimate constituent implies unity (*sāhitya*), the other nominal being only a pointer to the speaker's intention or imparting conventionality to the implication involved. For aggregation (*samāhāra*) carries the sense of unity. Instances of this compound, therefore, as a rule, end in a declensional suffix of the singular number only. The said implied meaning, thereupon, gets syntactically related to the meaning of the declensional suffix like *am* through the relation of *svāśraya-niṣṭhatva*, *sva* meaning unity, the substratum (*āśraya*) of which are hands and feet wherein the meaning of the declensional suffix inheres (*niṣṭha*).[2]

Jagadīśa refutes : Unity means either the state of being identically related (as the subject) to one and the same act

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यद्यदर्थोपस्थापकस्य क्रमिकयादृशनामस्तोमस्य निश्चयस्तत्तदर्थकप्रकारकान्वयबोधं प्रति तत्त्वेन समर्थस्तादृशनामनिवह एव तावदर्थको द्वन्द्वसमासः। ibid., pp. 260–61.

1. 'पाणिपादं वादय' धवखदिरौ छिन्धी'त्यादौ हि कर्मत्वाद्यंशे करचरणादिप्रकारकान्वयबोधं प्रत्यमादिधर्मिकः करणाद्युपस्थापकस्य पाणिपादादिक्रमिकनामस्तोमस्याव्यवहितोत्तरत्वसम्बन्धेन निश्चयः कारणम्, अतः पाणिपादादिसमुदायः करचरणादितत्तदर्थे द्वन्द्वः। ibid., p. 261.
2. यत्तु पाणिपादमित्यादौ समाहारद्वन्द्वे सर्वत्रोत्तरपदे पाणिपादसाहित्ये लक्षणा, अतएव नित्यं तत्रैकवचनं समाहारस्यैकत्वात्, पदान्तरन्तु तादृशलक्षणाया, निरूढत्वसम्पादकं, तथाविधसाहित्यस्य च स्वाश्रयनिष्ठत्वादि-सम्बन्धेनैव द्वितीयाद्यर्थककर्मत्वादौ सांकांक्षत्वात् पाणिपादं वादयेत्यादेर्नायोग्यत्वम्—इति प्राच्यैरुक्तम्। श. श. प्र. p. 261.

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or the state of being embraced as the substantive of a single verbal comprehension. In that case, as the counter-co-relates (*pratiyogin*) of an act or the substantive of a verbal knowledge come out to be many, an instance of *samāhāra-dvandva* too, should end in a declensional suffix of the dual or the plural number, to indicate the number of the counter-co-relate of the act involved or of the substantives of the verbal comprehension concerned.[1]

Grammarians reply : This is not reasonable. Multiplicity of unity notwithstanding, the *samāhāra-dvandva* compound is not to be suffixed with a declensional suffix of the dual or the plural number.[2] For the first declensional suffix has been provided for to be suffixed with it, as a rule.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, it is more reasonable to hold that although the compound, *pāṇi-pādam* means (through etymology) multiple objects viz, hands and feet, a declensional suffix of the dual or of the plural number is not to be suffixed therewith. For expectancy does not call for it. The view, therefore, that a constituent of the *samāhāra-dvandva* implies unity is unfounded.[4]

Not only that. The expression, *hastyaśvam dhanam* would bear out no verbal knowledge. Because the word-meanings concerned cannot be syntactically related. For the unity (or aggregation) of elephants and horses and wealth are identical

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1. तत्र युक्तम् तुल्यवदेकक्रियान्वयित्वं बुद्धिविशेष्य-विशेष्यत्वं वा पाणिपादयोः साहित्यं, तस्य नानात्वसम्भवेन तद्गतद्वित्वादिबोधार्थं समाहारद्वन्द्वादपि द्विवचनाद्यापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात्। ibid., p. 262.
2. साहित्यस्य द्वित्वबहुत्वेऽपि न समाहारद्वन्द्वस्य द्विवचनादिसाकांक्षत्वन्तादृश-द्विगोरिवेति। श. श. प्र. p. 262.
3. "द्वन्द्वैकत्वम्" तथा "द्विगो"रित्यनुशासनवशात्तथैव कल्पनादितिभावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 262.
4. तर्हि पाणिपादप्रभृतीनां नानात्वेऽपि न तदर्थकस्य द्वन्द्वस्य द्विवचनाद्या-कांक्षात्वमित्येव वक्तुमुचितं कृतं साहित्ये भवत्या। श. श. प्र. p. 262.

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and the meanings of any two nominals cannot be syntactically related through difference.[1]

Grammarians argue : In case (unity or) aggregation (*samāhāra*) is not borne out by the said compound, there is no reason to designate it as *samāhāra-dvandva*.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The said designation is only a grammatical formality. It merely signifies that this compound is to take the neuter form and be suffixed with a declensional suffix of the singular number as a rule. It does not mean that it should bear out the comprehension of aggregation.[3]

Mīmāṁsakas argue : In *dhava-khadirau* and the like, the instances of the *itaretara-dvandva* compound too, implication is inevitable. The last constituent of it implies the substratum of unity or aggregation of *dhava* and *khadira*[4], (the other constituent being indicative of speaker's intention or imparting conventionality to the implication involved).

Opponents ask : Why should the stipulated implied meaning be extended upto the substratum of (unity or) aggregation instead of being limited to (unity or) aggregation of itself ?

Mīmāṁsakas reply : The declensional suffix, *au* (added to *dhava-khadira*) denotes duality (*dvitva*) while aggregation (or unity) is unitary in character. These two word-meanings, therefore, are not syntactically related.

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1. हस्त्यश्वं धनमित्यादेरयोग्यताया दुर्वारतापाताच्च—नामार्थयोर्भेदान्वयाव्युत्पन्नत्वेन हस्तिनामश्वानाञ्च साहित्यस्य स्वाश्रयत्वादिसम्बन्धेन धनादावन्वयायोगात्, तादृशसाहित्ये धनादेरभेदविरहाच्च। ibid., p. 262.
2. नन्वेवं तस्य समाहारावोधकत्वे समाहारसंज्ञायाः किं फलम्। कृष्णकांती pp. 262–63.
3. समाहारपरिभाषा तु क्लीबलिङ्गत्वनित्यैकवचनत्वादिपदसंस्कारोपयोगितयैवोपपन्ना, न द्वन्द्वस्यार्थव्यवस्यापिका। श. श. प्र. p. 268.
4. धवखदिरावित्यादावितरेतरद्वन्द्वेऽप्युत्तरपदे धवखदिरसाहित्याश्रये लक्षणा। ibid., p. 263.

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Not only that. Aggregation (*sāhitya*) and the act of cutting (*chedana*) too are not mutually compatible to call for a similar relation.

As a matter of fact, the number denoted by a declensional suffix, is to be related as a rule to the meaning of the base thereof as qualified by the determinant of the said meaning (*prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka*).[1] In case the implied meaning is the aggregation of *dhava* and *khadira*, the determinant of the meaning of the base is *dhavatva* and *khadiratva*. As such duality is to be related to what are qualified by *dhavatva* and *khadiratva* severally. In consequence two *dhavas* and two *khadiras* would be liable of comprehension from *dhava-khadirau*.[2] Mere *dhavatva* or mere *khadiratva* cannot be held to be the determinant of the meaning of the base (of the suffix, *au*). For neither of these two are the determinants of the state of the exclusive locus of duality.[3] Hence taking any one of *dhavatva* or *khadiratva* as the determinant of the meaning of the base only one *dhava* and one *khadira* cannot be signified on the ground that duality that pertains to *dhava* and *khadira* together is inherent therein.

Conversely, if the implied meaning is extended upto the substratum of the aggregation of *dhava* and *khadira*, the determinant of the meaning of the base is aggregation (*sāhitya*). Duality, therefore, the meaning of the suffix, *au* is to be exclusively related to the substratum of the aggregation of *dhava* and *khadira* or what is qualified by the aggregation thereof, the determinant of the meaning of the base. Duality could not be related to *dhava* or *khadira* any longer to give the

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1. विभक्तेः प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकव्याप्यसंख्याभिधायकत्वनियमात्। भाट्टचिन्तामणि p. 115.
2. अन्यथा द्विवचनादेः प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकवत्त्येव पर्य्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन स्वार्थद्वित्वानुभावकत्वव्युत्पत्तेर्धवखदिराविति यतो धवद्वयस्य खदिरद्वयस्य च प्रतीत्यापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 263.
3. तत्र च न धवत्वाद्यन्वयितावच्छेदकं द्वित्वपर्य्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वानवच्छेदकत्वात्। भाट्टचिन्तामणि p. 115.

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comprehension of two *dhavas* and two *khadiras*. For these are other than what are qualified by the determinant of the meaning of the base.

Jagadīśa refutes : Unity (*sāhitya*) it has already been seen, means either the state of being identically related (as the subject) to one and the same act or the state of being embraced as the substantive of a single verbal comprehension. As such it is not unitary in character. Hence the substratum thereof may be two *dhavas* or two *khadiras*. There is no escape even if the implied meaning is extended upto the substratum of unity (or aggregation) of *dhava-khadira*. Two *dhavas* or two *khadiras* are still liable of comprehension from *dhava-khadirau*.[1]

Mīmāṁsakas argue : In *dhava-khadirau*, the unity (or aggregation) of *dhava-khadira* means the state of being embraced as the substantive of the verbal comprehension of *dhava-khadira* (that are) less than three in number. The apprehension of two *dhavas* or of two *khadiras* being liable of comprehension from *dhava-khadirau* therefore, is unfounded.[2]

Jagadīśa refutes : No such unity (or aggregation) is ever embraced by verbal knowledge.[3] The fact is that in case more than one property is the determinant of the meaning of the base, it is imperative that the declensional suffix of the dual or of the plural number should signify the number related to the collection of what are severally qualified by each of such property. It cannot so happen that the said suffix should signify a number related to what are qualified by one of such properties to the exclusion of what is qualified by the other. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason as to why two *dhavas* or

1. तुल्यवदेककियान्वयित्वं धवखदिरविशेष्यकधीविशेषविशेष्यत्वं वा धवखदिरयोः साहित्यं, तदाश्रयश्च धवखदिरादिकमपीति तादृशसाहित्याश्रयत्वपक्षेऽपि धवखदिरावित्यतो धवद्वयादिबोधस्थे दुर्वारतापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 263.

2. न च त्रितयाविशेष्यकधवखदिरधर्मिकधीविशेष्यत्वमेव प्रकृते धवखदिरयोः साहित्यं तच्च न धवद्वयादेरिति वाच्यम्। ibid., p. 263.

3. तादृशसाहित्यान्वयस्यानुभवेनास्पर्शात्। श. श. प्र. p. 263.

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two *khadiras* should be comprehended to the exclusion of the other from *dhava-khadirau*. The imagination of implication, therefore, in the case of *itaretara-dvandva* is absolutely uncalled for.[1]

Opponents argue : *Ghaṭa-ghaṭaḥ, ghaṭa-kalasaḥ, ghaṭa-tad-ghaṭaḥ* and the like should be regarded as the instances of the *dvandva*-compound. For these are formed of nominals used in strict chronology and are capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of the individual meanings severally presented by the said nominals posited as features.

Jagadīśa replies : These instances are not examples of the *dvandva* compound. For these do not cause the verbal comprehension of jar and the like by virtue of being known to have been formed of nominals, used in strict chronology.[2]

A *dvandva* compound is validly formed of nominals of different denotations or of different determinants thereof. With this end in view, Pāṇini has defined it as *cārthe dvandvaḥ*.[3] The elders also analyse the compound, *dhava-khadirau* as *dhavaśca khadirśca* bringing in the word *ca* meaning collection of what involve difference. The word *ca* is used twice to bring home the idea of mutual difference of the things signified.[4]

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1. तस्मात् यत्र नानाधर्माणां प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकत्वं तत्र तत्तद्धर्मावच्छिन्ने समुदित एव पर्य्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन द्वित्वादिबोधने द्विवचनादिकं साकाङ्क्षं, न तु तादृशैकधर्मावच्छिन्नं परित्यज्य तथाविधापरधर्मावच्छिन्ने, यतो धव-खदिरावित्यादितो धवयोः खदिरयोश्च बोधप्रसङ्ग इति तत्त्वम्। ibid. pp. 263–64.

   Vide तथा च साहित्ये भक्तिं विनाप्यापत्यसम्भवात् कृतं तादृशसाहित्ये भक्त्येति भावः। कृष्णकांती p. 264.

2. घटघटेत्यादिकस्य, घटकलसेत्यादिकस्य, घटतद्घटेत्यादिकस्य च क्रमिक-नामस्तोभस्य निश्चयत्वेन घटादेरन्वयबोधं प्रत्यहेतुत्वमतो न तादृङ् नामनिवहो घटाद्यर्थे न द्वन्द्वः। श. श. प्र. p. 264.

3. अतएव समस्यमानपदार्थयोस्तत्त्वावच्छेदकयोर्वा यत्र मिथो भेदस्तत्रैव द्वन्द्वस्य साधुत्वसूचनाय चार्थे द्वन्द्वः (II. 2. 29) इति पाणिनिः प्राह। ibid., p. 264.

4. अतएव भेदगर्भसमुच्चयार्थकं शब्दमन्तर्भाव्य धवश्च खदिरश्चेत्यादिकं विग्रहमस्य प्रयुञ्जते वृद्धाः, समुपाददते च तत्र मिथो भेदप्राप्त्यर्थञ्चकार-द्वयम्। ibid., p. 264.

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Grammarians argue : Like non-identity of the determinants of denotation, non-identity of words too is a factor in determining the validity of a *dvandva* compound. For otherwise the compound involved in *pīta-paṭayostādātmyam* cannot be explained.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The compound is formed of nominals of different determinants of denotation. There is no need therefore, to conceive of non-identity of words as an additional factor in determining the validity of *dvandva* compound.[2] The determinant of denotation of *pīta* is *pītatva* and that of *pīta-paṭa* is *pīta-paṭatva* although the things signified are identical.[3]

Grammarians argue : In that case duality (*dvitva*), the meaning of the declensional suffix cannot be syntactically related to the meanings of *pīta-tatpaṭa*, the base thereof. For these words signify the same thing. For how otherwise the meanings thereof be identical ? If identical, how could these be two ?

Jagadīśa replies : Duality in this instance is syntactically related to the determinants of denotation of *pīta* and *tat-paṭa* through *svāśraya-vṛttitva* although it involves the fault of a part of a word-meaning being syntactically related to another word-meaning due to semantic pecularity.

Grammarians argue : It has been held earlier that duality, the meaning of the declensional suffix is to be related to the meaning of the base thereof through exclusiveness (*paryyāpti*) only. How could then it be related to the determinants of denotation through *svāśraya-vṛttitva*.

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1. पदार्थतावच्छेदकभेदवत् पदभेदस्यापि द्वन्द्वनियामकत्वम्, कथमन्यथा पीततत्पटयोस्तादात्म्यमिति प्रयोग इति वैयाकरणाः वदन्ति। कृष्णकांती p. 264.
2. तन्मन्दम्. तत्र पदस्थतावच्छेदकभेदस्यापि तत्त्वात् पदभेदस्य तन्नियामकत्वाभावेऽपि न क्षतिः। ibid., p. 264.
3. पीत-तत्पटयोस्तादात्म्यमित्यादौ तत्पटादेः पीताद्यभिन्नत्वेऽपि पीतत्व-तत्पटत्वाद्योः पदार्थतावच्छेदकयोरस्त्येव भेदः। श. श. प्र. pp. 264-65.

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Jagadīśa replies : The rule that *dvitva* and the like are to be related through exclusiveness (*paryyāpti*) only is to be understood as obligatory only if it were to be related to the meaning of the base thereof and not otherwise.[1]

Grammarians argue : The syntactical relation of a part of a word-meaning with another word-meaning is imfounded.[2]

Jagadīśa refers to Udaynācārya who in his *guṇa-kiraṇāvali* observes that oneness (*ekatva*) the meaning of the declensional suffix, *su* in *kārya-dravyam* in the expression *dvyaṇukārambhaka-saṁyoga-nāśebhyaḥ kārya-dravyam naśyati*, (the effect, the triad gets destroyed with the destruction of the aggregation of the dyads that causes the formation of triad), is related to *kārya-dravyatva*. It cannot be related to *kārya-dravya*. For it is multiple in character.[3]

Grammarians argue : The word (*kārya*) *dravya* is used in the sense of *dravyatva* to be related to *nāśa* through *svāśraya-pratiyogitva* and this is what Udayanācārya has sought to mean. He has not approved of the relation of a part of a word-meaning with another word-meaning in any case.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : Subhūti, the celebrated commentator on the lexicon, Amarakośa has laid bare that *dvitva*, the meaning of the declensional suffix of the dual number is related to the

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1. सुबर्थस्तु द्वित्वं न तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थेऽन्वेति पर्य्याप्तिसम्बन्धेन पीततत्पटे तस्य बाधात्, सुबर्थद्वित्वादेस्तादृशसम्बन्धेनैव प्रकृत्यर्थसाकांक्षत्वात, परंतु प्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकयोः पीतत्व-तत्पटत्वयोरेव व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यात्। श. श. प्र. p. 265.
2. पदार्थस्य पदार्थतावच्छेदकान्वयो न दृष्टचरः। कृष्णकांती p. 265.
3. अतएव द्व्यणुकारम्भकसंयोगनाशेभ्यः कार्यद्रव्यं नश्यतीति भाष्यस्य योग्यता-सम्पत्तये सुबर्थैकन्वस्य कार्यद्रव्यत्वेऽन्वयमभिधित्सुनाऽऽचार्य्येण जात्यभि-प्रायकमेकवचनमिति गुणकिरणावल्यामभिहितम्। श. श. प्र. p. 265.
4. ननु तत्र द्रव्यपदं तादृशद्रव्यत्वपरम्, तस्य च स्वाश्रयप्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन नाशेऽन्वय इत्येव जात्यभिप्रायकमित्यस्याभिप्राय इति यद्यच्यते। कृष्णकांती p. 265.

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determinant of denotation. The lexicon reads *śyālāḥ syur-bhrātaraḥ patnyāḥ, svāminoḥ devṛ-devarau*[1]. Subhūti explains the expression as follows : The brothers of wife are known as śyālas and of husband are signified by the words *devṛ* and *devara, devṛ-devarobhaya-pada-vācyāḥ* i.e. *ubhayatva*, the meaning of the suffix is related to *pada* the determinant of denotation of *devṛ-devara*.[2]

Grammarians argue : If multiplicity of the determinants of denotation is of foremost consideration as a factor in the context of the formation of a *dvandva* compound, difficulties are bound to arise. In reference to one single piece of yellow cloth, *pīta-paṭau* should be used. For it involves multiplicity of the determinants of denotation viz, *pītatva* and *paṭatva* that may be syntactically related to duality (*dvitva*), the meaning of the declensional suffix through *śvāśraya-vṛttitva*.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : This is a welcome objection.[4]

Grammarians argue : In *pīta-paṭayorabhedaḥ, pītatva* the determinant of denotation as such of the word *pīta* is not to be liable of comprehension. For duality (*dvitva*) is related thereto as a feature.[5]

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is unfounded. For the use of a declensional suffix of the dual or of the plural

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1. अमरकोश, मनुष्यवर्ग, श्लोक 22.
2. अतएव च श्यालाः स्युर्भ्रातरः पत्न्याः, स्वामिनो देवृदेवरौ इत्यत्र द्विवचन-मनिच्ना स्वामिनो भ्रातरः देवृदेवरोभयपदवाच्याः इत्यर्थः सुभूत्यादिसिद्धः सङ्गच्छते । श. श. प्र. p. 265.

   तथा च तत्र द्वित्वस्य पदार्थतावच्छेदकपद एवान्वयात्तादृशव्युत्पत्ति-संकोचस्यावश्यकत्वादिति भावः । कृष्णकांती p. 265.
3. (यदि च) पटद्वयासत्त्वेऽपि भूतले पीतपटावित्याद्यैक्यकः प्रयोगः स्यात्, पीत-पटत्वोभयाश्रयस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 265.
4. इष्टापत्तावप्याह (एवमिति) । कृष्णकांती pp. 268–66.
5. एवं पीतपटयोरभेदः इत्यादितः शुद्धपटत्वादेरबोधप्रसङ्गश्च, तदर्थे सुबर्थद्वित्वस्य प्रकारत्वात् (इत्यादि सूचमर्मीचयते) । श. श. प्र. 265–66.

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number is at times only a grammatical formality as in *godau* meaning a village.[1]

Grammarians argue : The compound *vidyati-vindati-vinatti-nām* (*-iṭ*) is unfounded. For the constituents thereof are only the different conjugational forms of the same root-verb with the result that the determinant of denotation is the same.

Jagadīśa replies : The three constituent words although are the different forms of the root-verb, *vid*, the meanings presented thereby are different. The determinants of denotation, therefore, vary to justify the said compound.[2]

Grammarians argue : *Hariṇa-hariṇau* then should be regarded as instance of the *dvandva* compound, the first constituent meaning a deer and the ultimate one the yellow deer. For the determinants of denotation are variant.

Jagadīśa replies : Although the meanings of the word *hariṇa* in this case are different and so are determinants of denotation in consequence, the compound is to be *hariṇau*, the *ekaśeṣa* kind of compound. For words with the same sequence of letters are to form the *ekaśeṣa* componnd carrying the sense of the *dvandva* compound. In *hariṇau*, therefore, the word *hariṇa* with the help of the word *hariṇa* gone elided give the comprehension of a deer and a yellow deer. *Hariṇa-hariṇau* is never used in language.[3]

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1. (तदा) गोदौ ग्राम इत्यादाविव साधुत्वार्थमेव तत्र द्विवचनमिति वदन्ति। श. श. प्र. p. 266.
2. विद्यति-विन्दति-विनत्तीनामिट् इत्यत्र विद्यत्यादिशब्दो न विद्-धातुत्वेनोपस्थापकः, किन्तु सत्तार्थकतादृशधातुत्वेनैव। ibid., p. 266.

   तथा च सत्तालाभविचाराणां पदार्थतावच्छेदककोटिप्रविष्टत्वात् पदार्थतावच्छेदकभेदसत्त्वेन द्वन्द्वो नानुपपन्नः। कृष्णकांती p. 266.
3. मृगपाण्डुरयोः पदार्थयोर्भेदेऽपि हरिणहरिणावित्यप्रयोगात् समानशब्दयोर्द्वन्द्वप्रसक्तावेकशेषो व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धस्तेन हरिणावित्यत्र लुप्तश्रुताभ्यामेव हरिणपदाभ्यामुपस्थितयोर्मृगपाण्डुरयोर्बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 266.

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In *harī namasyau*, in the like manner, the words *hari*, elided and the word *hari* in use lead to the comprehension of (lord) *Viṣṇu* (*hari*) and of the moon (*hari*).[1]

Opponents argue : Words expectant of only of the declensional suffix of the dual (or plural) number are independent radicals. There is no need to admit of *ekaśeṣa*.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case *hari-harī namasyau* would have been used in language.

Opponents argue : In that case *harayaḥ* having the exposition *harī ca harayaśca* cannot give the comprehension of two *Viṣṇus* and three lions. For here the number of the word-meanings are not identical and thus although the word *hari* gone elided may through recollection present *Viṣṇu*, the number thereof is not likely to be presented. Because the declensional suffix denotative of the said number remains wanting.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The word *hari* gone elided is to present through implication its meaning as qualified by the number of itself and following thereto the word *hari* is to be taken to present a similar meaning through implication. Otherwise, the word *hari* in use may present two *Viṣṇus* and three lions through a single metaphor. It may also be held that two *Viṣṇus* and three lions are presented by the word, *hari* in use through the wrong notion of denotation thereof.[4]

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1. हरी नमस्यावित्यत्रास्युक्तरीत्यैव हरिपदाभ्यां विष्णुचन्द्रयोरवगतिः, अन्यथा हरिहरी नमस्यावित्यपि प्रयोगापत्तिः। ibid., p. 266.
2. ननु द्विवचनादिमात्रसाकांक्षं प्रकृत्यन्तरमेव स्वीक्रियते किमेकशेषादरेण। कृष्णकांती p. 266,
3. ननु प्रकृत्यन्तरास्वीकारे हरी च हरयश्चेति विग्रहे हरय इत्यादितः सिंहत्रय-विष्णुद्वयबोधो न स्यात्,. लुप्तहरिपदस्मरणेऽपि संख्यावाचकसुबाद्यभावात् संख्याऽवगमो न स्यात्। कृष्णकांती p. 266.
4. हरी च हरयश्चेति विग्रहस्थले तु यत्र हरय इत्यादितः समस्यमानपदार्था-नामवांतरसंख्यावगमस्तत्र तत्-तत्-संख्यावच्छिन्नस्वार्थलक्षकस्य लुप्तस्य हर्यादिपदस्योत्तरत्वेन प्रतिसंहितमेव हर्यादिपदं तथाविधस्वार्थस्य लक्षणया बोधकम् तदप्रतिसंधाने तु श्रुतमेव हरिपदं विष्णुद्वयस्य सिंहत्रयस्य चैकया लक्षणया शक्तिभ्रान्त्यैव वा। - श. श. प्र. p. 266.

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Opponents argue : A compound does not give the comprehension of duality and the like presented by the declensional suffix used in the sentence of analysis thereof. As such the instances that cause the comprehension of duality and the like presented by such suffixes are not compounds, let alone *dvandva*. As a result these cannot be regarded as *ekaśeṣa* even. For *ekaśeṣa* is provided for only in case but for the identity of the sequence of letters of the words constituting the compound, *dvandva* was called for.

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is unfounded. For there is no hard and fast rule to the said effect. The instances like *śalākāpari*, *hastyaśvam* and the like are cases in point.[1]

The exposition *haṁsaśca haṁsī ca* gives the *ekaśeṣa* compound, *haṁsau*. For *haṁsa-haṁsyau* is not used in language. There is, therefore, the special provision that the masculine form alone is retained if used with the masculine form of the same nominal provided the difference consists only of only one of these having a feminine suffix. The word *haṁsī*, gone elided is understood to present the duck and the word *haṁsa* in use presents the swan.[2]

Opponents argue : One not knowing that the word *haṁsa* has gone elided or that the said elided word is to be taken to present the duck, comprehends the duck.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the word *haṁsā* that is in actual use is to present the swan and the duck through one

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1. न च विप्रहस्थप्रवर्थस्य द्विस्वादेः समासाप्रतिपाद्यत्वनियमात् तथाविधद्वित्वत्रित्वांतर्भावेण द्वन्द्वस्यैवासाधुत्वादुक्तक्रमेणैकशेषो न युक्तः, शलाकापरि, हस्त्यश्वमित्यादौ व्यभिचारेणोक्तनियमस्यासत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 266–67.

2. हंसश्च हंसी च इत्यर्थे हंसहंस्यावित्यप्रयोगात् तत्रापि पुंसा स्त्रिया सारूप्ये इत्यनुशिष्टेर्हंसीपदस्य लोपे हंसावित्यत्र लुप्तमेव हंसीपदमनुसंधाय स्त्रीपुंसयोर्बोधः। ibid., p. 267.

Vide also पुमान् स्त्रियाः। पा. I. 2. 67. (सि. कौ. 933).

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multifaced power of denotation (as it so happens in the word *puṣpavantau*)[1] or through that of implication.[2]

The elders argue : In the *ekaśeṣa* compound like *haṁsau*, the word *haṁsa* that is in actual use denotes the swan and at the same time implies the duck. The meaning of the declensional suffix gets related to the swan and not to the duck because of incompatibility.[3] The exposition is of the form, *haṁsaśca haṁsaśca*.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : Such a view is untenable. For it cuts at the very root of *ekaśeṣa*. Because the determinants of denotation in that case become identical viz. *haṁsatva* and *strī-haṁsatva* and thus belie the scope of *dvandva*[5]

Opponents argue : *Haṁsatva* and *strī-haṁsatva* are not identical. There is no reason, therefore, to hold that the scope of *dvandva* has been belied.[6]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case a compound like *ghaṭa-tad-ghaṭau* has to be admitted.[7]

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1. विभिन्नरूपावच्छिन्नैका शक्तिस्तु पुष्पवन्तपदे एवं प्रसिद्धेरिति भावः। कृष्णकांती p. 267.
2. तल्लोपमजानतस्तु हंसपदे स्त्रीहंसत्वपुरुषहंसत्वाभ्यामेकस्याः शक्तेर्लक्षणाया वा ग्रहादेव। श. श. प्र. p. 267.
3. यत्तु तत्र हंसपदमेव लक्षणया हंसीत्वेन शक्त्या च हंसत्वेन बोधकम्, सुवर्थस्तु पुंस्त्वहंस एवान्वेति, न तु हंस्यामयोग्यत्वात् इति मतम्। श. श. प्र. p. 267.
4. तथा च हंसश्च हंसश्चेति विग्रहात् स्वरूपैकशेष एवेति भावः। कृष्णकांती p. 267.
5. तथा सति स्त्रीहंसत्व-हंसत्वयोः पदार्थतावच्छेदकयोर्मिथो भेदविरहेण द्वन्द्वाप्रसक्तावेकशेषस्य दुष्करत्वापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 267.
   विशिष्टहंसत्वे हंसत्वभेदासत्वात्। कृष्णकांती p. 267.
6. केचित्तु-विशिष्टस्यातिरिक्तत्वात् पदार्थतावच्छेदकभेद एवास्तीति। कृष्णकांती p. 268.
7. अन्यथा घट–तद्घटावित्यापि द्वन्द्वप्रसङ्गात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 267–68.

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The exposition *haṁsyau ca haṁsāsca* gives the compound, *haṁsāḥ* leading to the comprehension of two ducks and three swans as shown earlier.[1]

Dundubhī ca dundhubhiśca gives the compound *dundubhī sundarau.* For in *ekaśeṣa* formed of an exposition of words of masculine and feminine genders, the word of the masculine gender is retained.[2]

Following the similar principle *yuvā ca yuvatī ca* gives the compound *yuvānau; brāhmaṇaśca brahmaṇīca, brāhmaṇau; ekaśca ekā ca, ekau; dvau, ca dve ca, dvau, ubhau ca, ubhe ca, ubhau; trayaśca tisraśca, trayaḥ.*[3]

Varaṭā ca haṁsaśca give the compound, *Varatā-haṁsau* and *lakṣaṇā ca sārasaśca, lakṣaṇā-sārasau.* For such expositions cannot form into *ekaśeṣa.* Because the words are not of identical nature.[4]

Opponents ask : What is meant by the identity of nature ? Does it mean having the same sequence of letters ? If so then *haṁsī* and *haṁsa* should not form the compound *haṁsau.* If it means having the sequence of letters of the ultimate word, invariably concomitant with that of the other then *haṁsa-bhāryā* and *haṁsau* should give the compound, *haṁsau.*[5]

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1. हंस्यौ च हंसाश्चेति विग्रहेऽपि 'हंसा' इत्यतो हंसीद्वयहंसत्रययोः प्रागुक्तरीत्यावगमः। श. श. प्र. p. 268.
2. दुन्दुभी च दुन्दुभिश्चेति विग्रहे दुन्दुभी सुन्दरावित्यत्राप्तभेर्योर्बोधस्थले पुलिङ्गस्यैव दुन्दुभिशब्दस्य शिष्टतया तद्विशेषणत्वादेव सुन्दरादेः पुंस्त्वम्। श. श. प्र. p. 268.
   स्त्रीपुंस्त्वयोः पुस्मान् शेषः इत्यनुशासनादिति भावः। कृष्णकांती p. 268.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 268.
4. वरटा हंसौ, लक्षणा-सारसवित्यादौ च स्त्रीपुंसगोर्द्वन्द्वेऽपि पदसारूप्य विरहान्नैकशेषः। श. श. प्र. p. 268.
5. न चैकशेषनियामकं किमेतावता पदसारूप्यम् ? न चानुपूर्वीमत्वं; हंस-हंसी-पदयोस्तथात्वाभावात्, नाप्येकपदानुपूर्वीव्यापकपरपदानुपूर्वीमत्वं हंसावित्यत्राप्येकशेषप्रसङ्गादिति वाच्यम्। कृष्णकांती p. 268.

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Jagadīśa replies : The *ekaśeṣa* compound is formed of two such words which but for the suffixes indicative of femininity and the like have the identical sequence of letters.[1]

The exposition *meṣāśca meṣyaśca* gives the compound *meṣyaḥ, mahiṣāśca mahisyaśca, mahisyaḥ.* For in the case of an *ekaśeṣa* compound having the exposition involving words indicative of cloven hoofed (*aneka-śafa*) domestic animals that are other than young, the word of the masculine form gets elided in exception to the general rule. The word gone elided is taken to imply many such male sheep or male buffaloes and the word in use present many such female animals to cause the verbal comprehension thereof.[2]

Mṛgaśca mṛgyaśca, on the contrary, following the general rule gives the compound, *mṛgāḥ.* For the animals are not domestic

Gardahhāśca gardabhyaśca gives the compound *gardabhāḥ.* For the animals are not cloven-hoofed.

Varkarāśca Varkaryaśca gives the compound *Varkarāḥ.* For the animals are young.[3]

Svasā ca bhrātā ca gives the compound *bhrātarau, putraśca duhitā ca, putrau,* although the words involved are not of identical nature, to cause of the verbal comprehension of the meanings presented by the word gone elided through implication and by the word in use through denotation.[4]

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1. समस्यमानपदयोः, स्त्रीत्वादिव्यञ्जकविधुरयोरेकानुपूर्वीकत्वस्यैव तन्नियामकत्वं बोध्यम् । ibid., p. 268.
2. ग्राम्यानेकशफेष्वतरुणेषु स्त्रीपुंसयोर्बहुत्वमन्तर्भाव्य सारूप्येण द्वन्द्वस्थले तु पुस एव लुक्, तेन मेष्यश्च मेषाश्चेत्यर्थे मेष्य इत्यत्रापि लुप्तं बहुमेषाणां लक्षकं मेषपदं प्रतिसन्दधत एव बहुमेषाणामनेकमेषीणाञ्चावगमः एवं महिषाश्च महिष्यश्चेत्यर्थे महिष्यं इत्यत्रापि महिष्यपदं बहूनां महिषाणाम् । श. श. प्र. p. 269.

   Vide also ग्राम्यपशुसङ्घेष्वतरुणेषु स्त्री । पा. I. 3. 76.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 269.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 269.

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Opponents argue : How should that the compound in *jyeṣṭha-putra-duhitryośca* be explained.

Jagadīśa replies : The word *jyeṣṭa-putra-duhitṛ* is to be taken as an independent radical endowed with the single potency to denote what are qualified with the state of a son and of a daughter.[1]

The exposition, *sa ca maitraśca* gives the compound, *tau*. For in *ekaśeṣa*, the word other than those that come under the list of *tyadadi* (words) get elided. The said list covers the words, *tyat, tat, yat, idam, adas, asmat, yusmat, etat, eka, dvi, bhavat* and *kim*.[2]

Sa ca tvañca, gives the compound *yuvām*. For of the two words other than *kim* read under the *tyadādi* list involved in an *ekaśeṣa*, the first one or the one not preceded by a word read under the said list gets elided to give the comprehension of 'him' by the word elided through implication and of you denoted by the word in use as earlier.[3]

Sa ca sa ca gives the compound *tau*, to give the comprehension of different individuals presented by the word *tat* as before, used twice. The word initially used gets elided. For it is not preceded by a word of the *tyadādi* list in the sense that no other word of the said class follows it.[4]

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1. ज्येष्ठपुत्रदुहित्रोश्च ज्यैष्ठे मासि न कार्य्येदित्यादिकस्तु प्रयोगः परिचिन्तनीयः। श. श. प्र. p. 269.

   पुत्रत्व-दुहितृत्वाभ्यामेकशक्तिमत्प्रकृत्यन्तरस्वीकारेण कथञ्चिदुपपादनीय इति ग्रंथकृदभिप्रायः। कृष्णकांती p. 269.

2. स च मैत्रश्चेति विग्रहे त्यदादिना तदन्यस्य द्वन्द्वे लुकि तावित्यत्रापि लुप्तं मैत्रादिपदमनुसंदधत एव मैत्राद्यवगमः। श. श. प्र. p. 269.

   Vide also त्यादादीनि सर्वैर्नित्यम्। पा. I. 2. 72.

3. स च त्वञ्चेत्यादिविग्रहे किंपदान्यत्यदादिद्वयगर्भद्वन्द्वे तु पूर्वस्यैव स्वानुत्तरपदस्व वा त्यदादेर्लुकि युवामित्यादावप्युक्तक्रमेणैव तदर्थयुष्मदर्थबोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 269.

4. स च स चेत्यत्रापि विभिन्नार्थयोर्विग्रहे स्वपूर्वांगणितोऽपि तदादिः स्वोत्तरापठित एव। ibid., p. 269.

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Opponents argue : If words like *tat*, *yat* and so on are to form *ekaśeṣa*, the uses like *tat-tanmānuṣa-tulyo'sau yad-yad-vidyāti-nirmale* cannot be explained.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The words *tat* and *yat* in the instance cited do not come under the *tyadādi* list. These are only indeclinables and indeclinables other than *tat* and *yat* form *ekaśeṣa*. The instance cited, therefore, holds out a case of the *dvandva* compound as in *tat-tat-tāmasa-bhūta-bhītayah*.[2]

The exposition *kaśca tvanca* gives the compound *kau*. For in *ekaśeṣa*, the word other than *kim* of the *tyadādi* list gets elided in preference thereto.[3]

The instance, *pitarau* according to the elders holds out a case of *ekaśeṣa* formed of words not of the same sequence letters, the exposition being *mātā ca pitā ca*. The word *matṛ* gets elided on the recollection of the said elided word neither gets presented and the word *pitā* being in use denotes the father. To one not knowing of the elition and of subsequent recollection of the word, *mātṛ*, the word *pitṛ* which is in use would present both of the parents through implication, the determinant thereof being the state of the body of the progeniter.[4]

Jagadīśa following the *kalāpa* school of Grammarians holds that *pitarau* do not hold out a case of the *ekaśeṣa* compound.

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1. नन्वेवं ततत्तन्मानुषतुल्योऽसौवित्यादिकाव्यं कथं सङ्गच्छते ? कृष्णकांती p. 270.
2. तत्तत्तन्मानुषतुल्योऽसौ यद्यद्विद्यातिनिर्मलेत्यादौ तु न त्यदादिगणेन द्वन्द्वः, परन्तु तदाद्यव्ययेन यथा तत्तत्तामसभूतभीतय इत्यादौ, यत्तदादिव्यतिरिक्तानामेवाव्ययानां सरूपैकशेषस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 271.
3. कश्च स्वञ्चेत्यादिविग्रहेण किमा तादृशद्वन्द्वे तु तदन्यस्यव त्यदादेर्लुकि कौ इत्यादिक एव प्रयोगः। श. श. प्र. p. 270.
4. चैत्रस्यापि पितराविस्यत्रापि विरूपैकशेषे लुप्तस्य मातृपदस्य स्मरणात् मातुरवगमः, तदस्मरतस्तु पितृपदे जनकशरीरत्वेन लक्षणया मातापित्रोरवगतिरिति प्राञ्चः। ibid., p. 270.

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It is derived from an independent radical, *pitṛ* endowed with the single potency to denote both the parents like the word *puspavantau* invariably suffixed with a declensional termination of the dual number. For the *dvandva* compounds, *mātā-pitarau* and *mātara-pitarau* giving the comprehension of both the parents are found in use.[1] Similar is the situation with *śvaśurau*.[2]

As to the classification of the *dvandva* compound, Jagadīśa points out that the *samāhāra* is as a rule is to be suffixed with a declensional termination of the singular number and the *itaretara-dvandva* is that of the dual or of the plural number as in *pāṇipādām*, (*hastyaśvam*) and *dhava-khadirau* respectively.[3]

Opponents point out that the compound *padisthandikhidā-derdāt* obviously of the *itaretara* kind of *dvandva* has been suffixed with the declensional suffix of the singular number.

Jagadīśa replies : It is not an instance of the *dvandva* compound but of *madhya-pada-lopī Karmadhāraya*, as is the case with the text, *avyaptyativyāpteḥ* of the *tattva-cintāmaṇi*.[4]

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1. कौमारास्तु मात्रा पितुर्द्वन्द्वे मातापितृभ्यां मातरपितृभ्यामिति प्रयोगदर्शनात् चैत्रस्य पितरावित्यत्र नैकशेषः, परन्तु पुष्पवन्तादिपदवत् मातृत्वपितृत्वाभ्यां विभिन्नरूपाभ्यामेकशक्तिमदेव नियतद्विवचनाकाङ्क्षं पितृपदं प्रकृत्यन्तरम्। ibid., p. 270.
2. Vide ibid. pp. 273–71.
3. श. श. प्र. का. 49.
   Vide also ibid. p. 271.
4. पदिस्कन्दिखिदार्देदीदित्यादौ तु पदिस्कान्दिभ्यां सहितः खिदिरिति विगृह्य मध्यपदलोपी कर्मधारयः, यथा अव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्तेरिति मणिग्रन्थादौ। ibid., p. 271.

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CHAPTER XIII

CLASSIFICATION OF COMPOUNDS
(UPAPADASAMĀSA)

The compound that has as its last member, a word formed of a root-verb and a primary suffix, presenting a meaning, it does not carry, unless suffixed to a nominal, is the *upapada* kind of a compound.[1] *Kumbhakāra* for an example, has as its last member, the word, *kāra* formed of the root-verb, *Kṛ* and the primary suffix, *ghañ* presenting the meaning—*Kartā* which it itself does not carry, unless suffixed to a nominal like *kumbha* and hence it is regarded as an instance of the *upapada samāsa*. *Candranibham* is equally formed of the word, *nibha* posited as the last member thereof and the sense it presents, it itself does not carry, unless suffixed to a nominal like *Candra* but still as the said word has not been formed of a root-verb and a primary suffix, the definition of the *upapada* compound does not unwarrantedly over-extend thereto.[2] The said word again being a primitive (*avyutpanna*) word, any attempt to find out an etymology of the kind—*ni-bhā+al* is all the more meaningless.

The *upapada-samāsa* again is of many kinds and it is wrong to divide it into six in keeping with the number of cases, says Jagadīśa.[3]

1. यदुत्तरपदं नामानुत्तरं सदबोधकम् ।
धातुकृद्भ्यामुपपदसमासः स तदन्तकः ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 50.
2. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 272.
3. कारकैकोपपदकः षड्विधोऽयमिति भ्रमः । ibid., का. 51.

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Of the *kārakas*, that function as the *upapadas*, references could be made to *kartā* as in *uttānaśaya* (*uttānaḥ san śete yaḥ saḥ*) *pūrvasaraḥ* (*pūrvaḥ san sarati yaḥ saḥ*); to *karma* as in *kumbhakāraḥ* (*kumbhaṁ karoti yaḥ saḥ*), *sauvīrapāyi* (*sauvīraṁ pivati yaḥ saḥ*); to *karaṇa* as in *kacchapaḥ* (*kacchena pivati yaḥ saḥ*), *pārśva-śaya* (*pārśveṇa śete*); to *apādāna* as in *ukhāśrat* (*ukhāyāḥ śraṁsate*), *Vāhabhrat* (*Vāhāt bhraṁśate*) to *adhikaraṇa* as in—*khaśaya*, *kurucara* and so on.[1]

The *sampradāna-kāraka* or the dative case does not function as the *upapada*, points out Jagadīśa.[2] Sometimes even what is not a *kāraka* is found to be used as an *upapada* as in *brahmabhūyam*. Hence, says Jagadīśa, it is not proper to hold that on par with the number of cases, the *upapada-samāsa* too be divided into six kinds.[3]

Asūryampaśyā is also an instance of the *upapada-samāsa*, but on that analogy *sūryampaśyā* does not come to be recognised as an instance of the said compound or of any compound for that matter, says Jagadīśa.[4] For it is in the sense of negation involved in an earlier *nañ-tat-puruṣa* that such an use is made and not otherwise.

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1. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 272–73.
2. सम्प्रदानन्तु न कुत्रापि दृश्यते। ibid., p. 273.
3. दृश्यते च ब्रह्मभूयमित्यादौ कारकभिन्नेनाप्युपपदेन समास इत्यनेकविध एव न तु कारकमात्रोपपदकत्वात् षड्विध एव, न्यूनत्वाधिकत्वाभ्यां विभागव्याघातादिति। ibid., p. 273.
4. असूर्यम्पश्येत्यप्युक्तसमासः, परन्तवव्ययपदस्येव नञा समस्तस्यैव तस्य स्वार्थबोधने व्युत्पन्नत्वान्न केवलस्य तस्य प्रयोगः। ibid., p. 273.

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CHAPTER XIV

NOMINAL INFLECTIONS
(SUB-VIBHAKTIS)

Nominal inflections are read under the category of suffixes (*pratyaya*). Suffixes are of four kinds viz, inflections (*vibhakti*), a constituent of a root-verb (*san, kyac* and the like), secondary suffixes (*taddhita*) and the primary suffixes (*kṛt*).[1]

Inflections are divided into two viz., the nominal inflections (*sup-vibhaktis*) and the verbal inflections (*tiṅ-vibhaktis*).[2]

Inflection is a suffix endowed with the potency to denote what is qualified by a generic attribute invariably concomitant with the state of number.[3]

Opponents argue : The verbal inflections as such or at least the verbal inflection of the singular number does not denote a number.

Jagadīśa replies : By inflection, in that case, is to be understood a word that is capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of what the base thereof means predicated against the meaning of itself.[4]

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1. विभक्तिश्चैव धात्वंशस्तद्धितं कृदिति क्रमात्।
   चतुर्धा प्रत्ययः प्रोक्तः कादिभिः पञ्चधाऽथवा ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 60.
2. सा विभक्तिर्द्विधा प्रोक्ता सुप्तिङ् चेति विभेदतः। ibid., का. 61.
3. संख्यात्वव्याप्यसामान्यैः शक्तिमान् प्रत्ययस्तु यः। ibid., का. 61.
4. यद्याख्यातमात्रस्य तदेकवचनस्य वा न संख्याशक्तत्वे प्रमाणं तदान्यथा निर्वक्तिः—
   प्रकृत्यर्थस्य यः स्वार्थे विधेयत्वेन बोधने।
   समर्थः सोऽथवा शब्दो विभक्तित्वेन गीयते ॥ (श. श. प्र. का. 62)
   श. श. प्र. pp. 284–85.

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In *ghatam*, for example, the inflection, *am* bears out the verbal comprehension of the state of object (*karmatva*) in regard to a jar (*ghatīyam*). Similarly In *pacati*, the (verbal) inflection, *ti* leads to the verbal knowledge of the agency (*kṛti*) in respect of the act of cooking (*pākīyā*). But for such an inflection, this kind of comprehension does not occur. For the suffix like *tṛc* (*ṇaka*) and so on cause only the comprehension that embraces the meaning of itself qualified by the meaning of the base, as its content (substantive).[1]

Opponents argue : The secondary suffix, *in* in *dākṣi* leads to the comprehension of the progeny of *dakṣa*. Hence the definition of inflection over-extends to it. For the verbal knowledge it causes, embraces the meaning of the base, predicated against the meaning of itself.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The expression, *dākṣiḥ* does not ever cause the verbal knowledge of the progeny of *dakṣa* but of what is qualified by the state of progeny of *dakṣa*. What is thus qualified is the state of one (*ekatva*), the meaning of the nominal inflection suffixed to *dākṣi*.[3] *Dakṣa* or the meaning of the base to which the secondary suffix, *in* is added, is the determinant of the feature, the state of the progeny. The determinant of feature is not what could be comprehended as the predicate.[4]

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1. घटमित्यादौ सुपा कर्मत्वं घटीयमित्यादाविव, पचतीत्यादौ तिङापि कृतिः पाकीयेत्यादिरुद्देश्यविधेयभावेन स्वार्थे प्रकृत्यर्थस्य धीरुत्पाद्यते न तु प्रत्ययान्तरेण, तस्य प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्नस्वार्थविषयताशालिन्येव शाब्दे समर्थत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 285.
2. ननु दाक्षिरित्यादौ अपत्यं दक्षीयमित्युद्देश्यविधेयभावेनान्वयबोधात्तद्वशेण् प्रत्ययेऽतिव्याप्तिः । कृष्णकांती p. 285.
3. न हि दाक्षिरित्यादितोऽपत्यं दक्षस्येत्यादिरुद्देश्यविधेयभावेन बोधः कस्यापि किन्तु दक्षापत्यत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ने धर्मिण्येव सुबर्थैकत्वादेः । श. श. प्र. p. 285.
4. तथा च प्रकारतावच्छेदके विधेयतानङ्गीकारात् विधेयतानिवेशादेव तद्वारणादिति भावः । कृष्णकांती p. 285.

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Opponents argue : There is no harm in holding that the secondary suffix, *in* causes the verbal knowledge of the base, *dakṣa* predicated against the meaning thereof.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, *dākṣiścaitrasya ca* like *apatyam dakṣasya caitrasya* should cause the simultaneons comprehension of *dakṣa* and of *caitra* predicated against the progeny. For the collection of causes (*sāmagri*), in that case, is the same.[1]

Opponents argue : The definition is too narrow to cover the first nominal inflection. For it does not cause the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the base predicated against the meaning of itself. The expression, *ghaṭaḥ* leads to the comprehension of a jar i.e. jar qualified by the state of oneness.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The first nominal inflection too does cause the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the base thereof predicated against what it itself means. *Nīlo ghaṭaḥ* gives the verbal knowledge of a jar, one with the blue. Prior to this knowledge, *nīlaḥ* gives the comprehension of oneness with the blue or of the blue predicated against oneness, the meaning of the first nominal inflection. For but for the knowledge from a constituent sentence (*avāntara-vākya*), a continuous sentence (*mahā-vākya*) cannot give any comprehension. The definition, therefore, is free from the blemish ascribed to it.[3]

Of the two inflections again, the nominal inflection causes the verbal knowledge of a number denoted by itself, posited

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1. अन्यथा अपत्यं दत्तस्य चैत्रस्य चेत्यादाविव दाक्षिश्चैत्रस्य चेत्यादावप्यपत्यादिधर्मिकस्य दत्तचैत्राद्योर्विधेयभावेन युगपदन्वयस्य दुर्वारतापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 285.
2. ननु प्रथमायामव्याप्तिः, घट इत्यादावेकत्ववान् घट इत्येव बोधात्तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थस्याविधेयत्वात्। कृष्णकांती p. 285.
3. प्रथमाप्यभेदादौ स्वार्थे प्रकृत्यर्थस्य विधेयभावेन धियं जनयत्येव, न चेदेवं 'नीलो घट' इत्यादौ नीलाद्यभेदरूपस्यावान्तरवाक्यार्थस्य पूर्वमप्रतीतौ महावाक्यार्थबोधस्य तत्पूर्वकत्वहान्यापत्तिरतो न तस्यामव्याप्तिः। श. श. प्र. pp. 285–86.

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as the feature against what the base thereof denotes. The verbal inflection, on the other hand, leads to the comprehension of a number, denoted by itself posited as the feature against what is related as the substantive to agency (*kṛti*), another meaning of itself.[1]

Of the seven nominal inflections, the first one is potentially incapable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the base thereof, posited as the feature against what it itself means other than identity and that too if suffixed to an adjective. The other nominal inflections beginning with the second one are all capable of causing the verbal comprehension of the meaning of the base concerned, posited as the feature against the state of the object and the like.[2]

Opponents argue : The declensional form of the dual number of a word ending in the first nominal inflection and that of the same number of a word ending in the second, are identical. The definition of the first nominal inflection is, therefore, likely to over-extend to the second one.

Jagadīśa replies : This is not reasonable. For it is pointed out that the first nominal inflection is only *au* while the second is *auṭ*.[3] The fact is that conditions are not identical

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1. प्रकृत्यर्थे स्वार्थसंख्यान्वयधीहेतवः सुपः । श. श. प्र. का. 63.

   प्रकृत्यर्थधर्मिकस्वार्थसंख्यान्वयबोधिका विभक्तयः सुप उच्यन्ते । ताश्च प्रथमाद्वितीयादिभेदेन सप्तविधाः । तिङस्तु स्वार्थभावनाद्यन्वयिन्येव स्वार्थसंख्यामेव बोधयन्ति, न तु स्वप्रकृत्यर्थं इति तासां व्युदासः । ibid., p. 286.

2. तादाम्यभिन्ने स्वार्थे या प्रकृत्यर्थस्य बोधने ।
   न समर्था विभक्ति सा प्रथमा परिकीर्त्यते ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 64.

   या विभक्तिस्तादाम्यभिन्नस्वार्थधर्मिकप्रकृत्यर्थबोधं प्रति न स्वरूपयोग्या सा प्रथमा । द्वितीयादयस्तु स्वार्थे कर्मत्वादौ प्रकृत्यर्थस्यान्वयबोधं प्रति समर्थाः । प्रथमा तु विशेषणपदोत्तरस्था तादृशि तादाम्ये तथान्वयं बोधयन्त्यपि न तादाम्यभिन्ने तथा । ibid., pp. 286-87.

3. प्रथमाया द्विवचनम् औ द्वितीयायाः पुनः औट् इति न तत्रातिव्याप्तिशङ्कापीति वदन्ति । श. श. प्र. p. 287.

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on the ground that what are conditional are identical. Hence there is no reason to imagine that the first nominal termination and the second one are identical on the ground that the declensional form of a word in the dual number brought out by these two inflections are the same.[1]

Prabhākara argues : *Svarga-kāmo yajeta* is a continuous sentence. The sentence, *svarga-kāmaḥ* is a constituent thereof. Prior to the comprehension from the continuous, the comprehension of the constituent should occur. The sentence, *svarga-kāma* gives the comprehension of one aspiring for heaven, being commissioned (*svargakāma-prakāraka-niyojyatva-viśeṣyaka*, whereupon the knowledge of one aspiring for heaven being commissioned to the duty of performing a sacrifice occurs from the continuous sentence). The first nominal inflection, therefore, bears out the verbal comprehension of what is presented by the base thereof, posited as the feature against the meaning of itself, which is other than identity.

Jagadīśa replies : *Svargakāmo yajeta* does not bear any such verbal knowledge. For the verbal inflection of the injunctive (*liṅ*) does not mean the state of being commissioned (*niyojyatva*), according to the logicians.[2]

Opponents argue : Even if the said inflection is held to mean the state of abiding (*ādheyatva*), to bear out the comprehension of 'the state of agency abiding one aspiring for heaven, in respect of the sacrifice' from the sentence in question, the contingency cannot be brushed aside. For the first nominal inflection even then continues to cause the verbal knowledge of what the base thereof means posited as the feature against the meaning of itself which is other than identity.

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1. वदन्तीत्यस्वरससूचनाय, स चोपाधेयसङ्करेऽप्युपाधेरसाङ्कर्य्यात्तत्र प्रथमात्व-द्वितीयात्वयोः स्वीकारेऽपि न क्षतिः। कृष्णकांती p. 287.
2. नियोज्यत्वभानस्य यागादौ मीमांसकमतसिद्धत्वात् । नियोज्यत्वभानस्य नैयायिकैरनङ्गीकारात्। कृष्णकांती p. 288.

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Jagadīśa replies : The state of abiding is not borne out by the first nominal inflection. For it arises out of syntax.[1]

Opponents argue : In *dhṛtiḥ svāhā*, the first nominal inflection bears out the verbal knowledge of *dhṛti*, posited as the feature against the state of the subject of an assertion (*uddeśyatva*), meant by itself. It is no argument to say that the first nominal inflection is only a substitute for the fourth one. Hence the definition of the first nominal inflection is either too narrow to cover an instance like this or is about to bring in an absurd situation (*asambhava*).[2] The said comprehension has occurred not by the individual first nominal inflection but by virtue of being the first nominal inflection as such. Hence if it be so accepted that it bears out the said comprehension, the first nominal inflection as such has to be admitted to be potentially capable of bearing the said kind of comprehension elsewhere too.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The definition may then be like this. Being presented by a nominal with which at the end, is imperative for the verbal knowledge of the meaning of a verbal inflection qualified by what a root-verb means, (through the relation of *viśeṣyatā*) is the first nominal inflection.[4]

Opponents argue : In *yajeta*, the verbal knowledge of being productive of what is desired (*iṣṭasādhanatva*), the

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1. ……आधेयत्वस्य च संसर्गतयैव भानात्तयोः प्रथमार्थत्वमेवासिद्धमित्याशयेन यदीत्युक्तम् । कृष्णकांती p. 288.
2. यदि वा 'धृतिः स्वाहे'त्यादौ चतुर्थ्याः स्थाने न प्रथमा, परन्तु प्रथमैवोद्देश्यत्वबोधिका, तदा तस्यामप्यतिप्रसङ्गो वा स्यात् । श. श. प्र. p. 287.
3. तादृशबोधं प्रति तत्तत्प्रथमात्वेन न हेतुता किन्तु प्रथमात्वेनैव, तथा च प्रथमान्तरस्यापि तादृशबोधस्वरूपयोग्यत्वादसम्भव इति भावः । कृष्णकांती p. 288.
4. धात्वर्थेन विशिष्टस्यातिङर्थस्यान्वयं प्रति ।
यदन्तनामबोध्यत्वं तन्त्रं सुप् साऽथवा तथा ॥ श. श. प्र. p. 65.
तथा च यादृशानुपूर्व्यवच्छिन्ननामोपस्थाप्यत्वं विशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन धात्वर्थावच्छिन्नतिङर्थप्रकारकान्वयबोधं प्रति स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन प्रयोजकं तादृशानुपूर्वीमच्छन्दत्वं प्रथमात्वम् पर्यवसितम् । कृष्णकांती p. 288.

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meaning of the verbal inflection, *ta*, posited as the feature against sacrifice (*yāga*) is borne out without its being presented by a nominal with the first nominal inflection at its end.

Jagadīśa replies : The said verbal knowledge embraces only the meaning of a verbal inflection as such and not as what is qualified by the meaning of the base thereof. There is, therefore, no harm in the substantive not being presented by a nominal ending in the first nominal inflection.[1]

Opponents argue : In *caitra-maitrau staḥ*, without the first nominal inflection being at the end of the nominal, *Caitra*, the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the verbal inflection, *tas*, viz. the present tense (*vartamānatva*) qualified by the meaning of the base viz, the root-verb, *as*, posited as the feature against *caitra*, the substantive, occurs.

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *Caitra* in the instance cited, is only a constituent of a *dvandva* compound. As such, although the first nominal inflection is not visibly suffixed therewith, there is no harm. For the inflection suffixed to the *dvandva* compound is *ipso facto* suffixed to the constituents thereof.[2]

The inflections beginning with the second (*dvitīyā*) one bear out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the state of the object and so on, posited as the feature against the meaning of particular root-verbs.[3]

The second nominal inflection may thus be defined as what is of the kind of the nominal inflection that causes the comprehension of the state of the object, posited as the feature

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1. यजेतेत्यादौ तिङर्थस्येष्टसाधनत्वादेर्न प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छिन्नस्य यागादावन्वयः किन्तु केवलस्य, अतस्तस्य प्रथमान्तनामानुपस्थाप्यत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः। श. श प्र. p. 288.
2. 'चैत्रमैत्रौ स्त' इत्यादौ च द्वन्द्वेनैव प्रथमान्तनाम्ना चैत्रस्योपस्थापनान्न व्यभिचारः। श. श. प्र. p. 288.
3. Vide ibid., का. 66.

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against the act of cooking presented by the root-verb, *paci* suffixed with a verbal inflection.[1]

Opponents argue : In *caurasya hinasti*, the sixth nominal inflection (suffixed to the word *caitra*), bears out the verbal comprehension of the state of the object, posited as the feature against the act of affliction presented by the root-verb, *hinas* suffixed with a verbal inflection.

Jagadīśa replies : The root-verb involved in the instance cited, is other than *paci* and the like, the root-verbs in particular.[2]

Opponents argue : In *taṇḍulasya pācakaḥ*, the sixth nominal inflection bears out the verbal knowledge of the state of the object posited as the feature against the act of cooking.

Jagadīśa replies : The act of cooking in the instance cited, is not presented by the root-verb, *paci* ending in the verbal inflection, *ti*.[3]

In *Grāmaṁ gacchati*, the inflection, *am* being of the kind of the inflection, *am* that causes the verbal knowledge of the state of the object posited as the feature against the act of cooking presented by the root-verb, *paci* suffixed with the verbal inflection, *ti* through the relation of *viśeṣyatā*, is covered by the definition of the second nominal inflection.[4]

In *Kāṣṭena pacati*, the inflection, *ṭā* suffixed to the word *kāṣṭha* is not covered by the definition of the second nominal inflection. For it leads to the verbal knowledge of the state of the instrumental and not of that of the object posited as

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1. तिबन्तपदधातूपस्थाप्यपाकधर्मिककर्मत्वानुभवानुकूलसुप्सजातीयत्वं द्वितीयायाः लक्षणम्। श. श. p. 289.
2. चौरस्य हिनस्तीत्यादौ तिबन्तधात्वर्थे कर्मतादिप्रतिपादिकाऽपि षष्ठी न पाके। ibid., p. 289.
3. तण्डुलस्य पाचक इत्यादौ पाके तादृश्यपि न तिबन्तपदार्थे। श. श. प्र. p. 289.
4. ग्रामं गच्छतीत्यादावादेः पाकादौ कर्मत्वाननुभावकत्वेऽपि तदनुभावकसजातीयत्वान्नाव्याप्तिः। ibid., p. 289.

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the feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *paci* suffixed with the verbal inflection, *ti*.[1]

Opponents argue : The definition of the second nominal inflection should cover the inflection in *paṭau* in *paṭau staḥ*. For the declensional forms of the word, *paṭa* with the first and second nominal inflections of the dual number are identical.

Jagadīśa replies : The identity of the said two declensional forms is only apparent. For the first nominal inflection is *au* while the second one is *auṭ*. Identity of the conditional does imply the identity of conditions.[2]

The verbal knowledge caused by the first nominal inflection embraces the meaning of the base thereof as the invariable substantive. The verbal knowledge borne out by the second nominal inflection embraces what is presented by a word other than the base thereof as such. The definition of the second nominal inflection may thus be further qualified with the words 'being other than what occasions the verbal knowledge embracing the meaning of itself as the invariable substantive.'[3]

The inflection of the kind of the nominal inflection that bears out the verbal knowledge of instrumentality posited as the feature against what the root-verb, *paci* means is the third nominal inflection.[4]

Opponents argue : The definition of the third nominal inflection then should cover the inflection *ṅe* in *śatāya* in *śatāya parikrīṇāti*. For it bears out the verbal knowledge

1. काष्ठेन पचतीत्यत्र तृतीया करणत्वस्यैव बोधिका न तु कर्मत्वस्य। श. श. p. 289.
2. पटौ स्त इत्यादौ द्विवचनस्यौकारस्य प्रथमात्वमिव द्वितीयात्वं न क्षतिकरम्, उपाधेयसङ्करेऽप्युपाधेरसाङ्कर्यात्। श. श. प्र. p. 289.
3. प्रकृत्यर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकान्वयबोधानर्जकत्वे सतीति वा वक्तव्यम्। ibid., p. 89.
4. पच्यर्थधर्मिककरणत्वान्वयबोधानुकूलसुप्सजातीयत्वं तृतीयात्वम्। ibid., p. 289.

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instrumentality posited as the feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *pari-krī*.

Jagadīśa replies : The definiton of the third nominal inflection is not to over-extend thereto. For the said inflection does not bear out the verbal knowledge of instrumentality posited as the feature against what the root-verb, *paci* means. The inflection, *ṅe* in *śatāya* in *śatāya pankriṇāti* has been specially provided for to convey the sense of instrumentality in respect of what the root-verb, *pari-krī* means.[1]

Opponents argue : The definition over-extends to the inflection in *kāṣṭhāt* in *kāṣṭhāt pacanam*. For it bears out the verbal knowledge of instrumentality posited as the feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *paci*.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For the said inflection cannot convey the sense of instrumentality. It only means causality as provided for by a special injunction.[2]

The inflection of the kind of the nominal inflection that bears out the verbal knowledge of the state of being the recepient of a full-fledged gift (*sampradānatva*) posited as the feature against the act of giving, presented by the verb, *dadāti* is known as the fourth nominal inflection.[3]

Opponents argue : In *dāsyā mālām prayacchati*, the nominal inflection in *dāsyā* bears out the verbal knowledge of the state being the recepient of a gift. As such, the definition of the fourth nominal inflection over-extends thereto.

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1. शताय परिक्रीणातीत्यादौ धात्वर्थे करणत्वबोधं प्रत्यनुकूलापि चतुर्थी न पच्यर्थे तथा, परिक्रीजः करणतायामेव तद्विधानात्। श. श. प्र. p. 289
   Vide परिक्रयणे सम्प्रदानमन्यतरस्याम्। पा. I. 4. 44.
2. काष्ठात् पचनमित्यादौ तु पञ्चमी न करणत्वस्य बोधिका असामर्थ्यात्, किन्तु कारणत्वस्यैव, हेतुतायां तदनुशासनात्। श. श. प्र. p. 289–91.
   Vide विभाषा गुणेऽस्त्रियाम्। पा. II. 3. 25. ('विभाषा' इति योगविभागात् अगुणे स्त्रियाञ्च क्वचित्। धूमादग्निमान्। नास्ति घटोऽनुपलब्धेः। Vide दी on पा. II. 3. 25.)
3. ददात्यर्थदानधर्मिकसम्प्रदानत्वानुभावकसुप्सजातीयत्वं चतुर्थीत्वम्। श. श प्र. p. 290.

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Jagadīśa replies : No. For the act of giving in the said instance is not presented by the verb *dadāti* (or the root-verb, *dā* of the *juhotyādi* class). On the contrary, the act of giving is borne out by the root-verb, *dān* (of the *bhvādi* class) and the third nominal inflection has been specially provided for to signify the state of being the recepient of a gift presented, implying bad conduct.[1]

Grammarians argue : The aphorisms of Pāṇini viz, *caturthī sampradāne* and *karmaṇā yamabhi-praiti sa sampradānam* reveal that the fourth nominal inflection is denotative of the state of the recepient of a full-fledged gift.

Jagadīśa argues : This would involve complexity. For it is simpler to hold that the said inflection denotes oneness, duality and multiplicity as and when it is used in the singular, dual and plural forms respectively. The state of being the recepient of a full-fledged gift, on the contrary, involves the object of the gift (*dravya*), the act of giving (*tyāga*), the person in favour of whom it is made (*uddeśya*), the title accruing to the person who receives the gift (*para-sattvotpatti*) and so on.[2]

Grammarians argue : In that case, the rules of grammar fail to bring home the apprehension of the power of denotation with the result that the saying of the elders '*śaktigraham vyākaraṇopmānāt* and so on turns out to be unauthorative.

Jagadīśa replies : The lexicon brings home the apprehension of the denotative power of the word, *matsara* and also of the

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1. दास्या मालां प्रयच्छतीत्यत्र दाने सम्प्रदानत्वस्यानुभाविकापि तृतीया न ददात्यर्थे, दानधातोर्योग एव सम्प्रदानतायां दानोऽनाचारः इत्यनेन तृतीयाऽनुशासनात् । श. श. प्र. p. 290.

Vide दाणश्च सा चेच्चतुर्थ्यर्थे । पा. I. 3. 55.

अशिष्टव्यवहारे दाणः प्रयोगे चतुर्थ्यर्थे तृतीया । वार्त्तिक (Vide सि. कौ. 568).

2. सम्प्रदानत्वशक्ता सुप् चतुर्थीति तु न युक्तम्, सम्प्रदानत्वाद्यपेक्षया लघुन्येकत्वादावेव चतुर्थ्याः शक्तिमत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 290.

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power of frozen metaphor when it says that the said word is denotative of envy and that it conventionally implies the envious. The word, *sakti-graha*, therefore, in the saying of the elders stands for a frozen faculty of communication.[1]

The inflection of the kind of the nominal inflection that causes the verbal knowledge of separation (*vibhāga*) posited as the feature against what is qualified by the determinants as such of the meaning of the root-verb, *pat* is the fifth nominal inflection.[2]

Opponents argue : In *Khale patamstarum tyajati*, the second nominal inflection in *tarum* causes the verbal knowledge of separation posited as the feature against the meaning of the verb, *patati*, obviously qualified by the state of falling down (*patanatva*). The definition of the fifth nominal inflection, therefore, over-extends to the said inflection.

Jagadīśa replies : The sentenee *khale patamstarum tyajati* gives the comprehension of 'one having the act (*vyāpāra*) resulting in separation from the tree, one with the (act of) falling down, on the threshing floor'. Hence although the said act (*vyāpāra*) comes out to be (identical with) the act of falling down, it is comprehended as the said act or what is qualified the state of the said act and not as the act of falling down or what is qualified the state of the act of falling down.[3]

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1. अनुशिष्वेर्मत्सरादिपद इव निरूढलक्षणाभिप्रायकत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः । श. श. प्र. p. 291.

   तथा च यथा मत्सरादिपदस्य मात्सर्ये शक्तिस्तद्विशिष्टे निरूढलक्षणेति कोषस्य निरूढलक्षणाज्ञापकत्वं तथात्रापीत्यकामेनापि कारिकास्थशक्तिग्रह इत्यत्र शक्तिपदस्यानादितात्पर्यमूलकवृत्तिपरत्वमावश्यकमिति भावः । कृष्णकांती p. 290.

2. पतधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकरूपावच्छिन्नधर्मिकविभागबोधानुकूलसुप्सजातीयत्वं पञ्चमीत्वम् । श. श. प्र. pp. 290-291.

3. खले पतंस्तरुंस्यजतीत्यादौ वस्तुगत्या पतत्यर्थे विभागस्य बोधिकापि द्वितीया न पतनत्वजात्यवच्छिन्ने । श. श. प्र. p. 291.

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Opponents argue : The root-verb, *pati* is denotative of the act resulting in the union of its own kind. *Patanatva*, the generic property is not ever liable of comprehension. Hence the said root-verb is regarded as a transitive one by virtue of which, *naraka-patita*, an instance of the *tatpuruṣa* compound involving the second nominal inflection in the exposition, *narakaṁ patitaḥ*, is formed.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The law of parsimony favours the idea of regarding the state of the act of falling down (*patanatva*), a generic property as the determinant of denotation of the root-verb, *pat*. This generic property is also an established entity. For it is the determinant of what is occasioned by weight.[2]

In *narakaṁ patitaḥ*, the second nominal inflection does not denote separation but the state of abiding (*ādheyatva*). For the verbal knowledge from the sentence is of the fall of calamity on one experiencing misery in hell (*naraka-niṣṭha-bhogāvacchinna-sva-durita-patana*). Hence the definition of the fifth nominal inflection does not over-extend to it.[3]

The nominal inflection which being other than the first one is potentially incapable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of the meaning of itself posited as the feature against the

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खलवृत्तिपतनाभिन्नो य स्तरुवृत्तिविभागानुकूलव्यापारस्तद्वानिति बोधः, तत्र तादृशव्यापारस्य पतनत्वेऽपि न तेन रूपेण भानं किन्तु तादृशव्यापारत्वेनेति भावः। कृष्णकांती p. 291.

1. ननूक्तलक्षणमसम्भवि, पतेर्विलक्षणसंयोगावच्छिन्नव्यापारवाचित्वेन पतनत्वजातेः कुत्राप्यभानात्, अतएव तस्य सकर्मकत्वेन द्वितीयातत्पुरुषोदाहरणमध्ये नरकपतित इति दुर्गेणोदाहृतम्। ibid., p. 291.
2. तस्या एव पतत्यर्थतावच्छेदकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 291.

   तथा च लाघवात्तादृशजातेरेव पतधातोः शक्यतावच्छेदकत्वादिति भावः। न च तादृशजातौ मानाभाव इति वाच्यम्। गुरुत्वजन्यतावच्छेदकतयैव तत्सिद्धेरप्रत्यूहत्वात्। कृष्णकांती p. 291.
3. नरकं पतित इत्यादौ तु भोगावच्छिन्नस्वदुरितस्य पतत्यर्थेऽपि द्वितीयया न तत्र विभागोऽनुभाव्यते परन्त्वाधेयत्वम्। श. श. प्र. p. 291.

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meaning of the root-verb, *dā* ending in a verbal inflection is known as the sixth nominal inflection.

This definition is not too wide to cover the inflections like the second one as in *dhanaṁ kareṇa viprāya pātrāt kāśyāṁ dadātyasau.* For these are potentially capable of bearing out the aforesaid kind of verbal comprehension. The first one although is potentially incapable of bearing it out, there is no harm. For the definition is qualified by the clause 'being other than the first one'.

In *dhanasya dātā*, although the sixth nominal inflection bears out the comprehension of the meaning of itself posited as the feature against gift or what the root-verb, *dā* means, the said meaning is not presented by the said root-verb ending in a verbal termination. Hence no contingency.[1]

For the sake of simplicity, the sixth nominal inflection may be defined as what is of the kind of the nominal inflection that causes the verbal comprehension of the state of the object (*karmatva*) posited as the feature against affliction (*himsā*) borne out by the verb, *hinasti*.[2]

Opponents argue : In *Cauraṁ jvarayati*, the second nominal inflection causes the verbal knowledge of the state of the object posited as the feature against affliction, the determinant of the meaning of the root-verb. The definition of the sixth nominal inflection, therefore, over-extends thereto.

Jagadīśa replies : The definition of the said inflection does not overextend to the second one. For affliction (*himsā*) is not derived from the verb, *hinsati*.[3]

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1. धनं करेण विप्राय पात्रात् काश्यां ददात्यसावित्यत्र द्वितीयादिर्ददात्यर्थे स्वार्थान्वयबोधकतया तत्स्वरूपयोग्य एव, प्रथमा तु तदयोग्यापि प्रथमैव, धनस्य दातेत्यत्र दाने स्वार्थबोधिकापि षष्ठी, न तिवन्तस्य दाधातोरर्थे येनासम्भवः। श. श. प्र. p. 291.
2. हिनस्त्यर्थहिंसाधर्मिकस्वार्थकर्मत्वानुभावकसुप्सजातीयत्वं वा। श. श. प्र. p. 292.
3. चौरं ज्वरयतीत्यादौ च धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतहिंसायां कर्मत्वबोधिकापि द्वितीया न हिनस्त्युपस्थाप्यायाम्। ibid., p. 292.

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Jagadīśa replies : In *grāmam gacchati*, the second nominal inflection bears out the verbal knowledge of conjunction (*saṁyoga*), apprehended as the determinant of the meaning of the root-verb which is universally regarded as a relation. Similarly in *paṭam dadāti*, the same inflection again gives the verbal comprehension of ownership (*svatva*), equally apprehended as the determinant of the root-verb involved. Hence the definition over-extends to the second inflection.

Grammarians argue : In these instances the second nominal inflection is to mean the state of abiding (*ādheyatva*) only.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The sixth nominal inflection is well known to be denotative of oneness, duality and plurality as and when it is used in the singular, dual and plural number respectively. There is no reason, therefore, to imagine that it denotes relation as such or ownership and the like. As to the rules of Paṇini, it may be said that these indicate that the said inflections signify relation and the like through frozen metaphor.[2]

The inflection of the kind of the nominal inflection that causes the verbal knowledge of the state of abiding presented by itself, posited as the feature against what is qualified by the determinant as such of the meaning of the root-verb, *paca*, is the seventh nominal inflection.[3]

Opponents argue : The dual forms of the word, *śāka-sūpayoḥ* ending in the sixth and the seventh nominal inflections being identical, the definition of the seventh, nominal inflection over-extends to the sixth one.

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1. ग्रामं गच्छति पटं ददातीत्यादौ च धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूते संयोगस्वत्वादौ द्वितीयायाऽऽधेयत्वमेव बोध्यत इत्यपि वदन्ति। श. श. प्र. p. 292.
2. वदन्तीत्यस्वरससूचनाय, स च एकत्वादौ शक्तेः कल्पतया सम्बन्धादौ शक्तिकल्पने मानाभावः, अनुशासनस्य निरूढलक्षणासम्पादकतयाऽप्युपपत्तेरिति। कृष्णकांती p. 292.
3. षष्ठ्यात्वर्थतावच्छेदकरूपावच्छिन्नधर्मिकस्वार्थाधेयत्वबोधानुकूलसुप्सजातीयत्वं सप्तमीत्वम्। श. श. प्र. p. 292.

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Jagadīśa replies : No. For identity of the conditionals does not imply identity of conditions too.[1]

Grammarians argue : The seventh nominal inflection is what being an inflection is denotative of the state of the locus or of the state of abiding. In *grāmamadhyāste*, although the second nominal inflection conveys the sense of the said inflection, it is not endowed with the power of denotation in respect of such a meaning.[2] For the rules of Pāṇini lay down that the seventh nominal inflection alone is denotative thereof.[3] In *gramāya gacchati*, the fourth nominal inflection denotes the state of the object and not that of the state of the locus or of the state of abiding.[4]

Opponents ague : The seventh nominal inflection should be defined as the inflection that has the same sequence of letters with the nominal inflection bearing out the verbal knowledge of the state of the locus presented by itself, posited as the feature against *caitra*.[5]

Jagadīśa replies : All such definitions are illogical. For the inflection has to be admitted to be denotative of oneness, duality and plurality as and when used in its singular, dual and plural forms respectively. As to the rules of Paṇini or other grammarians, it may be said that these are indicative of the fact that the said infleetion present the meanings like the state of the locus and so on through metaphor.[6]

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1. शाकस्पयोः पाचक इत्यादौ द्विवचनस्य लघयत्वादि पूर्ववत्। ib'd., p. 292–93.
2. अधिकरणतायामाधेयत्वे वा शक्ता सुप् सप्तमी। ग्राममध्यास्ते इत्यादावधिकरणत्वं बोधयन्त्यपि द्वितीयादिस्तत्र न शक्ता। ibid., p. 293.
3. अधिकरणे सप्तमी इत्येवानुशिष्टेरिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 293.
4. ग्रामाय गच्छतीत्यादौ कर्मत्वादिष्वेव चतुर्थ्यादिः। श. श. प्र. p. 293.
5. चैत्रधर्मिकस्वार्थाधिकरणत्वान्वयबोधकसुप्समानानुपूर्वीकत्वं वा सप्तमीत्वमित्यपि वदन्ति। श. श. प्र. p. 293.
6. वदन्तीत्यस्वरससूचनाय, स चैकत्वादौ शक्तिरावश्यकतयाऽधिकरणत्वादौ तच्छक्तेरकल्पनादनुशिष्टेर्निरुक्तलक्षणाज्ञापकतयाऽप्युपपत्तेः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 293.

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Opponents argue : The first nominal inflection is what constitutes the triad beginning with *su* and following the same pattern, other nominal inflections too are to be defined.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : There is no such generic property like *suptva*. So innumerable definitions have to be put forword to cover all the individuals and the situation will turn out to be complex.[2]

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1. स्वादित्रिकान्यतमत्वं प्रथमात्वम्, एवमादित्रिकान्यतमत्वादिना द्वितीयादिकं निर्वाच्यमित्यप्याहुरिति कृतं विस्तरेण। श. श. प्र. p. p. 293.
2. आहुरित्यस्वरससूचनाय, स च सुप्त्वादिजातौ मानाभावेन तत्तद्व्यक्तित्व एव पर्यवसानादनन्तलक्षणापत्तिरिति। कृष्णकांती p. 293.

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CHAPTER XV

GOVERMENT OF CASES (KĀRAKA)

The nominal inflections have a distinct role to play. These bring about the syntactical relation of a case with the meaning of a verb.[1] The inflections that bring about such a relation are called case-endings (*kāraka-vibhaktīs*). These are, therfore, divided into two categories viz, case-endings and what are other than case-endings[2] to be described, hereafter, as prepositional inflections (*upapada-vibhakti*). The nominal inflection that bears out the comprehension of a case, therefore, through an established faculty of communication is regarded as a case-ending. The nominal inflections that give the comprehension of what are other than a case are known as prepositional inflections.[3]

The meaning of a case-ending, therefore, posited as the feature against the meaning presented by a root-verb involved is regarded as a case in respect of the said act borne out by the root-verb concerned.[4]

The fifth case-ending in *Vṛkṣātpatati* bears out the verbal comprehension of separation (*vibhāga*), posited as the feature

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1. क्रियाकारकयोरन्वयव्युत्पत्तयेऽन्यथापि सुपं विभजते । श. श. प्र. p. 294.
2. कारकार्थेतरार्था च सुप् द्विधा च विभज्यते । ibid., का. 67.
3. वृत्त्या कारकस्य बोधिका तदन्यस्य चेत्येवं द्विविधोऽपि सुपो विभागः । ibid., p. 294.
4. धात्वर्थांशे प्रकारो यः सुवर्थः सोऽत्र कारकम् । ibid., का. 67.
   तत्र यद्धातूपस्थाप्ययादृशार्थेऽन्वयप्रकारीभूय भासते यः सुवर्थः स तद्धातूपस्थाप्यतादृशक्रियायां कारकम् । ibid., p. 294.

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against the act of falling down, presented by the root-verb, *pat* used therewith. Similar are the cases with the different case-endings used in *vyaghrāt vibheti, brāhmaṇāya dadāti, putrāya krudhyati, dātreṇa cchinatti, ghaṭatvena jānāti, sthālyām pacati, śuktau bhāsate, grāmam gacchatī, ghaṭam paśyati, caitreṇa pacyate, ghaṭeṇa bhūyate* and the like.[1] Separation and the like other meanings, therefore, borne out by the respective nominal inflections are regarded as the cases in respect of the respective acts presented by the respective root-verbs and the said inflections as case-endings. For these have the distinction of bearing out the verbal knowledge of the meanings denoted (or implied) by themselves, posited as the features against the respective acts presented by the root-verbs concerned.[2]

Grammarians argue : In semantics, a noun or a pronoun is, related to a verb and the noun or the pronoun thus related is called a case (*kāraka*). The nominal inflection brings about this relation. The role that it plays is more or less that of a copula so to say. It is only indicative of a case-relation.

Jagadīśa replies : This is only the secondary meaning of the word, *kāraka*. Primarily, it means what is denoted by a case-ending. For it is the meaning thereof that is directly related to the act presented by the verb concerned. But the meaning of the noun or the pronoun that qualifies the meaning of such a case-ending, because of being indirectly related to the meaning of a root-verb is known as a case in respect of the meaning of the said verb in a secondary sense.[3]

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1. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 294.
2. पतप्रभृतिधात्वर्थे पतनादौ पञ्चम्याद्युपस्थापितो विभागादिः प्रकारीभूय भासत इति तत्तद्धातूपस्थापिततत्तत्क्रियायां विभागादिकं प्रकृते कारकमतो धात्वर्थे स्वार्थबोधकतया तत्र पञ्चम्यादिः कारकविभक्तिरुच्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 294.
3. यादृशेन नामार्थेनावच्छिन्नस्य सुवर्थस्य यादृशधात्वर्थेऽन्वयः स एव तादृश-धात्वर्थे कारकतया व्यपदिश्यते। ibid., pp. 294-95.

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In *Vṛkṣāt patati*, therefore, the meaning of the noun, *Vṛkṣa* viz, a tree is designated as the ablative case in respect of the act of falling down, the meaning of the root-verb, *pat*.[1]

In *stokaṁ pacati*, the meaning of the word, *stoka* (viz. abjectly) although it is apprehended as the feature against the act of cooking, the meaning of the root-verb, (used in association with the said word), is not to be regarded as a case. For the nominal inflection in *stokom* does not present any meaning whatsoever.[2]

Opponents argue : If the nominal inflection in *stokam* is held to present no meaning whatsoever, its use becomes illogical.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The use of the said inflection is only a grammatical formality like the provision of the neuter gender, with an adverb like this.[4] The inflection in such cases at the most makes the word-meanings involved mutually expectant. But it does not present any meaning that is liable of verbal comprehension.[5]

Opponents argue : The second nominal inflection, in that case, turns out to be only a prepositional inflection. The compounds like *stoka-pāka* cannot be explained under such circumstances.[6]

Jagadīśa replies : *Stoka-pākaḥ*, the *tatpuruṣa* compound involving the exposition, *stokena pākaḥ*, is provided for by a

1. तेन वृक्षात् पततीत्यादौ वृक्षादेरपि पतनादिक्रियायामपादानादिकारकव्यवहारः। श. श. प्र. p. 295.
2. स्तोकं पचतीत्यादौ क्रियायां प्रकारीभूतोऽपि स्तोकादिर्न कारकम्, सुपानुपस्थापनात्। ibid., p. 295.
3. ननु तत्र द्वितीयार्थं एव प्रकारः, अन्यथा द्वितीयाया आनर्थक्यापत्तेः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 295.
4. द्वितीया तु तत्र क्लीवलिङ्गत्ववदानुशासनिक्येव। श. श. प्र. p. 295.
5. तथा च तत्र द्वितीयाऽऽकांक्षासम्पादिका, न तु तदर्थस्य शाब्दे प्रवेश इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 295.
6. ननु तत्र द्वितीयाया उपपदविभक्तित्वे कथं स्तोकपाक इत्यादिकस्तत्पुरुषः? ibid., p. 295.

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special rule, like the compound, *giri-kāṇaḥ*, the exposition being *giriṇā kṛtaḥ kāṇaḥ*.[1]

Relation, the meaning of the sixth nominal inflection does not ever posit as the feature against the meaning of a root-verb. Hence no such expression like *taṇḍulasya pacati* is ever used in language. Therefore, neither is relation, the meaning of the sixth nominal inflection regarded as a case nor is the nominal inflection presenting the said meaning (relation) is a case-ending.[2] The grammarians, therefore, speak of six-fold cases and by case they mean what is comprehended as the feature against the meaning of a verb. The meaning of the sixth nominal inflection viz, relation is designated as *śeṣa* or what is other than a case.[3]

In *rajakasya vastram dadāti*, therefore, the sixth nominal inflection bears out the verbal knowledge of relation of the kind of *pariṣkāryatva* posited as the feature against cloth (*vastra*) only.[4]

In *taṇḍulasya pācakaḥ* or in *maitrasya bhoktavyam*, however, the sixth nominal inflection is regarded as a case-ending. For it means the state of the object (*karmatva*) and the state of agency respectively posited as the feature against the act of

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1. स्तोकपाक इत्यादिकस्तु तत्पुरुषो गिरिकाण इत्यादिवद्विशेषविधेरेव। श. श. प्र. p. 295.

   Vide कर्तृकरणे कृता बहुलम्। पा. II. 1. 32; तृतीया तत्कृतार्थेन गुणवचनेन। पा. II. 1. 30.

2. षष्ठ्यर्थस्तु सम्बन्धो न धात्वर्थे प्रकारीभूय भासते तण्डुलस्य पचतीत्याद्य-प्रयोगादतः सम्बन्धो न कारकं, न वा तदर्थिकापि षष्ठ्यादिः कारकविभक्तिः। ibid., p. 295.

3. अतएव—

   क्रियाप्रकारीभूयोऽर्थः कारकं तच्च षड्विधम्।
   कर्तृकर्मादिभेदेन शेषः सम्बन्ध इष्यते॥

   इति शाब्दिकाः स्मरन्तिः। शेषः=कारकावशिष्टः। सम्बन्ध कारकादन्य इत्यपि पठन्ति। ibid., p. 295.

4. रजकस्य वस्त्रं ददातीत्यादौ च परिष्कार्यत्वादिलक्षणः सम्बन्धो वस्त्रादावेव षष्ठ्यानुभाव्यते। ibid., p. 295.

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cooking or of eating. Because the use of the said inflection has been specially provided for in such cases in the senses referred to.[1]

Opponents ask : In *guru-vipra-tapasvi-durgatānām pratikurvīta bhīṣak sva-bheṣajaih, padmasyānukarotyeva kumārī-mukha-maṇḍalah, sā lakṣmirupakurute yayā pareṣām* and the like, the sixth nominal inflection should be regarded as case-endings or not ?

Jagadīśa replies : The sixth nominal inflection when used in association with a primary suffix turns out to be a case-ending and so also when used in association with certain root-verbs in particular, as in *mātuḥ smarati, caurasya hinasti, jalasyopaskurute* and so on.[2]

Opponents argue : The instances cited in defence are provided for by specific rules.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The examples referred to are to be regarded as well, to have been thus provided for. The object of the verb, *karoti* prefixed by *prati, anu* and *upa* should optionally take to the sixth case-ending, in view of such uses found in the language. It can not be argued that *guru* is not liable of comprehension as the object of medical treatment (*pratikāra*), the act meant by *prati-kṛ* from the expression in question as from *gurun prati-kurute.*[4]

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1. तण्डुलस्य पाचकः मैत्रस्य भोक्तव्यमित्यादौ कर्त्तृकर्मत्वादिकं कारकमेव धात्वर्थे पचनादौ कृद्योगे कर्त्तृकर्मणो षष्ठ्यनुशिष्टेः । श. श. प्र. p. 295.
   Vide कर्त्तृकर्मणोः कृति । पा. II. 3. 65; कृत्यानां कर्त्तरि वा । पा. II. 3. 71.
2. गुरु-विप्र-तपस्वि—दुर्गतानां प्रतिकुर्वीत भिषक् स्वभेषजैः·····इत्यादावपि मातुः स्मरति·····इत्यादाविव क्रियाविशेषयोगे कारकार्थैव षष्ठी । श. श. प्र p. 295–96.
3. अधीगर्थदयेशां कर्मणि । पा. II. 3. 52. जासि-नि-प्र-हृण नाट-क्राथ-पिषां हिंसायाम् । पा. II. 3. 56; कृञः प्रतियत्ने । पा. II. 5. 52.
4. प्रयोगदृष्ट्या प्रत्यनूपेभ्यः करोतेः कर्मण्यपि वैकल्पिकस्य षष्ठी-विधेर्वक्तव्यत्वात्, न हि गुरून् प्रतिकरोतीत्यादित इवोक्तवाक्येभ्यो गुर्वादिकर्मकत्वं प्रतिकारादिक्रियायां नावगम्यते । श. श. प्र. p. 296.

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Opponents argue : Such over-stretching of the provision made by a rule of grammar is only a flight of imagination.

Jagadīśa replies : Not at all. Pakṣdhara Miśra has lent support to such a view. The locative absolute is used, he says, in the text *sāmānya-vatve sati bāhyakaraṅaka-pratyakṣa-tvāt*, of the *tattva-cintāmaṇi* to convey the sense of collocativeness notwithstanding the fact that there is no provision therefor.[1]

In *daṇḍena ghaṭaḥ* or in *bhutale pataḥ*, the third or the seventh nominal inflection is not a case-ending. For the meaning thereof is not syntactically related to that of a verb, although the said inflection in such cases mean instrumentality and locativeness. Such expositions, therefore, do not form into compounds like *daṇḍa-ghaṭa*, *bhūtala-paṭaḥ* and so on. Because the *tatpuruṣa* compound is provided for only in case the exposition thereof reads the third case-ending, but for a special injunction.[2]

Opponents argue : In the instances like *'mama pratibhāti, spurati, rocate* and so on, relation, the meaning of the sixth nominal inflection is posited as the feature against the meaning of the respective root-verb. The said inflection, therefore, while meaning relation should be regarded as a case-ending. If on the contrary, the said inflection conveying the sense of relation is treated only as a prepositional inflection then it should not bear the kind of the verbal knowledge it, does.

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1. अतएव सामान्यवत्वे सति बाह्यकरणप्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यादावनुशासनासत्वेऽपि सति सप्तम्याः सामानाधिकरण्यमर्थश्चिन्तामणौ चिन्तितः। श. श. प्र. p. 296.

   चिन्तित इति। शब्दमप्यालोके पक्षधरमिश्रैरिति शेषः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 296.

2. दण्डेन घटः, भूतले पटः इत्यादौ तु तृतीयाद्यर्थः करणत्वादिकं न कारकं धात्वर्थानन्वितत्वात्, अतएव तादृशवाक्यार्थे दण्डघटः, भूतलपट इत्यादिर्न समासः, कारकविभक्त्यन्तर्भावेणैव विशेषविधिं विना तत्पुरुषस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 296.

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Jagdīśa replies : The sixth nominal inflection, meaning relation as such, is a prepositional inflection. But when it means a relation in particular, it is a case-ending. In the instances cited, it denotes *ādheyatva*, a particular relation to give the comprehension of knowledge abiding in me and the like.

Opponents argue : In that case, the seventh case-ending should have been used instead of the sixth one.

Jagadīśa replies : The sixth one has been used in view of the speaker's purpose, or rather the said inflection may even be regarded as a prepositional inflection. The expressions cited may be regarded as elliptical ones and a word like *citte* may be supplied as an ellipsis.[1]

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1. मम प्रतिभाति; स्फुरति, रोचते इत्यादौ प्रतिभातिक्रियायामस्मदादेः सम्बन्धः षष्ठ्या कथं बोध्यताम् अकारकविभक्तित्वादिति तु विभावनीयम् । श. श. प्र. p. 296.

प्रतिभातिस्फुर्तिश्च ज्ञानविषयत्वम्, इच्छाविषयत्वं, रोचनम्, तत्र ज्ञानेच्छयोराधेयतात्वेनास्मदादेः सम्बन्धो भासते, न तु सम्बन्धत्वेन, सम्बन्धत्वावच्छिन्नस्यैवाकारकत्वोक्तेरिति सप्तमीप्रसक्तौ विवक्षातः षष्ठी । अथवा चित्त इति पदमध्याहार्यमित्यभिप्रायः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 296.

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CHAPTER XVI

CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
(APĀDĀNA)

Cases are divided into six categories viz, ablative (*apādāna*), dative (*sampradāna*) instrumental (*karaṇa*), locative (*ādhāra*) objective (*karma*) and nominative (*kartṛ*).[1]

This six-fold division of cases is rooted in the difference of the meanings of the six case-endings like the state of the ablative (*apādānatva*) and so on.[2]

By the state of the ablative is meant the meaning of the fifth case-ending constituting a sentence of analysis (of a compound) comprehended as the feature against the meaning of a root-verb.[3]

Vṛkṣāt patitaḥ (the sentence of analysis of the compound *Vṛkṣā-patitaḥ*) gives the verbal knowledge of the agent of the act of falling down, leading to the separation from the tree. Separation, therefore, the meaning of the fifth case-ending being comprehended as the feature against the act of falling down, the meaning of the root-verb, *pat*, through the relation of *svānukūlatva*, is known as the state of the ablative.[4]

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1. अपादान-सम्प्रदान-करणाधारकर्मणाम् ।
   कर्त्तुश्च भेदतः षोढा कारकं परिकीर्त्तितम् ॥ श. ब्र. प्र. का. 68.
2. अपादानादीनां भेदो वैधर्म्यमपादानत्वादि, तत्प्रयुक्तं कारकस्य षड्विधत्व-व्यवहारः । ibid., p. 297.
3. क्रियाधर्मिणि यः स्वार्थः पञ्चम्या विग्रहस्थया ।
   अनुभाव्यः कारकन्तदपादानत्वसंज्ञकम् ॥ ibid., kā. 69.
4. वृक्षात् पतित इत्यादौ वृक्षावधिकविभागानुकूलपतनकर्त्तेत्यन्वयबुद्धौ धातू-पस्थाप्यपतने पञ्चम्युपस्थाप्यो विभागः स्वानुकूलत्वसम्बन्धेन प्रकार इति स एव तत्रापादानत्वम् । ibid., pp. 297–98.

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Opponents argue : The fifth case-ending must not be held to mean separation only. For otherwise *svasmāt patitaścaitraḥ* should have been regarded a valid proposition to be used in language. It must be admitted, therefore, that the said case-ending also means the state of the act being inherent in what is other than what the base thereof signifies. By the state of the ablative, therefore, the state of the act involved, being inherent in what is other than what is signified by the base of the said case-ending, also is to be understood.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection.[2] For the elders subscribe to such a view.[3] But the fact is that the state of being inherent in what is other (than what is signified by the base of the fifth case-ending) cannot be regarded as the meaning of the said case-ending. For otherwise *dravyāt patati khagaḥ* could not be used in language. Because the act of falling down, inherent in what is other than substance (*dravya*) is inconceivable.[4]

It is, therefore, held that separation, the meaning of the fifth case-ending, is syntactically related to the meaning of the base thereof through the relation of *svāvadhikatva*. Thereupon, the said separation is related to the meaning of the root-verb through two-fold relation viz, *sāmānādhikaraṇya* and *anukūlatva*. The use like *svasmāt patitaścaitraḥ*, is thus ruled out.[5] For the act of falling down that inheres in the substratum of separation from *caitra* and results in the separation of

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1. न च वृक्षादिव स्वस्मात् पतितश्चैत्र इत्यग्रयोगात् धात्वर्थान्वितं परसमवेतत्व-मपि तत्र पञ्चम्यर्थ इति तद्दृष्यदानत्वं स्यात्। श. श. प्र. p. 298.
2. इष्टत्वात्। ibid., p. 298.
3. इदञ्च प्राचीनमतानुसारेणोक्तम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 298.
4. वस्तुतः परसमेवतत्वं न पञ्चम्यर्थः, तथा सति द्रव्यान्यसमवेतस्य पतनस्या-प्रसिद्धया द्रव्यात् पतति खग इत्यादेरयोग्यतापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 298.
5. परन्तु स्वावधिकत्वसम्बन्धेन प्रकृत्यर्थविभागस्य सामानाधिकरण्यानुकूलत्वो-भयसम्बन्धेन धात्वर्थे पतनेऽन्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वाच्च तादृशप्रयोगः। श. श. प्र. p. 298.

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caitra cannot inhere in *caitra*. Because separation from oneself does not abide one; one cannot be separated from oneself.[1]

Succession, (*ānantaryya*), the meaning of the fifth nominal inflection in *prāsādāt prekṣakaḥ* used to convey the sense of one who on climbing (atop) a building looks on thereform, is not comprehended as the state of the ablative. For the said proposition is not a sentence of analysis of any compound. Because to convey the idea of the said proposition, a compound like *prāsāda-prekṣakaḥ* is never formed.[2]

Opponents argue : If separation is to be comprehended as the state of the ablative, then like the tree (*vṛkṣa*) concerned, the bird (*khaga*) too should be regarded as the ablative case. For both the tree and the bird are equally the substratum of separation.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *apādana* is denotative of what being other than the locus of the act involved is the substratum of separation caused by the said act. The bird, therefore, is not disignated as the ablative case.[4]

Opponents argue : In the case of a bird deserting a tree, the tree (*taru*) being other than the locus of the act of deserting (*tyāga*) is the substratum of separation caused by the said act, and thus it is comprehended as the ablative case and the objective case alike. *Tarostyajati* should, therefore, be validly used in language.

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1. चैत्रावधिकत्वविशिष्टविभागाधिकरणनिष्ठं यच्चैत्रविभागानुकूलं पतनं तस्य चैत्रे बाधात्, स्वावधिकत्वविशिष्टविभागस्य स्वस्मिनसत्त्वादिति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः। श. श. प्र. p. 298.
2. प्रासादमारुह्य प्रेक्षक इत्यार्थे तु प्रासादात् प्रेक्षक इत्यादिवाक्यं न विग्रहः. तादृशार्थे प्रासादप्रेक्षकादिशब्दानामसमासत्वादतस्तन्निविष्टपञ्चम्यर्थे आरोहणानन्तर्यादौ नातिप्रसङ्गः। ibid., p. 298.
3. ननु विभागस्यापादानरूपतया तदाश्रयत्वस्याविशेषाद वृक्ष इव खगेऽपि तादृशव्यवहारः स्यादित्यत आह-अपादानशब्दस्त्विति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 298.
4. अपादानशब्दस्तु तत्तत्कर्मानधिकरणत्वे सति तत्तत्कर्मजन्यविभागाश्रये शक्त इति न तत्र तद्व्यवहारः। श. श. प्र. 298-99.

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Jagadīśa replies : Such an use is not to be made. For the fifth case-ending is provided for only to denote separation, not comprehended as the determinant of denotation of the root-verb involved. The root-verb, *tyaji*, on the contrary, denotes an act, the determinant of denotation of which is separation.[1]

Opponents argue : *Vṛkṣādapaiti* then, cannot be used in language. For the determinant of denotation of the root-verb in this case too is separation.

Jagadīśa replies : The root-verb, here implies the act of falling down.[2]

Opponents argue : The root-verb, *apa-in* in that case when not known to have the said power of implication, *Vṛkṣamapaiti* should be used.

Jagadīśa replies : Such an use is fully jastified like *Vṛkṣaṁ tyajati, jahāti* and so on.[3] For a root-verb denotative of an act determined by separation (*vibhāgāvacchinna kriyā*) optionally calls for such an use.

Opponents argue : The root-verb, *pati* meaning the act of falling also is determined by separation. As such like *Vṛkṣamapaiti, Vṛkṣam patati* should also be validly used in language.

Jagadīśa replies : The root-verb, *pati* is not denotative of an act determined by separation. On the contrary, it denotes an act determined by conjunction with the region below.[4]

Opponents argue : In that case, the region below being the substratum of the effect (of the act) of the kind of the

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1. तत्रकर्मकत्याग एव तरुतः पतनमतस्तस्य त्यागे कर्मवदपादानं तदभवत्येव। धात्वर्थतानवच्छेदकीभूत एव विभागे पञ्चम्याः साधुतया तरोस्त्यजतीत्यादिको न प्रयोगः, त्यजेर्विभागावच्छिन्नक्रियावाचित्वात्। ibid., p. 299.
2. वृक्षादपैतीत्यादावपि लक्षणया पतनमेव धात्वर्थः। ibid., p. 299.
3. विभागावच्छिन्नक्रियायास्तथात्वे वृक्षं त्यजति, जहातीत्यादिवत् वृक्षमपैतीत्यपि प्रमाणमेव। ibid., p. 299.
4. पतिस्तु न विभागावच्छिन्नं स्पन्दमभिधते, किन्त्वधःसंयोगावच्छिन्नम्। श. श. प्र. p. 299.

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determinant of denotation of the root-verb should be comprehended as the objective case of the said act to call for the use *bhūmiṁ patati*.

Jagadīśa replies : The region below is the determinant of the determinant of denotation of the said root-verb. As such a contingency does not arise.[1]

Opponents argue : But even then the root-verb, *pati* turns out to be a transitive verb. For it is held to denote an act determined by an effect.[2]

Jagapīśa replies : In that case, the said root-verb is to be regarded to be denotative of an act determined by the state of falling down (*patanatva*), a genus, occasioned by weight.[3]

Opponents argue : In that case *Vṛkṣāt spandate* is to be used as a valid proposition. For the use of the fifth case-ending is used to denote the state of the ablative.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : There is no reason why such an use is not to be validly made. For *Vṛkṣāt calati* and the like are used and the root-verb, *cali* is equally intranstive.[5]

Opponents argue : In *tarum tyajati*, the separation involved holds out a case for the state of the ablative case. At the same time, separation being denoted by the root-verb, *tyaji* (meaning *vibhāgvacchinna-krīyā*), it is the determinant of denotation thereof. This again is the effect of the act of desertion to make out a case for the state of objective case. Hence both the fifth and the second case-endings are simultaneously likely to be used to denote the said separation. But in view

1. तथा चाधोदेशस्य भूरुधादेर्धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकताश्रेयस्त्वेऽपि धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकतया न भूमिं पततीति प्रयोगः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 299.
2. ननु तथापि पतधातोः सकर्मकत्वव्यवहारापत्तिः, फलावच्छिन्नस्पन्दवाचित्वात्। ibid., p. 299.
3. गुरुत्वप्रयोज्यपतनत्वजात्यवच्छिन्नत्वं वा। श. श. प्र. p. 299.
4. नन्वेतावताऽकर्मकधातोर्योगे पृवापादानपञ्चम्याः साधुतया वृक्षात् स्पन्दत इति प्रयोगः स्यात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 299.
5. वृक्षाच्चलतीत्यादिवच्च वृक्षात् स्पन्दते इत्यपि प्रयोगो भवत्येव, चलिस्पन्दयोर्द्वयोरप्यकर्मकधातुत्वेन तत्प्रयोगस्याविशिष्टत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 299.

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of the provision to the effect that in a case like this, (the state of) the objective case is to prevail, the second case-ending is used in preference to the fifth one to denote the separation from the tree. Had not there been a tie like that and the said provision, the use of the fifth case-ending to denote the said separation would be quite reasonable.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, when the root-verb, *tyaji* implies a simple act, *tarostyajati* should be used. Moreover, in *Vṛkṣādārūhya patati*, *bhrāmaṇānāhūya diyate* and so on, the said provision does not hold good.[2]

In *Vṛkṣād vibhajate Khagaḥ*, the fifth case-ending means the state of boundary or the state of the determinant of boundary, posited as the feature against separation (*vibhāga*), the meaning of the root-verb, *vi-bhaji* to give the comprehension of a bird having the separation, the boundary of which is a tree (i.e. a bird separated from a tree). Like conjunction (*saṁyoga*) having oneself as the counter-corelate (*pratiyogī*), the separation having oneself as the boundary does not abide oneself. Hence *svasmād vibhajate* is not used in language.[3]

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1. यत्तु—तरुं त्यजीत्यत्र विभागो धात्वर्थः, क्रियाजन्यविभागत्वेनापादानत्वमिव धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतफलत्वेन कर्मत्वमीत्यपादानत्वकर्मत्वयोर्विभक्तिप्रसक्तौ कर्मत्वस्य परत्वात्तस्य बोधिका द्वितीयैव प्रवर्त्तते, न त्वपादानत्वस्य बोधिका पञ्चमी, तथैव साकांक्षत्वात्—

अपादानसम्प्रदानकरणाधारकर्मणाम् ।
कर्त्तुश्चोभयसम्प्राप्तौ परमेव प्रवर्त्तते ॥ इत्यनुशासनात् इति ।

श. श. प्र. pp. 299–300

2. तच्चिन्त्यम् । ibid., p. 302.

त्यजेः स्पन्दमात्रे लक्षणास्थले तरोस्त्यजतीति प्रयोगापत्तिः, एवं वृक्षमारुह्य पततीतिवारणाय आहूय दीयते इत्यादौ तादृशनियमस्य व्यभिचारित्वमेव चिन्ताबीजम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 300.

Vide also श. श. प्र. 344.

3. वृक्षाद् विभजते खग' इत्यत्राविधित्वमवधिनिरूपकत्वं वा धात्वर्थेऽन्वितं पञ्चम्याः प्रतिपाद्यते, तेन वृक्षनिष्ठावधिताकविभागवान् खग इत्याकारस्तत्र बोधः । स्वप्रतियोगिकसंयोगस्येव स्वावधिकाविभागस्यापि स्वस्मिन्नसत्त्वादेव स्वस्माद्विभजते इत्यादिको न प्रयोग इत्युक्तप्रायम् । श. श. प्र. p. 300.

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Opponents argue : The state of boundary (*avadhitva*) of separation is but the state of the counter-co-relate thereof. Hence an expression like *Vṛkṣād Vibhajate* cannot reasonably be used to convey the sense of separation having the counter-co-relate of separation as its counter-co-relate. For the sense is complete without *vibhajate.*[1]

Jagadīśa argues : The state of boundary is a kind of *svarūpa-sambandha* or an independent category by itself.[2]

The source of alarm is related to verbs denotative of alarm and deliverance as in *vyāghrāt vibheti, corāt trāyate.*[3] The fifth case-ending, in such cases, means the state of the source (or cause) or the state of the effect.[4] The state of the cause or the effect is to be related to apprehension (*cintana*) or to evil only, a part of what alarm means viz, apprehension of evil likely to occur to oneself. The verbal knowledge from the expression, *vyāghrād vibheti*, therefore, is of one apprehensive of the likealihood of evil of oneself due to the tiger or of one apprehensive of the likely evil due to the tiger.[5]

In *pāpānnivartate, adharmād viramati* and the like, the fifth case-ending means abhorance (*dveṣa*) against which the meaning of the base thereof is posited as the feature through the relation of *viṣayatā.* The whole thing, thereupon, is related to abstention (*nivṛtti*), the meaning of the root-verb through the

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1. नन्ववधित्वं विभागप्रतियोगित्वं, तथा च विभागप्रतियोगि-प्रतियोगिक-विभागस्य भाने तादृशवाक्यस्य निराकांक्षत्वापत्तिः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 300.
2. अवधित्वन्तु स्वरूपसम्बन्धप्रभेदः, पदार्थान्तरं वा इत्यन्यदेतत् । श. श. प्र. p. 300.
3. भीत्रार्थानां भयहेतुः । पा. I. 4. 25.
4. व्याघ्राद् विभेति त्रस्यतीत्यादौ हेतुत्वं जन्यत्वं वा पञ्चम्यर्थः । श. श. प्र. p. 300.
5. व्याघ्राद् विभेतित्रयस्तीत्यादौ हेतुत्वं जन्यत्वं वा पञ्चम्यर्थः, तच्च भावित्वेन स्वानिष्टचिन्तनपर्य्यवसितस्य भयस्यैकदेशेऽनिष्टे चिन्तन एव वान्वितम्, तथा च व्याघ्रहेतुकस्य स्वानिष्टस्य भावित्वेन चिन्तनवान् व्याघ्रहेतुकत्वेन भाव्यनिष्टधर्मिकचिन्तनवानिति वा तत्र बोधः । श. श. प्र. p. 301.

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relation of *janyatva*. The verbal knowledge, therefore, is of one having abstention born of abhorance against sin.[1]

Others hold that in such cases, the fifth case-ending means *viṣayatva* to give the comprehension of one having abstention from sin.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : This is incorrect. For to convey the sense of one having astention from what causes sin also, an expression like *pāpānnivartate* would be validly used in that case.[3]

Opponents argue : It is a welcome objection.

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For it is not borne out by experience.[4]

In *raṇāt parājayate*, the root-verb, *parā-ji* meaus 'abstention from war' and the fifth case-ending 'abhorance'. Hence the said expression gives the comprehension of one having abstention from war due to abhorance against war.[5]

Others hold that the said root-verb means the lack of inclination due to the knowledge of one's inability to go on and the fifth case-ending the state of the substantive to be related to knowledge, a part of what the root-verb means. The said proposition, therefore, gives the comprehension of one lacking in the inclination due to the knowledge of one's inability to go on with war.[6]

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1. पापान्निवर्त्तते, अधर्माद् विरमति इत्यादौ पञ्चम्या द्वेषोऽर्थः, तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थस्य विषयत्वेन तस्य च निवृत्तिरूपे धात्वर्थे जन्यत्वेमान्वयः, तेन पापगोचरद्वेष-जन्यनिवृत्तिमानित्येवं तत्र बोधः । ibid., p. 301.
2. तत्र विषयत्वं पञ्चम्यर्थः, तथा च पापगोचरनिवृत्तिमानित्यर्थं इत्यन्ये । ibid., p. 301.
3. अन्य इत्यस्वरससूचनाय, स च पापजनकान्निवर्त्तत इत्यत्र तथाप्रयोगापत्तिः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 301.
4. न चेष्टापत्तिरनुभवविरोधात् । ibid., p. 301.
5. रणात् पराजयते इत्यत्र युद्धनिवृत्तिः पराजेरर्थः, पञ्चम्यास्तु द्वेषस्तेन रणगोचर-द्वेषजन्ययुद्धनिवृत्तिमानित्येवं तत्र बोधः । श. श. प्र. p. 301.
6. कृत्यसाध्यत्वधीप्रयुक्तप्रवृत्यभाववत्वं तत्र पराजेरर्थः, पञ्चम्यास्तु विशेष्यत्वं, तच्च धात्वर्थैकदेशे बुद्धावन्वितम्, तेन रणधर्मिकस्वकृत्यसाध्यत्वधीप्रयुक्त-प्रवृत्यभाववानित्याकारकस्तत्र बोध इत्यपि वदन्ति । ibid., p. 301.

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Jagadīśa replies : This is incorrect. For this proposition would in that case be used in reference to one neither having the inclination for war nor lacking in it.[1]

In *śatruṁ parājayate*, the root-verb, *parā-ji* means the course of action (*vyāpāra*) bringing in defeat (*abhibhava-hetu*) to the enemy, comprehended as the objective case, by virtue of being the recipient of defeat, the determinant of denotation of the root-verb the effect of the action.[2]

In *pāpājjugupsate*, the root-verb, *gup* means abstention with ran cour and the fifth case-ending *viṣayatva* to be severally related to rancour and abstention. The said proposition, therefore, leads to the comprehension of one abstained from sin due to rancour against sin.[3]

In *valmīkāgrāt prabhavati dhanuḥ-khaṇḍamā-khaṇḍalasya*, the root-verb *pra-bhū* means first appearance and the fifth case-ending the state of the substratum (*adhikaraṇatā*) or the state of abiding (*ādheyatā*). The said proposition, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of the part of the bow of *Indra*, appearing first on the head of the clouds marked with sunshine.[4]

In *valmīkāgre āvirbhavati*, appearance conveyed by the root-verb, *ā-vi-bhū* is not first appearance or what is meant by the root-verb, *pra-bbū*. Hence the use of the seventh case-ending

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1. रणे प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरसत्त्वदशायामपि तत्प्रयोगापत्तिरित्यस्वरसो वदन्तीत्यनेन सूचितः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 301.
2. शत्रुं पराजयते इत्यादौ त्वभिभवहेतुव्यापारः पराजेर्थः इति; धात्वर्थतावच्छेदक-फलशालितया शत्रुप्रभृतेः कर्मत्वम्। श. श. प्र. p. 301.
3. पापाज्जुगुप्सते इत्यत्र गर्हापूर्वकनिवृत्तिर्जुगुपधातोरर्थः, सुपो विषयत्वं, तच्च गर्हानिवृत्त्योः क्रमेणान्वयि, तथा चे पापविषयकगर्हाप्रयुक्तपापगोचरनिवृत्ति-मानित्याकारकबोधः। ibid., p. 301.
4. वल्मीकाग्रात् प्रभवति धनुःखण्डमाखण्डलस्येत्यत्र धातोरर्थः प्राक्प्रकाशनम्, तत्र पञ्चम्या अधिकरणत्वमाधेयत्वं वा प्रत्याय्यते, 'यत्र प्रकाशनं प्रभुव' इति सूत्रेणाधिकरस्यैवापादानत्वोपदेशात्। एवञ्च वल्मीकाग्रवृत्तिप्रथमप्रकाशन-वदाखण्डलस्य धनुःखण्डमित्याकारकस्तत्र बोधः। श. श. प्र. pp. 301–302.
Vide also भुवः प्रभवः। पा. I. 4. 31.

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suffixed to the word, *valmīka* indicating the locative case is called for.[1]

In *dharmāduapadyate sukham, daṇḍād jāyate ghaṭaḥ* and the like, the root-verb means being (*utpāda*). 'Being' means relation with the (moment of) time that has been the locus of itself or being related to the individual moment of time without being existent at the moment of time that has been the counter-positive of the destruction abiding the said individual moment of time.[2] The fifth case-ending means the state of being caused, abiding therein. The said proposition, therefore, gives the comprehension of pleasure as what is possessed of the relation with the moment, the locus of itself, borne out by merit.[3]

The author of the *vārtika* argues : In '*utpadyate*', the root-verb means 'being the counter-positive of previous non-existence' (*prāgabhāva*). The verbal suffix means the present tense which is related to the meaning of the root-verb through the relation of *avacchedyatva*. Hence what is yet to be (*bhāvī*) is not referred to as what is being. On the contrary, it is referred to as what is to be. For the state of the counterpositive of the previous non-existence abiding what is to be qualified by the future tense and (thus) not qualified by the present tense. Hence in *nāśaṁ prāpnoti* or *prāpsyati* also the verbal suffix of the present tense (*laṭ*) or of the future tense (*lṛṭ*) bears out the comprehension of being qualificd by the present tense or the future tense, and not of the present tense

1. 'वल्मीकाद्रो आविर्भवति'इत्यादौ च प्रकाशपर्य्यवसितोऽप्याविर्भावो न प्रपूर्वस्य भवतेरर्थ इति तत्राधिकरणतायां सप्तम्येव प्रमाणम्। श. श. प्र. p. 302.
2. धर्मादुत्पद्यते सुखम्, 'दण्डाद् जायते घट' इत्यादौ धातुना स्वाधिकरणसमयध्वंसानधिकरणसमयसम्बन्धरूपस्तत्तत्समयवृत्तिध्वंसप्रतियोगिसमयावृत्तित्वे सत तित्-तत्सम्बन्धरूप एव वा उत्पादः प्रत्याय्यते । ibid., p. 302.
3. पञ्चम्या च तन्निष्ठं जन्यत्वम्, तथा च धर्मजन्यो यः स्वाधिकरणसमयसम्बन्धस्तद्वत् सुखम् इत्याकारस्यत्र बोधः । श. श. प्र. 302.

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and the like posited against 'being the counter-positive', the meaning of the root-verb, (of destruction).[1]

For otherwise the state of the counter-positive of destruction being a category of unlimited application (*vyāpya-vṛtti*) *bhāvi nāśam prāpnoti* or *naṣṭo nāśam prāpsyati* and the like other uses would be made in language. For the state of the counter-positive of destruction abiding the present or the future also abides the future or the past respectively. In *naśyati, naṅkṣyati* and the like too, the verbal suffix bears out the comprehension of the state of the counter-positive of destruction presented by the root-verb, as qualified by what it itself means viz, the present tense or the future tense. Hence *bhāvi naśyati* or *naṣṭo naṅkṣyati* and the like are not used in language. For the state of the counter-positive qualified by the present tense does not abide what is yet to be and so on.[2]

The author of the *Dīdhiti* argues : In *naśyati, naṅkṣyati* and *nanāśa*, the verbal suffix has two-fold denotation viz, being the counter-positive (of destruction, the meaning of the root-verb) and the present being, the future being and the past being (as the case may be). The state of the counterpositive of the destruction presently being does not abide what is yet to be or that of the destruction yet to be is not in what is

1. वार्त्तिककृतस्तु—'उत्पद्यते' इत्यादौ प्रागभावप्रतियोगितारूपमेवोत्पत्तिमत्वं धात्वर्थस्तत्र च तिङर्थस्य वर्त्तमानादिकालस्यावच्छेद्यतासम्बन्धेनान्वयात् भाविन्युत्पद्यते इत्यादिको न प्रयोगः, किन्तु उत्पत्स्यत इत्यादिः, तत्र भविष्यकालावच्छेद्यस्यैव प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य सत्त्वेन वर्त्तमानकालावच्छेद्यतदसत्त्वात्, अतएव 'नाशं प्राप्नोति प्राप्स्यती'त्यादावपि प्रतियोगित्वपर्य्यवसितायां प्राप्तौ लडादिना वर्त्तमानादिकालावच्छेद्यत्वमेवानुभाव्यते, न तु वर्त्तमानत्वादिकम्। ibid., pp. 302–303.

2. नाशप्रतियोगित्वस्य व्याप्यवृत्तित्वेन् भावि नाशं प्राप्नोति, नष्टो नाशं प्राप्स्यतीत्यादिप्रयोगस्य दुर्वारतापत्तेः, वर्त्तमानं भाविकालवृत्ति वा यत् नाशप्रतियोगित्वं तस्य च भाविनि विनष्टे च सत्त्वात्। 'नश्यति, नङ्क्ष्यती'त्यादावपि धात्वर्थस्य नाशस्य प्रतियोगित्वं स्वार्थेन वर्त्तमानादिकालेनावच्छिन्नं तिङा बोध्यते, तेन 'भावि नश्यति, नष्टो नङ्क्ष्यती'त्यादिको न प्रयोगः, सम्प्रत्यादिकालावच्छेद्यस्य नाशप्रतियोगित्वस्य भाव्यादावसत्त्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 303.

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destroyed. Hence *bhāvi naśyati* and the like are not used in language.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For it involves complexities. The *tiṅ* is held to have two-fold denotation. Conversely the state of being qualified by the present or the future tense if held to be liable of comprehension arising out of syntax, there is simplicity. Hence the view that the state of being quaiified the previous moment or the posterior moment is comprehended as what is posited posited as the feature against the state of the counter-positive of destruction or of previous non-existence in such a situation as endorsed by Pakṣa-dhara Miśra and others is more reasonable.[2]

Opponents argue : In that case *dharmādutpadyate sukham* should bear out no verbal knowledge because of incompatibility. For the state of the counter-positive of the previous non-existence is not liable of being caused by merit.

Jagadīśa replies : In the view of the opponents too, the same contingency prevails. For the idea of 'being' or the relation of pleasure with the first moment being caused by merit is unfounded. There is no harm, therefore, for even if the relation with the first moment is not caused. For the fifth case-ending, may well mean the state of being occasioned (*prayojyatva*) instead, to be related to the state of the counter-positive of the previous non-existence derived from the root-verb.[3]

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1. (यत्तु) 'नश्यति, नङ्क्ष्यति, ननाशे'त्यादौ प्रतियोगित्वमिव वर्त्तमाना भाविन्यतीता चोत्पत्तिरपि यथाक्रमं तिङर्थः, तथा च वर्त्तमानोत्पत्तिकस्य ध्वंसस्य प्रतियोगित्वं न भाव्यादौ, भाव्युत्पत्तिकस्य च नष्टादौ, अतो 'भावी नश्यती'त्यादिको न प्रयोग इति दीधितिकृदुक्तम् । ibid., p. 303-304
2. तन्न युक्तम्, कथितक्रमेणैव सामञ्जस्ये लङादेरुत्पत्तावपि वृत्त्यन्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । अत एव ध्वंसप्रागभावयोः प्रतियोगितायां पूर्वापरकालावच्छेद्यत्व-प्रवादोऽपि पक्षधरमिश्राद्यनुमोदितः सङ्गच्छते । श. श. प्र. p. 304.
3. न चैवं प्रागभावादिप्रतियोगित्वस्य धर्माद्यजन्यत्वात् 'धर्मादुत्पद्यते सुखमित्यादेरयोग्यतापत्तिः सुखादेराद्यक्षणसम्बन्धरूपायामुत्पत्तौ धर्मादिजन्यत्वे प्रमाणाभावेनोक्तदोषस्य मतान्तरेऽप्यविशिष्टत्वादाद्यक्षणसम्बन्धस्य धर्माद्य-जन्यत्वेऽपि तदधीनत्वोपगमेन पञ्चमीसमर्थने प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वरूपाया-मप्युत्पत्तौ तस्य सुवचत्वादिति प्राहुः । ibid., p. 304.

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In *kūpādandham vārayati*, the root-verb means an action resulting in the abstention from an act. The fifth case-ending signifies the state of the well being posited as the feature against abstention, constituting the meaning of the root-verb and the second case-ending the state of being inherent in the blind man. By an act is to be meant the act of falling (into). The said expression, therefore, gives the comprehension of one who has undertaken the task resulting in the abstention in the blind man, from the act of falling in respect of a well. Similar is the case with the sentence *viṣād bālam nivārayati*, that gives the comprehension of one who has undertaken the task resulting in the abstention in the child, from the act of eating, in respect of poison. By action (*vyāpāra*) resulting in the abstention from an act of the kind referred to above is to be meant the articulation of a sentence like 'avoid falling into the well' or 'avoid eating any poison'.[1] Such sentences help one infer that falling into a well or eating poison is other than what is conducive to one's welfare.

Grammarians argue : In a sentence like *kūpādandham vārayati*, the root-verb means the action going counter to one's falling into a well. The well is related to fall(ing) through the relation of *karmatva*. For the root-verb, *pati* is transitive. The blind man is related to fall(ing) through *ādheyatva* to give the comprehension of one with the action going counter to the act of falling undertaken by the blind man related to a well, the objective case of the said act.[2]

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1. कूपादन्धं वारयति, विषान् बालं निवारयति इत्यादौ च क्रियाधर्मिकनिवृत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारो वारणं, तन्निविष्टनिवृत्तौ पञ्चम्याः कूपादिप्रकारकत्वं द्वितीयया चान्धादिनिष्ठत्वं प्रत्याय्यते। क्रिया च पतनभोजनादिर्विशेषतो ग्राह्या, तथा चान्धनिष्ठायाः पननधर्मिककूपप्रकारकनिवृत्तेर्बलिनिष्ठायाश्च भोजनधर्मिकविषप्रकारकनिवृत्तेरनुकूलव्यापारवानित्याकारकस्तत्र बोधः। तथाविधनिवृत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारश्च स्वार्थधीद्वारा 'कूपे मा पत' विषं मा भुङ्क्ष्व इत्याद्यभिलापरूपः स्कुट एव। श. श. प्र. 304.
2. (यत्तु)—पतनादिप्रतिकूलव्यापार एव वारणं, तदेकदेशे च पतनादावन्धादेराधेयत्वेन कूपादेः कर्मत्वेनान्वयादन्धनिष्ठस्य कूपकर्मकपतनस्य प्रतिकूल-

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Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For in that case the use of the aforesaid kind of a sentence would be uncalled for in the case of a blind man not actually falling into a well. For the act of falling related to a well, the objective case thereof has not been undertaken by the blind man as yet. In such a situation, therefore, the said kind of a sentence is obviously incompatible. Conversely, if the blind man really undertakes the act of falling related to the well, the object case i.e. the state of the objective case of the well is respect of the act of falling, undertaken by the blind man, if accomplished, there is no point to use a sentence like that to deter him from doing so. This is a curions situation.[1]

In *parasvebhyo pānim nivārayati*, the root-verb means the action resulting in the abstention from the act of taking. With abstention, a constituent of the meaning of the root-verb, hand is related as a limit (*avaccheda*) and other's wealth (*parsva*) as a feature. The proposition, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one undertaking the action resulting in the abstention from other's wealth in respect of taking by hand. By action resulting (in abstention) means the act of withholding one's stretched out hands.[2]

Svāṅgād bāṇam vārayati does not convey the idea of an act going counter to the conjunction of one's own body, inherent in an arrow. For the said conjunction is what is sought to be deterred and thus not effected. What it conveys, therefore, is the idea of undertaking an act that occasions the state of abiding, determined by the state of the locns in one's own body, in the negation of conjunction inherent in an arrow.

व्यापारवानित्यादिरूपः 'कूपादन्धं वारयती'त्यादितो बोध इति। श. श. प्र. p. 305.

1. तत्तुच्छम्, तादृशपतनस्याप्रसिद्धस्थले तथाविधवाक्यस्यायोग्यतापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 305.

2. परस्वेभ्यः पाणिं निवारयती'त्यत्रानयनधर्मिकनिवृत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारो निवारणं, तदन्तर्गतनिवृत्तौ च पाण्यादेरवच्छेदकत्वेन परस्वादेश्च प्रकारत्वेनान्वयः. तादृशव्यापारः करकुड्मलादिरेव। ibid., p. 305.

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The root-verb, *vṛ* means an act that occasions what abides the negation of conjunction. The word ending in the second case-ending viz, *bāṇam* means the state of having an arrow as the counter-co-relate, related to conjunction, a constituent of the meaning of the root-verb. The word ending in the fifth case-ending viz, *svāṅgāt* means the state of abiding, determined by the state of the locus in one's own body. The said, proposition, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one who has undertaken an act that occasions the state of abiding, determined by the state of locus in one's own body, in the negation of conjunction inherent in an arrow. The act of removing an arrow is well-known as an act that occasions the state of abiding determined by the state of the locus in one's own body in the negation of conjunction inherent in an arrow.[1]

Opponents argue : The act of removing an arrow is an is an obstacle (*pratibandhaka*) to the conjunction inherent in an arrow. As such, it can be regarded as an act that occasions the negation of conjunction, inherent in an arrow like the moon-stone occasining the negation of burning by fire. But it cannot be considered as what occasions the state of abiding, determined by the state of the locus in one's own body, in the negation of conjunction inherent in an arrow.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : An obstacle occasions the state of abiding, determined by the state of the locus in an individual locus of the negation of effect with its occasioning the negation of the effect. The moon-stone, an obstacle to burning by fire occasions

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1. 'स्वाङ्गाद् बाणं वारयति' इत्यत्र च यद्यपि बाणनिष्ठस्य स्वाङ्गसंयोगस्य विरोधिव्यापारो नार्थः, तादृशसंयोगस्याप्रसिद्धेः, तथापि बाणसंयोगाभावनिष्ठायाः स्वाङ्गवृत्तितायाः प्रयोजकव्यापारत्वम्, तथा च संयोगाभावनिष्ठस्य प्रयोजकव्याषारस्तत्र वारणं, तन्निविष्टे च संयोगे द्वितीयान्तलभ्यस्य बाणप्रतियोगिकत्वस्य संयोगाभावनिष्ठे च पञ्चम्यन्तलभ्यस्य स्वाङ्गवृत्तित्वस्यान्वयः,……इति बाणसंयोगाद्यभावनिष्ठस्य स्वाङ्गवृत्तित्वस्य प्रयोजकत्वं बाणापसारणादिव्यापारस्य नासिद्धम् । श. श. प्र. p. 305.
2. ननु बाणसंयोगप्रतिबन्धकीभूतव्यापारस्य कुतस्तादृशवृत्तिताप्रयोजकत्वमिति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 305.

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the negation of burning and with this, it occasions the state of abiding, determined by the state of the locus in the wood, in the negation of burning. For the said stone occasions the negation of burning only in so far as the locus of the negation of burning by fire is wood and not water. Similarly, the act of removing an arrow, an obstacle to the conjunction inherent in an arrow occasions the negation of the said conjunction and with this it occasions the state of abiding, determined by the state of the locus in one's own body, in the negation of the said conjunction.[1]

In *daṇḍād ghaṭaḥ*, the fifth nominal inflection means the state of being effected and as such not a case. For it is not syntactically related to the meaning of any root-verb. Hence any such exposition does not bring about the compound *daṇḍa-ghaṭaḥ*.[2]

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1. कार्याभावे इव तन्निष्ठे अधिकरणविशेषवृत्तित्वेऽपि प्रतिबन्धकस्य प्रयोजकत्वात्। अत एव 'मणिः काष्ठे दाहाभावस्य प्रयोजकः न तु पांथसी'त्यादिकं सर्वलौकिकव्यवहारः। श. श. प्र. p. 305.
2. 'दण्डाद् घट'इत्यादौ पञ्चम्यर्थोऽपि जन्यत्वादिकं न क्रारकं धात्वर्थानन्वयित्वात्, अतएव 'दण्डघट'इत्यादिकस्तत्र न प्रयोग इत्युक्तप्रायम। श. ख. प्र. p. 305.

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CHAPTER XVII

CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
(SAMPRADĀNA)

He, whom the agent of the act of gift approaches with the object of gift, is known as the dative case (*sampradāna*), says Pāṇini.[1] In *viprāya gām dadāti*, the agent of the act of gift of a cow approaches with the cow, the object of the said act, a bhrahmin (*vipra*). As such, he is comprehended as the dative case and the fourth case-ending is suffixed to the word, *vipra* denotative of (a) brahmin.

Etymologically, the word, *sampradāna* means full-fledged gift. What is suggested, therefore, is that the gift involved in the context of the dative case is to be voluntarily made and the person receiving it is to receive it of his own accord with-the view that the title in respect of the thing given accrues on the recipient thereof on the liquidation of ownership in respect of the said thing of one giving it in gift.

In cases like *rajakasya vastram dadāti*, therefore, as the clothes are given to a washerman (*rajaka*) not with the view spoken of, the washerman is not liable of comprehension as the dative case. So also in *ghnataḥ pṛṣṭham dadāti* or in *aparādhinaḥ daṇḍam dadāti*, the killer (*ghna*) or the criminal (*aparādhī*) are not comprehended as the dative case. For neither the person to be killed gives his back to the killer voluntatily nor does the criminal accepts punishment of his own accord.

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1. कर्मणा यमभिप्रैति स सम्प्रदानम् । पा. I. 4. 32.
दानस्य कर्मणा यमभिप्रैति स सम्प्रदानसंज्ञः स्यात् । दी on ibid.

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In *upādhyāyaḥ śiṣyāya capetām dadāti*, the pupil (*śiṣya*) is comprehended as the dative case notwithstanding the fact that the pupil (*śiṣya*) does not accept the slap (*capetā*) the object of gift, of his own accord.

The word, *sampradāna*, therefore, has a wider connotation. The person whom the agent of an act as such (*kriyā-mātra*) and not merely of an act of gift (*dāna-kriya*) approaches with the object thereof is comprehended as the dative case.

In *mātā putrāya candram darśyati*, therefore, the son (*putra*) is comprehended as the dative case of the act of showing. For the agent of the said act viz., the mother approaches him with the moon, the object of the said act.

The word, *sampradāna*, therefore, although is constituted of the word, *dāna* meaning the act of gift (*dāna-kriyā*), the said word viz. *dāna* stands for (*upalākṣaṇa*) of act as such (*kriyā-mātra*).

Instances of the dative case other than what involve an act other than that of gift are, therefore, explained by an independent aphorism by other grammarians.[1]

The definition of the dative case suggests that the verb involved is to be a transitive one. For the object thereof is what the agent approaches with. But in cases like *patye śate* or *yuddhāya saṁnahyate*, the verbs involved are intransitive ones.

The author of the *vārtika*, therefore, says that one approached with an act too is also liable of comprehension as the dative case.[2]

Many other occasions call for the use of the fourth case-ending in the sense of the dative case. The person gaining pleasure (*prīyamāna*) is comprehended as the dative case of the act, presented by a root-verb meaning 'to cause pleasure' as in *haraye rocate bhaktiḥ*.[3]

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1. क्रियायोगे चतुर्थी । सि. कौ. (Mukhajee) p. 80.
2. क्रियया यमभिप्रैति सोऽपि सम्प्रदानम् । वार्त्तिक Vide सि. कौ. 570.
3. रुच्यर्थानां प्रीयमाणः । पा. I. 4. 33.

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The person intended to be enlightened is comprehended as the dative case of the act presented by the root-verbs, *ślāgha, hnu, sthā,* and *śap* as in *Gopi smarāti Kṛṣṇāya ślāghate, hnute, tiṣṭhate, sapate vā.*[1]

The creditor is comprehended as the dative case of the act presented by the root-verb, *dhāri* meaning 'to owe' as in *devadattāya śātam dhārayati grame.*[2]

The thing desired is comprehended as the dative case of the act presented by the root-verb, *spṛha* meaning 'to desire' as in *puṣpebhyo spṛhayati.*[3]

The person who has been the target of one's anger is comprehended as the dative case of the act, presented by the root-verbs, *krudh, dhruha, īrṣyā* and *asūya* as in *haraye krudhyati, druhyati, īrṣyati asūyati vā.*[4]

The person regarding whom querries are made is comprehended as the dative case of the act, presented by the root-verbs, *rādha* or *īkṣa* as in *kṛṣṇāya rādhyati īkṣate vā.*[5]

The agent of an act antecedent to the act of promise is comprehended as the dative case of the act of promise presented by the root-verb, *śru* prefixed by *prati* or *ā* as in *viprāya gām pratiśṛṇoti āśṛṇoti vā.*[6]

Similarly, the agent of an act, antecedent to the act of speaking out is comprehended as the dative case of the act presented by the root-verb, *gṛ* meaning 'to speak out' preceded by *anu* or *prati* as in *hotre anugṛṇāti prati gṛṇāti vā.*[7]

The instrument of owning a thing is exchange of money for a limited period of time (*parikrayaṇa*), is comprehended as the dative case optionally as in *śatāya śatena vā parīkrītaḥ.*[8]

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1. पा. I. 4. 34.
2. पा. I. 4. 35.
3. पा. I. 4. 36.
4. पा. I. 4. 37.
5. पा. I. 4. 39.
6. पा. I. 4. 40.
7. पा. I. 4. 41.
8. पा. I. 4. 44.

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Jagadīśa defines the state of the dative case (*sampradānatva*) as follows : The meaning of the fourth case-ending used in a sentence of analysis, liable of comprehension as the feature against the meaning a root-verb other than those denotative of movement is know as (the state of) the dative case in respect of the said meaning of the root-verb involved.[1]

In *brāhmaṇāya dānam dhanasya*, the root-verb, *dā* means the act of giving away that brings in title (in respect of whom the gift is made to the thing of gift). The fourth case-ending bears out the eomprehension of a brahmin's state of being the counter-co-relate or of being in respect of, posited as the feature against title (*svattva*), a constituent of the meaning of the root-verb. The state of being the counter-co-relate or of being in respect of, therefore, is what is to be understood as the (state of the) dative case (*sampradānatva*). For the verbal knowledge occurring from the proposition given is of the act of giving away that brings in title to the wealth given away in gift, the counter-co-relate of which is a brahmin or in respect of a brahmin.[2]

Opponents argue : A brahmin is the counter-co-relate of title to wealth given in gift. Similarly, the act of giving is the counter-co-relate of objectness (*viṣayatva*) in jar in *ghaṭe dānāsya viṣayatvam.* The definition thus overextends.

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1. गत्यादिभिन्ने धात्वर्थे चतुर्थ्या विग्रहस्थया।
यः स्वार्थो बोधनीयस्तत् सम्प्रदानत्वमीरितम ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 70.

गत्यादिभिन्ने यद्धातुपस्थाप्ये यादृशार्थे विग्रहस्थचतुर्थ्या यः स्वार्थो बोधयितुं शक्यते स तद्धापूपस्थाप्यतादृशक्रियायां सम्प्रदानत्वमुच्यते। ibid., p. 306.

2. ब्राह्मणाय दानं धनस्येत्यादौ ददातेः स्वस्वजनकस्त्यागोऽर्थस्तनिविष्टे च स्वत्वे ब्राह्मणादेः प्रतियोगित्वं निरूपितत्वं वा। चतुर्थ्या बोध्यते इति तदेव तत्र सम्प्रदानत्वम्, ब्राह्मणनिरूपितं वा यद्धनवृत्ति स्वत्वं तज्जनकस्त्याग इत्येव तत्र प्रत्ययात्। ibid., p. 306.

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Jagadīśa replies : The state of being in respect of (*nirūpitatva*), therefore, has been suggested as the alternative meaning of the fourth case-ending.[1]

Incidently, Jagadīśa makes a very significant observation. He says that wealth (*dhana*) is comprehended as the objective case because of its being the locus of title (*svattva*), the determinant of denotation of the root-verb, *dā* meaning the act of giving away bringing in title (*svatta-janakastyāga*), and the effect of the said act.

Jagadīśa appears to lay bare the features of the dative case as distinct from those of the objective one. What is sought to be comprehended as the locus of the determinant of denotation of a root-verb, the effect of the act denoted thereby (*dhātvarthā'vacchedakībhūta-phalaśāli*) is the objective case. What, however is liable of comprehension as related to the effect (*phala-sambandhī*) is the dative case. In *brāhmaṇāya dhanasya dānam*, wealth (*dhana*) is sought to be comprehended as the locus of litle, (*svattva*), the effect of the act of giving away (*dāna*), the determinant of denotation of the root-verb, *dā*. *Brāhmaṇa* on the contrary, is not desired to be comprehended as the locus of the said effect but as one in respect of whom title is to accure. Being related to the effect (*pada-sambandhatva*) means being related through other than *āśrayatā*. There would be no reason to apprehend that wealth (*dhana*) being related to title (*svattva*), the effect (*phala*) through *āśrayatā* is related to the effect the way *brāhmaṇa* is.

Opponents argue : In that case, tree (*vṛkṣa*) in *Vṛkṣāya siñcatī* or husband (*pati*) in *patye śete* would no longer be liable of comprehension as the dative case. For these are related to the respective effects of the act of watering and lying through *āśrayatā* only.

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1. ननु धने ब्राह्मणस्य स्वत्वमित्यादिप्रतीत्या यदि ब्राह्मण-द्रतियोगित्वं स्वत्वे स्वीक्रियते तदा घटे दानस्य विषयत्वमिति प्रतीत्यापि विषयत्वे दानप्रतियोगित्वं स्वीक्रियतां युक्तेस्तौल्यादित्यत आह—निरूपितत्वं वेति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 306.

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This is unreasonable. Being related to the effect means being related thereto without being the locus of what has been the determinant of denotation of the root-verb involved, the effect of the act denoted thereby. In *Vṛkṣāya siñcati*, the determinant of denotation of the root-verb, *sīc*, the effect of the act denoted thereby is encircling (the tree) with water (*jala-kartṛka-vyāpana*). The tree is comprehended as the dative case of the act of watering (*śecana*) not because it is the locus of encircling with water, the determinant of denotation of the root-verb, *sic*, the effect of the act of watering. It is comprehended as such because of its being the locus of water-conjunction (*jala-saṁyoga*) which is ovbiously other than the determinant of denotation of the root-verb involved, the effect of the act denoted thereby.

In *patye śete*, the husband (*pati*) is comprehended as the dative case of the act of lying down (*śayana*) not because he is the locus of the determinant of denotation of the root-verb, *śīṅ*, the effect of the act denoted thereby. For the said root-verb is an intransive one, On the contrary, he is the locus of pleasure (*prīti*), the effect of the act of lying down or what is other than the determinant of denotion of root-verb involved, the effect of the act denoted thereby.

Opponents argue : In case of a sacrifice being performed with the desire for animals, *caitraḥ svātmane paśum dadāti* should be validly used in language. For such a sacrifice is but giving away (an animal) bringing in title to animal in respect of *caitra*.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : Such an apprehension is unfounded. For 'giving away (*tyāga*)' virtually means an act resulting in the liquidation of ownership in respect of oneself and although with the liquidation of ownership, a part of what 'giving away'

1. न चैवं पशुकामनया यागकरणदशायां 'चैत्रः स्वात्मने पशुं ददाती'त्यपि प्रयोगापत्तिः, तादृशयागस्य चैत्रीयं यत् पशुनिष्ठं स्वत्वं तज्जनकस्त्यागत्वादिति वाच्यम् । श. श. प्र. p. 306.

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means the meaning of the second case-ending has been syntactically related, the sacrifice aimed at animals as retribution does not result in the liquidation of ownership of animal. The use of a sentence like *svātmane paśum dadāti*, therefore, is wrong.[1]

In *grāmāya gataḥ*, although the meaning of the fourth case-ending, the state of being the object is liable of comprehension as a feature against the act of going (*gamana*), presented by the root-verb, *gam*, it is not regarded as the (state of the) dative case of the said meaning (but as the objective case thereof). For the root-verb is denotative of movement (*gatyarthaka*),[2]

In *Vṛkṣāya secakaḥ*, although the root-verb involved viz., *sic* is not denotative of movement and the meaning of the fourth case-ending, 'with a view to nourishing' is comprehended as a feature against the meaning thereof, the definition of the dative case does not over-extend thereto. For the sentence given is not a sentence of analysis.[3]

Opponents argue : There would then be the use that state of being the counter co-relate of ownership is the dative case. (*sampradāna-kāraka*).[4]

Jagadīśa replies : The word *sampradāna* is denotative of the counter-co-relate of title accruing on him due to one's giving away (a thing) keeping him in view as the (would be)

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1. स्वत्वध्वंसजनकक्रियापर्यवसन्नस्य त्यागस्यैकदेशे स्वत्वध्वंसेऽपि द्वितीयार्थस्यान्वये पशुफलकयागे पशुनिष्ठस्य स्वत्वध्वंसस्य जनकत्वविरहादेव तद्वाक्यस्याप्रमाणत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 306.
2. 'ग्रामाय गत' इत्यादौ विग्रहस्थचतुर्थ्या धात्वर्थे बोध्यमपि कर्मत्वं न गत्यादिभिन्ने। ibid., pp. 306–7.
3. 'वृक्षाय सेचक' इत्यादौ गत्यादिभिन्ने चतुर्थ्या बोधनीयोऽपि संवर्द्धयितुमित्यादितुमर्थो न विग्रहस्थयेति न तत्र प्रसङ्गः। ibid., p. 306.
4. ननु स्वत्वप्रतियोगित्वं सम्प्रदानकारकमिति व्यवहारः स्यात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 307.

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substratum of the state of the counter-co-relate of title (to the thing given in gift). The state of the dative case (*sampradānatva*) and the dative case (*sampradāna-kāraka*), therefore, are not inter-woven. Hence there is no reason why the use like 'the state of being the counter-co-relate of title, is the dative case (*sampradāna-kāraka*)' be made.[1]

Opponents argue : The act of giving away i.e. gift is not regarded as a rightful means of bringing in title. For the *Manu-samhitā* does not include it in the list of seven rightful means of acquiring wealth. It speaks only of inheritance (*dāya*), treasure (*lābha*), purchase (*kraya*), bating (*jaya*), interest on loans given (*prayoga*), trade (*karmayoga*) and acceptance (of gift) from proper persons as the rightful means of acquiring wealth.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : It is matter of universal experience that one on having given away a cow to a brahmin understands that the cow is no longer his property but of the brahmin.[3]

Opponents argue : Such an experience only leads to one's knowledge of one's title to the cow in question subsequent to the gift made. This does not mean that gift leads to the acquiring of title in any case.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : Gift is specifically enumerated as the cause of acquiring ownership.[5] Not only that. Mere gift as a

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1. सम्प्रदानशब्दस्तु स्वाश्रयगोचरत्यागजन्यस्वत्वस्य प्रतियोगिन्येव शक्त इति स्वत्वप्रतियोगित्वं सम्प्रदानमित्यादिको न प्रयोगः। श. श प्र. p. 307.
2. न च दानस्य स्वत्वहेतुत्वं प्रमाणाभावः—
   सप्त वित्तागमा धर्म्या दायो लाभः क्रयो जयः।
   प्रयोगः कर्मयोगश्च सत्प्रतिग्रह एव च॥ (मनु X. 115)
   इत्यादिमन्वादिवचनैस्तस्य स्वत्वहेतुत्वाप्रतिपादनादिति वाच्यम्। ibid., p. 307.
3. ब्राह्मणाय त्यक्तायां गवि 'गौरियं ब्राह्मणस्य न तु ममे'त्यादि सर्वजनीन-प्रतीतेरेव तत्र प्रमाणत्वात्। ibid., p. 307.
4. ननु तदनन्तरं स्वत्वबोधकप्रतीतेस्तस्य स्वत्वजनकत्वसाधकत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 307.
5. 'प्रदानं स्वाम्यकारणमि'ति वचनाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 307.

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rightful means to title is also borne out by the fact that even if the person living in a far off land to whom some property has been given by way of gift, dies prior to his accepting the same, it is the sons of him that acquire ownership thereof through inheritance and partition. Had not the mere act of gift resulted in the title, the outsiders like the sons of the dead person should have been entitled to the said property as a matter of right to Nature.[1]

Opponents argue : In case title accrues on as a result of mere gift then the acceptance thereof should have no bearing.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : No. Acceptance has its bearing on the completion of the act of gift made with idea of gaining merit. For gift completing in acceptance is said to cause eight-fold merit.[3]

Opponents argue : If acceptance of gift is not regarded as what brings in title, then the text of the *śruti*, 'a brahmin is to earn wealth through officiating in a sacrifice, teaching and acceptance (of gift from proper persons) as also the text of Manu referred to earlier would be rendered meaningless.'[4]

Jagadīśa replies : The text of the *śruti* and the text of Manu reveal that acceptance too is a cause of title.[5]

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1. अतएव विदेशस्थपात्रमुद्दिश्य त्यक्तधने स्वीकारमन्तरेणैव पात्रस्य मरणस्थले पितृदायत्वेन तद्धनं पुत्रादिभिर्विभज्य गृह्यते, अन्यथा तैरिव उदासीनैरपि तद्धनस्यारण्यककुशादेरिवोपादाने यथेष्टविनियोगे च प्रत्यवायो न स्यात्। श.श. प्र. p. 307.
2. नन्वेवं दानादेव स्वत्वसिद्धेर्दत्तवस्तुनि स्वीकारो व्यर्थ (इति चेन्न)। ibid., p. 307.
3. 'लब्धा चाष्टगुणं फलम्'इत्यादिस्मृतेः प्रतिगृहीतद्रव्यदानस्य फलविशेषं प्रति हेतुत्वेन ताहशदानसंपत्यर्थमेव प्रतिग्रहस्योपयोगात्। ibid., p. 307.
4. प्रतिग्रहस्य स्वत्वाजनकत्वे याजनाध्यापनेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 307.
5. याजनाध्यापनप्रतिग्रहैर्द्विजो धनमर्जयेदितिश्रुत्या प्रागुक्तस्मृत्या च प्रतिग्रहस्यापि स्वत्वहेतुत्वबोधनाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 307-8.

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Opponents argue : The text of the *śruti* does not contain any word indicative of acceptance being a cause of title.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The word *arjana* in the said text means 'an act bringing in title' only.[2]

The elders argue : The verb, *dadāti* is denotative of an act of gift that brings in transcendental merit (*adṛṣṭa*). Hence in *dāsāya bhakṣyam dadāti* or in *bhṛtākāya vetanam dadāti*, the said verb does not carry its primary sense. If mere gift is regarded as a cause of title, the verb, *dadāti* in these cases too are to carry the primary sense thereof.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection. For the said verb in the instances carry its primary sense. For in such cases too, the act of giving away things brings in title to things given in respect of one to whom it is made. The only difference is that the act of gift in such cases does not cause any transcendental merit. For it is not enjoined by any injunction.[4]

The *Maithilas* argue : Gift means the act of giving away a thing, bringing in title to the thing given in respect of one to whom the gift is made on one's having (formally) accepted the (thing given in) gift. The act of willing away a thing is not gift. It is only relinquishing of one's title thereto. For the act of giving away a thing, enjoined by an injunction bringing in title to the thing given in respect of one on one's having (formally) accepted it alone constitutes gift. Mere parting with ownership of a thing on the other hand means

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1. ननु श्रुतौ स्वत्वजनकत्ववोधकपदाभावात् कुतः प्रतिग्रहस्य स्वत्वहेतुत्वम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 308.
2. स्वत्वजनकव्यापारस्यैवार्जनपदार्थत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 308.
3. (ननु) प्राच्यैर्दासाय भक्ष्यं ददातीत्यादिप्रयोगानां मुख्यत्वं न स्वीक्रियते, तेषां मतेऽदृष्टजनकत्यागस्यैव ददात्यर्थत्वात्, भवन्मते तत्र च ददातिर्मुख्यः स्यात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 308.
4. 'दासाय भक्ष्यं ददाति, भृतकाय वेतनं ददातीत्यावपि स्वत्वजनकत्यागं प्रतिपादयन् ददातिर्मुख्य एव, पुण्यजनकन्तु न तादृशं दानमवैधत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 308.

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only the act of giving it away resulting in the loss of one's title thereto. As such, it is not regarded as a gift bringing in one's title to a thing given.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. The verb, *dadāti* (i.e. the root-verb, *dā*) means the act of giving away bringing in title. For the law of parsimony favours such a view. The determinant of denotation of the said verb, in that case, is 'the state of the act of giving away bringing in title' while, according to the view of the *Maithilas* it is 'the state of the act of giving away bringing in title on one's having formally accepted the (thing given in) gift'.[2]

In *tilānasmai pratiyacchati* (giving away to this person the seeds of the sesamum plant in exchange) or in *turagamasmai vikriṇite* (giving away to this person a horse by sale) too the fourth case-ending denotes the state of the dative case in the primary sense of the term.[3]

Opponents argue : No. The seeds of the sesamum plant are considered as legal tender. As such exchange thereof by way of bartar would amount to sale.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : The seeds of the sesamum plants are not regarded as legal tender. It is only the *paṇa* or eighty cowries and *puraṇa* or the multiple thereof that are regarded as such.[5]

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1. यत्तु स्वीकारजन्यस्य स्वत्वस्य जनकस्त्यागो दानम्, मनसा पात्रमुद्दिश्य धनत्यागस्तु न दानं, किन्तूत्सर्गमात्रम्, प्रतिग्रहजन्यस्वत्वं प्रति हेतुभूतवैधत्यागस्यैव तथात्वात्, उपेक्षा तु स्वत्वध्वंसजनकस्त्यागो, न तु तत्र स्वत्वजनकत्वस्यान्तर्भाव–इति मैथिलैरुक्तम् । श. श. प्र. p. 308.
2. तन्न युक्तम्, लाघवेन स्वत्वजनकत्यागस्यैव ददात्यर्थत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 308.
3. तिलानस्मै प्रतियच्छति, तुरगमस्मै विक्रीणीत'इत्यादौ द्रव्यान्तरग्रहणपूर्वकं दानमेव प्रतिदानं, मूल्यग्रहणपूर्वकं दानमेव च विक्रय इति तत्रापि मुख्यमेव सम्प्रदानत्वं चतुर्थ्या बोध्यते । श. श. प्र. pp. 308–9.
4. ननु तिलादेरपि मूल्यतया प्रतिदानस्यापि विक्रयत्वापत्तिः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 309.
5. तिलादिकञ्च न मूल्यं, पणपूरणादेरेव शास्त्रे तथात्वोपदेशात् । श. श. प्र. p. 309.

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Opponents argue : The seeds of the sesamum plant or a horse and the like are forbidden by the *śāstras* to be accepted as gift. Hence if exchange even amounts to gift, then a brahmin by virtue of accepting such a thing in gift would indulge in sin.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : There is no harm in accepting the seeds of the sesamum plant or a horse in exchange or by way of sale. For a brahmin indulges in sin only if he accept these things given away with a view to acquiring merit.[2]

In *maitrāya rocate modakaḥ*, the fourth case-ending means the state of abiding (*ādheyatva*) to be posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, viz, the desire of eating (*idam me bhakṣyam bhavatu*). The verbal suffix means the state of being the object as does the verbal suffix in *prakāśate* means (*prakāśate-prakāśa-viṣayaḥ*). The said proposition, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of the sweet, the object of the desire of eating, inherent in *maitra*.[3]

In *gurave gām dhārayati*, the root-verb, *dhṛñ* means 'being in the house' (*gṛhāvasthiti*), the second case-ending (in *gām*) means 'agency' (*kartṛtva*), the fourth case ending means 'of' (*sambandhitva*), to be related to house, a constituent of the meaning of the root-verb. The proposition, therefore, is to give the verbal comprehension of one undertaking the intermediary act contributing to the being in the house of the preceptor, of the cow, the causative suffix (*ṇic*) added to the root-verb meaning the intermediary act as held by the followers of the *kalāpa* scnool of Grammar.[4]

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1. ननु प्रतिदानस्यापि दानत्वेन स्वीकर्त्तुः प्रत्यवायः स्यात् । कृष्णकांती p. 309.
2. 'अदृष्टार्थं दत्तस्यैव च स्वीकारः प्रतिग्रह' इति परेण प्रतिदत्तस्य विक्रीतस्य वा तिलतुरगादेः स्वीकारो न दोषावहः । श. श. प्र. p. 309.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 309.
4. 'गुरवे गां धारयते'इत्यत्र धृङा गृहावस्थितिर्द्वितीयया तदन्वितं कर्त्तृत्वं, चतुर्थ्या च तन्निविष्टगृहान्वितं सम्बन्धित्वमुपस्थाप्यते, तेन गोकर्त्तृकायाः गुरुसम्बन्धिगृहावस्थितेरनुकूलव्यापारवानित्याकारकस्तत्र बोधः, धातूत्तरणिचा व्यापारबोधनादिति कालापाः । श. श. प्र. p. 309.

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According to the followers of the Pāṇini school of Grammar, on the contrary, the sentence cited gives the verbal knowledge of the pupil owing a cow to the preceptor who has given it to him by way of loan. For according to them, the root-verb, *dhṛṅ* means to owe as in *caitraḥ śatam dhārayate* and to owe means taking a thing by way of loan with the promise of giving it back.[1]

In *putrāya rādhyati* or *putrāya īkṣate*, the root-verb means ascertaining destiny' (*daiva-nirūpaṇa*). The fourth case-ending means 'of' posited as the feature against fortune, a constituent of the meaning of the root-verb. The proposition cited, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one ascertaining the destiny of one's son (from a fortune-teller).[2]

In *gām pratiśṛṇoti* (*āśṛṇoti*) the root-verb, *prati-śru* (*ā-śru*) means undertaking the promise of giving a thing to be given, with which cow is related as the substantive; 'to be given' means to be the object of the act of giving and it is with 'giving' (*dāna*) that the meaning of the fourth case-ending viz, to or 'the state of being in favour of' is related. The sentence cited, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one undertaking the promise of giving a cow to the preceptor (*gurūddeśyaka-go-viśeṣyaka-dāna-karmatvenābhyūpagama-vān*).[3]

In *hotre pratigṛṇāti*, the root-verb means the act of encouraging by way of bringing in pleasure (relief) and it is with pleasure, a constituent of the meaning of the root-verb that the priest the meaning of the word, *hotṛ* is related as a feature. The verbal knowledge from the said sentence, therefore, is of one undertaking the act bringing in pleasure to the priest.[4]

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1. पाणिनीयास्तु 'धारेरुत्तमर्णः (पा. I. 4. 35) इति सूत्रानुसारेण चैत्राय शतं धारयते इत्यादावपि ऋणग्रहणं धारणं, दत्तत्वञ्च चतुर्थ्यर्थः तथा च गुरुदत्तां गां ऋणत्वेन गृह्णातीत्याकारकस्तत्र वाक्यार्थः पश्चाच्छोध्यत्वेनाङ्गीकृत्य गृहीतश्च द्रव्यमृणमित्याहुः । श. श. प्र. pp. 309–10.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 310.
3. ibid., p. 310.
4. ibid., p. 310.

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In *caitrāya kupyati* (*krudhyati*) and the like, the root-verb means excessive malice and the fourth case-ending means in respect of'; an extended meaning of the state of the dative case, to be related thereto. The verbal knowledge from the sentence cited, therefore, is of one having excessive malice in respect of *caitra.*[1]

Opponents argue : In *śatrubhyo yujyate kopaḥ putre kopo na yujyate,* then the seventh nominal inflection in *putre* should denote the state of the dative case.

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning of the word, *putra* in the sentence cited is related to the meaning of the word, *kopa* ending in a primary suffix and not to that of the root-verb, *Kup.* Hence there is no reason for any such apprehension.[2]

The case-ending in *śatrubhyaḥ* is the fifth one the meaning of which is related to the meaning of the root-verb, *Kup.*[3]

In *paṭāya yatate,* the root-verb, *yat* means agency (*kṛti*) and the fourth case-ending means 'having as the object' to give the verbal knowledge of one with the agency having cloth as its object i.e. one having the agency of cloth.[4]

Opponents argue : The fourth case-ending in *paṭāya yatate* means 'with a view to'. For otherwise in respect of one engaged in making threads with a view to spinning out a cloth, the expression, *paṭāya yatate* cannot be used.[5] Because in such a situation cloth is not the object of one's agency i.e. cloth is not what one is to accomplish but the threads with a view to

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 310.
2. 'पुत्रे कोपो न युज्यते' इत्यादौ कृदन्तस्य कोपपदस्यैवार्थे पुत्र इत्यस्यान्वयो न तु धात्वर्थे। Ibid., p. 310.
3. शत्रुभ्य इति पञ्चम्यर्थस्तु धात्वर्थं एवान्वित इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 310.
4. 'पटाय यतते' इत्यादावपि धात्वर्थकृतौ सुपा पटस्य विषयितं बोध्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 310.
5. तत्रोद्देश्यत्वं चतुर्थ्यर्थः, कथमन्यथा पटेच्छया तन्तुनिर्माणदशायां पटाय यतते इत्यादिकं प्रयोग इत्यपि वदन्ति। श. श. प्र. p. 310.

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spinning out a cloth. Hence the said expression becomes uncalled for.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The fourth case-ending denotes 'being the object of' as such. It is not necessarily to be understood as being the object of accomplishment. Hence there is no harm.[2] On the contrary, if the fourth case-ending is taken to mean 'with a view to', the sentence cannot be used in reference to one spinning out a cloth with something else in mind.[3]

Opponents argue : This is welcome objection.

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For it is against all experience.[4]

In *mitrāya druhyati*, the root-verb means ill-treatment to give the verbal knowledge of one meting out ill-treatment to one's colleague.[5]

In *śiṣyāyerṣyati*, the root-verb means getting intolerant of evil being done to give the verbal knowledge of one getting intolerant of evils being done to one's pupil.[6]

In *putrāyāsūyati*, the root-verb means getting envious of virtues to give the verbal knowledge of one getting envious of the virtues of one's son.[7]

In view of the uses like '*mitram druhyati, śiṣyamīrṣyati, putramasūyati*, validly made in language, it is deduced that the objective case of verbs like *druha* and the like is optionally liable of comprehension as the dative case thereof.[8]

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1. तत्र साध्यताख्यविषयतायाः पटेऽसम्भवादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 310.
2. वदन्तीत्यस्वरससूचनाय। स च मया तु साध्यता चतुर्थ्यर्थ इति नोच्यते, परन्तु विषयतामात्रमिति न कोऽपि दोषः। ibid., p. 310.
3. प्रत्युत अन्योद्देशेन पटनिर्माणदशायां पटाय यतत इति प्रयोगो भवन्मते न स्यात्। ibid., pp. 310–311.
4. अनुभवविरोधेनेष्टापत्त्यसम्भवात्। ibid., p. 311.
5. श. श. प्र. p. 310.
6. Ibid., p. 310.
7. Ibid., p. 311.
8. Ibid., p. 311.

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According to the followers of the *kalāpa* school grammar, if ill-treatment (*droha*) and the like presented only by the root-verbs like *druha* and so on (and not by a root-verb having the sense of ill treatment and the like as held by Pāṇini) be associated with anger (*kopa*) then the objective case thereof optionally is liable of comprehension as the dative case also and if not associated with anger then only as the objective case.[1] If prefixed, the objective case of of *Krudh* or of *druha* i,e, not comprehended as the dative case. The instances like *śiṣyasyābhikroddhā*, *śiṣyasyābhidroḍhā* are the cases in point, the sixth declensional suffix meaning the state of being the object.[2]

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1. कोपपूर्वकस्य द्रोहादेर्दुहादिधातुवाच्यत्वे तत्कर्मणः सम्प्रदानत्वं, द्रोहादिमात्रस्य तथात्वे तु कर्मत्वमेवेति पुनः कौमाराः । ibid., p. 311.
   (vide also द्रोहादयोऽपि कोपप्रभवा एव गृह्यन्ते । सि. कौ. 575.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 311.

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CHAPTER XVIII

CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
(KARAṆA)

Pāṇini has defined the instrumental case (*karaṇa-kāraka*) as what is the most effective means of accomplishment of an act.[1] Following immediately the action (*vyāpāra*) of which, an act gets accomplished is the most effective means of accomplishment of an act. In *cakṣuṣā candram paśyati*, the eye (*cakṣu*) is the most effective means of accomplishment of the act of seeing (*darśana-kriyā*) the moon. For followting immediately the action (*vyāpāra*) of the eye viz., conjunciion of the eye (*cakṣu-saṁyoga*) with the object of seeing, the act of seeing is accomplished.

As a matter of fact each and every case is a means (*sādhaka*) of accomplishment of an act. The use of the suffix indicative of the superlative degree viz, *tamap* added to the word, *sādhaka* in the aphorism of Pāṇini, therefore, is redundant. The use of the mere word, *sādhaka* serves the purpose well. *Sādhakam kārakam* would give the sense of the superlative degree instead. But lest the definition of the locative case[2] be too narrow that the said suffix has been used. Location (*adhikaraṇa*) is of three kinds viz, pervasive (*abhivyāpaka*), contactual (*aikadeśika*) and objective *(vaiṣayika)*. Had but for the suffix, *tamap* in the aphorism providing for the instrumental case, the superlative degree been understood, the word, *ādhāra* in the aphorism providing for the locative case would signify the location of the superlative degree viz, the

1. साधकतमं करणम् । पा. I. 4. 42.
2. आधारोऽधिकरणम् । पा. I. 4. 45.

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pervasive kind of location. The other two kinds of location, in that case woutd not be covered by the definition of the locative case and the uses like *gaṅgāyam ghoṣaḥ* or *vidyāyāma-nurāgaḥ* would remain unexplained.[1]

According to Jagadīśa, what is borne out by the third case-ending to be verbally comprehended as the feature against the meaning of a root-verb marked by a conjugational transformation (*vikaraṇa*), is known as the state of the instrumental case.[2]

In *dātreṇa chinatti* for an example, the state of being caused through an intermediary action (*vyāpāra*) by the cutter is borne out to be verbally comprehended as the feature against the act of cutting (*chedana-kriyā*), the meaning of the root-verb, *chidi*, marked by the conjugational transformation, *śap*, by the third case-ending. Similarly, in *ghaṭatvena jānāti*, the state of having jarness (*ghaṭatva*) as the feature is borne out to be verbally comprehended as the feature against knowledge, the meaning of the root-verb, *jñā* marked by the conjugational transforman, *snā*, by the third case-ending. Hence the state of being caused through an intermidiary (*vyāpāra*), and the state of having as a feature, the meanings presented by the third case-ending in the respective instances are known as the state of the instrumental case.[1]

In *caitreṇa pakvam*, although, the meaning presented by the third case-ending is borne out to be verbally comprehended as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *paci*, the said

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1. तमप्ग्रहणं किम्? गङ्गायां घोषः। सि. कौ. 560.
2. योऽर्थो विकरणाक्तस्य धातोरर्थे तृतीयया।
बोध्यते करणं नाम कारकं तदिहोच्यते॥ श. श. प्र. का. 71.
सविकरणस्य यद्धातोरूपस्थाप्ययादृशार्थे तृतीयया यादृशः स्वार्थोऽनुभाव्यते स तद्धातूपस्थाप्यतादृशक्रियायाः करणसंज्ञकं कारकमुच्यते। ibid., p. 311.
3. 'दात्रेण छिनत्ति, घटत्वेन जानाती'त्यादौ धात्वर्थे छिदायां दात्रस्य व्यापारद्वारा जन्यत्वादि, ज्ञानादौ च घटत्वादेः प्रकारित्वादिकं तृतीयया बोध्यते, तदेव तत्र करणत्वम्। ibid., pp. 311-12.

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meaning is not regarded as the state of the instrumental case but of the nominative on the contrary. For the root-verb, *paci*, in the said instance is not marked by any conjugational transformation.[1]

Opponents argue : In *ghṛtena (atti) juhoti*, the third case-ending should not mean the state of the instrumental case. For the root-verb, *hu*, (being of *juhotyādi* class) is not marked by any conjugational transformation.

Jagadīśa replies : In such an instance the conjugational transforman (*śap>slu*) gone elided is taken into consideration as held by some. Hence the definition of the instrumental case would cover *ghṛta* too in such instances.[2]

As a matter of fact, the transformation gone elided need not be imperatively taken into consideration. For the knowledge of transformation being in sequence is not conceived of as a cause of verbal knowledge. The definition of the instrumental case also does not provide for the root-verb concerned being qualified by transformation.[3]

Opponents argue : The definition would in that case over-extend to *caitra* in *caitreṇa pakvam*.

Jagadīśā replies : Any such apprehension is uncalled for. For the definition of the instrumental case as suggested above is to be understood as follows : What being other than the state of the nominative case and the like is presented by the third case-ending and is borne out thereby to be verbally

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1. 'चैत्रेण पक्वमि'त्यादौ धातोरर्थे तृतीयया बोध्यमपि कर्त्तृत्वं न विकरणाक्तस्य श. श. प्र. 312.

2. 'घृतेनात्ति, जुहोती'त्यादावपि लुप्तमेव प्रतिसन्धीयमानविकरणमस्तीति मतेनेदं, नातस्तत्र घृतादेः करणत्वव्याहतिः। ibid., p. 312.

3. इतिमतेनेदमित्यस्वरससूचनाय, स च विकरणानुपूर्वीप्रकारकज्ञानस्याहेतुत्वात्तत्र तत्प्रतिसन्धानमनर्थकमिति। लक्षणे तु विकरणवैशिष्ट्यं न निवेश्यते। कृष्णकान्ती p. 312.

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comprehended as the feature against the meaning of a root-verb, is the instrumental case.[1]

Opponents argue : Then *cākṣuṣe cakṣuḥ karaṇam* should not be used in language. For the word viz, the third case-ending is not there to present the sense of the state of the instrumental case spoken of above.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Here the word, *karaṇa* means what functions as a cause through its intermediary (*vyāpāra*). The eye (*cakṣu*) is only the cause of the act of seeing through sense-object contact (*saṁyoga*), the intermediary. Similar are the cases with the knowledge of concomitance (*vyāpti-jñāna*) and direct experience (*anubhava*) that cause inference (*anumiti*) and recollection (*smṛti*) through consideration (*parāmarśa*) and impression (*saṁskāra*) fuuctioning as the intermediaries thereof, respectively.[3]

Opponents argue:Intermediaries vary and are thus numerous or multiple. For a unifying property like the state of (being) intermediary (*vyāpāratva*) canot be conceived of. The word, *karaṇa*, therefore, cannot be held to be denotative of what is the locus of causality qualified by the relation of intermediary (*vyāpāra*) i.e. what functions as a cause through the relation of intermediary (*vyāpāra*).[4]

Jagadīśa replies : Intermediary (*vyāpāra*) is uniform by nature. For the state of (being) intermediary (*vyāpāra*) is logically conceivable. It means being possessed of a

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1. परन्तु चैत्रेण पक्वमित्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्वार्थं कर्तृत्वादिभिन्नत्वं निवेश्यते इति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 312.
2. ननु चाक्षुषे चक्षुः करणमित्यादिव्यवहारो न स्यात् तत्र निरुक्तकरणत्वबोधकपदाभावेन तद्बोधाभावात्। ibid., p. 312.
3. करणशब्दस्तु व्यापारप्रत्यासत्या जनकस्य वाचकः। चाक्षुषादौ, चक्षुरादिः, संयोगेन, अनुमित्यादौ व्याप्तिज्ञानादिः, परामर्शादिना, स्मृत्यादावनुभवादिः, संस्कारादिना, स्वव्यापारेणैव सम्बन्धेन हेतुः। श. श. प्र. p. 312.
4. ननु व्यापारत्वस्यानुगतत्वाभावात् सम्बन्धभेदेन जनकताया भिन्नत्वाद् व्यापारसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नजनकताश्रये करणशब्दस्य शक्तिकल्पनमसम्भवीति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 312.

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property through the twofold relation of the state of (being) the effect of what it is the intermediary (*svajanyatva*) and the state of (being) the cause of what is the effect of what it is intermediary of (*svajanya-janakatva.*) The word, *karaṇa*, therefore, can safely denote what is possessed of causality through the relation qualified by the property implied by the state of (being) intermediary (*vyāpāra*).[1]

Opponents argue : Body or the soul too, then should be regarded as the instrument of knowledge.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For body or the soul is only the inherent cause of knowledge. In other words body or the soul gives rise to knowledge in itself i.e. body or the soul is the cause of knowledge through the relation of identity. Identity cannot be intermediary (*vyāpāra*). Hence the apprehension that body or soul is an instrument of knowledge is uncalled for.[2]

Opponents argue : Perception of sound then should not occur. For the auditory organ (*śrotrendriya*), the instrument of such perception lacks in an intermediary for itself.

Others say : Inherence is the intermediary of the auditory organ. Sound inheres in the ear, one with ether circumscribed by the ear, abiding itself through the relation of identity.

Jagadīśa replies : Inherence cannot be conceived of as an intermediary. For it is uncaused (*nitya*).[3] The intermediary of the auditory organ, therefore, is sound itself circumscribed by the ear (*śrotrā'vacchinna-śabda*).[4] It is caused by the said

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1. स्वजन्यत्वस्वजन्यजनकत्वोभयसम्बन्धेन किञ्चिद्धर्मविशिष्टत्वं व्यापारत्वमनुगतं निरुच्य तादृशव्यापारत्वोपलक्षितधर्मावच्छिन्नसंसर्गताकजनकत्वविशिष्टस्य शक्यत्वात्। ibid., p. 312.
2. शरीरात्मप्रभृतयस्तु ज्ञानादौ तादात्म्येनैव, अतो न तेषां तत्र करणत्वप्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 312.
3. ननु श्रोत्रप्रत्यासत्तेः समवायस्य नित्यतया व्यापारत्वायोगात् तत्र करणत्वानुपपत्तिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 312.
4. श्रावणेऽपि प्रत्यक्षे कर्णावच्छिन्नशब्दात्मना व्यापारेणैव सम्बन्धेन श्रोत्रं करणम्। श. श. प्र. p. 312.

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organ (*tajjanya*) and is the cause of what is caused by the said organ (*tajjanya-janaka*) viz., perception of sound (*śrāvaṇa-pratyakṣa*) by virtue of being the content (*viṣaya-vidhayā*) thereof.

Opponents argue : Sound cannot be conceived of as the intermediary of the auditory organ without telling upon the view of the Neo-logicians.[1] For sound according to them is the quality of ether and for that matter of the auditory organ too, one with ether circumbscribed by the ear.

Jagadīśa replies : The auditory organ is only an external organ. An external organ again means what apprehends its content through its determinant quality functioning as the intermediary thereof.[2]

Opponents argue : Negation of sound as such, then, abiding the auditory organ should go unperceived. For sound circumscribed by the ear, the intermediary of the said organ is not there in the said organ, the locus of the said negation through the relation of identity,[3] the relation involved in the perception of sound, the counterpositive of the said negation, by the auditory organ through sound circumscribed by the ear, the intermediary of the said organ. In the perception of jar, for an example, the organ of the ocular perception has conjunction with the jar. The said conjunction again abides the jar through the relation of inherence. The negation of jar, therefore, is perceived through the relation of attributives (*viśeṣaṇatā*) of what (earth = *bhūtala*) has the said conjunction through the relation of inherence. For the organ involved has to be related to the locus of negation through the relation it is related through to the counterpositive, thereof during the perception thereof. Not only that. The determinant relation of the said relation is to be identical in both the situations.

1. ननु शब्दस्य श्रोत्रव्यापारत्वमपसिद्धान्त इति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 312.
2. स्वव्यवस्थापकगुणं पुरस्कृत्यैव बहिरिन्द्रियाणां प्रवृत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 312.
3. नन्वेवं शब्दसामान्याभावस्य प्रत्यक्षं न स्यात् तत्र व्यापारीभूतताद्दशशब्दस्य तादात्म्येनासत्त्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 313.

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In the present case, in the like manner, the negation of sound in the auditory organ is to be perceived by the auditory organ through the relation of attributiveness of what has sound circumscribed by the ear through the relation of identity. In the perception of the negation of jar, the earth, the locus of the negation thereof is possessed of conjunction through the relation of inherence identically with the jar itself. The negation of the jar, therefore, is an attribute of the earth (*ghaṭābhāvavat bhūtalam*) possessed of conjunction of the eye through the relation of inherence. Hence through the relation of attributiveness of what has conjuction of the eye through the relation of inherence, the negation of jar on the earth is perceived by the eye. In the present case, on the contrary, sound circumbscribed by the ear, (like conjunction in the case of perception of jar), the intermediary of the auditory organ is sound, the content of auditory perception (like jar, the content of ocular perception), the counterpositive of the negation of sound, through the relation of identity (like inherence in the case of conjunction in the perception of jar by the eye). But unlike the earth in the case of ocular perception of the negation of jar, the auditory organ, the locus of the negation of sound, is not possessed of sound circumscribed by the auditory organ through the relation of identity. As such, the relation needed for the perception of the negation of sound in the auditory organ viz, the relation of attributiveness of what has sound circumscribed by the ear through the relation of identity does not come out. In other words, the auditory organ is not related to the locus of the negation of sound viz., the anditory organ, through sound circumbscribed by the ear abiding through the relation of identity, the way it is related to sound the counter-positive thereof. Hence the said negation remains imperceptible, in case sound circumscribed by the ear is conceived of as the intermediary of the auditory organ.

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection.[1]

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1. शब्दसामान्याभावस्य श्रावणत्वविरहेऽपि क्षत्यभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 313.

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Opponents argue : The negation of sound as such then is liable of perception in sound. For the relation of attributiveness of what has sound circumscribed by the ear through the relation of identity, the relation needed for the perception of the negation of sound in sound shall come out.

Jagadīśa replies : There is no harm.[1] But the negation of sound in the ear remains to be imperceptible.

Opponents argue : But there are schools of thought who regard that the negation of sound in the ear too is a content of auditory perception.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the conjunction of the auditory organ with the mind is to be understood as intermediary (*vyāpāra*). The said organ is in the mind through the relation of *saṁyoga* (conjunction) and the negation of sound therein is also in the mind through the relation of *svarūpa*. The negation of sound in the ear, therefore, would be liable of apprehension through the relation of attributiveness of the conjoined.[3]

Opponents argue : Being an instrument (*karaṇatā*) cannot mean being cause through the relation of *vyāpāra*. For, in that case, the indeterminate knowledge of jarness would turn out to be the cause of the determinate knowledge, 'this is a jar' through the intervening indeterminate knowledge of jar, functioning as the relation of intermediary (*vyāpāra*).[4]

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1. तेन शब्दादौ तत्सामान्याभावस्य तादृशशब्दतादात्म्यवद्विशेषणतया प्रत्यक्षसम्भवेऽपि न क्षतिः । अन्यथा शब्दत्वादेरश्रावणत्वापत्तेरिति ध्येयम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 313.
2. श्रवणादौ शब्दसामान्याभावस्याश्रावणत्वे विप्रतिपन्नं प्रत्याह—कृष्णकान्ती p. 313.
3. श्रोत्रमनसोः संयोग एव वा तत्र व्यापारः । श. श. प्र. p. 313.
तथा च तादृशसंयोगाश्रयविशेषणताया एव तत्राभावग्राहकतयैतत्कल्पानुपपत्तिरिति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 313.
4. ननु घटघटत्वयोर्निर्विकल्पकानन्तरमयं घट इत्याकारकज्ञानद्वयस्थले द्वितीयज्ञानरूपव्यापारसम्बन्धेन प्रथमज्ञानस्य तृतीयं प्रति जनकतया प्रथमस्य तृतीयं प्रति करणतापत्तिः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 313.

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Jagadīśa replies : Any such apprehension is uncalled for. Because the knowledge of jarness is the cause of the determinate knowledge, 'this is a jar' only through the relation of inherence.[1]

Others hold : By instrument (*karaṇa*) is understood what is other than what is possessed of the negation of the effect abiding what is other than the locus of the counterpositive thereof, through the relation of immediate precedence; cloth, (*paṭa*), for an example, is possessed of the negation of jar abiding what is other than the two haves of a jar (*kapala-kapālikā*) through the relation of immediate precedence. The stick (*daṇda*) used by the potter is other than that. Hence the stick is regarded as the instrument (*karaṇa*) of jar. By stick again, the stick actually used as the efficient cause (*phalopadhāyaka*) of jar is to be understood to exclude the sticks in the wood, the potential causes (*svarūpa-yoga kāraṇa*) thereof.[2]

Opponents argue : The soul, in that case, would turn out to be an instrument (*karaṇa*) of knowledge. For it is other than what is possessed of the negation of knowledge abiding in the locus of the counter-positive thereof, through the relation of immediate precedence.

Others reply : It is a welcome objection.[3]

Opponents argue : The soul is the agent of knowledge. As such, it cannot be the instrument of knowledge. For what is

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1. ज्ञानस्य धारावहनस्थले च तृतीयादिकं प्रति द्वितीयादिकं न प्रथमादेः प्रत्यासत्तिस्तत्सम्बन्धेन हेतुत्वे मानाभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 313.

   मानाभावादिति । विशिष्टबुद्धौ विशेषणज्ञानस्य तदलौकिकप्रत्यक्षे तज्ज्ञानस्य समवायेनैव हेतुत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 313.

2. फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं फलोपधायकं वा करणमेव वा कारणम्। श. श. प्र. p. 313.

   अव्यवहितपूर्वत्वसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकप्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणफलाभावविशिष्टान्यत्वित्यर्थः। स्वरूपयोग्ये करणत्वमसहमान आह-फलोपधायकमिति। कृष्णकान्ती p 313.

3. ज्ञानादावात्मादेः करणत्वस्येष्टत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 313.

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apprehended as agent is not liable of comprehension as instrument.

Others reply : The soul can be apprehended as both, agent and instrument. For although the attributes (*upādhi*) vary, the attributable (*upādeya*) remains the same.[1]

Opponents argue : The six-fold division of cases then would be meaningless.

Others reply : The six-fold divison of cases is much the more reasonable because of the very reason that one and the same word-meaning is liable of comprehension as more than one case as desired by the speaker as in *ātmānamātmanā vetsi, sṛjasyātmānamātmanā*[2].

Jagadiśa concludes : This is wrong. For what is well established as what is other than the instrumental case and thus a mere cause, cannot be regarded as (the) instrumental case.[3]

Opponents ask : How then the third declensional suffix has been added to the word, *paśu* in *paśunā rūdram yajeta* ?

Jagadīśa replies : The use of the third declensional suffix is justified in view of the specific provision that the instrument and the object of the verb, *yaji* are to be comprehended as the objective and the dative cases respectively.[4] In this context, again, there is difference of opinion. According to the elders, such use is restricted to the instance cited. According to others, on the contrary, no such restriction is to be abided by.

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1. उपाधेयसङ्करेऽपि कर्तृत्वकरणत्वाद्युपाधेरसाङ्कर्यादेव । ibid., p. 313.
2. कारकस्य षड्विधत्वादत एव 'आत्मानमात्मना वेत्सि सृजस्यात्मानमात्मने-त्यादिकः प्रयोगः । अतएव च विवक्षातो हि कारकविभक्तयो भवन्तीत्यपि प्रवाद इत्यन्ये । श. श.प्र. pp. 313–314.
3. अन्य इत्यस्वरससूचनाय, स चाकरणत्वेन सर्वजनसिद्धानां साधारणकारणानां करणत्वमनुभवविरुद्धम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 314.
4. पशुना रुद्रं यजते इत्यत्र पशुं रुद्राय ददातीत्यर्थः, करणं कर्म यजेः कर्म च सम्प्रदानमित्यनुशासनात् कर्मत्वादापि तृतीयादेः साधुत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 313-314.

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For in *pāyasena viṣṇum yajate* too, the third case-ending is in use under similar circumstances.[1]

Opponents argue : In *daṇḍena ghataḥ*, the third declensional suffix denotes instrumentality and as such it should be regarded as the state of the instrumental case.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For it has no track with a verb.[2]

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1. एतदुदाहरणमात्रविषयानुशिष्टिरियमिति वृद्धाः। 'पायसेन विष्णुं यजते' इत्यादिप्रयोगात् सामान्यत एवेत्यपरे। ibid., p. 314.
2. 'दण्डेन घट' इत्यत्रापि तृतीयार्थः करणत्वं परन्तु तच्च कारकम्, क्रियानन्वयित्वात्। ibid., p. 314.

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CHAPTER XIX

CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
(ADHIKARAṆA)

Pāṇini defines the locative case (*adhikaraṇa-kāraka*) as *ādhāra.*[1] By *ādhāra* is meant the locus. Hence the locus syntactically related to a verb is called the locative case. Relation to a verb is two-fold viz, direct and indirect. All other cases are directly related to verbs. Conversely, the locative case is related to a verb only indirectly. In *śiśuḥ śāyyāyam śete* or in *pācakaḥ sthālyām taṇḍulam pacati,* the bed (*śayyā*) or the cooking pot (*sthālī*), the locative case is related to the act of lying down (*śayana*) or the act of cooking through the child (*śiśu*) or rice (*taṇḍula*). Hence what is the location of what abides the agent or the objective case, through the agent or the objective case is known as the locative case.[2]

Location is of three kinds viz, contactual (*aupaśleṣika*) pervasive (*abhivyāpaka*) and objective (*vaiṣayika*). In *śiśuḥ sayyāyām śete,* the bed (*śayyā*) is the contactual kind of location; in *tileṣu tailamasti,* the sesamum-seeds are of the pervasive kind and in *vidyāyām anurāgaḥ,* learning (*vidyā*) is of the objective kind.

According to Jagadīśa, what is borne out to be comprehended as the feature against the meaning of a root-verb by the seventh case-ending constituting a sentence of analysis is

1. आधारोऽधिकरणम् । पा. I. 4. 45.
2. कर्तृकर्मद्वारा तन्निष्ठायाः आधारः कारकमधिकरणसंज्ञः स्यात् । सि. कौ. p. 632.

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known as the state of the locative case of the said meaning of the said root-verb.[1]

In *grāme gantā*, the state of the locus abiding a village (*grāmaniṣṭhādhikaraṇatā*) or rather the state of abiding, the counter-co-relate of the state of the locus abiding a village (*tannirūpitādheyatva*) is borne out by the seventh case-ending constituting the sentence of analysis of the compound, *grāma-gantā*, to be comprehended as the feature against movement, the meaning of the root-verb, *gam* (constituting the word *gantā*). As such, the said meaning of the seventh case-ending is regarded as the locative case of the act of movement denoted by the said root-verb.[2]

Opponents argue : Movement is inherent in *caitra*, the agent thereof. The seventh case-ending may bear out the comprehension of the state of abiding related to a village i.e. the state of abiding a village (*grāma-vṛttitva*) syntactically related to moment (*gati*) inherent in *caitra*, the agent thereof. But the question is through which relation should movement be in village ? It cannot be inherence. For *grāme gacchati* is never used in language. Nor could it be *kālika*. For in that case *spande gacchati* would be liable of use in language.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The relation involved is a kind of *svarūpa* and the uses like *grāme gacchati na tu gṛhādau* are instanees in point.[4]

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1. यत्क्रियायां याद्दशार्थः सप्तम्या विग्रहस्थया ।
बोध्यस्तस्यां तदेवाधिकरणं नाम कारकम् ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 72.
2. 'ग्रामे गन्ते'त्यत्र धात्वर्थे गतौ ग्रामनिष्ठमधिकरणत्वं तन्निरूपितमाधेयत्वं वा सप्तम्यानुभाव्यते इति तदेव तद्धातूपस्थाप्यताद्दशक्रियायामधिकरणत्व-कारकम् । श. श. प्र. p. 314.
3. यद्यपि चैत्रादिनिष्ठायाः गतेः समवायादिना ग्रामादिवृत्तित्वं बाधितम्, कालिकादिना तद्वृत्तित्वञ्चातिप्रसक्तम्, 'स्पन्दे गच्छती'त्यपि प्रयोगापत्तेः । ibid., pp. 314–15.
4. तथापि 'ग्रामे गच्छत्ययं न तु गृहादावि'त्याद्यनुभवसाक्षिकेण स्वरूप-सम्बन्धविशेषेण तथात्वं बोध्यम् । ibid., p. 315.

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Opponents argue : Movement is only an act. Its state of abiding its own locus through (a kind of) the relation of *svarūpa* is inconceivable. For substance or a quality or an act does not abide the respective locuses thereof through such a relation.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In *girinitambo hutāśanavān, vṛkṣāgrām kapi-saṁyogā-vat* and *caitro jānāti*, a substance (*hutāśana* or fire), a quality (conjunction i.e., *kapi-saṁyoga*) and an act (knowledge or *jñāna*) are admittedly in their respective locuses through the relation of circumscription (*avacchedakatva*), a kind of the relation of *svarūpa*. So also in *vahni-sāmānādhikaraṇyavān parvataḥ, dravya-sāmānādhikaraṇya-vat dravyam*, the relation involved is *nirūpakatva*, another kind of the relation of *svarūpa*.[2]

Opponents argue : All such relations are what are known as *vṛttyaniyāmaka-sambandhas*. Hence the said kind of verbal knowledge from the instances cited are not reasonable.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : This is not correct. For the author of the *dīdhiti* himself has held that the negation of collocativeness is io be comprehended through the relation of *nirūpakatā* from *'dravyatve; gune ca na pṛthivītva-sāmānādhikaraṇyam* and the like.[4]

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1. न च द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन वृत्तित्वं न दृष्टचरमिति वाच्यम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 315.
2. 'गिरिनितम्बो हुताशनवान्, वृक्षाग्रं कपिसंयोगवत्, चैत्रो जानाति'इत्यादाववच्छेदकत्वाख्यस्वरूपसम्बन्धेन, वह्निसामानाधिकरण्यवान् पर्वतः, द्रव्यत्वसामानाधिकरण्यवद् द्रव्यमित्यादौ निरूपकत्वाख्यस्वरूपसम्बन्धेनाधिकरणत्वानुभवस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 315.
3. न च तादृशसम्बन्धानां वृत्त्यनियामकतयोक्तप्रतीतिरसिद्धेति न देश्यम्। ibid., p. 315.
4. द्रव्यत्वे गुणे च न पृथिवीत्वसामानाधिकरण्यमित्यादौ निरूपकतासम्बन्धेन सामानाधिकरण्याभावावगाहित्वस्योक्तप्रतीतेर्दीधितिकारोक्तत्वात्। ibid., p. 315.

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Bhavānanda Siddhānta-vāgīśa[1] argues : Movewent means an act resulting in conjunction. The state of abiding a village, therefore, may well be held to be in conjuction constituting the meaning of the root-verb, viz, movement through the relation of inherence.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : This is incorrect. For in that case *grāman gacchati* would have been uniformally used in language. Because village, in that case, is liable of comprehension as the objective case of the act of movement. For it becomes the locus of the determinant effect thereof.[3]

Opponents argue : Being the objective case does not mean being the locus of the determinant effect of the meaning of the root-verb involved; it means on the contrary, what is signified by the verbal suffix added to a root-verb ending in *yak*. Hence the word, *karma* is denotative of what is the locus of the determinant effect of the meaning of a root-verb ending in *yak*. Hence the objections raised are equally pertinent to the opposite camp.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : Even then in *sthālyām taṇḍulam pacati*, the problem of getting the state of abiding the cooking-pot related to the act of cooking remains unsolved. For the act of cooking is an act resulting in the breaking up (*viklitti*) of rice only. With the breaking up of rice, obviously, the state of abiding the cooking-pot cannot be syntactically related through

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1. सिद्धान्तवागीशमतमुत्थाय निराकरोति–यत्विति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 315.
2. (यत्तु)—संयोगावच्छिन्नक्रियायाः गतित्वात् तन्निविष्टसंयोगे समवायेनैव ग्रामवृत्तित्वसत्त्वाद्ग्रामसङ्गतिः–इति । श. श. प्र. p. 315.
3. तन्न, ग्रामादेर्धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतफलान्वयित्वेन कर्मत्वापत्त्या 'ग्रामं गच्छती'-त्येव नियमतः प्रयोगापत्तेः । ibid., p. 315.
4. ननु धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतफलान्वयित्वं न कर्मत्वं, किन्तु यगन्तधात्वर्थ-विशेष्यीभूततिङर्थः, तद्धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतफलशालिनि कर्मपदस्य शक्तिः, तथा चोक्तापत्तिर्भवन्मतेऽपि तुल्या । कृष्णकान्ती p. 315.

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the relation of inherence.[1] For the breaking up of rice inheres only in the parts of rice.[2]

In *ghaṭatvam ghaṭe bhāsate, bhāsana* or coming to light, the meaning of the root-verb, *bhāsa* amounts to the state of being the content (*vīsayatā*). The seventh case-ending bears out the comprehension of the state of the substantive abiding the jar posited against the meaning of the root-verb through the relntion of *nirūpakatva.* Hence the state of the substantive (*viśeṣyatva*) is regarded as the state of the locative case in the said instance.[3] The verbal knowledge is, 'jarness is the content (feature) of what has the jar as its substantive (*ghaṭa-niṣṭha-viśeṣyata-nirūpita-viṣayatā-vad-ghatatvam*).'[4]

In *jñāne ghaṭatvam bhāsate*, the meaning of the seventh case-ending viz, *nirūpitatva* is the state of the locative case. The verbal knowledge from the said expression is of jarness being embracced as the content (feature) of knowledge (*jñāna-nirūpita-vișayatā-vad-ghaṭa-tvam*).[5]

Opponents argue : On similar grounds, then in *ghaṭe paṭatvam jānāti*, the meaning of the seventh declensional suffix viz, the state of the substantive (*viṣayatā* i.e. *viśeṣyatā*) be regarded as the state of the locative case to give the verbal knowledge of one having the knowledge of a jar as the content (substantive)

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1. विक्लित्यवच्छिन्नक्रियायाः पाकत्वेन तस्यामिव तन्निविष्टविक्लितावपि समवायादिना स्थाल्यादिवृत्तित्वासम्भवेन 'स्थाल्या पचति तण्डुलम्रि'त्यादौ तथाप्यतीकाराच्च, तण्डुलाद्यवयवविभागप्रभेदस्यैव विक्लित्तित्वादिति । श. श. प्र. p. 315.
2. तस्य तण्डुलावयवमात्रसमवेतत्वादिति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 315.
3. 'घटत्वं घटे भासते'इत्यत्र विषयतापर्य्यवसन्ने भासने घटनिष्ठं विशेष्यत्वमवच्छेद्यतासम्बन्धेन सप्तम्यानुभाव्यते इति तत्रापि तदेवाधिकरणतानामकं कारकम् । श. श. प्र. pp. 315–16.

   अवच्छेद्यतेति निरूपकतेत्यर्थः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 315.
4. कृष्णकान्ती p. 316.
5. 'ज्ञाने घटत्वं भासते'इत्यादौ निरूपितत्वमपि । श. श. प्र. p. 316.

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of what has clothness as ths feature (*paṭatva-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpita-ghata-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-śali-jñāna.*)[1]

Jagadīśa refutes : The state of the substantive, denoted by the seventh declensional suffix notwithstanding, is not a case. For it has no track with a verb. If otherwise, then even in case of a valid knowledge like *ghaṭaḥ paṭaśca,* such an expresson could be validly used in language.[2] For the state of being comprehensive of jarness of the said knowledge determines the state of its being comprehensive of a jar and a cloth.[3]

On the contrary, Jagadīśa concludes, the said meaning of the seventh declensional suffix viz, the state of the substantive is syntactically related to the state of the feature denoted by the second declensional suffix added to the word, *paṭatva* through the relation of *nirupitatva* to give the verbal comprehension of one comprending clothness posited as the locus of the feature in respect of the state of the substantive abiding a jar (*ghaṭa-niṣṭha-viseṣyatā-nirūpita-prakāratā'śraya-paṭatva-viṣayaka-jnāna-vān*).[4]

Opponents argue : The meanings of two declensional suffixes are not liable of syntactical relation.[5]

Jagadīśa replies : There is no harm even if the meanings of two declensional suffixes are syntactically related. The

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1. ननु तुल्ययुक्त्या 'घटे घटत्वं जानाती'त्यादौ घटानिष्ठविषयत्वमप्यधिकरणत्वकारकं स्यात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 316.
2. 'घटे पटत्वं जानाती'त्यादौ तु विशेष्यतारूपः सप्तम्यर्थो न धात्वर्थेऽन्वेति, घटपटयोस्तादृष्येण प्रमास्थलेऽपि तादृशप्रयोगापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 316.
3. घटः पटश्चेत्यादिज्ञानेऽपि घटत्वविषयिताशालित्वस्य घटविषयितानिरूपकत्वस्य पटविषयितानिरूपकत्वस्य च सत्त्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 316.
4. परन्तु द्वितीयार्थे पटत्वप्रकारत्वे एवावच्छेद्यत्वसम्बन्धेन। श. श. प्र. p. 316.
5. ननु सुबर्थयोर्मिथोऽन्वयोऽन्युत्पन्नः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 316.

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problem is to be discussed in details in the context of the study of the seventh declensional suffix signifying degrees of comparison.[1]

Bhūtalam ghaṭādhikaraṇam gives the verbal knowledge of the earth related to a jar. But it does not mean, says Jagadīśa, that the determinant of denotation (*śakyatāvacchedaka*) of the word, *adhikaraṇa* is relation as such (*sambandha-mātra*). For in that case, a jar itself through the relation of identity would turn out to be the locus of a jar.[2]

Nor could it be so said that the determinant of denotation of the word, *adhikaraṇa* is *vṛttiniyāmaka-sambandha*. For that would render the jujube fruit (*badara*) to be identified as the locus of the bowl wherein it abides. Because conjunction, the relation involved equally abides both, the bowl and the jujube fruit.[3]

Opponents argue : There is no reason to apprehend that *kuṇḍam baduradhikaraṇam* would lead to the comprehension of the jujube fruit (*badara*) as the locus of the bowl. For there is no word to bear out such comprehension.

Jagadīśa replies : There is no word either to rule out the comprehension of the jujube fruit as the locus of the bowl.

Opponents argue : In that case, *bhūtalam ghaṭādhikaraṇam* too should lead to the comprehension of the earth as the locus of a cloth. For there is no word to rule out any such comprehension. Hence the determinant of denotation of the word *adhikaraṇa* is the relation that governs the state of abiding of

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1. यथा च सुवर्धयोर्मिथोऽन्वयेऽपि न क्तिस्तथा वचयते । श. श. प्र. p. 316. वचयत इति । निर्द्धारणार्थविवेचनायामिति शेषः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 316.
2. अधिकरणपदस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकन्तु न सम्बन्धमात्रं घटाद्यात्मनस्तदधिकरणत्वापत्तेः । श. श. प्र. p. 316.
3. वृत्तिनियामकसम्बन्धस्तथेत्यपि न, कुण्डादौ बदरादेरपि बदरादावपि कुण्डादेरधिकरणत्वापत्तेः । श. श. प्र. p. 316.

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what abides what is denoted by the word used in sequence with the word, *adhikaraṇa* (i.e. the *Vṛtti-niyāmaka-sambandha*).[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This involves the fallacy of *petitio principi* (*anyonyāśraya*). For if the determinant of denotation of the word, *adhikaraṇa* is *vṛtti-niyamaka-sambandha*, then *vṛtti-niyāmaka* becomes the determinant of location (*adhikaraṇatā'-vacchedaka*).[2] As a result the knowledge of import of the word, *adhikaraṇa* becomes dependendent on the knowledge of the determinant of location and vice versa.[3]

Opponents argue : The determinant of denotation of the word, *adhikaraṇa* may well be the state of what determines the state of abiding (*ādheyatā-nirūpakatva*).

Jagadīśa replies : No. For the state of abiding may on similar grounds, be regarded as what determines the state of the locus and thus bringing in the same fallacy again.[4]

Jagadīśa concludes : The state of the locus is an independent concept like the state of abiding.[5]

Opponents argue : Both of these two viz., the state of abiding and the state of the locus not being of the kind of the relation of *svarūpa*, the state of the locus is liable of being regarded a unitary concept.[6]

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1. यद्यपि वदरादेः कुण्डाधिकरणत्वापत्तिर्न सम्भवत्यापादकाभावात्, तथाप्यनधिकरणत्वप्रयोजकविरहादेवापत्तिरभिहिता । नन्वेवं घटाधिकरणस्यापि पटाधिकरणत्वापत्तिरिति तद्वाचकपदसमभिव्याहृताधिकरणशक्तिनियामकत्वं तन्निष्ठाधेयतानियामकसम्बन्धे स्वीकर्त्तव्यम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 316.
2. वृत्तिनियामकस्याधिकरणतावच्छेदकत्वे पर्यवसानाच्च । श. श. प्र. p. 316.
3. तथा चाधिकरणपदशक्तिग्रहाधीनाधिकरणतावच्छेदकग्रहः, तदधीनश्च तादृशशक्तिग्रह इत्यन्योन्याश्रय इति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 316.
4. नाप्याधेयतानिरूपकत्वमधिकरणत्वम्, तुल्यन्यायेनाधिकरणतानिरूपकत्वस्यैवाधेयतात्वेन परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गात् । श. श. प्र. p. 316.
5. परन्त्वाधेयतावत् पदार्थान्तरमेवाधिकरणत्वम् । ibid., p. 317.
6. ननु तयोः स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपत्वाभावेनाधेयत्ववदधिकरणत्वानामैक्यापत्तिः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 317.

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Jagadīśa replies : The state of the locus is multiple by nature. It varies with the variance of the state of abiding. For otherwise all things would have been the locus of all.[1]

Opponents argue : The uniform character of the state of the locus, in that case, is not liable of comprehension.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The uniform character of the state of the locus is liable of comprehension by virtue of its being qualified by the state of the state of the locus, an unanalysable property as it so happens with colours being qualified by colourness (*rūpatva*), a genic property.[3]

Opponents argue : In that case, by virtue of being qualified by a single property, the state of the locus should be regarded as unitary.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : This would mean that colour (*rūpa*) being qualified by colourness, a single property, the use of an expression like 'the white is the locus of the blue' is to be validly made in language. It is reasonable, therefore, to note that colour and taste (*rasa*) although are co-existent in the earth, the states of the locus of these two are not identical. For otherwise a jar being the locus of colour would come out to be the locus of taste as well.[5]

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1. तच्च नैकम्, सर्वस्य सर्वाधिकरणतापत्तेः, किन्त्वाधेयताभेदेन नानैव। श. श. प्र. p. 317.
2. नन्वेवमनुगतप्रतीतिर्न स्यात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 317.
3. प्रतीत्यनुगमस्तु रूपत्वादिना रूपादेरिवाधिकरणतात्वेनैवाखण्डेन तस्य। श. ख. प्र. p. 317.
4. न चैकधर्मावच्छिन्नाधिकरणत्वं लाघवादेकमेवोचितम्। ibid., p. 317.
5. रूपत्वेन नीलस्याधिकरणं स्फटिकमित्यपि प्रयोगापत्तेः। अतएव तद्रुपरसयोः समनियतमप्यधिकरणत्वं विभिन्नमेव, अन्यथा तद्रूपत्वेन तद्रसस्याधिकरणं घट इत्यादेरपि योग्यतापत्तेरित्यास्तां विस्तरः। ibid., p. 317.

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CHAPTER XX

CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
(KARMA)

Pāṇini defines the objective case as what is the most desired for by the agent for the accomplishment of an act.[1] In *māṣeṣu aśvam badhnāti*, (he binds the horse to feed on beans), the horse is the most desird for by the agent of the act of binding for the accomplishment of the said act. In *payasā odanam bhuṅkte*, what is the most desired for by the agent of the act of eating is rice (*odana*) for the accomplishment of the said act; milk (*payas*) being only a supplementary ingrediant of food. Rice, therefore, is liable of comprehension as the objective case of the act of eating in preference to milk.

Opponents argue : In *grāmam gacchaṁstṛṇam spṛśatī* (he treads upon or touches the grass while going to the village) the grass is not desired for by the agent. Similarly in *odanam bhuñjāno viṣam bhuṅkte* (he eats up poison while having his meal), poison (*viṣa*) cannot be what is desired for by the agent. For he is up to have his meal only. Not only that. He has an inborn aversion against poison. The use of the second case-ending, therefore, suffixed to the words, *tṛṇa* and *viṣa* to denote the objective case is ungrammatical.

Pāṇini replies : Although not desired for by the agent of the respective acts involved, grass or poison are comprehended as the objective case. For the relation of the verb involved therewith is the same as with what is the most desired for by the agent.[2]

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1. कर्तुरीप्सिततमं कर्म । पा. I. 4. 49.
2. तथायुक्तञ्चानीप्सितम् । पा. I. 4. 50.

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Pāṇini speaks of another kind of the objective case known as unidentified (*akathita*) one.[1] There are certain root-verbs that are related to two objective cases, direct and indirect. The indirect one is known as unidentified case. For it is not identified as any other case like the ablative by the speaker, as a rule.[2]

The auther of the *vārtika* adds one more to the list. According to him, place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), action (*bhāva*) and distance (*adhvā*) of jouney are comprehended as objective cases in case words, denotative of such things are used with intransitive verbs.[3]

The agent of a non-causative verb meaning 'to go' (*gati*), to know (*buddhi*) as such, to eat (*pratyavasāna*) or of a non-causative verb having sound or what are verbally communicable (like the *vedas*) as the objective case thereof or of a non-causative intranstive verb is comprehended as the objective case (because of his being rendered an instrumental agent (*prayojya-kartā*) with the said verbs being used causatively with the suffix, *ṇic* added thereto.[4]

The agent of any of these verbs once used causatively with the suffix, *ṇic* added thereto is a not comprehended as the objective case although he subsequently turns out to be the instrumental agent (*prayojya kartā*). Hence *viṣṇudattaḥ yajñadattena devadattam gamayati* is used in language instead of *viṣṇudattaḥ yajñadattam devadattam gamayati*.[5]

There are however, certain exceptions to this general rule. The agent of the non-causative verbs, *nī* or *vahi* is not comprehended as the objective case even with the addition

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1. अकथितञ्च। पा. 4. 51.
2. अपादानादिविशेषैरकथितं कारकं कर्मसंज्ञं स्यात्। सि. कौ. 539.
3. अकर्मकधातुभिर्योगे देशः कालो भावो गन्तव्योऽध्वा च कर्मसञ्ज्ञ इति वाच्यम्। (वार्त्तिक) Vide सि. कौ. 539.
4. पा. I. 4. 52.
5. अण्यन्तानां किम्? गमयति देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्तम्। तमपरः प्रयुङ्क्ते-गमयति देवदत्तेन यज्ञदत्तं विष्णुमित्रः। सि. कौ. 540.

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of the causative suffix, *ṇic*, therewith,[1] except, however, a charioteer being the agent of the verb, *vahi*.[2] The agent of a verb meaning to know in a special manner except that of the verb *dṛśi*[3] under similar conditions is not comprehended as the objective case. For by the verbs meaning to know, spoken of in the head rule, only verbs to know as such are meant.[4]

The root-verbs meaning 'to eat' also have similar exception in respect of the root-verb, *ādi* and *khādi*. *Ādayati* (*khādayati*) *annam baṭunā*, therefore, is used in language in preference to *ādayati* (*khādayati*) *annam baṭum*.[5] Similar is the situation with the root-verb, *bhakṣi* except in cases it implies malice.[6]

The root-verb, *śabdāya* meaning to make noise, although is an intransitive one is an exception to the general rule. Hence *śabdāyayati devadattena* is used.[7]

Of the verbs having sound or what are verbally communicable, the verbs like *jalpati* pose exceptions to the general rule. Hence *jalpayati, bhāṣayati vā dharmam putram devadattaḥ* is validly used.[8]

The general rule is optionally observed in cases of the root-verbs, *hṛ*, *kṛ*[9], and in cases of the root-verb *abhi-vādi* and *dṛśi* used in *ātmauepada*.[10]

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1. नीवह्योर्नं। (वार्त्तिक) Vide सि. कौ. 540.
2. नियन्तृकर्त्तृकस्य वहेरनिषेधः। op. cit.
3. दृशेश्च। op. cit.
4. दर्शयति हरिं भक्तान्। सूत्रे ज्ञानसामान्यार्थानामेव ग्रहणं न तु तद्विशेषार्थानामित्यनेन ज्ञाप्यते। तेन स्मरति, जिघ्रति इत्यादीनां न। स्मारयति, घ्रापयति देवदत्तेन। op. cit.
5. आदिखाद्योर्नं। (वार्त्तिक) Vide सि. कौ. 540.
6. भक्षेरहिंसार्थस्य न। op. cit.
7. शब्दायतेर्नं। op. cit.
8. जल्पति प्रभृतीनामुपसंख्यानम्। op. cit.
9. हक्रोरन्यतरस्याम्। पा. I. 4. 53.
10. अभिवादिदृशोरात्मनेपदे वा इति वाच्यम्। (वार्त्तिक) Vide सि. कौ. 541.

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The locus of the meanings of the root-verbs, *śīṅ*, *sthā* and *āsa* prefixed by *adhi* is liable of comprehension as the objective case[1] and so is also the locus of the root-verb, *vas* prefixed by *upa anu* or *adhi*[2] or that of the root-verb, *viś* preceded by the conjunct prefix, *abhi-ni*.[3]

What being other than the state of the agent is borne out by a verbal suffix, to be comprehended as the substantive against which the meaning of the root-verb, involved, ending in *yak*, is projected as the feature is known ās the state of the objective case according to Jagadīśa.[4]

In *grāmo gamyate*, conjunction (*saṁyoga*) (as other than the agent) is borne out by the verbal suffix, *te* to be comprehended as the substantive against which the act that results in conjunction, the meaning of the root-verb, *gam* ending in *yak* is posited as the feature through the relation of *sva-janyatva*. Hence conjunction is known as the state of the objective case of the act, denoted by the root-verb, involved in the present instance.[5]

Opponents argue : In *Vṛkṣam tyajati*, the second case-ending means disjunction (*vibhāga*) and the root-verb, *tyaji* means an act resulting in disjunction. The meaning of the case-ending is regarded as the state of the objective case. In *grāmo gamyate* too, the root-verb, *gam* means an act resulting in conjunction with the space yonder concomitantly occurring with the disjunction with the space behind and not merely conjunction with the space yonder. Hence both conjuction and disjunction are the outcome of the act of going denoted by the root-verb, *gam*. As a result, the verbal suffix appears to bear out the verbal comprehension of both, conjunction and

1. अधिशीङ्स्थासां कर्म। पा. I. 4. 46.
2. उपान्वध्यां वसः। पा. I. 4. 47.
3. अभिनिविशश्च। पा. I. 4. 48.
4. यगन्तधातोरर्थो यस्तिङा स्वार्थोऽनुभाव्यते।
यत्रासौ कर्मता नाम कारकं कर्तृतेतरः॥ श. श. ः. का. 73.
5. 'ग्रामो गम्यते'इत्यत्र गम्धातूपस्थाप्यायाः संयोगावच्छिन्नक्रियायाः स्वजन्यत्वसम्बन्धेन तिङ्पदोपस्थाप्ये संयोगे एवान्वयः। ibid., p. 318.

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disjunction posited as the substantives against which the act of going the meaning of the root-verb;, *gam* ending in *yak*, is posited as the feature. By the state of the objective case, there-therefore, in the present instance, disjunction too should be understood.

Jagadīśa replies : Disjunction is not to be understood as the state of the objective case in the present case but conjuction only. For disjunction is not presented by the verbal suffix added to the root-verb involved (viz, *gam-yak*). Because a suffix provided for to signify the objective case is expectant of a root-verb only to denote the determinant outcome of the meaning of the said root-verb (*dhātvarthatā'vacchedaka-phala*). Disjunction even if it is construed as the outcome of the act of going, it is not the determinant outcome thereof. At the most, it is the determinant of the determinant outcome of the act of going. Therefore, in reference to a bird leaving a tree, *tarum gacchati* is not used in language.[1]

Opponents argue : In *gamyate rathaḥ svayameva*, the verbal suffix bears out the verbal knowledge of conjunction, posited as the substantive against which the meaning of the root-verb, *gam*, ending in *yak* is presented as the feature. As such, conjunction should be understood as the state of the objective case in the present instance too.

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning of the verbal suffix *te*, viz, conjunction although conforms to what is understood as the state of the objective case, it is not other than the state of the agent viz, the state of being possessed of the intermediate action (*vpapāra*) contributing thereto.[2]

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1. न तु त्यजतीत्यादाविव विभागादौ, धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकस्यैव फलस्य बोधने कर्मविहितप्रत्ययानां धातुसाकांक्षत्वादतः संत्रोग एव तत्र गतिक्रियायाः कर्मत्वं न तु विभागादिः। तेन तरोस्त्यागिनि खगे तरुं गच्छतीत्यादिको न प्रयोगः। श. श. प्र. p. 318.
2. गम्यते रथः स्वयमेवेत्यादौ कर्मत्वमिवानुकूलव्यापारवत्वलक्षणं कर्तृत्वं धात्वर्थस्य धर्म्यपि न तत् कर्तृताभिन्नमिति तद्व्युदासः। ibid., p. 318.

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Opponents argue : The conjunction resulting from the act of going undertaken by *caitra* is in both *caitra* and village. Hence like *grāmo gamyate*, *caitra gamyate caitrena* too should be used in language.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : It cannot be used. For movement or the act of going, the meaning of the root-verb is to be related to conjunction, the meaning of the verbal suffix, *te* through the two-fold relation of *svajanyatva* and *svā'śraya-pratiyogikatva*. The expression *caitreṇa grāmo gamyate*, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of village, possessed of conjunction, inherent in *caitra*, the counter-co-relate (*āśraya*) thereof, resulting from the act of going, undertaken by *caitra*. But *caitreṇa gamyate caitraḥ* obviously cannot bear out the verbal comprehension of *caitra*, possessed of conjunction, inherent in *caitra*, the counter-co-relate (*āśraya*) thereof, resulting from the act of going undertaken by *caitra*. For *Caitra* cannot be comprehended as one possessed of the conjunction the counter-co-relate (*pratiyogin*) of which is *caitra* himself. Conjunction qualified by the state of the counter-co-relate of the locus of movement cannot be in *caitra*.[2]

Hence *Caitreṇa caitram gacchati* is not used in language on par with *caitreṇa gramam gacchati*. For in this case, the meaning of the base is expectant to be related to conjunction, the meaning of the second case-ending through *sva-pratiyogikatva* and thereupon the meaning of the word ending in the second case-ending viz, conjunction, the counter-co-relate of which is *caitra* cannot be related to the act of going, the meaning of the root-verb through the two-fold relation of *sva-jankatva* and *svāśraya-vṛttitva* (*āśraya* meaning *anuyogin*, for the relation through which the meaning of the second case-eding is related

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1. ननु चैत्रकर्तृकगमनजन्यसंयोगस्य ग्राम इव चैत्रेऽपि सत्त्वात् 'चैत्रेण गम्यते चैत्रः'इत्यपि प्रयोगः स्यात्। ibid., p. 318.
2. न स्यात्, तिङर्थसंयोगे स्वजन्यत्व-स्वाश्रय-प्रतियोगिकत्वोभयसम्बन्धेन धात्वर्थगतेः साकांक्षत्वेन चैत्रकर्तृकगत्याश्रयप्रतियोगिकत्वविशिष्टस्य संयोगस्य चैत्रे बाधात्। श. श. प्र. p. 318.

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to the meaning of the base thereof is *svapratiyagikatva*). Because *Caitra* cannot be comprehended as the *āśraya* or *anuyogin* of *sva* or conjunction. For he is the counter-co-relate (*pratiyogin*) thereof.[1]

Conversely in *caitro grāmam gacchati*, the meaning of the base of second case-ending is expectant to be related to the meaning of the said case-ending through the relation *sva-pratiyogikatva*. Thereupon the meaning of the word ending in the second case-ending viz., *grāmam* is related to the act of going the meaning of the root-verb, *gam* through the two-fold relation of *sva-jankatva* and *svāśraya-vṛttitva*. The expression, thus, bears out the verbal comprehension of *caitra* having the agency of the act of going, inherent in him, apprehended as one who is the locus of conjunction, the cause of which is the said act and which has village as the counter-co-relate thereof.[2]

Bhavānanda argues : The suffixes, denotative of the objective case i.e. a verbal suffix of the passive voice and the second case-ending (in the activc voice) also denotes 'the state of being inherent in what is other, qualifying the act the way it denotes the outcome of the act.

By being inherent in what is oiher, when denoted by a verbal suffix is meant being inherent what is other than what is posited as the substantive of the outcome of the act, denoted by the verbal suffix itself and when denoted by the second case-ending, being inherent in what is other than what is signified by the base of the said case-ending.

Hence *caitreṇa gamyate caitraḥ* is not nsed in language. For the act of going undertaken by *caitra* but inherent in one other

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1. अतएव चैत्रो ग्रामं गच्छतीतिवत् चैत्रश्चैत्रं गच्छतीत्यपि न प्रयोगः, तत्रापि द्वितीयार्थसंयोगे प्रकृत्यर्थस्य स्वप्रतियोगिकत्वसम्बन्धेनैव साकांक्षतया द्वितीयान्तलभ्यस्य चैत्रीयस्वविशिष्टसंयोगस्य जनकत्व-स्वाश्रयवृत्तित्वोभयासम्बन्धेनैव क्रियायामन्वयेन चैत्रप्रतियोगिकसंयोगाश्रयवृत्तिगतेश्चैत्रे बाधितत्वात्। ibid., pp. 318–19.
2. सिद्धान्तवागीशमतमुपन्यस्य निरस्यति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 319.

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than *caitra* being inconceivable, conjunction resulting from any such act cannot simply be in *caitra*. Similarly *caitraś-caitram gaccati* is also not used in language. For the act of going, inherent in one other than *caitra* cannot be in *caitra*. There is, however, no bar to the comprehension of a village possessed of the conjunction resulting from the act of going inherent in one other than the village, undertaken by *caitra* from the expression, *caitreṇa gamyate grāmaḥ*.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For the state of being inherent in other, the meaning of a verbal suffix, being other than a numeral or time cannot be embraced in verbal knowledge as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb.[2]

Opponents argue : In *yajeta* the state of being the instrument, the meaning of the verbal suffix, *ta* is related to sacrifice (*yāga*), the meaning of the root-verb, *yaji*.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : But the meaning of the word, ending in the first declensional suffix (viz. *grāmaḥ*) cannot be syntacti-related to the meaning of a suffix through a relation of difference.

Opponents argue : In *odano bhujyate* or in *dhṛtiḥ svāha*, the meaning of the words, *odanaḥ*, *dhṛtiḥ* and the like ending

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1. यत्तु-फलमिव क्रियायामन्वितं परसमवेतत्वमपि कर्मतावाचिप्रत्ययस्यार्थः, परत्वञ्च तिङा स्वार्थफलान्वयिप्रतियोगिकं द्वितीयादिसुपा तु प्रकृत्यर्थ-प्रतियोगिकं प्रत्याय्यते। तथा च चैत्रकर्तृकस्य चैत्रान्यसमवेतगमनस्या-प्रसिद्धत्वेन चैत्रे तत्सन्यसंयोगस्यासम्भवात्, 'चैत्रेण गम्यते चैत्रः' इत्यादिको न प्रयोगः। एवं चैत्रान्यसमवेतस्य गमनस्य चैत्रे बाधात् चैत्रश्चैत्रं गच्छतीत्यादिरपि। 'चैत्रेण गम्यते ग्रामं' इत्यादौ तु चैत्रकर्तृकस्य ग्रामभिन्नसमवेतस्य गमनस्य जन्यो यः संयोगस्तद्वान् ग्राम इत्यन्वय-बोधने न किञ्चिद् बाधकम् इति प्राच्यैरुक्तम्। श. श. प्र. p. 319.
2. तत्र युक्तम्, संख्याकालातिरिक्तस्य तिङर्थस्य धात्वर्थविशेष्यत्वनियमेन तिङर्थ-परत्वादेर्धात्वर्थगत्यादावन्वयायोगात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 319–20.
3. 'यजेत्' इत्यादौ तिङर्थेष्टसाधनत्वादौ व्यभिचारात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 320.

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in the first declensional suffix do get related to the meaning of a suffix through a relation of difference.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning of a word, ending in the first declensional suffix does not ever get related to the meaning of a verbal suffix through a relation other than that of identity.[2]

Opponents argue : It is true that the meaning of a word, ending in the first declensional suffix is not much seen to be related to the meaning of a verbal suffix through a relation other than that of identity. But in view of syntactical peculiarity the chances of a word ending in the first declensional suffix being thus related to the meaning of a verbal suffix cannot be altogether ruled out.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The expressions like *caitreṇa gamyate dravyam* or *dravyam gacchati caitraḥ*, in that case should cause no verbal knowledge, for want of compatibility since movement inherent in what is other than substance is inconceivable.[4]

Opponents argue : Movement inherent in what is other than substance, the counter-positive of negation i.e. difference of what is qualified by quality is of course conceivable.

Jagadīśa replies : By negation i.e. difference (*bheda*) is to be understood negation or difference of what is qualified by the determinant of the substantive. Hence there is no such possibility.[5]

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1. 'ओदनो भुज्यते' इत्यादौ 'घृतिः स्वाहा' इत्यादौ च प्रत्ययार्थेऽपि तस्य दृष्टत्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 320.
2. प्रथमान्तोपदोपस्थाप्यग्रामादेरभेदान्यसम्बन्धेनान्यत्र प्रत्ययार्थे तिङर्थे वाऽन्वयस्यादृष्टचरत्वेनाव्युत्पन्नत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 320.
3. ननु तादृशान्वयस्यादृष्टचरत्वेऽपि व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यात् स्वीकारे वाधकाभावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 320.
4. 'चैत्रेण गम्यते द्रव्यं' 'द्रव्यं गच्छति चैत्र' इत्यादौ द्रव्यान्यसमवेतस्य गत्यादेरप्रसिद्धत्वेनायोग्यतापत्तेश्च। श. श. प्र. p. 320.
5. द्वित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नभेदमादायोक्तातिप्रसङ्गतादवस्थ्यभियाऽन्वयितावच्छेदकाव - वच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदस्यैव निवेश्यत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 320

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Neo-logicians argue : A suffix signifying the state of the objective case denotes differenee too like the (determinant) outcome of the act denoted by the root-verb involved. Hence in *caitreṇa gamyate grāmaḥ*, difference, a meaning of the verbal suffix, *te* is embraced in the resultant verbal knowledge as the substantive of the meaning of the root-verb through the relation of collocation (*samānādhikaraṇya*) and as a feature against village through the relation of counterpositiveness. As such, the rule of semantics that the meaning of a root-verb is related to the meaning of a verbal suffix as a feature is not violated. Nor is there the possibility of an use like *caitreṇa gamyate caitraḥ*.[1] For *caitra* is not liable of comprehension as the counter-positive of the difference abiding the locus of the act of going undertaken by *caitra* himself as the agent thereof.[2]

Similarly *caitraścaitram gaccati* too cannot be used in language. For the act of going, qualified by difference, denoted by the second case-ending (in *caitram*) cannot be syntactically related to *Caitra*. Because, difference, the meaning of the case-ending is related to the meaning of the base thereof through the relation of counter-positiveness and to the act of going, the meaning of the root-verb, involved through the relation of collocation.[3]

Opponents argue : In that case, *caitro dravyam gacchati* should not be used in language. For difference, the meaning of the second case-ending related to substance (dravya)

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1. नव्यास्तु फलमिव भेदोऽपि कर्मतावाचिप्रत्ययस्यार्थः, तथा च 'चत्रेण गम्यते ग्राम' इत्यत्र तिङर्थभेदस्य सामानाधिकरण्यसम्बन्धेन धात्वर्थविशेष्यत्वात् प्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन च प्रथमान्तार्थे ग्रामादौ विशेषणत्वान्न व्युत्पत्तिविरोधः न वाऽतिप्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 320.
2. चैत्रकर्तृकगमनाश्रयवृत्तिभेदप्रतियोगित्वस्य चैत्रे बाधात्। श. श. प्र. p. 320.
3. 'चैत्रं गच्छती'त्यादावपि प्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन चैत्रान्वितस्य सामानाधिकरण्यसम्बन्धेन धात्वर्थगतावन्वयात्, तादृशगतेश्चैत्रे बाधाच्चैत्रं गच्छति चैत्र' इत्यादिको न प्रयोगः। श. श. प्र. pp. 320–21.

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through the relation of counter-positiveness cannot be related to the act of going, the meaning of the root-verb through the relation of collocation. Because *Caitra* himself being a substance cannot be the locus of the said act and of difference related to substance through the said relation (i.e. difference of substance) to make room for any such relation.

Jagadīśa replies : Difference related to substance through the relation of counter-positiveness means difference of substance as what is qualified by a poperty not abiding two or as what is not qualified by more than one property. Hence by difference of substance is meant the difference of an individual substance or substance qualified by the state of the individual In other words difference of substance would mean difference of village and the like. Hence there would be no bar to verbal knowledge.[1]

Jagadīśa concludes : Such views as put forward by Bhavānanda and the Neo-logicians are subject to scrutiny.[2] For in both the views, a suffix signifying the state of the objective case has been held to have twofold potency. According to Bhavānanda it denotes the outcome of the act involved and the state of being inherent in other and according to the Neo-logicians, the said outcome and difference. Conversely, it is simpler to hold that the said suffix has the single potency to denote only the determinant of denotation of the root-verb involved, to be related to the meaning of the said root-verb through two-fold relation. If inevitable, it is less harmful to contemplate of more than one syntactical relation than to conceive of more than one potency.[3]

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1. प्रतियोगित्वञ्च उभयावृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नं धर्मद्वयानवच्छिन्नं वा ग्राह्यम्, अतो 'द्रव्यं गच्छती'त्यादौ गतेर्द्रव्यभेदसामानाधिकरण्यविरहेऽपि न क्षतिरिति प्राहुः। ibid., p. 321.
2. तच्चिन्त्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 321.
3. चिन्ताबीजन्तु अस्दुक्तरीत्या सामक्षस्ये तिङादेः शक्यान्तरकल्पने. गौरवम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 321.

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In *Vṛkṣam Khagastyajati*, the root-verb, *tyaji* means an act resulting in disjunction. The second case-ending (in *vṛkṣam*) means disjunction. Thus the verbal knowledge from the said expression is of a bird undertaking the act resulting in disjunction, possessed of the disjunction from the tree. Hence *Khagaṁ tyajati khagaḥ* is not used in language. For the state of being possessed of the disjunction from the tree is to be related to the act involved through the two-fold relation of *janakatva* and *svāśraya-vṛttitva*. *Khagena tyajate khagaḥ* too is not used. For the meaning of the root-verb, *tyaji* cannot be syntactically related to disjunction through the two-fold relation of *svajanyatva* and *svāśrayā'vadhikatva*.[1]

The elders argue : In *grāmam gacchati tyajati* or in any other situation like this, the root-verb means only act as such.[2]

Opponents argue : In that case the root-verbs, *gam* and *tyaji* would turn out to be synonymous.

Elders reply : There is no harm. For the suffix signifying the objective case, added to a root-verb meaning the act of going is to denote conjunction and to a root-verb meaning the act of leaving, disjunction. Because in *tarum tyajati*, conjunction or in *'tarum gacchati'* disjunction is never borne out for comprehension by the second case-ending.[3]

Opponents argue : The idea that each individual second case-ending or suffix signifying the objective case has the

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1. वृक्षावधिकविभागवत्त्वञ्च जनकत्यस्वाश्रयवृत्तित्वोभयसम्बन्धेनैव क्रियायां प्राह्यमतः खगाद्यवधिकविभागस्य खगादावसत्त्वात् 'खगं त्यजति खग' इत्यादिको न प्रयोगः। 'खगेन त्यज्यते खग' इत्यपि प्रयोग प्रागुक्तरीत्या निरसनीयः । श. श. प्र. pp. 321-22.
2. प्राञ्चस्तु 'ग्रामं गच्छति, त्यजती'त्यादौ सर्वत्र क्रियामात्रं धात्वर्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 322.
3. त्यजिगम्योश्च पर्यायत्वेऽपि फलत्यभावात्, गत्यर्थक्रियायां संयोगस्यैव त्यज्यर्थक्रियायाञ्च विभागस्यैव बोधकतायाः कर्मप्रत्ययेषु व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। 'तरुं त्यजती'त्यादौ संयोगस्य 'तरुं गच्छती'त्यादौ च विभागस्य द्वितीयादितो नावगमः। ibid., pp. 322-23.

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potency to denote conjunction (or disjunction) as such is more complex in comparison to the view that the second case-ending as such denotes what is qualified by the property implied as the determinant outcome of the meaning of the root-verb concerned.[1]

Elders reply : Even those who hold that a root-verb is denotative of an act resulting in the outcome thereof also have to admit that the second case-ending and the like are denotative only of the determinant outcome of the meaning of the root-verb involved. Fo-, otherwise, disjunction is liable of comprehension in the case of the root-verb, *gam* and conjunction in the case of *tyaji*.[2]

Opponents argue : In case a root-verb denotes only act as such, then *tyāgo na gatiḥ* should not be used in language because of expectancy lacking as in *spando na spandaḥ*.[3]

Elders reply : Such apprehension is unfounded. For the root-verbs in such cases severally imply the acts resulting in conjunction or disjunction.[4]

Opponents argue : If a root-verb does not denote an individual act but only act as such, then verbs cannot be classified into transitive and intransitive ones. For the very basis of such classification is that a verb denotative of an act resulting in the outcome thereof is a transitive and if otherwise intransitive.

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1. ननु धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलत्वोपलक्षितधर्भावच्छिन्ने द्वितीयात्वादिना शक्तिमपेक्ष्य संयोगत्वावच्छिन्ने तत्तद्द्वितीयात्वादिना शक्तिकल्पने गौरवम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 323.
2. परैरपि समभिव्याहृतधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलस्यैव द्वितीयादिबोध्यताव्युत्पत्तेरभ्युपेतव्यत्वात्, अन्यथाऽति प्रसङ्गात्। श. श. प्र. p. 323.
3. न चैवं 'स्पन्दो न स्पन्द इत्यादेरिव 'त्यागो न गति'रित्यादेरपि वाक्यस्य निराकांक्षत्वापत्तिः। ibid., p. 323.
4. तत्र त्यजिगम्योर्विभागाद्यवच्छिन्नक्रियालक्षकत्वेनैवान्वययोग्यतासम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 323.

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Elders reply : Verbs are classified into transtive and intransitive ones not on any such basis. For in that case, the root-verb, *jñā* would turn out to be an intransitive one. Because in *ghaṭam jānātt* and the like the said verb does not denote an act resulting in the outcome thereof; jar is only a content (*viṣaya*) of knowledge. It is not possessed of the determinant outcome of the act of knowing. Conversely, the basis of the classification of verbs into transitive and intransitve ones is this : A root-verb with the infinitive suffix (*tuman*) added thereto expectant of the second case-ending is the transitive kind of verb and if not expectant of the said case-ending, it is an intransitive one.[1]

Opponents argue : The root-verb, *smṛ* in that case should be regarded an intransitive one. For the infinitive suffix added thereto is expectant of the sixth declensional suffix.[2]

Elders reply : It is difinitely expectant of the second case-ending also. For like *mātuḥ samarati, mātaram smarati* is validly used in language.[3]

Elders conclude : Thus *grāmam gacchati* or *tarum tyajati* bears out the verbal comprehension of one having undertaken an act that causes conjunction with the village or of one having undertaken an act that causes disjunction from the tree. It does not lead to the verbal comprehension of one having undertaken an act resulting in conjunction or disjunction, that causes conjunction with the village or disjunction from the tree. For conjunction or disjunction is devoid of expectancy that calls for the comprehension thereof twice-once presented by

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1. द्वितीयासाकांक्षतुमन्तधातुत्वप्रयुक्त एव च धातूनां सकर्मकत्वव्यवदेशो न तु फलावच्छिन्नक्रियावाचित्वप्रयुक्तः ज्ञाप्रभृतावव्याप्तत्वात्। ibid., p. 323.
2. ननूक्तरूपस्य सकर्मकत्वे स्मृधातोः सकर्मकत्वं न स्यात्, तदुत्तरतुमः षष्ठी-मात्रसाकाङ्क्षत्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 323.
3. स्मृत्यर्थधातूनां कर्मणि षष्ठया इव द्वितीयाया अपि साधुत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 323.

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the root-verb and then by the second case-ending like *ghaṭa* in *nila-ghata-janaka-ghaṭa-janaka-daṇḍa-vān.*[1] Because the determinant of the subject and the predicate have been identical.[2]

Opponents argue : The determinant of the subject and the predicate are not identical in the view of the Neo-logicians. For what is comprehended as the predicate in their view in such cases comprises of more than what forms the determinant of the subject.[3]

Elder reply : All this goes counter to experience.[4]

Jagadīśa observes : Inspite of all this, *tyāgo na gatiḥ* would nontheless remain incapable of being used in language because of compatibility of the word-meanings involved, for syntactical relation lacking but for the kdowledge of implication suggested.[5]

Opponents argue : In the view of Jagadīśa too the problem remains unsolved. For conjuction or disjunction lack in expectancy for being comprehended twice.[6]

Jagadīśa replies : There is no such contingency. For as in *karoti*, agency (*kṛti*) is comprehended only once although presented by the root-verb, *kṛ* and the verbal suffiv, *ti* (with-

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1. एवञ्च ग्रामं गच्छति, तरुं त्यजतीत्यादौ ग्रामसंयोगजनकक्रियावांस्तरुविभागजनकक्रियावानित्याकारक एव बोधः, न तु ग्रामसंयोगजनकसंयोगावच्छिन्नक्रियावांस्तरुविभागजनकविभागावच्छिन्नक्रियावानित्याकारकः, संयोगविभागयोरुभयथा भानस्य 'नीलघटजनक-घटजनकदण्डपानित्यादौ घटादेखि निराकांक्षत्वेनासम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 324.
2. उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेययोरैक्यस्थले निराकांक्षत्वदाढ्याय सुगमं दृष्टान्तमाह नीलघट्योरिति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 324.
3. नञ्यैर्विधेयांशेऽधिकावगाहिंशब्दस्वीकारात् तन्मतसाधारणं दोषमाह। ibid., p. 324.
4. अनुभवविरोधाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 324.
5. आदुरित्यवरसूचनाय, स च लक्षणया अग्रहदशायां त्यागो न गतिरित्यादेरयोग्यत्वप्रसङ्गरूपः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 324.
6. न च भवन्मतेऽपि निराकांक्षत्वं दुष्परिहरमिति वाच्यम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 324.

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out any one of them being redundant) conjunction presented by the verbal suffix, *ti* and the root-verb, *gam* in liable of being comprehended only once.[1]

Grammarians hold : The root-verb, *gam* severally denotes conjunction and an act and these are related as cause and effect arising out of syntax. These two meanings viz, conjunction and an act being mutually expectant, the root-verb, *gam* is not used to signify any one of these two meanings in isolation of the other.[2]

Opponents argue : The two meanings of a single word are not found liable of syntactical relation.[3]

Grammarians reply : The two meanings of the word, *eva* viz., the relation of others (*anyayoga*) and exclusion (*vyavacchedaka*) are well found liable of such relation.[4] The verbal knowledge from *viṣṇureva sarvajñaḥ*, for example, is like this : Those who are other than Viṣṇu (*anyayoga*) are not omniscient (*vyavaccheda*).

Opponents argue : The idea of a word being denotative of more than one meaning involves complexity. For a word, in that case, is either endowed with multiple potencies or is capable of presenting one meaning in isolation of the others.[5]

Grammarians reply : A word denotes more than one meaning not because it is endowed with multiple potencies but because the determinant of denotation (*śakyatāvacchedaka*) is

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1. करोतीत्यादावाविव सम्भेदेनान्यतरवैयर्थ्याभावेनान्यसंयोगादेरेकदैव भानादिति । ibid., p. 324.
2. परे तु संयोगः क्रिया च द्वयमेव प्रत्येकं गमिशक्यम्, तयोर्जन्यजनकभावस्तु वाक्यार्थमर्यादया भासते । श. श. प्र. p. 324.
3. नन्वेकपदोपस्थाप्ययोः परस्परसम्बन्धो न दृष्टचर इत्येकमात्रे गमिप्रयोगः स्यात् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 32S.
4. एवार्थयोरन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदयोरिव गम्यर्थयोः संयोगक्रिययोर्मिथ एवं साकांक्षत्वाच्च नैकमात्रे गमिप्रयोगः । श. श. प्र. p. 324.
5. ननु मानाशक्तिकल्पने गौरवम् । कृष्णकाती p. 324.

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of multiple nature. The word *puṣpa-vantau*, for example denotes the sun and the moon, the determinant of denotation thereof being sunness and moonness. Similarly, the root-verb, *gam* is to denote conjunction and an act qualified by conjunctionness and act-ness, the determinant of denotation of the said root-verb. There is, therefore, no reason to apprehend either that the root-verb, *gam* should denote one of these two meanings in isolation of the other.[1]

Opponents argue : The two meanings of the word, *puṣpa-vantau* are not syntactically related while the two meanings of the root-verb, *gam*, are claimed to be so.

Grammarians reply : This much of difference has to be recoinciled with.[2]

Grammarians conclude : Hence in *grāmam gacchatī* the second case-ending means the state of abiding (*ādheyatva*). As such conjunction as qualified thereby is syntactically related to the act to give the verbal knowledge of one undertaking an act possessed of conjunction abiding a village.

In *tarum tyajati*, the second case-ending means the state of abiding. Hence disjunction, the meaning of the root-verb, *tyaji*, as qualified thereby is syntactically related to the act, the other meaning of the said root-verb to give the verbal knowledge of (a bird) undertaking the act possessed of disjunction that abides a tree.

Opponents argue : The state of abiding is syntactically related to village or to tree through the relation of the counter-co-relate or a relation other than what govern (the state of) abiding (*vṛttiniyāmaka*).

Grammarians reply : In that case, the second case-ending in the aforesaid instances may well be held to denote the state of being the counter-co-relate and the state of being the limit

1. पुष्पवन्तपदे च चन्द्रत्वसूर्यत्वाभ्यामिव विभिन्नरूपाभ्यां प्रकृते संयोगत्व-क्रियात्वाभ्यां गमधातोरेकशक्तिस्वीकारेऽपि न क्षतिः। श. श. प्र. pp. 324–25.
2. इयांस्तु विशेषो-यत्तत्र सूरशशिनोर्मिथो नान्वयः, प्रकृते तु संयोगक्रिययोस्त-थेति। ibid., p. 325.

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respectively to give the verbal knowledge of one undertaking an act possessed of conjunction that has village as its counter-positive and of one undertaking an act possed of disjunction that has a tree as its limit.[1]

Opponents argue : Even then the uses like *svaḥ svam gacchati* (*tyajati*) cannot be ruled out.

Grammarians reply : The verbal knowledge given, it may be noted, embrace 'acts possessed of conjunction or disjnnction'. The relation through which the acts are thus possessed of is twofoid viz, *janakatva* and *svāśraya-vṛttitva*. Hence the act abiding one who is the locus of conjunction or disjunction that has oneself as its counter-co-relate cannot inhere in oneself. As such the uses like *svaḥ svam gacchati* is *ip so facto* ruled out.[2]

Opponents ask : How should then verbs be classified into transitive and intransitive ones ?

Grammarians reply : By a transtitive verb is meant what bears out the verbal knowledge of (an) act denoted by itself qualified by the outcome (thereof) denoted again by itself.

Opponents argue : The root-verb, *jñā* in that case becomes liable of being regarded an instransitive root-verb.

Grammarians reply : Such root-verbs are considered as transitive ones in a secondary sense.[3]

Jagadīśa contradicts : It is more reasonable to hold that a root-verb is denotative of an act qualified by the determinant

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1. तथा च 'ग्रामं गच्छती'त्यत्र द्वितीयाया आधेयत्वं प्रतियोगित्वं वार्थस्तेन तदन्वितस्य संयोगस्य क्रियायामन्वयात् ग्रामवृत्तित्वप्रतियोगिको वा यः संयोगस्तद्विशिष्टक्रियावानित्याकारकस्तत्र बोधः। 'तरुं त्यजती'त्यत्राप्याधेयत्वमवधित्वं वा द्वितीयार्थस्तेन तदन्वितस्य धात्वर्थविभागस्य धात्वर्थान्तरे क्रियायामन्वयात् तद्वृत्तित्वतदवधिको वा यो विभागस्तद्विशिष्टक्रियावानित्याकारको बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 325.
2. संयोगादिवैशिष्ट्यञ्च जनकत्व-स्वाश्रयवृत्तित्वोभयसम्बन्धेनैव प्रागिव ग्राह्यमतो नातिप्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 325.
3. सकर्मकत्वमपि धातोः स्वार्थफलावच्छिन्नस्वार्थक्रियान्वयबोधकत्वम्, 'जानाती'त्यादौ सकर्मकत्वव्यवहारो भाक्त इत्याहुः। ibid. p. 325.

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outcome thereof than to hold that it denotes the said meaning piece-meal mutually expectant.[1]

In *taṇḍulam pacati*, the root-verb, *paci* means an act resulting in conjunction of heat (fire) bringing about transformation of colour. Rice (*taṇḍula*) is syntactically related to conjunction constituting the meaning of the said root-verb through the relation of abiding (*ādheyatva*). The said expression, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one undertaking the act that results in the conjunction of heat (fire), abiding rice, bringing about transformation of colour (in rice, *taṇḍula-rūpa-parāvṛtti-janaka taṇḍula-vṛtti-tejaḥ· saṁyogāvacchinna·kriyā - vān*).[2]

Others hold : The root-verb, *paci* means an act resulting in the break-up of parts (viklitti = avayava-vibhāga). Rice is related to parts (*avayava*) constituting the meaning of the said root-verb through the relation of *samavetatva*. Hence the said expression gives the verbal knowledge of one undertaking the act that results in the break-up of parts inherent in rice (*taṇḍula-samavetāvayava-vibhāgānukūlavyāpāra-vān*).[3]

In *odanam pacati*, Jagadīśa says, the word, *odana* implies rice, to give an identical verbal knowledge with *taṇḍulam pacati*. For otherwise neither transformation of colour (*rūpa-parāvṛtti*) nor the breaking up of parts (*viklitti*) can be syntactically related to what the word, *odana* denotes viz cooked rice.

Others argue : The view that the word, *odana* implies rice is not acceptable. Conversely, let the second case-ending be

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1. अस्मदुक्तप्रकारस्यैव सम्यक्त्वात् किं व्युत्पत्तेः संङ्कोचेन मिथः साकांक्षत्व-कल्पनेनेत्यस्वरसः आहुरित्यनेन सूचितः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 325.
2. 'तण्डुलं पचती'त्यत्र रूपादिपरावृत्तिफलकतेजःसंयोगावच्छिन्नक्रिया पचेरर्थः तन्निविष्टे च निरुक्ते तेजःसंयोगे तण्डुलस्याधेयत्वेनान्वयः । श. श. प्र. pp. 325-26.
3. ये तु—अवयवविभाग एव विक्लित्तिः, तदनुकूलव्यापारः पचेरर्थः तदेकदेशे-ऽवयवे समवेतत्वसंसर्गेण तण्डुलस्यावगमः—इति वदन्ति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 325.

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understood to mean the state of contributing to (*anukūlatva*) to be related to the act. The sentence, *odanam pacati*, therefore, bears out the verbal comprehension of one undertaking an act contributing to cooked rice (*odanānukūla-kriyā-vān*).[1]

Jagadīśa observes : In that case, the very base of implication would collapse. For with the help of some relation or the other in *gangāyām ghoṣaḥ* and the like other well-known instances of implication, the denoted meaning of the word, *ganga* and the like might well be syntactically related to other word-meanings.[2]

In *tṛṇam chinatti*, the root-verb, *chidi* means an act resulting in disjunction counteracting upon the conjunction inherent in the aggregation of primary atoms. The meaning of the word, *tṛṇa* is related to such conjunction or to such disjunction through the relation *svāvayava-vṛttitva*.[3] The verbal knowledge from the said sentence, therefore, is of one undertaking an act resulting in disjunction counteracting upon the conjunction of primary atoms inherent in the parts of grass or of one engaged in an act resulting in disjunction abiding the parts of grass, counteracting upon the conjunction inherent in the aggregation of primary atoms thereof.

Opponents argue : *Paramāṇum chinatti* should also be used in language then.

Jagadīśa replies : It cannot be used. For an atom (*paramāṇu*) having no parts (*avayava*) cannot be syntactically related

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1. ओदनं पचतीत्यादौ तु तण्डुलादावोदनादिपदस्य न लक्षणा, अत्र क्रियायामन्वितमनुकूलत्वं द्वितीयार्थ इति कश्चित्। श.श. प्र. p. 326.

2. क्वचिदित्थंस्वरससूचनाय, स च गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादिस्थलेऽपि लक्षणानुगतिरूपः, तत्रापि सम्बन्धविशेषण गङ्गापदस्यान्वयसम्भवादिति। कणकान्ती p. 326. pp. 325-26.

3. 'तृणं छिनत्ती'त्यादाववयवसंयोगविरोधिक्रियाश्रयत्वविशिष्टक्रियाविशिष्टे संयोगे [illegible] स्वावयववृत्तित्वसम्बन्धेन तृणादेरन्वयः। श. श. प्र. p. 326. p. 325.

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to conjunction or disjunction, constituting the meaning of the root-verb, *chidi* through the relation of *svavayava-vrttitva*.[1]

In *puspena visnum yajate*, the root-verb, *yaji* means the act of giving up of substance accompanied with the recitation of hymns resulting in pleasure. The meaning of the word, *visnu* is related to *priti*, viz, pleasure through the relation of *adheya-tva*. The meaning of the word, *puspa*, viz, flower is related to substance through identity. Hence the verbal knowledge from the said expression is of one undertaking the act of giving up flowers, one with substance accompanied with the recitation of hymns, causing pleasure abiding *visnu*.[2]

Opponents argue : In that case, *dravyena visnum yajate* is not to bear out any verbal knowledge. For the determinant of the subject and that of the predicate are identical.[3]

Jagadisa replies : The root-verb, *tyaji* means the act of giving up a substance not as substance. Giving up (*tyaga*) a thing virtually means the desire that results in the loss of one's title to the thing. The meaning of the word, *puspa* is related to title, a constituent of such a meaning. Hence the verbal knowledge from the said kind of a sentence is of one having the desire causing loss of title to flowers or a substance.[4]

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1. स्वावयववृत्तित्वसम्बन्धेनेति । तथा च परमाणुं छिनत्तीति न प्रयोग इति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 326.

2. पुष्पेण विष्णुं यजते' इत्यत्र प्रीत्यवच्छिन्नसमन्त्रकद्रव्यत्यागो यजेरर्थः, प्रीतौ विष्णोराधेयत्वेन द्रव्ये च पुष्पादेरभेदेनान्वयस्तेन विष्णुनिष्ठप्रीतिहेतुर्योमन्त्रकरणकः पुष्पाभिन्नद्रव्यत्यागस्तद्वानित्याकारस्तत्र बोधः । शा. शि. प्र. p. 326.

3. उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोरैक्येन निराकांक्षत्वादित्यादिः । कृष्णकान्ती pp. 326-27.

4. स्वस्वध्वंसजनकेच्छापर्यवसन्नस्य त्यागस्यैकदेशस्वत्व एव वेर्हि पुष्पादेराधेयत्वेन तत्रान्वयः, तेन 'द्रव्येण विष्णुं यजते' इत्यादौ द्रव्यांशेऽपि शाब्दसत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । शा. शि. प्र. p. 326.

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In *pitaramārādhayati* (*upāste, pūjayati*) and the like the root-verb means an act occasioned by venerations resulting in pleasure. The meaning of the word, *pitṛ* is syntactically related to veneration (*gaurava*) and pleasure (*prīti*), the constituents of the said meaning of the root-verb involved through the relation of *viṣayatva* and *ādheyatva* respectively. The verbal knowledge from a sentenee like this, therefore, is of one undertaking the act that brings about pleasure to (abiding) one's father, occasioned by the veneration for (in respect of) to one's father.[1] By veneration again is meant the knowledge that father is one to be adored.[2]

Opponents argue : *Pitaram yajate* too should be used in language.

Jagadīśa replies : It cannot be used. For the worship of father is not accompanied with the recitation of hymns while the root-verb, *yaji* involves such recitation.[3]

Opponents argue : In *paramātmānamupāste*, the root-verb cannot mean an act occasioned by veneration, resulting in pleasure. For the 'Supreme Being' (*parāmātmā*) is self-sufficient. He cannot be imagined to have pleasure lacking in Him to be caused by worship.

Jagadīśa replies : In this case, the root-verb implies only an act occasioned by veneration to give the comprehension of one engaged in the act of worship of the Supreme Being, occasioned by the veneration for Him'.[4]

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1. पितरमाराधयति, उपास्ते, पूजयतीत्यादौ गौरवप्रयुक्तप्रीत्यवच्छिन्नक्रिया धात्वर्थः, तन्निविष्टयोर्गौरवप्रीत्योः क्रमेण विषयत्वाधेयत्वाभ्यां पित्रादेरन्वयस्तेन पितृगोचरगौरवप्रयुक्ता या पितृनिष्ठप्रीतिहेतुक्रिया तद्वानित्येव तत्र बुद्धिः ।। ibid., p. 326.
2. गौरवं पुनराराध्यत्वावगाही ज्ञानप्रभेदो येयं भक्तिरित्युच्यते । ibid., p. 326.
3. पित्रादिसेवायाश्च मंत्रकरणकत्वाभावाच्च तत्र 'पितरं यजत' इत्यादिकः प्रयोगः । Ibid., p. 326.
4. 'परमात्मानमुपास्ते' इत्यादौ तु गौरवप्रयुक्तक्रियामात्रे धातोर्लक्षणा, नातः परमेशितुः प्रीतिविरहादयोग्यत्वापत्तिः । श. श. प्र. p. 326.

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In *ghṛtaṁ juhoti*, the root-verb, *hu* means an act employing hymns resulting in the fall inherent in clarified butter into (the sacrificial fire) through the relation of *svarūpa*. The meaning of the word, *ghṛta* viz, clarified butter is related to fall (*patana*), a part of the meaning of the word, *hu* through the relation of *ādheyatva*. Hence the verbal knowledge from the said sentence is of one undertaking the act employing hymns, resulting in the fall inherent in the clarified butter in (to) fire, the locus, thereof (through the relation of *svarūpa*). By the said act is meant stretching out of one's hand with (the sacrificial ladle containing) clarified butter (on to the sacrificial fire-place) and then turning it upside down. Hence a priest who does not make any such oblation of clarified butter is only designated as *hotā* and not as *yastvā*.[1]

Opponents argue : *Vahnau juhoti* should not bear out any verbal knowledge. For the fall (*patana*) constituting the suggested meaning of the root-verb *hu* cannot be syntactically related to the meaning of the word, *vahnau* meaning the state of abiding fire, the locus. Because the state of abiding fire, is not related to fall in view of expectancy lacking.

Jagadīśa replies : In this instance, the meaning of the word, *vahnau* is not related to 'fall' constituting the meaning of the root-verb. It is related ouly to the act resulting in the said 'fall' on the contrary, to give the verbal knowledge of one undertaking the act resulting in the fall of clarified butter making out the state of abiding in fire, the locus.[2]

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1. 'घृतं जुहोती'त्यादौ वह्न्यधिकरणकपतनावच्छिन्नमन्त्रकरणकक्रिया हुधातोरर्थः, प्रोक्षे च पतने घृतस्याधेयत्वेनान्वयः, तेनाग्न्यधिकरणकस्य घृतवृत्ति-पतनस्यानुकूलमंत्रकरणकक्रियावानित्येव तत्र बोधः । तादृशी च क्रिया सघृतस्य करादेः प्रसारण-न्युञ्चीकरणादिरेव । अतएव घृतादेः परित्यागित्वविरहादत्विगादेर्न यष्टृत्वं किन्तु होतृत्वमेव । ibid., pp. 326-27.

2. 'वह्नौ जुहोती'त्यत्र सप्तम्यन्तस्यार्थो न धात्वर्थनिविष्टे पतनेऽन्वेति, वह्निवृत्तित्वविशिष्टपतने तद्वृत्तित्वस्यान्वये निराकांक्षतापत्तेः, परन्तु तदवच्छिन्नक्रियायामेव । श. श. प्र. p. 327.

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Opponents argue : The act of bathing with clarified butter employing hymns, the image of a god should then be regarded as oblation (*homa*).

Jagadīśa replies : No. For fire is not involved in such a case as the locus of oblation. Similarly, mere pouring down clarified butter into fire is not regarded as oblation. For this act is not accompanied with the recitation of hymns.[1]

Opponents argue : The oblation to *Prajāpati* should not be regarded as oblation as such. For hymns are not employed in it.

Jgadīśa replies : Hymns are understood to have been mentally employed.[2]

Opponents argue : In spite of all this, the idea that fall inherent in clarified butter is to be in fire through the relation of *svarūpa* is not borne out by experience.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The root-verb, *hu* in that case may well be taken to mean an act employing hymns, that brings about the fall that causes conjunction inherent in fire. The sentence, *ghṛtam juhoti*, therefore, bears out the comprehension of one undertaking the particular act employing hymns, that brings about fall inherent in clarified butter, resulting in conjunction with fire.[4]

Opponents argue : Conjuuction, in that case, by virtue of being the determinant of the determinant of denotation of the root-verb, *hu*, remotely turns out to be the determinant out-

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1. प्रतिमादौ घृतादिस्नपनं मंत्रकरणकमपि नाग्न्यधिकरणकं, वह्नौ घृतस्य प्रक्षेपमात्रमग्न्यधिकरणकं तत्पतानुकूलमपि न मंत्रकरणकमतस्तदुभयं न होमः। ibid., p. 327.
2. प्राजापत्येऽपि मानस एव मंत्रः करणम्। ibid., p. 327.
3. पतनक्रियायाः स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन वह्निवृत्तित्वं न सकलानुभवसिद्धम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 327.
4. यद्वा वह्निसंयोगावच्छिन्नपतनानुकूलमंत्रकरणकक्रियैव जुहोत्यर्थः, तेन 'घृतं जुहोती'त्यत्र वह्निसंयोगजनकं यद्घृतस्य पतनं तदनुकूलमंत्रकरणकक्रिया-विशेषवानित्याकारको बोधः। श. शे. प्र. p. 327.

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come of the meaning of the root-verb *bhū*. As such, fire being the receipient thereof is liable of comprehension as the objective case. Hence *vahnim juhoti* should be used in language instead of *vahnau juhoti*.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is unfounded. For what is possessed of the direct determinant outcome of an act denoted by a root-verb, alone is liable of comprehension as the objective case. For otherwise in *gagane lostamutkṣipati*, the sky would be liable of comprehension as the objective case of the act of tossing up (*utkṣepana*). Because the verb, *utkṣipati* means the act resulting in the act that brings about conjunction inherent in the upper region, making conjunction the remote determinant outcome of the act of tossing up. As such, the sky (*gagana*) being possessed of such conjunction, should become liable of comprehension as the objective case of the said act. Hence *gaganam utkṣipati* should be used in preference to *gagane utkṣipati*.[2]

Opponents argue : The determinant outcome of the act of tossing up is the generic property (*jāti*), *utkṣepanatva*.

Jagadīśa replies : It cannot be so. For *utkṣepanatva* is not a generic property. Because it involves cross-division (*sānkarya*) with *praveśanatva*[3] in view of the fact that in convulsion in the sky, *praveśanatva* is lacking, in the conduction of the state of an element, *utkṣepanatva* is wanting while in the entrance of a concrete substance to the region above there are both; *utkṣepanatva* and *praveśanatva*.[4]

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1. न चैवं परम्परया हुधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतसंयोगाश्रयकर्मफलशालित्वेन वह्न्यादेस्तदर्थकर्मतया 'वह्निं जुहोती'त्यपि प्रयोगापत्तिः। शा. शा. प्र. pp. 327.

2. साक्षाद्धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतस्यैव फलस्यान्वयिनः कर्मत्वात्, अन्यथा 'गगने लोष्टमुत्क्षिपती'त्यादौ गगनादेरुत्क्षेपणादिकर्मतया दुर्वारितापत्तेः, उर्ध्वसंयोगफलक-क्रियावच्छिन्न-व्यापारस्यैवोत्क्षेपणत्वात्। ibid., pp. 327-28.

3. न चोत्क्षेपणत्वादिकं जातिरेव, तत्र धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकं प्रवेशनत्वादिना सङ्करेण तस्य जातित्वायोगात्। ibid., p. 328.

4. गगनात्क्षेपणे च न प्रवेशनत्वं, भूतत्वादिप्रवेशने च नोत्क्षेपणत्वम् एकस्मिन्नूर्ध्वमूर्त्तप्रवेशने च द्वयोः समावेशादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 328.

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Not only that. In that cease, the stone should cease to be comprehended as the objective case of the act of tossing up. For it does not possess the said generic property, the determinant outcome of the said act.[1]

The idea that what is possessed of the direct determinant outcome of an act denoted by a root-verb, alone is liable of comprehension as the objective case is further corroborated by the enunciation of an independent aphorism by Pāṇini viz., *akathitañca* to justify what is possessed of a remote determinant outcome of an act denoted by a root-verb of the *duhādi* list, being comprehended as the objective case.[2]

Pāṇini provides that a case (*kāraka*) of a verb coming under the list of what are related to two objective cases, undesignated as a rule as a specific case is comprehended as the objective case. In *gopaḥ gām payaḥ dogdhi* for example, *go* is undisgnated as a rule as the ablative case. It, therefore, is related to the verb *dogdhi* as the objective case to be designated as the indirect (*gauṇa*) object of the said verb, *payas* being the direct one. In the passive voice, *go*, the indirect object is identified (*abhihita*) by the verbal suffix, to be suffixed with the first declensional suffix. *Payas*, the direct one is suffixed with the second declensional suffix, not being thus identified.

The root-verb, *duhi* means the act resulting in the act of releasing (*mocana* of milk) causing the streaming out (of milk, *bahiḥ-kṣaraṇa-janaka-mocanāvacehinna-kriyā*). The act of releasing (of milk) is in cow while streaming out (thereof) is in milk (itself). The direct determinant outcome of the act of milking is the act of releasing and streaming out is only the determinant of the said determinant and thus the remote determinant of the said act. Had not the rule *akathitañca*

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1. लोष्टादेस्तत्कर्मत्वाप्रसङ्गाच्च । श. श. प्र. p. 328.
2. अतएव परम्परया दुहाद्यर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतबहिःक्षरणशालित्वेन पयःप्रभृतेस्तत्कर्मत्वसम्पत्त्यर्थं अकथितेति (1. 4. 51) सूत्रान्तरस्य प्रणयनमपि पाणिनेः सङ्गच्छते । ibid., p. 328.

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been provided for only cow would be liable of comprehension as the objective case of the act of milking. For it is cow alone that has the act of 'releasing', the direct determinant outcome of the said act denoted by the verb, *duhi*. Milk, notwithstanding the fact that it is the most desired for thing of the agent of the act of milking would not in that case be liable of comprehension as the objective case. For it is possessed of streaming out, the indirect determinant outcome of the act of milking. But as cow has been made liable of comprehension as the objective case of the act of milking on the strength of the rule, *akathitañca* i.e. on an independent ground, the basis of determination of cow's being comprehended as the objective case of the act of milking shifts. It's being possessed of the direct determinant of the said act is no longer a factor in its being designated as the objective case of the said act. As such, it does not stand in the way of milk's being recognised as the objectlve case of the said act on grounds of its being possessed of an indirect determinant outcome of the said act. Milk, therefore, is liable of comprehension as the objective case of the act of milking inspite of its being possessed of an indirect determinant outcome of the said act only on cow's being made liable of comprehension as the object of the said act on the strength of an independent provision made. Otherwise, it is cow that was liable of comprehension as the objective case of the act of milking on grounds of its being possessed of the direct determinant outcome of the said act. The provision made by Pāṇini, therefore, by the rule *akathitañca* lays it bare that what is possessed of the direct determinant outcome of an act denoted by a root-verb is liable of comprehension as the objective case. The rule, further indicates that the objective case provided for by this rule is only an indirect one making room for the other one to be regarded as the dlrect object.

In *dhanam pratigṛhṇāti*, the root-verb, *pratigrahi* means to receive (*pratigraha*) brining about title to the thing recived consequent upon its being given with the desire of acquiring merit. As such, wealth (*dhana*) (the thing received) being

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possessed of the title (*svattva*), the determinant outcome of the act of receiving is liable of comprehension as the objective case of the said act.[1]

Sale and the like also involve the act of giving away of things. But to receive such things does not amount to *pratigraha*. For the act of giving in such cases is not resorted to with the desire of acquiring merit. In *grāmam krīnāti*, therefore, title (*svattva*), the outcome of the act of purchasing is related to village (*grāma*) through *ādheyatva*. The verbal knowledge from the sentence, therefore, is of one acquiring title abiding (to) village consequent upon one's paying the price therefor or of one paying the price bringing in title abiding (to) village.[2] Conversely, the sentence, *grāmam vikrīnāti* gives the verbal knowledge of one giving away a village, that brings about title to another abiding the village, consequent upon accepting the price (for it) or of one accepting the price that brings about title of another, abiding the village.[3]

By price is meant eighty cowries (*paṇa*) or mulliple thereof (*purāṇa*) and so on that are of legal tender. Barter does not involve sale. A brahmin, therefore, by parting with the seeds of sesamum plants (*tila*) in exchange of beans (*māṣa*) does not indulge in sin.[4]

In *narakam patati*, the root-verb, *pati* means the state of being cast down ending in suffering to give the verbal comprehension of one cast down resulting in one's undergoing

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1. 'धनं प्रतिगृह्णाती'त्यत्र पुण्यार्थकदानजन्यस्वत्वस्य जनकः स्वीकारः प्रतिग्रह इति फलीभूतस्वत्ववत्त्वया धनस्य कर्मत्वम् । श. शा. प्र. p. 328.
2. विक्रयादेर्दानविशेषत्वेऽपि न तस्य पुण्यजनकत्वमतस्तद्ग्रहस्य स्वीकारो न प्रतिग्रहः । 'ग्रामं क्रीणाती'त्यत्र मूल्यदानजन्यस्वत्वस्य जनकः स्वीकारः, स्वत्वजनकं मूल्यदानमेव वा क्रयः, तत्फले च स्वत्वे ग्रामस्याधेयत्वेनान्वयः, तेन ग्रामनिष्ठस्य मूल्यदानजन्यस्वत्वस्यानुकूलस्वीकारवान्, ग्रामनिष्ठं यत् स्वत्वं तदनुकूलमूल्यदाता वेति तत्र बोधः । ibid., p. 328.
3. ibid., p. 328.
4. श. शा. प्र. p. 328.

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suffering (i.e. of one having the demerit resulting in one's undergoing the specific kind of suffering). Such explanation enjoys the support of the author of the commentary (*vṛtti* on the *kalāpa-vyākaraṇa*). For he has cited *naraka-patitaḥ* as an instance of the *dvitiyā-tatpuruṣa* compound.[1]

Opponents argue : *Nurake patati* is also used in language.

Jagadīśa replies : In such a case, the root-verb, *pati* means the act of falling down.

Opponents argue : But if the word, *naraka* means the specific kind of suffering, the said act should not have it a locus to call for the use of the seventh case-ending in the word, *naraka*.

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *naraka*, in that case is to signify the nether region (hell) as the word, *svarga* in *svargam gacchati* signifies the region called heaven.[2]

In *dhanam labhate* (*prāpnoti*) and the like, the root-verb involved means an act leading to one's (acquiring) title. The meaning of the word, *dhana* is related to title (*svattva*) through *ādheyatva* to give the verbal knowledge of one undertaking an act that leads to one acquiring title.[3]

Opponents argue : The state of the objective case cannot be defined as what being denoted by a verbal suffix is comprehended as the substantive of the meaning of a root-verb ending in *yak*. For any such defination is too narrow to cover the direct object of a verb like *duhi*. *Gopena gauḥ payo duhyate* gives the verbal knowledge of a cow having the act of releasing milk consequent upon the act (of milking) under-

1. 'नरकं पतती'त्यत्र भोगावच्छिन्नं पातित्यमेव पतेरर्थः, तेन नरक-भोगानुकूल-पातित्यवानित्याकारकस्तत्र बोधः। 'नरकपतित' इति द्वितीयातत्पुरुषोदाहरणमपि वृत्तिकारकस्य एतदभिप्रायकमेव। ibid., pp. 328-29.
2. पतनक्रियायास्तथात्वे तु 'नरके पतती'त्यादिरेव युक्तः प्रयोगः, 'स्वर्गे गच्छती'त्यादौ स्वर्गादिपदस्येव प्रकृते नरकपदस्यापि तद्देशपरत्वात्। ibid., p. 329.
3. ibid., p. 328.

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taken by a cowherd. For the verbal suffix, *te* identifies the cow or what is having the act of releasing (*mocana*), the indirect determinant outcome of the act of milking as the objective case in preference to what is possessed of streaming out (*bahiḥ-kṣaraṇa*), the direct determinant outcome of the said act as provided for by the elders.[1]

Others contradict : 'Streaming out' cannot be regarded as the determinant outcome of the act of milking. It is only the determinant of the determinant outcome of the said act.

Opponents argue : This is unreasonable. For the root-verbs like *duhi* are provided for with two objects keeping in view two independent determinant outcomes of the act involved. Otherwise the provision of two objects becomes meaningless.[2]

Others contradict : But 'streaming out' cannot be regarded as the direct determinant of the act of milking.

Opponents argue : The root-verb, *duhi* means the act of milking (*dohana*). By the act of milking is meant an act that results in the act of releasing of milk undertaken by (or inherent in) the cow and by the act of releasing milk is meant an act that results in milk's being streamed out. Hence it is streaming out that is the ultimate outcome of the act of milking. As such, it is reasonably regarded as the most direct determinant outcome of the act of milking. It is possessed of by milk (*payas*), the most desired for by the agent of the act of milking. Milk, therefore, is the direct object of the said act.

Jagadīśa replies : To cover such instances the state of the objective case is alternatively defined thus: What being presented

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1. ननु यगन्तधात्वर्थविशेष्यतापन्नस्तिङर्थो यदि कर्मत्वं तदा दुहादेर्मुख्य-कर्मण्यव्याप्तिः 'गोपेन गौः पयो दुह्यत' इत्यादौ गोपकर्तृकव्यापारजन्यं यत् पयःकर्मकमोचनं तद्वती गौरित्येवमन्वये मोचनवहिःक्षरणयोर्द्वयोरेव दुहधात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलत्वेऽपि गौणं यत् मोचनरूपं तस्यैव कर्म तिङाद्यै-र्बोधनात् 'गौणं कर्म दुहादिभ्यस्तिङाद्यैरभिधीयते' इति व्युत्पत्तेः। ibid., p. 329.
2. कृष्णकान्ती pp 329-30.

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by the second case-ending is comprehended as a feature against a certain meaning of a root-verb is the state of the objective case of the said meaning of the root-verb concerned. In *gām dogdhi payaḥ* and the like milk (*payas*) and the like, the direct object of the act involved would be covered by this definition. The root-verb, *duhi* is regarded as what has two objects. For it is denotative of an act that results in another act bringing about the (ultimate) outcome. The sentence *gapaḥ gām payo dogdhi*, the root-verb, *duhi* means an act that results in the act of releasing (milk). The meaning of the word, *go* viz. cow is related to the act of releasing through *ādheyatva* and the meaning of the word, *payas* viz. milk is related to the said act through the relation of *karmatva*. Hence the said sentence bears out the verbal knowledge of a cow-herd undertaking the act (of milking, *dohana*) that results in the act of releasing of milk, inherent in cow. Thus what it comes to is this : The act of releasing means an act that results in the streaming out (of milk) and the act of milking is an act that results in the act of releasing (milk). As such milk is liable of comprehension as the objective case of the act of milking in view of its being possessed of the streaming out the determinant outcome of the act of releasing denoted by the root-verb, *duhi* and *go* or cow in view of its being possessed of the act of releasing, the determinant outcome of the act of milking itself denoted equally by the said root-verb.[2]

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1. अतः प्रकारान्तरेण कर्मत्वं निर्वक्ति—

   यस्य धातोर्यदर्थे यः प्रकारीभूय भासते ।
   द्वितीयया स्मारितोऽर्थस्तद्वा तत्कर्मतोच्यते ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 74.

2. दुहादयस्तु फलावच्छिन्नक्रियाहेतुव्यापारवाचित्वेन द्विकर्मकाः तेन 'गां पयो दोग्धि गोप' इत्यत्र दुहेर्मोचनानुकूलव्यापारोऽर्थः इति तत्रत्यमोचने गोराधेयत्वेन पयसः कर्मत्वेनान्वयात् पयःकर्मताकं यद्गोवृत्तिमोचनं तदनुकूलव्यापारवान् इत्याकारबोधः, तत्र बहिःक्षरणावच्छिन्नव्यापारो मोचनं, तदनुकूलव्यापारो दोहनमतो धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकीभूतं बहिःक्षरणरूपं फलमादाय पयसो मोचनात्मकञ्च तदादाय गोः कर्मत्वमवसेयम् । श. श. प्र. p. 331.

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In *gopena gauh payo duhyate* too, *payas* or milk is to be comprehended as the objective case because of the same reason.

In *pākam kurute*, the meaning of the second case-ending viz, *viṣayatva* is comprehended as a feature against *kṛti* or *yatna* presented by the root-verb, *kṛ* and it is thus recognised as the state of the objective case of *kṛti* or *yatna*, the meaning of the root-verb.

Opponents argue : Then *pākam yatate* too should be validly used in language.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For *viṣayatva* is comprehended as a feature against *yatna*, the meaning of the root-verb, *kṛ* and not against the said meaning presented by the root-verb, *yati*.[1]

In *grāmam bhavate*, the meaning of the second case-ending viz. *viṣayatva* is comprehended as a feature against the act leading to conjunction of the village (*prāpti*), the meaning of the root-verb, *bhū*.

Opponents argue : Then *grāmam bhavati* too should be validly used in language to bear out the verbal knowledge of a village growing with the meaning of the second case-ending viz, the state of being conjoined being comprehended as a feature against growth (*utpatti*), presented by the root-verb *bhū*.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For a particular meaning of the second case-ending is comprehended as a feature against a particular meaning of the said root-verb viz., *prāpti*. It does not mean that any meaning of the second case-ending is liable of comprehension as a feature against any meaning of the said root-verb.[2]

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1. पाकं करुते इत्यादौ यत्ने प्रकारीभूतमपि विषयत्वं न यतेरर्थः। श. शे. प्र. p. 330.

2. भवते ग्राममित्यादौ भूधात्वर्थं प्राप्तौ तथाभूतमपि संयोगित्वादिकं न तदर्थोत्पत्तौ प्रकारः। bid., p. 330.

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Opponents argue : In *caurāṛya hinasti, rujati* and so on the state of the objective case is presented by the sixth declensional suffix and not by the second case-ending. The definition given, therefore, is too narrow to cover such instances.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning of the second case-ending is comprehended as a feature against the meanings of such root-verbs in instances like *cauram rujan, pāyaḥ pariṣkurvan*[2], the use of the sixth declensional suffix being ruled out in such cases.[3]

Opponents argue : In *akṣān divyati*, the state of instrument, the meaning of the second case-ending is posited as the feature against the meaning of the root-verb. As such, the state of instrument (*karaṇatva*) is to be comprehended as the state of the objective case according to the definition given.

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection. The state of instrument is obviously regarded as the state of the objective case in such a situation. For the instrument of the act of playing at dice, the meaning of the root-verb, *div* has been so enunciated with the difference that such object is treated as an indirect one. Suffixes capable of identifying the objective case, therefore, in the instances like *akṣāḥ divyante, dyūtā vā* signify the instruments of the act of playing at dice.[4]

Like the root-verb, *duhi*, all other root-verbs coming under the list of *dvi-karmaka dhātus* denote an act that results in

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1. ननु रुजादिधातुयोगे षष्ठीविधानात् ततकर्मत्वे उक्तलक्षणेऽव्याप्तिः, तादृशार्थस्य तत्र द्वितीयाविशक्तयाऽप्रतिपादनात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 330.
2. चौरं रुजन्, पयः परिष्कुर्वन्तित्यादावेव रुजादिधात्वर्थद्वितीयार्थ-कर्मतायां विशेष्यत्वं सुलभम्। श. श. प्र. p. 330.
3. शतृशानजादेर्निष्ठादिगणान्तर्गतत्वेन तदन्तधातोः कर्मणि षष्ठ्याः प्रतिषिद्ध-त्वात्। bid., pp. 330.

Vide also न लोकाव्ययनिष्ठाखलर्थतृणाम्। पा. II-3, 69.

4. दिवः करणस्य कर्मत्वोपदेशात् 'अक्षान् दीव्यति' इत्यत्र द्वितीयार्थः करणत्व-मपि गौणं कर्मत्वमेव, अतएव 'अक्षा दीव्यन्ते, द्यूता वा' इत्यादौ क्रीडाकरण-तायामेव विहितास्तिङादि कर्मप्रत्ययाः। ibid., p. 331.

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another act that bears out a result. In *śiṣyam dharmam vadati* (*vakti, brūte, upadiśati, ācaṣṭe*) and the like, the root-verb means an act that results in the act of acquiring knowledge. The meaning of the word, *śiṣya* viz, disciple is related to the act of acquring knowledge, a constituent of the meaning of the root-verb involved through the relation of *ādheyatva* and so also the meaning of the word, *dharma* is related thereto through the relation of *viṣayatva*. The said kind of a sentence, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one undertaking an act resulting in the act of acquring knowledge by the disciple. By the word, *dharma* again is meant the articulation of words like 'perform religious duties' and so on.[1]

In *śatrum śataṁ jayati* the root-verb, *ji* means the act condeming resulting in the act of seizing to give the verbal comprehension of one condemning one's enemy resulting in the act of seizing of one hundred rupees.[2]

In *prajāḥ śataṁ daṇḍayati*, the root-verb *daṇḍi* means the act of sizing up to give the verbal comprehension of one undertaking the act of sizing up of one's subjects resulting in the act of seizing of one hundred rupees.[3]

In *sudhāṁ samudram mathnāti*, the root-verb, *manthi* means the act of churning resulting in the act of acquisitioning to give the verbal knowledge of one undertaking the act of churning the ocean, resulting in the act of acquisition of nectar.[4]

In *pāntham panthānam pṛcchati* the root-verb, *pracchi* means the act of asking, that results in the act of telling to give the verbal knowledge of one having the act that results in the act of telling, inherent in a way-farer.[5]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 331.
2. ibid., p. 331.
3. ibid., p. 331.
4. ibid., p. 331.
5. ibid., p. 331.

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In *nṛpamartham prārthayate* (*bhikṣate yācate*) and the like the root-verb means the act of urging (one) of the act of giving leading to the verbal knowledge of one, having the act of urging the act of giving money, inherent in the king (with the words like please give me).[1]

In *grāmamajām vahati* (*nayati*), the root-verb *vahi* means an act resulting in the act of moving to give the verbal knowledge of one, undertaking an act (like pulling by the string of rope put around the neck of a goat) that results in the act of moving, inherent in a goat towards the village.[2]

In *putram dharmamanuśāsti*, the root-verb, *anu-śāsi* means the act of impelling through the act of instructing to give the verbal knowledge of one, undertaking the act of impelling one's son through the act of instruction with words like, perform the rituals at intervals', collect the sacrificial wood and the like.[3]

In *śākhām grāmamākarṣati*, the root-verb, *ā-kṛṣ* means the act of dragging that results in the act of moving to give the verbal knowledge of one, undertaking the act of dragging that results in the act of moving by a branch (of a tree) towards the village,[4]

In *gāmavaruṇaddhi vrajam*, the root-verb, *ava-rudhi* means the act of fencing that causes the act of obstructing movement to give the verbal knowledge of one undertaking the act of fencing a cow-pen that results in the act of obstructing of movement of cows.[5]

In *Vṛkṣam phalaṁ avacinoti*, the root-verb, *ci* means the act of striking, that results in the act of separating to give the

1. श. श. प्र. pp. 331–32.
2. ibid., p. 332.
3. ibid., p. 332.
4. ibid., p. 332.
5. ibid., p. 332.

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verbal knowledge of one, undertaking the act of striking or shaking (a tree), that results in the act of separating fruit (from the tree).[1]

Verbs like *utkṣipati*, although are denotative of acts resulting in an act bearing out a result are not enlisted under the class of root-verbs like *duhi*.[2]

In *gopān gamayati*, *dvijān bhojayati*, *gurun anujñāpayati*, *śiṣyān pāṭhayati*, *sutān snapayati*, the second case-ending means agency of the acts denoted by the original (or non-causative) root-verbs and such agency is regarded as the state of indirect objective case. The verbal knowledge from such a sentence, therefore, is of one, undertaking the act resulting in the act of moving by a cow-herd and so on. For such uses are made in the sense cited as provided for by the grammarians. They hold that the state of agency of the acts presented by the original root-verbs, denotative of the act of moving, the act of eating, the act of knowing, the act of acquiring, and the verbs having sonnd or what is liable to verbal communication as objects thereof and the intransitive verbs (*dhrauvya-dhātus*), ending in the causative suffix bearing the causative sense are comprehended as the state of the objective case.[3]

In *putrān prītim prāpayati*, the meaning of the root-verb, *pra-āp* does not come under the category of such root-verbs that denote the act of moving. Hence a special provision has

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1. ibid., p. 332.
2. उत्क्षिपत्यादिकस्तु धातुः सफलक्रियाहेतुव्यापारवाच्यपि न दुहादिः। श. श. प्र. p. 332.
   Vide also सि. कौ. 539.
3. गतिभोजनधीप्राप्तिशब्दार्थभ्योऽन्यधातुषु।
   कर्तृत्वं हेतुविहितण्यन्तेष्वेतेषु कर्मता॥
   इत्यादिशाब्दिकस्मृतेर्गोपान् गमयति, द्विजान् भोजयति, गुरूननुज्ञापयति, शिष्यान् पाठयति, सुतान् स्नापयतीत्यादौ मूलधात्वर्थस्य कर्तृत्वलक्षणं गौणमेव कर्मत्वं द्वितीयार्थः, तथा च गोपकर्तृकगत्यनुकूलव्यापारवानित्याकारस्तत्र बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 332.
   Vide also पा. I. 4. 52.

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been made to accomodate such an instance. The system of Pāṇini does not make any such provision.[1]

In *caitro grāmam bhāvayate*, although the root-verb, *bhāvi* is causative in form and is denotative of the act of attaining (*prāpti*), the agency thereof is not liable to comprehension as the state of the objective case. For it does not carry the sense of a causative verb. The causative suffix added to it is provided to carry the sense it itself carries.[2]

In *bhakṣayati muṣikān mārjāram* or in *bhakṣayati latām chāgam*, the agency of the root-verb, *bhakṣi* is liable to comprehension as the state of the objective case thereof. For malice is involved in such cases and grammarians provide for such uses. Hence in *bhakṣayatodanam bhṛtyena*, the agency of the said root-verb is not thus comprehended. In *bhakṣayati prajāḥ parijanaiḥ kunṛpaḥ*, the root-verb, *bhakṣi* is not used in the sense of eating (but in the sense of making rob). As such, the agency thereof is not liable to eomprehension as the state of the objective case.[3]

In *vāhayati rathamaśvān sārathiḥ* or in *vāhayati vṛṣabhān vāhikaḥ*, the act of the causative agent like *sārathi* or *vālika* is involved in the act of carrying (*vāhana*) being accomplished. As such, the instrumental agent of the act of carrying (*vāhana*) is liable to comprehension as the objective case thereof. In *vāhayati bhāram bhṛtyena dhanikaḥ*, on the cnntrary, the act of causative agent is not involved in the act of carrying being accomplished. As such, the instrumental agent of the act of carrying remains to be comprehended as agent.[4]

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1. 'पुत्रान् प्रीतिं प्रापयती'त्यादौ च प्राप्तिर्न गतिः। श. श. प्र. p. 332.
2. श. श. प्र. pp. 332-33.
3. ibid., p. 333.
4. 'वाहयति रथमश्वान् सारथिः, वाहयति गोणीं वृषभान् वाहिक'इत्यादाविव वाहयति भारं भृत्येन धनिक इत्यादौ स्वचेष्टया वाहको न धनिकादिः। ibid., p. 333.

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In *hārayati kārayati vā paṭam kuvindena kuvindam vā* or in *hārayati kārayati vā bhṛtyena bhṛtyam vā kaṭam*, the instrumental agent is optionally liable to comprehension as the objective case. For the grammarians provide that the instrumental agent of the act of carrying or of making denoted by the verb, *hṛ* or *kṛ* is optionally comprehended as the objective case thereof.[1] If, however, prefixes like *abhi* or *vi* are used with these verbs carrying a sense other than that of carrying or making only, the instrumental agent of the act denoted by such a verb is optionally liable to comprehension as the objective case thereof.[2] As such, uses like *abhyavāhārayatyodanam tanayena tanayam vā jananī, vikārayatī cittam cittena vā vasantaḥ* are made in language.[3]

In *gurumabhivādayate sutam sutena vā gṛhasthaḥ* or in *dhruvam darśayate bhāryām bhāryayā vā patiḥ*, the instrumentnl agent is optionally comprehended as the objective case. For the grammarians provide that the instrumental agents of the acts denoted by the root-verbs, *abhi-vādi* and *dṛśi* used in *ātmanepada* is optionally liable to comprehension as the objective case thereof.[4]

The instrumental agent of the root-verb, *dṛśi* as provided by the general rule, *gati-buddhi* etc. was likely to be comprehended as the objective case thereof but for the provision made by the author of the *vārtika*. Similarly the instrumental agent of the root-verb, *abhi-vādi* was liable to comprehension as the agent only if the present provision were not made.[5]

The uses like *panthānam pathikam darśyati, putreṇa mitramabhivādayati* etc. are made as provided for by the general

1. ibid., p. 333.
2. परन्तु पूर्वयोरप्राप्तावेतयोस्तु प्राप्तावेव कर्मत्वस्य वैकल्पिको विधिः । श.श.प्र. p. 333.
3. ibid., p. 333.
4. ibid., p. 333.
5. दृशः प्राप्तावभिवादयतेस्त्वप्राप्तौ सः । ibid., p. 333.

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rule[1] and as the author of the *vārtika* has only provided for the optional use of the second case-ending only in case the root-verbs are used in *ātmanepada*.[2]

In *chātreṇārtham nirṇāyayati, chātreṇa odanaṃ khādayati, saṃkhena śabdāyayati, dūraiḥ krandayati putreṇa mitramāhvayatī* and the like, the instrumental agent is not liable to comprehension as the objective case of the acts involved as provided for by the general rule. For such provision has been counteracted upon by Bhartṛhari.' The agents of the root-verbs like *(ni–)nī* (to know) *khādi* or *ādi* (to eat), *śabdāya* (to make (sound), *krandi* (to cry, an intransitive verb) and *ā-hū* (to invite) even if suffixed with the causative suffix, *ṇic* are not liable to comprehension as the objective cases thereof.[3]

Opponents argue : In *caitreṇārtham nirṇaryamāṇastiṣṭhati* or in *maitreṇa pugam khādyāmano brūte*, the gerundial suffix, *śānac* identifies the instrumental agent as the objective case of the act presented by the root-verbs like, *ni-nī* or *khādi* and so on.

Jagadīśa replies : This is quite reasonable. For the verse of Bhartṛhari makes room for such use. At times, being identified by a verbal suffix or the gerundial sufix, *śānac*, (signified by the word, *ādi*), the instrumental agents of the said acts are comprehended as the objective cases thereof.[4]

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1. पा. I. 4. 52.
2. अभिवादिदृशोरात्मनेपदे वा इति वाच्यम् । (वार्त्तिक) Vide सि. कौ. 541.
   Vide also श. श. प्र. p. 333.
3. न नी खाद्यदि-शब्दाय-क्रन्दि-ह्वयतिषु क्वचित् ।
   हेतुण्यन्तेषु कर्तृत्वं कर्मता स्यात्तिङादिषु ॥
   Vide श. श. प्र. 333–34.
4. अत्र च क्वचित्तिङादिष्विति कथनात् 'चैत्रेणार्थं निर्णाय्यमाणस्तिष्ठति, मैत्रेण पूगं खाद्यमानो ब्रूते' इत्यादौ कर्मविहितस्य शानजादेर्नानुपपत्तिरिति वदन्ति । श. श. प्र. p. 334.

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In *ghaṭam paśyati, śabdam śṛṇoti* (*anubhavati*) and so on that involve the root-verbs like *dṛśi, śru* meaning to see, to hear and the like, the second case-ending means the state of being the content of normal sensasory perception only. For in the case of jar being the content of a supersensuous perception (*upanītā-bhāna*), such use is not made in language.[1]

In *taṇḍula-pākam karoti*, the second case-ending means the state of having an act as the object in view (*uddeśyatā*), the determinant of what is effected by desire posited as a feature against agency, the meaning of the root-verb, *kṛ*, (desire having taken the form, may I undertake the agency, the object in view of which is the act of cooking—*pāka-kṛyā-niṣṭhoddośyatāka-kṛtirme bhavatu*). Hence merely *taṇḍulam karoti* is not used in language.[2]

Opponents argue : In *odanam karoti*, used in reference to one, engaged in the act of cooking, the second case-ending cannot mean the state of being the object in view. For *odana* is not to be.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the said case-ending implies the state of being conducive to.[3]

Opponents argue : In that case, *odanam karoti* may be used in reference to one, engaged in the act of buying rice. For the agency involved in the act of buying rice too is equally conducive to the accomplishment of *odana*.

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1. घटं पश्यति, शब्दं शृणोत्यनुभवतीत्यादौ दर्शनाद्यर्थकधातुयोगे साक्षात्कार-निरूपितमेव विषयत्वं कर्मत्वं घटादेरुपनीतचाक्षुषादौ तादृशप्रयोगात्। श. श. प्र. p. 335.

2. तण्डुलपाकं करोतीत्यत्र चिकीर्षाजन्यतावच्छेदकः क्रियायामुद्देश्यताख्यो विषयताविशेष एव द्वितीयार्थः कृतौ भासते, तेन 'तण्डुलं करोती'त्यादिको न प्रयोगः। ibid., p. 335.

3. पाकदशायां ओदनं करोती'त्यादौ च द्वितीयायामनुकूलत्वे लक्षणा। ibid., pp. 335–36.

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Jagadīśsa replies : Such an use cannot be made in such a situation. For there is no guarantee that the agency involved in the act of buying rice is going to bear out *odana.*[1]

Vardhamāna argues : In an instance like *odanam karoti,* the root-verb, *kṛ* means 'agency conducive to being' and *odana,* is only the direct object of the act denoted by the root-verb, *kṛ.*[2]

Jagadīśa asks : What would happen in cases where the said root-verb means agency as such ?

Vardhamāna replies : In cases where the root-verb means agency as such, the second case-ending is not used as in *ghaṭāya yatate.*[3]

Jagadīśa concludes : This view is unreasonable. For the root-verb, *kṛ* as a rule means agency as such. Because the word, *kṛti* invariably leads to the comprehension of agency as such.[4]

The author of the *Mimāṃsā-mahārnva* argues : The second case-ending in *odanam pacati* means the state of *odana's* being an object to be related to the agency of cooking as the effect as it so happens in the case of *taṇḍulam pacati* where the state of (*taṇḍulas*) being an object is related to the agency of cooking as materials (*upādāna*)[5]. For the state of being the object to be related to agency pertains to threedifferent things viz what is accomplished (*siddha*), what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*), and the outcome of accomplishment. The state of

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1. तण्डुलादिक्रयणकृतिस्तु नौदनादिजनिका प्रमाणाभावात्। ibid., p. 336.
2. वर्द्धमानस्तु उक्तस्थले धातूनां उत्पत्त्यनुकूला कृतिरुच्यते इति, तत्रोदनस्य मुख्यमेव कर्मत्वम्। श. श. प्र. p. 336.
3. अतएव यत्र कृतिमात्रं धात्वर्थस्तत्र न द्वितीया यथा 'घटाय यतते' इत्यादावित्याह। ibid., p. 336.
4. तन्न, कृत्यादिपदाद् यत्नमात्रप्रतीत्या यत्नत्वावच्छिन्नस्यैव करोत्यर्थत्वात्। ibid., p. 336.
5. मीमांसामहार्णवे तु पाककृतौ तण्डुलादेरुपादानविधयेव फलविधयौदनादेरपि विषयत्वमुक्तम्। ibid., p. 336.

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what is accomplished being the object of agency pertains to materials like rice and that of what is to be accomplished to an act like that of cooking and that of the outcome to an effect like *odana*.[1]

In *māsam jivati*, *krośam svapiti*, *godoham tiṣṭhati* and *kurun kriḍati*, the second case-ending means the state of the locus liable to comprehension as the state of the indirect object. For the grammarians provide that time (*kāla*), distance of journey (*adhvamāna*) action (*kriyā*) and inhabited country (*nivṛt*) projected as the locus to action denoted by an intransitive verb are optionally liable to comprehension as the indirect cases thereof.[2]

Māsaścaitrena jīvyate, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of *Caitra* having life that has a month as its (temporal) locus. Similarly *māsaścaitrena jivitaḥ*, gives the verbal knowledge of a month being the (temporal) locus of life lived by *Caitra*.[3]

In *sandhyāyām pacati*. the root-verb viz. *paci* is a transitive one. As such, there is no reason why the word, *sandhyā*, indicating the temporal locus of the act of cooking should be suffixed with the second case-ending.[4]

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1. यदाह वत्सेश्वर :—
   सिद्धं साध्यं फलञ्चेति प्रवृत्तेर्विषयस्त्रिधा ।
   तत्र सिद्धमुपादानं, क्रिया साध्यं, फलं सुखम् ॥ ibid., p. 336.
2. 'मासं जीवति, क्रोशं स्वपिति, गोदोहं तिष्ठति, कुरून् क्रीडतीत्यादावधिकरण-स्वरूपं गौणमेव कर्मत्वं सुपाऽनुभाव्यते,
   कालानामध्वमानानां क्रियाणां नीवृतामपि ।
   आधारता ध्रौव्यधातोः कर्मता स्याद्विभाषया ॥
   श. श. प्र. p. 336.
3. अतएव, 'मासश्चैत्रेण जीव्यते, जीवित'इत्यादौ कर्मतार्थकतिङादयः, तथा च 'मासाधिकरणताकजीवनवान् चैत्रः चैत्रकर्तृकजीवनाधिकरणतावान् मास' इत्यादिक्रमेण तत्र बोधः । ibid., p. 336.
4. ibid., p. 336.

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The second case-ending in instances like *divasam supyate sundarībhiḥ, krośam tatsenayā sthitam,* denotes pervading time and distance of journey respectively and not the state of the locus of the acts involved.[1]

In *śayyāmadhiśete* (*adhyāste, adhitiṣṭhati*), the second case-ending means the state of the locus comprehended as the state of the objective case. For the verbal suffix in *śayyāmadhiśayyate* or the primary suffix in *śayyāmadhiśayitaḥ* denotative of the state of the objective case give such a verbal knowledge. Because grammarians have provided that the locus of the act denoted by an intransitive verb like *śiṅ, āsa* and *sthā* prefixed by *adhi* is to be comprehended as the object of the act signified thereby.[2]

Opponents ask : How is it then that the word signifying the locus of the act denoted by the root-verb, *sihā* prefixed by *adhi* has been suffixed with the seventh case-ending in *atrādhiṣṭhānam kuru.*

Jagadīśa replies : In *atrādhiṣṭhānam kuru,* the meaning of the word, *etat* (in *atra*) is not comprehended as the locus of the act of being (*adhiṣṭhāna*) but of agency (*kṛti*). Had the meaning of the word, *adhiṣṭhāna* been related to the meaning of the word, *etat,* the sixth declensional suffix would prevail upon the second case-ending[3] as provided for by the rule, *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti.*[4]

In *Kāśimanuvasati* (*anuṣyate*) and the like the second case-ending signifies the state of the locus of the act of putting up

1. दिवसं सुप्यते सुन्दरीभिः, क्रोशं तत्सेनया स्थितमित्यादौ तु द्वितीयया कालाध्वनोरभिव्याप्तिरेव बोध्यते न त्वधिकरणत्वम् । ibid., p. 336.
2. 'शय्यामधिशेते, अध्यास्ते, अधितिष्ठती'त्यादावप्यधिकरणत्वमेव कर्मत्वं द्वितीयार्थः, तथैव शय्यामधिशय्यते, अधिशयिते'त्यादौ कर्मतार्थक्योराख्यातकृतोः सम्भवात्, 'ध्रोव्याणामधिशीङासस्थानां कर्मत्वमेव' तदितिस्मरणात तदाधारत्वम् । श. श. प्र. pp. 336–37.
3. 'अत्राधिष्ठानं कुर्विंत्यादौ त्वधिष्ठानस्याधारत्वं नैतस्य भासते, किन्तु कृतेः, तदलाभस्थले तु 'एतस्याधिष्ठानं कुर्वि'त्यादिकमेव प्रमाणम् । ibid., p. 337.
4. पा. II. 3. 65. (अधिशीङस्थासाम् कर्म पा. I. 4. 46).

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denoted by the root-verb, *vas* prefixed by *anu* to be comprehended as the state of the objective case of the said act. For the grammarians provide that the locus of the act of putting up, denoted by the root-verb, *vas* prefixed by *upa*, *anu* or *adhi* is comprehended at the object of the said act.[1]

In *gṛhe'anuvaste* the root-verb, *anu-vas* means the act of putting on garments and not the act of putting up. Hence the seventh case ending has been suffixed to the word, *gṛha* signifying the locus of the said act.[2]

In *gṛhepyuvasedraṅgah prāntarepi nṛpaḥ sukhī*, the word, *gṛha* is suffixed with the seventh case-ending to signify that it is the locus of fasting denoted be the verb, *upa-vas*. For the second case-ending has been provided for to be suffixed to a word signifying the locus of the act denoted by the said verb used in the sense of putting up.[3]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 337.
2. 'गृहेऽनुवस्ते'इत्यादौ तु वस्तिर्न वसतिः। श. श. प्र. p. 337.
3. शय्यामुपवसतीत्यादौ तूपवसतेर्निवासार्थकत्व एव तदाधारस्य कर्मत्वं तत्रैव तदनुशासनात्। अनशनार्थकत्वेऽधिकरणत्वमेव, अतएव गृहेऽप्युपवसेद्रङ्गः प्रान्तरेऽपि नृपः सुखी। श. श. प्र. p. 337.
Vide also अभुरुक्यर्थस्य न। (वार्त्तिक) vide सि. कौ. 544.

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CHAPTER XXI

CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
(KARTṚTVA)

By case (*kāraka*) is meant, it has been seen, what contributes to the accomplishment of an act. In semantics, therefore, what is related to the verb involved is known as a case. All other cases contribute to the accomplishment of an act through the agent of the said act. The relation of these cases with the verb involved, therefore, is through the nominative case. Conversely, the nominative case is not dependent on any other case in the matter of its syntactical relation with the verb concerned. For towards the accomplishment of an act, the agent is the mainstay. Hence it is defined as what is independent as a case.[1]

In *sthālī pacati* or *kaṣṭhāni pacanti* although the agents viz., the cooking pot (*sthālī*) or the wood (*kāṣṭha*) is not to accomplish the act of cooking independently, there is no bar to its being regarded as the nominative case. For the agent in such cases has been presented as independent of any other case in the matter of getting the act of cooking accomplished.[2]

This again does not mean that the instrumental agent (*pryojya-kartā*) is not to be regarded as an agent on the ground that he is not presented as what is independent of others in the matter of accomplishing an act. For 'being

1. स्वतन्त्रः कर्त्ता । पा. I. 4. 54.
2. क्रियायां स्वातन्त्र्येण विवक्षितः अर्थः कर्त्ता स्याद् । सि. कौ. 559.

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independent of others' means regulating all other cases in the context of the accomplishment of an act, one is engaged in.

The causative agent, however, does not cease to be regarded as an agent on the score that such an agent, is not engaged in accomplishing an act. For to accomodate such an agent. Pāṇini has formulated an independent rule.[1] Such an agent, therefore, is known as the causative agent (*hetu-kārtā*) as against what is known as *svatantra-kartā*.

According to Jagadīśa, by agency (*kartṛtva*) is meant what is borne out by a verbal suffix to be comprehended as the substantive in respect of certain (specific) meaning presented by a root-verb, undergoing a conjugational transformation, posited as a feature thereagainst.[2]

In *pacati*, for an example, the meaning of the verbal suffix, *ti* is comprehended as the substantive in respect of the act of cooking (*pāka-kriyā*), presented by the root-verb, *paci*, undergoing the conjugational transformation, *śap* (a), posited as a feature thereagainst.

Opponents argue : The meaning of the verbal suffix, *ti* in *pacati* is comprehended as a feature against what is liable to comprehension as the invariable substantive viz, *caitra*. As such, the definition fails to cover the said instance.

Jagadīśa replies : Notwithstanding the fact that the meaning of the verbal suffix, *ti* is comprehended as a feature against the invariable substantive, the said meaning of the verbal suffix remains to be comprehended as a substantive. For the state of the feature inherent therein is but the state of the substantive in essence (*viśeṣyatākhya-prakāratā*) or rather is qualified by the state of the substantive (*viśeṣyatā'vacchinna-prakāratā*).

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1. तत्प्रयोजकहेतुश्च । पा. I. 4. 55.
2. तिङा विकरणाक्तस्य धातोरर्थस्तु यादृशः ।
स्वार्थे यादृशि बोध्यस्तत्-कर्तृत्वं तदिहोच्यते ॥
श. श. प्र. का. 75.

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Opponents argue : A root-verb undergoes a conjugational transformation, if any, only in the first four tenses (*lakāras*). As such, the definition of the nominative case fails to cover instances like *jagāma* of the *lit-lakāra* or any other *lakāra* other than the first four.

Jagadīśa replies : The definition would cover such instances in view of the fact that the root-verbs involved undergo conjugational transformation in the first four tenses and thus are similar thereto (*tatsadṛśa*).

Opponents argue : In *gamyate*, the meaning of the verbal suffix, *te* is comprehended alike as the substantive in respect of the root-verb, *gam* ending in *yak* posited as a feature thereagainst. The definition of the nominative case, therefore, unwarrantedly over-extends thereto.

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is unfounded. For the root-verb in the said instance viz., *gam-yak* does not undergo any conjugational transformation.[1]

Opponents argue : In *jānāti*, the verbal suffix, *ti* does not mean agency (*kṛti*). The definition, therefore, becomes too narrow to cover such an instance.

Jagadīśa replies : In this instance, the said verbal suffix means the state of the substrantum and that is what is comprehended as the agency of knowledge.[2]

Similarly in *naśyati*, the state of the counterpositive of destruction (*nāśa*) and in *pratibimbate*, the state of reflection being a feature are comprehended as agency.[3]

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1. कर्मत्वादौ धातुनोपस्थाप्योऽर्थस्तिङानुभाव्योऽपि न विकरणाक्षेपेति न तत्र प्रसङ्गः । श. श. प्र. p. 337.
2. 'पचति जानाती'त्यादौ स्वोपस्थाप्यकृत्याश्रयत्वादौ धातूपस्थाप्यस्य पाकबुद्ध्यादेरन्वयः पचाद्युत्तरतिङा बोध्यत इति पाकस्य यत्नवत्त्वं ज्ञानस्याश्रयत्वम् । श. श. प्र. p. 337.
3. एवं नश्यतीत्यत्र नाशस्य प्रतियोगित्वम्, 'प्रतिबिम्बत' इत्यत्र भ्रमात्मनः प्रतिबिम्बस्य प्रकारत्वमेव कर्तृत्वम् । श. श. प्र. p. 337.

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The word, *kartṛ* is the derivative kind of a nominal carrying the sense of the substratum of agency through etymology. It is not denotative of such a meaning. For what is not comprehended otherwise, alone is regarded as the denoted meaning of a word.[1]

Opponents argue : It is simpler to admit of denotation in the word, *kartṛ* as a whole. For instead of two, only one potency has to be conceived of in that case.

Jagadīśa replies : It is equally simpler to hold that the primary suffix, *tṛc* through frozen metaphor (*nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā*) implies or through the power of denotation denotes the said meaning viz, the substratum of agency, the root-verb, *kṛ* being only a pointer to such metaphor or to denotation.[2]

In *ghaṭasya kartā*, the sixrh declensional suffix means 'being conducive to' giving the verbal comprehension of one having the agency conducive to jar.

Opponents argue : The sixth declensional suffix should mean the state of being an object (in view, *viṣayatā*).

Jagadīśa replies : No. For an outcome of agency usually cannot be the object (in view) of agency. For it is yet to be.[3]

Opponents argue : In that case a person using a jar would come out to be comprehended as the agent of jar. For he has the agency contributing to the use of jar and for that matter the agency conducive to jar.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For the agency, conducive to the use of jar is not necessarily an agency conducive to jar.[4]

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1. कर्त्तृशब्दस्तु अवयववृत्तिलभ्ये कृत्याश्रये यौगिक एव न तु शक्तः, प्रकारान्तरालभ्यस्यैव शक्यत्वात्। ibid., p. 337.
2. निरूढलक्षणया शक्त्यैव वाऽऽश्रयस्य तृचा प्रत्यायनात्। ibid., p. 337.
3. 'घटस्य कर्त्ते'त्यादौ चानुकूलत्वं षष्ठ्यर्थः, फलस्य प्रायशः कृत्यविषयत्वात्। ibid., p. 337–38.
4. घटाद्युपभोगानुकूलकृतिश्च न घटाद्यनुकूला प्रमाणाभावात्। अतो न घटादि भोक्तुस्तत्कर्त्तृत्वप्रसङ्गः। श. श. प्र. p. 338.

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Opponents argue : The word, *kartṛ* conventionally denotes the substratum of action (*kriyāśraya*). As such, in *ratho gaccati* too, the chariot (*ratha*) is to be comprehended as the agent of the act of moving in the primary sense of the term, *kartṛ*. For it is the substratum of the said act.

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *kriyā* (in *kriyāśraya*) does not mean movement (*spanda*). For in that case in *pacati, caitra* a conscious being would cease to be comprehended as the agent of the act of Cooking. Conversely, rice would be liable of comprehension as the agent of the said act. Because movement is in rice and not in *caitra*.[1]

Opponents argue : By *kriyā* is meant the meaning of the root-verb involved.

Jagadīśa replies : Still the situation does not improve. For the same contingency prevails even then.[2]

Opponents argue : By *kriyā* is meant an act that contributes to motion (*spanda*).

Jagadīśa replies : In that case whatever case (*kāraka*) with such an act would come out to be recognised as the agent of the said act. The place whereform a cow moves and the place whereto it moves and the stick used to make it move, all alike would be comprehended as agent in *gaurgacchati*.[3]

Opponents argue : The definition of the nominative case cannot cover the instances like *atti* or *juhoti*. For the conjugational transformation that the root-verbs have undergone are not in view.

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1. क्रियाश्रये कर्त्तृशब्दो रूढस्तेन रथादेर्गत्यादिकर्त्तृत्वमपि मुख्यमेवेति तु न युक्तम्, क्रिया हि नात्र स्पन्दश्चेतनस्य पाककर्त्तृत्वापत्तेः प्रत्युत तण्डुलादेरेव तथात्वापत्तेः। ibid., p. 338.
2. नापि धात्वर्थमात्रम् तत एव। ibid., p. 338.
3. नापि स्वन्दानुकूलव्यापारः, चलनानुकूलव्यापारवतः कारकमात्रस्य चलनकर्त्तृत्वापत्तेः। ibid., p. 338.

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Jagadīśa argues : The conjugational transformation gone elided is to be taken into consideration in such cases.[1]

Opponents argue : Such explanation is not acceptable to all.

Jagadīśa replies : The nominative case, in that case, may be defined like this :

What is borne out by the *laṭ-lakāra* or the present tense to be comprehended as qualified by the meaning of a root-verb other than what ends in *yak* is the agency of the said act denoted by the said verb (i.e. the state of the nominative case of the said verb).[2]

This definition does not extend to an instance like *pacyate*. For the root-verb, *paci* in this instance ends in *yak*. Nor would it cover the instadce *pakṣyate* for the *lakāra* or tense here is *lṛt* or the future tense.[3]

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1. 'अत्ति जुहोती'त्यादावप्यदादेरुत्तरं लुप्तस्यैव विकरणस्य प्रतिसन्धाने भोजन-कर्त्तृत्वादेरवगमः। श. श. प्र. p. 338.

2. यगन्तभिन्नधात्वर्थवत्तया योऽनुभाव्यते।
लटा स्वार्थः स धात्वर्थः कर्त्तृता वा निगद्यते॥
ibid., का. 76.

3. ibid., p. 338.

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CHAPTER XXII

INDENTIFICATION (ABHIDHĀNA) OF CASES

The word, *abhidhāna* bears out a technical sense in Sanskrit grammar. In semantics, it means identification of an individual word-meaning.

Pāṇini does not indicate the means of such identification. The author of the *vārtika*, therefore, has formulated an aphorism for the purpose. According to him, identification is effected through four-fold means viz, a verbal suffix (*tiṅ*), a primary suffix (*kṛt*), a secondary suffix (*taddhita*) and a compound (*samāsa*).

Bhaṭṭoji dikṣit adds one more viz., an indeclinable (*nipāta*). He qualifies the aphorism of the author of the *vārtika* by the word, *prāyeṇa* to accomodate an indeclinable as a means of identification.[1]

In *Harim bhajati Caitraḥ*, the verb *bhajati* is used in the active voice. The verbal snffix, *ti*, therefore, identifies *Caitra*, the agent (*kartā*) of the act of worshipping (*bhajana*), to be signified by the word, *Caitraḥ* ending in the first declensional suffix as provided for in grammar.[2]

In *Hariḥ bhajyate Caitreṇa*, the verb, *bhajyate* is used in the passive voice. The verbal suffix, *te*, therefore, identifies *Hari*,

1. अभिधानञ्च प्रायेण तिङ्कृत्तद्धितसमासैः । क्वचिन्निपातेनाभिधानम् । सि. कौ. 536.
2. प्रातिपदिकार्थलिङ्गपरिमाणवचनमात्रे प्रथमा । पा. II. 3. 46.
अभिहितमात्रे प्रथमा । (वार्त्तिक) ।

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the object (*karma*) of the act of worshipping (*bhajana*) to be equally signified by a word ending in the first declensional suffix.

In *lakṣmyā sevitaḥ* (*Hariḥ*), in the like manner, the primary suffix, *kta* (in the word *sevitaḥ*), identifies *Hari* the object of the act of serving (*sevā*), to be signified by the word, *Hariḥ* ending in the first declensional suffix.[1]

In *śatyaḥ granthaḥ*, the secondary suffix, *yat* added to the word *śata*, provided for to carry the sense of bought therefor (*tena krīta*) identifies the book bought for one hundred rupees, the object of the act of buying, signified by the word, *granthaḥ* ending in the first declensional suffix.

The compound, *prāptānandaḥ* identifies the person (*jana*), the object of the act of reaching (*prāpaṇa*). For the said compouud (an instance of the *bahuvrīhi* compound) being formed of collocative words ending in the first declensional suffix is liable to bearing out the comprehension of an attribute of what is presented by a word not constituting the componnd. Hence the word, *jana* denoting the person, ends in the first declensional suffix (*prāptānandaḥ janaḥ*).

The instance of identification by an indeclinable like *asāmpratam* is cited by Bhaṭṭoji dikṣit viz, *viṣavṛkṣo'pi saṁvardhya svayaṁ cchettumasāmpratam*. Identification by the indeclinable, *iti* also, is very common.

Like the agent and the object, other cases too, are liable to identification. Pāṇini, therefore, reads the aphorism, *anabhihite*[2] as a head-rule governing the cases. Cases, therefore, are broadly divided into two viz, identified (*abhihita*) and un-identified (*anabhihita*).

According to Jagadīśa identification means being borne out by a verbal suffix and the like to be comprehended as the

1. Vide सि. कौ. 536.

2. पा II. 3. 1.

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substantive of the meaning of a root-verb. Conversely, being borne out by a verbal suffix and the like to be comprehended as a feature of the meaning of a root-verb is known as non-identification.[1]

Opponents argue : Identification may be held to mean being denoted by a suffix expectant of a root-verb.

Jagadiśa replies : In that case, in *taṇḍulaṁ pacati*, the objective case denoted by the suffix, *am* would turn out to be identified. For the said suffix is obviously expectant of a root-verb.[2] Conversely, following the definition given, such a contingency could be easily avoided. For the said objective case is not liable to comprehension as what has the meaning of the root-verb involved viz, *paci* as its feature.[3]

In *pacati* and *pacyate* for example, agency and the state of the objective case respectively, are identified by verbal suffix. For these are borne out thereby to be comeprehended as the substantive in respect of the meaning of the root-verb posited as a feature thereagainst.

In *pācaka*, *pacyamāna* and the like in the said manner, agency and the state of the objective case respectively are identified.

In *pacanam kāṣṭhaṁ*, *dānīyo dvijaḥ*, *bhīmo gajaḥ*, *śayanaṁ gṛham* and the like, instrumentality, the state of the dative case, the state of the ablative case and the state of the locative case respectively are identified by primary suffix.[4]

Opponents argue : In *pācaka*, the primary suffix cannot identify agency. For in that case a part of the meaning of

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1. धात्वर्थस्य धर्मितया तिङाद्यैरनुभाव्यते।
यत्तदुक्तं धर्मतया त्वनुक्तं कारकं भवेत्॥ श. श. प्र. का. 77.
2. न तु धातुसाकांक्षप्रत्ययस्याभिधेयत्वमात्रमुक्तत्वं, 'तण्डुलं पचति' इत्यादावपि कर्मत्वादेरुक्तत्वापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. pp 338–39,
3. अस्मन्मते च तत्र धात्वर्थप्रकारककर्मत्वबोधाभावात् नापत्तिरिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 339.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 339.

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the word, *pācaka* viz., the meaning of the root-verb constituting the said word is to be related to another part of the meaning of the said word viz, the meaning of the primary suffix, *ṇaka* constituting the said word.[1]

Jagadiśa replies : The meaning of a root-verb is validly posited as a feature against agency and the like although it is a part of the same word-meaning, due to semantic peculiarity.[2]

Sometimes even an indeclinable identifies the state of the objective case as in *sevitum sāmpratam vijñaiḥ guruḥ paruṣavāgapi* or in *viṣa-vṛkṣo'pi saṁvardhya svayam cchettumasāmpratam*.[3]

In *gopena gauḥ payo duhyate* (*dugdhā*), the verbal suffix added to the root-verb, *duhi* identifies the direct determinant of denotation of the said root-verb as the state of the objective case of the said verb. For it is comprehended as the substantive in respect of the meaning of the said root-verb, posited as a feature thereagainst. As such, the said sentence bears out the verbal knowledge of a cow having the act of releasing (milk), caused by the act undertaken by a cow-herd, contributing to the act of releasing milk. Because the root-verb, *duhi* having (primarily) denoted an act resulting in the act of releasing, the act of releasing is liable to comprehension as the direct determinant outcome of the act denoted by the said root-verb.[4]

The root-verb, *vahi* (primarily) denotes an act that results in the act of movement, *kṛṣi* means the act of dragging that results in the act of movement. As such the state of being

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1. नन्वु पाचक इत्यादौ एकदेशान्वयभयेन धात्वर्थवत्तया कर्तृत्वान्वयासम्भवात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 339.
2. व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण पदार्थैकदेशे कर्तृत्वादौ धात्वर्थस्य पाकादेरन्वयात्। श. श. प्र. p. 339.
3. ibid., p. 339.
4. दुहादिभ्यः प्रत्ययेन मुख्यं कर्मत्वमुच्यते। ibid., का. 78.
तत्र मोचनावच्छिन्नव्यापारस्य धातुवाच्यता मोचनस्यैव साक्षाद्धात्वर्थतावच्छेदकफलत्वात्। ibid., p. 339.

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possessed of (the act of) movement, the direct determinant of denotation of these two root-verbs is the outcome of the act, denoted thereby and not conjunction and the like that constitutes (the act of) movement. As such conjunction and the like are not liable to comprehension as the direct determinant of denotation of the said root-verbs.

Hence from *bhāro bhavanamuhyate* (*nīyate*) and the like and from *śākhā grāmaṁ kṛṣyate* and so on, the verbal comprehension of a load possessed of movement caused by the act resulting in (the act of) movement towards the house and of a branch, the locus of the state of the object of the act of dragging resulting in movement towards village, respectively occur.[1]

As such, the verbal knowledge occurring from sentences comprised of different root-verbs listed under the *duhādi* class or what are liable to being related to two objective cases being reasonably explained by a single principle referred to above, the two-fold principle of identification of the objective case of such verbs viz, the direct object of the verbs like *duhī* and the indirect object of the verbs, *nī*, *hṛ*, *kṛṣi* and *vahi* are identified by a suffix denotative of the objective case, added thereto is uncalled for.[2]

Opponents argue : *Maitreṇa Caitro grāmo gamyate* (*gamitaḥ*) gives the verbal knowledge of *Caitra* as the agent of the act of going to a village, resulting from the act of making him go, undertaken by *Maitra*. The state of agency, therefore, of the act of going, the meaning of the original root-verb, *gam*, inherent in *Caitra* has been identified as the state of the objective case of the said root-verb having been suffixed with *ṇic* and thus carrying the sense of a causative verb. For the state

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 336–40.

2. उक्तव्युत्पत्त्यैव सम्पत्तौ दुहादेर्गौणकं कर्म नीवहादेः प्रधानकर्मसि'त्याद्युक्तिभेदेन विधिद्वयं शाब्दिकानामनादेयम् । ibid., p. 340.

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of agency of the act denoted by the original root-verb has been made liable to comprehension as the state of the object of the causative verb, as provided for by the rule, *gati-buddhi*[1] etc. posited as the substantive in respect of the meaning of the said root-verb, posited as a feature thereagainst.[2]

Odana pācyate (*khādyate vā*) *bhṛtyena bhartrā* and the like give the verbal knowledge of rice (*odana*), the object of the act of cooking undertaken by a servant, caused by the act of making the servant cook, undertaken by the master. The state of rice's (*odana's*) being the object of the original root-verb, viz, *paci*, therefore, is identified by the verbal suffix added to the said verb suffixed with *ṇic* to carry the sense of a causative verb. For in such an instance the agency of the original root-verb has not been made liable to comprehension as the state of the said verb turned into a causative one.[3]

In *Maitreṇa pūgam khādyamānaścaitraḥ vrajati*, the suffix *śānac* identifies the state of the object as it has been discussed upon earlier.[4]

Opponents argue : *Bhidyate, abhedi vā kuśūlaḥ svayam* gives a two-fold verbal knowledge viz, the cup-board (*kuśūlaḥ*) is possessed of a fissure caused by an act contributing to fissure (*bhedā'nukūla-vyāpāra-janya-bheda-vān kuśūlaḥ*) and the cup-board has undertaken the act contributing to fissure, resulting in fissure (*bheda-janaka-bhedānukūla-vyāpāra-vān kuśūlaḥ*). For both the agent and the object of the act resulting in fissure are

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1. पा. I. 4. 52.
2. णिजन्तोत्तरं कर्मतावाचिप्रत्ययस्थले तु मूलधातोः कर्तृतायां कर्मतातिदेश-सम्भवे तादृशमेव कर्मत्वं धात्वर्थस्य विशेष्यतया तिङाद्यैर्बोध्यते, यथा 'चैत्रो ग्रामं गच्छति गमितो वे'त्यादौ ग्रामकर्मकस्य व्यापारजन्यगमनस्य कर्त्ता चैत्र इत्यादि। श. श. प्र. p. 340.
3. यत्र तु न तदतिदेशस्तत्र मूलधातोः कर्मत्वमेव तदर्थविशेष्यतया तैरुच्यते, यथा ओदनः पाच्यते, खाद्यते वा भृत्येन भर्त्रेत्यादौ। तत्र भर्तृकर्तृकव्यापारजन्यस्य भृत्यकर्तृकपाकादेः कर्मतयौदनादिरेव उच्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 340.
4. श. श. प्र, p. 333–34.

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identified by the verbal suffix added to the verb, *bhid*, in the sentenee cited. The situation is fairly comparable to an instance of the quassi-pasive verb in English grammar.

In so far as the verbal knowledge of the cup-board possessed of a fissure caused by the act contributing to fissure occurring from the said sentence is concerned there is no difficulty. For the verbal suffix, *te* added to the root-verb, *bhid* ending in *yak* reasonably identifies the state of the object of the said root-verb. Because in the verbal knowledge given, it is the state of the object i.e. fissure (*bheda*) that is comprehended as the substantive in respect of the meaning of the root-verb, posited as a feature thereagainst, the meaning of the root-verb, viz, the act contributing to fissure (*bheda'-nukūla-vyāpāra*) being related to *bheda*, the state of the object through *sva-janyatva*.

But how could the verbal knowledge of being possessed of act (*vyāpāravattva*), the state of the agent as the substantive in respect of the meaning of the root-verb, *bhid*, posited as a feature thereagainst, occur from the sentence cited ? For the root-verb, is a *parasmaipadī* one and as such the verbal suffix of the *ātmanepadī* kind added thereto cannot bear out the verbal knowledge of the state of the agent as the substantive in respect of the meaning of the said root-verb, posited as the feature thereagainst. Not only that. The augment *yak* (in *bhidyate*) or the augment *ic* (in *abhedi*, the aorist (*luṅ*) form of conjugation of the root-verb *bhid* is an (additional) obstacle to such a verbal knowledge[1].

Jagadīśa replies : For the simultaneous verbal comprehension of the state of the agent and of the state of the object posited as the substantive in respect of one and the same act (denoted by a single root-verb), posited as a feature there-

1. अथ 'भिद्यते, अभेदि वा कुशूलः स्वयमि'त्यादौ भेदाद्यनुकूलव्यापारवत्त्वरूपस्य तत्कर्तृत्वस्य कथं कुशूलादावन्वयः, भिदादेः परस्मैपदित्वेन तदर्थधर्मितया कर्तृत्वबोधने पदान्तरस्यासामर्थ्यात् , यगिचोर्विगुणत्वाच्च । श. श. प्र. pp. 340-41.

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against, the sequence of words involving the augment, *yak* and a verbal suffix of the *ātmanepadī* kind of conjugation, responsible for bringing out the comprehension of the state of the object posited as the substantive is, as a rule, waited upon. Hence the expression *bhidyate* (*abhedi*) *kuśūlah svayam* reasonably bears out the simultaneous verbal knowledge of the cup-board both as the agent and the object of the act resulting in fissure. Conversely, for the verbal comprehension of the state of the agent posited as the substantive of an act denoted by a root-verb, the sequence of words involving the conjugational transformation, that a *parasmaipadī* root-verb undergoes is not insisted upon. It is not imperative, therefore, that for the verbal comprehension of the cup-board as the agent of the act resulting in fissure, the root-verb, *bhid*, should undergo the conjugational transformation, *na*[1] (to give the conjugational form, *bhinatti*).

Opponents argue : If a verbal suffix added to a root-verb ending in *yak* can bear out the simultaneous verbal knowledge of the state of the agent and the state of the object posited as the substantive in respect of the act denoted by the root-verb involved, posited as a feature thereagainst, then *taṇḍula-Caitrau pacyete* should be validly used in language.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Such an apprehension is unfounded. For in this instance what are comprehended as the agent and as the object are qualified by two different properties viz,, *taṇḍulatva* and *caitratva*. A suffix, on the contrary, is not admitedly capable of bringing about the simultaneous comprehension of the state of the agent and that of the object posited as features

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1. एकक्रियाधर्मितया कर्तृताकर्मतोभयोः ।
बोधने कर्मताकांक्षैवापेक्षयोत्सर्गतो भवेत् ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 79.

कर्मताकाङ्क्षा कर्मत्वान्वयस्यैवानुकूला, आत्मनेपदयगादिसमभिव्याहाररूपाकांक्षा व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यादपेक्षणीया, न तु कर्तृत्वान्वयस्य परस्मैपदविकरणादिसन्दंशरूपा ॥ ibid., p. 341.

2. यद्येवं 'तण्डुलचैत्रौ पच्येते' इत्यपि प्रयोगः स्यात् । ibid., p. 341.

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against what are qualified by different properties. For the conditions of the comprehension of the state of the agent and that of the object posited as features against different individuals embraced as substantives are not simultaneous. Hence *pacelimau* (*paci*+*kelim*, a primary suffix) *maitra-taṇḍulau* too is not used in language.[1]

Not only that. An intransitive root-verb of the *ātmanepada* class, a desideratlve verb, a causative verb, the root-verbs, *kir*, *śranthi*, *granthi*, *bruñ*, used in the quassi-passive voice (*karma-kartṛ-vācya*), are not augmented by *yak* or ic (in the aorist) to bear out the simultaneous verbal knowledge of the state of the agent and that of the object of an act denoted thereby. So also the root-verb, *duhi* used in the said voice is not augmented by *yak* and so are the root-verbs ending in a vowel. The root-verb *duhi* however, used in the aorist tense is augmented by *ic*. All these root-verbs, however, used quassi-passively are, as a rule, suffixed with *ātmanepadī* verbal terminations, as it is so held by the elders.[2]

In *Svayam Vikurute* (intransitive root-verb used in *ātmanepada*), *Yuvā svayam cikīrṣate* (desiderative root-verb) *Kaṭaḥ*, *svayam kaṭaḥ kārayate* (causative root-verb), *gaurutpucchyate* (causative verb), (*gauḥ*) *corayate* (causative verb *per se*); *svayamavakirate karī* (the root-verb, *kir*), *svayam śrathnite* (the root-verb, *sranthi*), *svayam grathnīte* (the root-verb *granthi*) *vā mālikā*; *svayam brūte* (the root-verb, *bruñ*), *kathā*, *svayam dugdhe* (the root-verb, *duhi*) *gauḥ* and the like, the respective root-verbs do not need be augmented by *yak* to bear out the

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1. न स्यात्, सामग्र्योर्मिथो विरोधेन विभिन्नधर्मावच्छिन्ने प्रत्ययानां युगपत्-कर्तृताकर्मत्वयोरनुभावकत्वस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात्, अतएव पचेलिमौ मैत्रतण्डुला-वित्यादिको न प्रयोगः। श. श. प्र. p. 341.

2. आत्मने ध्रौव्यधातूनां सनन्तण्यन्तयोः किरः।
श्रन्थिग्रन्थ्योस्तथा ब्रूञः कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वबोधने॥
यगिचौ न, दुहेर्नो यगजन्तस्य च तस्य च।
इच् वा स्यादुक्तधातूनां नित्यं त्यामनेपदम्॥ इति वृद्धस्मृतेः।
ibid., pp. 341–42

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simultaneous verbal comprehension of the state of the agent and that of the object of the respective acts denoted by the respective root-verbs involved. Similarly, in *svayam vyakṛta* (the root-verb *kṛñ*, an intransitive root-verb used in *ātmanepada*), *svayamacikīrṣata* (a desiderative root-verb) *kaṭaḥ*, the respective root-verbs are not augmented by *ic* too either. So also in *svayamalāvi alaviṣṭa vā kedārah* the root-verb is not augmented by *yak*. For it ends in a vowel. In *svayamadugdhe adohi vā gauḥ*, the root-verb, *duhi* is optionally augmented by *ic* to bear out the simultaneous verbal comprehension of the state of the agent and that of the object of the act of milking denoted by the root-verb, *duhi*.[1]

Opponents argue : In *vikāra-hetau sati vikriyante yeṣām na cetāṁsi te eva dhīrāḥ* the root-verb, *kṛ*, an intransitive root-verb used in its *ātmanepadi* conjugational form, used quassi-passively, is augmented by *yak*.

Jagadīśa replies : An intransitive verb of the said kind or any other verb referred to are not augmented by *yak* only in case, 'an act conducive' to is liable to comprehehsion as the state of the agent. As such, there is no such contingency.[2]

Opponents ask : How should the state of vegetables (*śāka's*) being the object of the act of cooking be comprehended from '*śākaḥ pacatā* (*paśyatā vā*) *bhujyate* ? For the state of the object (of an act), denoted by a case-ending alone is expectant of being syntactically related as a feature, to the meaning of a root-verb, and the first declensional suffix, cannot denote the state of the object.[3]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 342.
2. विकारहेतौ सति विक्रियन्ते येषां न चेतांसि ते एव धीरा इत्यादौ तु यको गतिश्चिन्त्या। ibid., p. 342.

   अनुकूलव्यापाररूपकर्तृत्ववोधस्थल एव तदनुशासनमित्युक्तौ न दोष इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 342.
3. ननु 'शाकः पचता पश्यता वा भुज्यते' इत्यादितः कुतः पाकादौ शाकादिकर्मत्वावगमः, सुबर्थस्यैव कर्मत्वस्य धात्वर्थे धर्मिणि साकांक्षत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 343.

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Jagadīśa replies : The first declensional suffix is provided for to identify the state of the object comprehended as a feature posited against what is comprehended as the object of an act undertaken by the agent of what is denoted by either a root-verb or a particle (like *sāmpratam*) qualified by the state of itself, being the object thereof. *Sākaḥ pacatā* (*paśyatā vā*) *bhujyate* gives the verbal comprehension of vegetables (*śaka*) or what is possessed of the state of the object, posited as a feature against the act of eating, undertaken by the agent of the act of cooking, denoted by the root-verb, *paci*, qualified by the state of itself, being the object thereof (the act of cooking). Hence the first declensional suffix is validly used to identify the state of vegetables being the object of the act of cooking, in preference to the second case-ending.[1]

The grammarians argue : The first declensional suffix is used not to identify only the state of the object. For the fact is that a case identified in respect of the finite verb in a sentence, is *ipso facto* identified in respect of the infinite verb used in the said sentence.[2]

Jagadīśa argues : It is unreasonable. For in that case, *hasteṇa pacatā bhujyate śākaḥ* should not be used in language. For vegetables, the nominative case in respect of the finite verb, *bhuñj* being identified by the verbal suffix, *te*, the instrumental case viz., hand (*hasta*) too is *ipso facto* identified calling for the first declensional termination to be suffixed therewith. Hence it is more reasonable to hold that the

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1. स्वकर्मतैकैकधात्वर्थकर्तृकापरकर्मता ।
यत्रान्वेत्यस्य कर्मत्वे प्रथमैवानुशिष्यते ॥ ibid., kā. 80.
स्वकर्मताकत्वविशिष्टैकधात्वर्थकर्तृ-कर्तृकस्यापरस्य धातुनिपातयोरन्यतरस्य कर्मत्वं यत्र धर्मिणि अन्वेति तदीयत्वेनानुभाव्ये कर्मत्वे प्रथमैवानुशिष्यते न तु द्वितीयादिरपेक्षयते, येन शाकः स्वकर्मताकपाककर्तृ-कर्तृताकभोजनकर्मतावानित्याद्यन्वयधीस्तत्र न स्यात् । ibid., p. 343.
2. अतएव प्रधानशक्त्यभिधाने गुणशक्तिरभिहितवत् प्रकाशते' इति पठन्ति । शक्तिः कारकमिति शाब्दिकाः । ibid., p. 341–43.

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objective case in respect of the finite verb in a sentence being identified is *ipso facto* identified in respect of the infinite verb.[1]

What Jagadīśa emphasises upon is this : The case in respect of the infinite verb, liable to *ipso facto* identification must be identical with the one, identified, in respect of the finite verb. In *śākaḥ pacatā bhujyate*, the case, liable to *ipso facto* identification is identical with the one, identified (by the verbal suffix, *te*) in respect of the finite verb, *bhuñj*, viz., the objective case. Conversely in *hastena pacatā bhujyate śākaḥ* the case in respect of the infinite verb viz., the instrumental case is other than that in respect of the finite verb. Hence the said case is not liable to *ipso facto* identification with the case in respect of the finite verb being identified.[2]

Opponents argue : In an instance where against an act denoted by a finite verb and against another denoted by an infinite verb, comprehended as the determinants (*nirūpaka*) of the contents of a *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvāgahi* kind of verbal knowledge, the same kind of a case like the state of the object is liable to comprehension as features, the state of the object in respect of the infinite verb is not *ipso facto* liable to comprehension with the comprehension of the state of the object in respect of the finite verb.[3]

Paktrā śākasya bhoktā, for an example, gives the verbal knowledge of one who has undertaken the act of eating (*bhoktā*), the determinant of the state of the object, abiding vegetables qualified by the state of being subsequent to the act

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1. कर्मतामात्रन्तु उद्यायः, तेन 'हस्तेन पचता भुज्यते शाक' इत्यादौ नाभिहिताधिकारीयप्रथमाप्रसक्तिः । श. श. प्र. p. 343.
2. इदमापाततः, प्रधानान्वयियादृशशक्तेरभिहितत्वं गुणान्वयितादृशशक्तेरपि तथात्वम् इति शाब्दिकाभिप्रायात् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 343.
3. ननु यत्र विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहितानिरूपकत्वेन गौणप्रधानभावापन्ने क्रियाद्वये प्रकारीभूय एकविधस्यैव कर्मत्वादिकारकस्य भानं तत्र तन्न स्यात् । श. श. प्र. p. 344.

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of cooking, the determinant of the state of the object abiding vegetables (*śāka-niṣṭha-karmatā-nirūpaka-pāka-kriyo'ttaratva-viśiṣṭa-śāka-niṣṭha-karmatā-nirūpaka-bhojana-kriyā-vān*). This is an instance of what is known as *viśiṣṭa-vaiśityāvagāhi-jñāna.* The state of the object abiding vegetables in respect of the act denoted by the infinite verb (*bhuñj in bhoktā*) and that of abiding vegetables in respect of the act denoted by the infinite verb (*paci* in *paktvā*) are comprehended as features against the said two acts comprehended as the determinants of content of the said knowledge. The state of the object abiding vegetables, in respect of the act of eating denoted by the finite verb is borne out by the sixth declensional suffix as provided for by the rule *kartṛ-karmaṇoh kṛti.*[1]

But the state of the object abiding vegetables in respect of the act of cooking denoted by the infinite verb is not liable to being *ipso facto* borne out by the sixth declensional suffix. For the use of the sixth declensional suffix to denote the state of the object as provided for by the said rule is prohibited[2] by the rule *na lokā'vyaya-khalartha-tṛṇām.*[3]

Similar are the cases in *paktva'nnasya dātā, bhoktumannasya pācaka, purasya gatvā gantā, bhuktvā caitrasya sthitiḥ, paktvā sūdasya gamanam.*[4]

Similar is the case where two different cases are comprehended as features against the acts denoted by two such different verbs as in *bhrāhmaṇāyā'hūya dadāti, vṛkṣādāruhya patati.* For in such instances, the fourth case ending or the fifth one bearing out the comprehension of the state of the dative case or of the ablative case, cannot bear out the comprehension of the state of the object in respect of the act of inviting or of climbing, denoted by the infinite verb, *āhūya* or *āruhya.*[5]

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1. पा. II. 3. 65.
2. क्त्वादेर्निष्ठादित्वेन तदन्तधर्मत्वेऽपि षष्ठ्याः कर्मत्वाद्यनुभावकत्वस्य निषिद्धत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 344.
3. पा. II. 3. 69.
4. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 344.
5. एवं यत्र तादृशक्रियाद्वये नानाविधकर्मत्वसम्प्रदानत्वादि प्रकारस्तत्रापि तथा,

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Jagadīśa replies : In an instance where the same kind of a case or two different kinds of case are comprehended as features against two different verbs of which one is finite and the other one is an infinite one, the case-ending called for by the finite verb, is used.[1]

Hence in an instance like *paktvā'annasya bhoktā* or in *brahmaṇāyā'hūya dadāti*, the sixth declensional suffix (used as a case-ending denotative of the state of the objective case as provided for by *kaṭr-karmaṇoḥ kṛti*) or the fourth case-ending respectively bears out the verbal comprehension of the state of the objective case in respect of the infinite verb too due to semantic pecularity, notwithstanding the prohibition of the use of the sixth declensional suffix, made by the rule, *na lokā'vyaya-khalartha-tṛṇām* or that the fourth case-ending incapable of denoting the state of the objective case.[2]

Opponents argue : *śatrave kupyati* gives the simultaneous verbal knowledge of one having anger against one's enemy and of one having anger due to one's enemy. *Putreṇa dadāti*, gives the verbal knowledge of one making a gift through one's son implying thereby that one makes a gift to one's son who makes the said gift to another. In *pātryāṁ bhuṅte* in the like manner, the pot is comprehended both as the instrument and the locus of the act of eating. In *gṛhaṁ gacchati*, similarly, the house is liable to comprehension as both the object and the locus of the act of going. In *caitrasya calanaṁ* too, *caitra* is comprehended as the agent and the locus of the act of going. But the case-endings used in these instances cannot bear out the comprehension of one's enemy as the ablative case, of

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यथा 'ब्राह्मणायाहूय ददाति' 'वृक्षादारुह्य पतति' इत्यादौ, कर्मत्वादौ चतुर्थ्यादेरसामर्थ्यात्। ibid., p. 344.

1. गौणप्रधानक्रिययोः प्रकारीभूतकारके।
एकस्मिन् वाऽपि भिन्ने वा प्रधानापेक्षया स्थितिः ॥ ibid., kā. 81.

2. 'ब्राह्मणाय आहूय ददाती'त्यादौ च ब्राह्मणकर्मताकाह्वानोत्तरब्राह्मणसम्प्रदानताकदानत्वादिना बोधने व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यादेव पचनाह्वानादिगौणक्रियायां षष्ठी-चतुर्थ्यादिना कर्मत्वादेर्भानमिति भावः। ibid., p. 344.

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one's son as the dative, of the pot as the objective case, of the house as the locative case and of *Caitra* as the locative case respectively.[1]

Jagadīśa replies: In an instance where in respect of one and the same verb two cases are liable to comprehension, the case-ending called for by the case read later in the chronology of cases is provided for.[2] The list of this chronloogy given by Bhartṛhari, is like this : *apādana-sampradāna-karaṇādhāra-karmaṇāṁ / kartuśco'bhaya-samprāptau parameva pravartate*[3] // The followers of the Kalāpa School of grammar, however, reads the instrumental case later in chronology, than the locative one.[4]

The author of the commentary (*vṛtti*) on *kalāpa-vyākaraṇa*, however, is of the view that the instrumental case should give way to the locative one.[5]

Opponents argue : In *brahmaṇāyā'hūya dadāti*, then, the second case-ending should have been suffixed to the word, *brāhmaṇa*.

Jagadīśa replies : In this instance, although one and the same word-meaning is comprehended as the objective case, it is in respect of two different verbs. Hence there is no harm.

Opponents argue : In *daṇḍena gāmabhyāja*, the verb involved is only one.

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 344–45.
2. एकस्यैकक्रियायान्तु कारकद्वयबोधने।
   यत्परं कारकं तत्र विहिता सुबपेक्षिता॥ ibid., का. 82.
3. Vide ibid., p. 345.
4. करणत्वाधारत्वयोरेकदा अन्वयस्थलेऽधिकरणत्वार्थिकैव विभक्तिरपेक्षितेति प्राञ्चः। करणत्वार्थिकैव तथेति कालापाः, तैराधारत्वं निरुच्यैव करणत्वस्य निर्वचनादिति ध्येयम्। inid., p. 346.
5. एतच्च न वृत्तिकारस्य सम्मतम्, तेन 'कांस्यपात्र्यां भुङ्क्ते' इत्यधिकरणमेवेत्युक्तेः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 346.

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Jagadīśa replies : In this instance the two cases although in respect of one verb do not abide one and the same word-meaning and thus there is no contingency.[1]

For the comprehension of the state of the agent, posited as a feature against an act presented by a root-verb, the third case-ending is used and for the comprehension of the state of the object posited against an act similarly presented by a root-verb, the second case-ending is suffixed to a nominal as a general rule.[2]

Opponents ask : How is it then in *sattā'sti* or *graho gṛhyate*, the first case-ending is suffixed to *sattā* or *graha* ?

Jagadīśa replies : In these instances, what is embraced as the substantive of the state of the agent or that of the object although as a matter of fact, is comprehended as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, it is not expectant of the said meaning presented by a root-verb but by a nominal (like *sattā* or *graha*). For the verbal knowledges that occur from such sentences are like this : *astitā-kriyā'nukūla-kṛti-mati sattā* and *grahaṇa-kriyānukūla-kṛti-mad-grahaṇam* and *sattā* or *grahaṇa* although as a matter of fact, are acts i.e. meanings of root-verbs, these are not presented by root-verbs but by nominals viz, *sattā* and *graha*. The instances cited therefore, do not militate against the rule.[3]

There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule that the second case-ending is to be suffixed to a nominal to bear out the comprehension of the state of the object posited as a feature against an act presented by a root-verb. These are : If the said

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1. 'ब्राह्मणायाऽऽहूय ददाती'त्यादावेकनिरूपितमपि नैकक्रियायां, 'दण्डेन गाम-भ्याजे'त्यावावेकक्रियायाम्पि नैकनिरूपितं कारकद्वयमन्वेति। श. श. प्र. p. 345.
2. क्रियायां धातुलभ्यायां कर्तृत्वस्याववोधिका।
तृतीया कर्मतायास्तु द्वितीयोत्सर्गतो भवेत्॥ idid., का. 83.
3. 'सत्ताऽस्ति, ग्रहो गृह्यते' इत्यादौ वस्तुगत्या धात्वर्थेऽपि कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वाद्यन्वयो न धर्मिणो धातुजन्यामुपस्थितिमपेक्षते, किन्तु नामजन्यामतस्तत्र न व्यभिचारः। ibid., p. 346,

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act is that of movement (*gati*) in which case, the fourth case-ending in optionally used; if the said act is presented by any of the root-verbs like, *daya* to *pity*, *īśa* to rule, *saṁ-jñā* to promise, *nāthi* meaning to wish, *smṛ* to recollect, *paṇi* to promise or to sell or purchase, *vi-ava-hṛ* to sue or to sell or purchase, *div* to avow or to sell or purchase, *kṛ* meaning to superimpose the quality of another and *hins* to harm, in which case the sixth declensional suffix is optionally provided for.[1] The instances like *grāmam gacchati, grāmāya gacchati, dīnam dayate, dīnasya dayate, dīnamiṣṭe, dīnasya iṣṭe, saṁ-jānīte, cintayati, smarati,* (*putram*), *putrasya nāthate;* (*śatam*) *śatasya paṇāyati, vyavaharati, divyati; svarṇasya upaskurute, caurasya hinasti* are cases in point.[2]

Opponents argue : In *maitramanunāthati*, in *nṛpam paṇāyate, bandhuṁ vyavaharati, divaṁ divyati* and the like too, the sixth declensional suffix should be optionally provided for.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For in the said instances the root-verb, *nāthi* does not mean 'to wish' but 'to pray' (to beg), the root-verb, *paṇi* means 'to eulogise', *vi-ava-hṛ* means to please and the root-verb, *div* means 'to go'.[3]

In case, however, the root-verb involved ends in a primary suffix, other than those coming under the *niṣṭhā* list without any other suffix being further added thereto, the sixth declensional suffix only, as a rule, in supersession of the first or the second case-ending is used, unless provided for otherwise, to bear out the comprehension of the state of the agent or of that of the object posited as a feature against the act

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1. Vide श. श. प्र. का. 84–85.

Vide also पा. II. 3. 52; VI. 4. 34; II. 3. 55; II. 3. 36; II. 357; II. 3. 58.

2. श. श. प्र. p. 347.

'मैत्रमनुनाथती'त्यादौ नाध्यर्थोऽपि प्रार्थनादिर्नाशंसनम्। 'नृपं पणायति, बन्धुं व्यवहरति, दिवं दीव्यती'त्यादौ पण्यादेरर्था अपि स्तुति-तोष-गत्यादयो न क्रयादिरूपाः। ibid., p. 347.

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presented by the said root-verb[1], as in *caitrasya gatiḥ, grāmasya gamanam* and the like.

In *caitreṇa dṛṣṭa-caraḥ, taṇḍulaṁ pācakataraḥ* and the like the root-verb involved does not end in a mere primary suffix; a secondary suffix is further added thereto[2]. Hence the sixth deciensional suffix is not used in these instances to bear out the comprehension of the state of the agent or that of the object.

In *aṅgāni vyātyukṣī* and *dhanāni sāṁgrāhiṇaṁ* also the sixth declensional suffix is not used to bear out the comprehension of the state of the object. For the primary suffixes, *ṇac* and *inuṇ* invoived in thc formation of *vyātyukṣī* and *sāṁgrāhiṇaṁ* although other than *kta* and *katvatu*, are as a rule, followed by a secondary suffix, (viz., *aṅ* and *aṇ* respectivcly).[3]

Opponents argue : In *grāmasya gantṛmān* or in *caitrasya gatimad gṛhaṁ*, then, the use of the sixth declensional suffix should be held grammatically wrong. For the ro ot-verb, *gam* in the said two instances, against the meanings of which the state of the object and that of the agent are liable to compre-

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1. निष्ठाद्यन्यकृदन्तार्थे कर्तृत्वस्यान्वयं प्रति ।
कर्मत्वस्य च षष्ठ्येव हेतुर्बाधविधिं विना ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 86.

निष्ठादिभिन्नं कृन्मात्रमन्ते यस्य न तु तदुत्तरप्रत्ययवान्तरं, तादृशधातोरर्थे कर्तृत्वस्य कर्मत्वस्य वाऽन्वये नाम्नः षष्ठ्येव तन्त्रं न तु तृतीयादिः । ibid., p. 347–348.

Vide also पा. II. 3. 65; II. 3. 69.

2. 'चैत्रेण दृष्टचरः, तण्डुलं पाचकतर' इत्यादौ तु धातोरुत्तरं न कृन्मात्रम् । श. श. प्र. p. 348.

3. अतएव निष्ठादिभिन्नयोरपि णजिनुणोर्नित्यं तद्धितान्तत्वात् 'अङ्गानि व्याय्युची, धनानि सांग्राहिणमि'त्यादौ कर्मतायां न षष्ठीप्रसङ्गः, प्रापकाभावात् । ibid., p. 348.

Vide also कर्मण्यतिहारे णच् स्त्रियाम् । पा. III. 3. 43; णचस्त्रियामञ् । पा. V. 4. 14.; (वि-अति-अच्+णच्+अञ्+ङीप्= व्याय्युची); अभिविधौ भावे इनुण् । पा. III. 3. 44. अणिनुणः । पा. V. 4. 15. (सम्-ग्रह-इनुण्+अण्=सांग्राहिणम्) ।

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hension as features, does not end in a mere primary suffix; *matup* is further added thereto.

Jagadīśa replies : The said two instances hold out cases of *aluk-samāsa*, or rather, as some hold, the sixth declensional suffix in such cases denote only relation posited as a feature against the meaning of the word, *gantṛmān* or *gatimat*. It does not bear out the comprehension of the state of the object or of that of the agent, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb.[1]

The state of the agent, comprehended as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb involved, is not borne out by the sixth declensional suffix in *caitreṇa bhuktaḥ, maitreṇa dattaḥ* (*kta*); *sukaraḥ kaṭo mayā, duṣkaraḥ paṭastvayā* (*khal*); *supāno somo mayā, duṣpāna somastvayā* (*yuc*). For the root-verbs involved end in primary suffixes that are read under the *niṣṭhādi-list*.[2]

Similarly, in *temanaṁ pacan* (*śatṛ*), *grāmaṁ gātavān* (*ktavatu*), *pārāyaṇamadhīyan* (*śatṛ*), *upaniṣad dhārayan* (*śatṛ*), *ghaṭaṁ vidvān* (*vansu*) *taṇḍulam pecivān* (*kvasu*), *bhakṣyaṁ bhunjānaḥ* (*śānac*), *somaṁ pavamānaḥ* (*svānan*), *kavacamudvahan* (*śatṛ*), *kaṭaṁ cakrāṇaḥ* (*kāna*), *dadhirghaṭaṁ* (*dhā+kiḥ* in the sense *liṅ*), *cakriḥ kaṭam* (*kiḥ*), *śatam jiṣṇuḥ* (*snuk*), *striyamalaṁkariṣṇu* (*iṣṇu*), *kaṣṭaṁ sahiṣṇu* (*iṣṇu*), *dhanam gṛdhnuḥ* (*knu*), *śaram kṣipnuḥ* (*knu*), *kaṭaṁ cikīrṣuḥ, puṁyogamāśaṁśuḥ, taṇḍulaṁ bhikṣuḥ* (*ukārānta kṛt*), *kaṭam dāyī* (*bhaviṣye ṇini*) *grāmaṁ gāmī* (*in*), *grāmamāgāmī* (*in*) *kaṭam kārako vrajati* (*yun*), *taṇḍulam paktvā vartatē* (*ktāc*), *payaḥ pāyam pāyam vrajati* (*ṇamul*), *paṭam kartuṁ gacchati* (*tuman*), *vaditā janāpavādaṁ* (*tṛn*), *grāmaṁ kāmukhaḥ* (*ukañ*), *sukham-abhilāṣukaḥ* (*ukañ*), the state of the object posited as a feature

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1. 'ग्रामस्य गन्तृमान् देशः, चैत्रस्य गतिमद् गृहमि'त्यादौ तु गतिश्चिन्त्या। अत्र गन्तादावेव षष्ठ्यर्थसम्बन्धो भासते न तु धात्वर्थे कर्मत्वादिरित्यपि कश्चित्। श. श. प्र. p. 348.

अलुकसमासस्त्वोकारेण कथञ्चिदुपपादनीयम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 348.

2. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 348.

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against the meaning of the root-verbs involved is not borne out for verbal comprehension by the sixth declensional suffix. For the root-verbs involved end in primary suffixes that are read in the *niṣṭhādi* list.[1]

The primary suffixes that are read under the *niṣṭhādi*-list include *kta*, not used in the sense of the present tense or to identify the locative case, *ktavatu*, *śatṛ*, *vansu*, *āna* (*śānan*), *śānac*, *kāna*, *kiḥ*, *ṣṇuk*, *iṣṇu*, *knu*, *u*, *ṇin* bearing the sense of owing, *in* meaning to be, *vun* carrying the sense of *tuman*, *khal*, *yuc* bearing the sense of *khal*, *ktvā*, *ṇamul*, *tuman*, *tṛṇ* and *ukañ*.[2]

In *bhītam mṛgāṇām*, *mataḥ sādhūnām*, *iṣṭaḥ prajānām*, *pūjito janānām*, the sixth declensional suffix is used to bear out the verbal comprehension of the state of the agent posited against what is presented by a root-verb. For the primary suffix in all such instances carry the sense of the present tense.[3]

Similarly, in *suptāmaraṇyaṁ pathikānām*, *gataṁ nabho nakṣatrāṇām*, *pītamāgāram payasaḥ*, *bhuktā pātrī karambhasya mitrāṇām*, and the like, the sixth declensional suffix is used to bear out the verbal comprehension of the state of the agent or of that the object posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb. For the primary suffix, *kta* in these instances identifies the locative case.[4]

Opponents argue : In *dhanasya grāhī*, then, the use of the sixth declensional snffix should be held grammatically wrong.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For the primary suffix, *ṇini* in the instance cited does not mean to owe.[5]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 346.
2. ibid., का. 87–89.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 349.
   Vide also क्तस्य च वर्तमाने । पा. II. 367.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 349.
   Vide also अधिकरणवाचिनश्च । पा. II. 3. 68.
5. 'धनस्य ग्राही'त्यादावृण्यर्थे न णिनिः । श. श. प्र. p. 349.

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Opponents ask : How then in *odanasya pācaka*, the use of the sixth declensional suffix, is justified ?

Jagadīśa replies : The primary suffix, *vuṇ* used in the instance given does not carry the sense of *tuman*. As such, there is no bar to the sixth declensional suffix being used[1] (as provided for by *kartṛ-karmaṇoḥ kṛti*).

Opponents argue : The use of the sixth declensional suffix in *striyāḥ kāmukaḥ* is unjustified. For the root-verb involved ends in the primary suffix, *ukañ* read under the *niṣṭhādi*—list.

Jagadīśa replies : The sixth declensional suffix is justifially used in the said instance. For the root-verb, *kami* even if suffixed with *ukañ* should reasonably call for such use in view of the fact that the said kind of an expression is admittedly used in language and as such the suffix, *ukañ* added to the root-verb, *kami* is not read under the *niṣṭhādi* list.[2]

The suffix, *śatṛ* also optionally falls out of the *niṣṭhādi* list, when suffixed with the root-verb, *dviṣ*. For *caurasya dviṣan* is admittedly used in language alternatively with *cauram dviṣan*.[3]

In *odanasya pākaścaitreṇa or dohaḥ kṣīrasya gavām gopena* and the like both the state of the agent and that of the object of the act presented by the root-verb involved ending in a mere primary suffix other than those that come under the *niṣṭhādi*—list are simultaneously liable to being borne out for verbal comprehension by the sixth declensional suffix. But the state of the object alone in such cases, is borne out for verbal comprehension by the said suffix. The state of the agent is left to be denoted by the third case-ending.

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1. 'ओदनस्य पाचक' इत्यादौ च न पुमर्थे वुण्। ibid., p. 349.
2. कमेरुकञ् गणे नास्मिन्। श. श. प्र. का. 89.
   'स्त्रियाः कामुक'इत्यादिदर्शनान्नात्र गणे कमेरुकञ् ग्राह्यः। ibid., p. 349.
   Vide also कमेरनिषेधः। (वार्त्तिक) Vide सि. कौ. 627.
3. तथा द्विषः शन्तृङ् विभाषया 'चौरं द्विषन्नितिव'चौरस्य द्विषन्नि'त्यपि-प्रयोगात्। श. श. प्र. p. 349.

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For the sixth declensional suffix signifies the state of the object alone in case it so happens that both the state of the agent and that of the object are simultaneously liable to comprehension as features against what is presented by a root-verb ending in a primary suffix that is other than those that are impersonal ones and feminine as a rule.[1]

In *bhidā tamasāmarkasya, chidā vṛkṣāṇām dātrasya, cikīrṣā puṇyānām puruṣasya, īhā dhanānām dīnasya, mama bhojikā śaktunām, tava śāyikā rātrīnām, tīrthānām gatirāstikasya, gurūṇām paricaryā śiṣyasya, pitṛṇāmupāsanā santānasya, rajanīnām jāgaryyā caurasya, puṇyānāmakaraṇirjālmasya, jantūnām hatyā vyādhasya, hānirarthānām viraktasya*, both the state of the agent and that of the object are simultaneously borne out for verbal comprehension by the sixth declensional suffix. For the root-verbs involved end in primary suffixes that are of the feminine gender as a rule and impersonal.[2]

Opponents argue : *Hānirarthānām viraktena, tīrthāṇām gatirāstikena* are admittedly used in language.

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *hāni* is derived from the root-verb, *hā* with the primary suffix, *ni* carrying the sense of *kti* added thereto. So also is the word, *gati* from the root-verb, *gam* with the primary suffix, *kti* added thereto. The followers of the *kalāpa* school of grammar admit of the alternative use of the sixth and the third declensional suffixes to bear out the verbal comprehension of the state of the agent in case both the state of the agent and that of the object become simult-

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1. कृदन्तधात्वर्थे कर्तृत्वस्य कर्मत्वस्य वाऽन्वये षष्ठ्येव बाधकं विना, तन्त्रमित्युक्तं तत्र बाधकमाह—

   स्व्यधिकारोक्तभावान्यकृदन्तस्यार्थधर्मिके ।
   द्वयोर्बोधे कर्मतायामेव षष्ठी न कर्तृरि ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 90

   स्व्यधिकारविहिताः ये भावप्रत्ययाः तदन्यकृदन्तस्य धातोरर्थे कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वयोर्युगपद् बोधने कर्मतायामेव षष्ठी तन्त्रं, न तु कर्तृत्वे । श. श. प्र. pp. 349–50.

2. स्व्यधिकारोक्तभावान्तस्य धातोरर्थे तु कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वयोर्युगपदन्वये द्वयोरपि षष्ठ्येव । श. श. प्र. p. 350.

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neously liable to comprehension as a feature against the meaning of root-verb ending in the primary suffix, *kti* or *ni*.[1]

Kartavyaḥ, karaṇīyaḥ, kṛtyaḥ, kāryaḥ pradeyo vā paṭaścaitreṇa is optionally used with *kartavyaḥ, karaṇiyaḥ, kṛtyaḥ, kāryaḥ, pradeyo vā paṭaścaitrasya*. For the use of the third case-ending is provided for to be alternatively used with the sixth declensional suffix to bear out the comprehension of the state of the agent posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb ending in any of the five primary suffixes, *tavya, anīya, kyap, yat* and *ṇyat*[2] collectively known as the *kṛtya* suffixes.[3]

In *netavyaḥ, prāpaṇīyo vā grāmaṁ gaurgopena, gantavyaṁ grāmamanena* and the like, the sixth declensional suffix is not provided either to present the state of the agent or that of the object. For both of these are simultaneously liable to comprehension as features against the meaning of a root-verb ending in a *kṛtya* suffix, in such instances.[4]

Opponents argue : The uses like *sthitaṁ caitrasya, gataṁ grāmasya* or *gataṁ grāmasya caitrasya* should be held grammatically wrong. For the sixth declensional suffix is held to be incapable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of either the state of the agent or of that of the object posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb ending in a primary suffix read under the *niṣṭhādi*—list.

Jagadīśa replies : The sixth declensional suffix is alternatively provided for with the third or the second case-ending

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1. 'हा-ञ्या-ञ्ला-ञ्लाभ्यः कृत्यर्थे निः',उक्तक्तिन्याद्यन्तस्य धातोरर्थे कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वयोर्युगपद्-बोधे कर्तृत्वांशे तृतीयाषष्ठयोर्वैकल्पिकं कारणत्वमिति तु कौमाराः। ibid., p. 350.
2. कृत्यान्तधातोरर्थे तु कर्तृत्वस्यैव बोधने।
षष्ठी वा स्यात्..... ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 91.
Vide also कृत्यानां कर्त्तरि वा। पा. II. 3. 71.
3. तव्यानीयौ क्यप् ण्यण्यौ पञ्चैते कृत्यसंज्ञकाः। श. श. प्र. p. 351.
4. द्वयोर्बोधे न द्वयोरपि सा स्यात्। ibid., का. 91.
तादृशधात्वर्थे कर्तृत्वकर्मत्वयोर्द्वयोर्बोधने तु न द्वयोरपि षष्ठी। ibid., p. 351.

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to bear out the verbal comprehension of the state of the agent or that of the object posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb ending in the primary suffix, *kta* used impersonally.[1]

Opponents argue : In that case the causality of verbal knowledge being inherent in two different sequence of words, the very concept of causality of verbal knowledge in such cases can not gain ground.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For following the maxim of *tṛnāraṇi-maṇi* (in the case of fire), the determinant of the effect is to be limited in such cases.[2]

By way of a general rule, the fourth, the fifth and the seventh case-endings are provided for to bear out the verbal comprehension of the state of the instrumental case, that of the dative case, that of the ablative case and that of the locative case respectively, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb.[3]

In *śatena śatāya vā parikrīṇīte sarpiṣā sarpiṣo vā pūrṇaḥ, phalena phalasya vā tṛptaḥ,* the fourth case-ending or the sixth declensional suffix also is admittedly used in language to bear out the verbal comprehension of the state of the instrumental case by way of an exception to the general rule referred to above.[4]

Similarly in *dāsyai dāsyā vā samprayacchate mālām,* the third case-ending also bears out the comprehension of the dative case posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb.[5]

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1. द्वितीययेव कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वं वा तृतीयया ।
षष्ठयापि बोध्यते भावक्तान्तधात्वर्थधर्मिणि ॥
श. श. प्र. का. 92.
2. सर्वत्रैव कार्यतावच्छेदकसंक्लोचान्न व्यभिचारः । ibid., p. 351.
3. श. श. प्र. का. 93.
4. ibid., p. 352.
5. ibid., p. 352.

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CHAPTER XXIII

PREPOSITIONAL INFLECTIONS
(UPAPADA-VIBHAKTI)

In semantics, the meaning of a noun or of a pronoun is related to that of a verb or of a noun or of a pronoun or of any other word. The relation of a noun or of a pronoun with that of a verb is known as a case-relation. This relation is brought about by a nominal inflection known as a case-ending (*kāraka-vibhakti*). The relation of the meaning of a noun or a pronoun with that of another noun or of pronoun or of any other word other than a verb is also brought about by a nominal inflection to be known as prepositional inflection (*upapada-vibhakti*). A nominal inflection, therefore, the meaning of which is not embraced in the verbal knowledge as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb is known as a prepositional inflection.[1]

All the seven nominal inflections are denotative of numbers that are not embraced in the resultant verbal knowledge as features against the meaning of a root-verb. Conversely, these are thus embraced as features against the meaning of the respective bases.[2]

Opponents argue : In *pākah,* the number, denoted by the nominal inflection is obviously embraced as a

1. यत्सुपो यादृशार्थो न प्रकारीभूय भासते।
धात्वर्थे; तादृगर्थे सा कारकान्यार्थसुप् भवेत्॥ श. श. प्र. का. 94.
2. प्रथमादीनां सप्तानामपि विभक्तीनामेकत्वादयोऽर्था न धात्वर्थे प्रकारीभूय भासन्ते, परन्तु प्रकृत्यर्थे। ibid., p. 352.

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feature against the act of cooking, the meaning of the root-verb, *paci*.

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning of the nominal inflection, in this case, is not embraced as a feature against the meaning of the said root-verb. On the contrary, it is comprehended as a feature against cooking *per se*, the meaning of the nominal, *pāka*. For the primary suffix, *ghañ*, involved in the formation of the word, *pāka* is denotative of *per se* or self-abstraction as it has been observed eairlier[1] (in the context of the definition of suffixes).

Opponents argue : In the context of the definition of suffixes, the primary suffix, *ghañ* has been held to be denotative of *per se* or self-abstraction to explain the situation that arose in respect of the syntactical relation of the word, *stoka* with *pāka* in *stokaḥ pākaḥ*. For otherwise the meanings of these two words could not be so related.[2] But in the present context, there is no such contingency. Hence there is no bar to the number, denoted by the nominal inflection being related (as a feature) to the meaning of the root-verb.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The prepositional inflection, in that case, may be defined as a nominal inflection, the meaning of which is not liable to comprehension as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb constituting (or likely to constitute) a compound.[4] In *grāma-gataḥ*, for an example, like the state of (the village) being the object, the number presented by the nominal inflection (*am* elided) is not liable to comprehension

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1. 'पाक' इत्यादावपि सुबर्थसंख्या न प्रकारः, परन्तु पचनादिस्वरूपे नामार्थे इत्युक्तप्रायम्। ibid., p. 352.

   Vide also ibid., p. 47.

2. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 47.

3. ननु 'स्तोकः पाक' इत्यादिप्रयोगोपपत्त्यर्थं भावकृतः स्वरूपार्थकत्वस्य तादृशार्थे स्तोकदेरन्वयस्य स्वीकारेऽपि अत्र धात्वर्थे संख्याद्यन्वये बाधकाभावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 352.

4. समासनिविष्टस्य धातोरर्थे इति वा वक्तव्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 352-53.

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as a feature against (the act of) movement, the meaninig of the root-verb, *gam*.[1]

As such, the definition fairly covers the fifth (prepositional) inflection in the instance, *prāsādāt prekṣate*. For the meaning of the said inflection viz. the state of being subsequent to the act of climbing, is not posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb viz, the act of looking on (*prekṣaṇa*), likely to form into a compound; because no such use like *prāsāda-prekṣaka* is ever made (in the said sense), in language. Conversely, the said meaning of the (prepositional) inflection is obviously embraced as a feature againist the said meaning of the root-verb in *prāsādāt prekṣate*.[2]

In *śalākāpari, ekatva,* the number is posited as a feature against the meaning of the nominal, *śalākā*, constituting the compound, *śalākāparī* and not against the meaning of the root-verb viz, the act of playing at dice. Hence the third nominal inflection in *śalākayā viparītam vṛttam*, the sentence of analysis of the said compound is regarded as a prepositional inflection.[3]

Opponents argue : This definition of the prepositional inflection is too wide. For it over-extends to a case-ending too. Because it has been held that one and the same nominal inflection, while presenting a case is a case-ending and while presenting a meaning other than a case is a prepositional inflection.

Jagadīśa replies : The attributed viz., the nominal inflection although appears to be the same, the attributes viz, the state

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1. न हि 'ग्रामगत' इत्यादौ धात्वर्थे कर्मत्वादिरिवैकत्वादिरपि सुबर्थः प्रकारः। ibid., p. 353.
2. अतएव 'प्रासादात् प्रेक्षते' इत्यादौ ल्यबर्थस्य धात्वर्थे प्रकारत्वेऽपि तदर्थ-पञ्चम्यां नाव्याप्तिः; 'प्रासादप्रेक्षक' इत्यादौ समासनिविष्टस्य धातोरर्थे ल्यबर्थस्यारोहणोत्तरत्वादेरप्रकारत्वात्। ibid., p. 353.
3. 'शलाकापरी'त्यादौ समासनिविष्टस्य नाम्नोऽर्थे प्रकारीभूतमप्येकत्वादिकं न धातोरर्थे। श. श. प्र. p. 353.

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of a case-ending and that of a prepositional inflection are not identical.[1]

Opponents argue : In *caitra* ! *vraja*, the meaning of the first nominal inflection, viz, the state of being addressed (*sambodhyatva*) is obviously posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *vraji*, not liable to form into a compound. It cannot be posited as a feature against the meaning of the base of the said inflection viz, *caitra*. For none other than a number, denoted by a nominal inflection is liable to comprehension as a feature against the meaning of the base thereof. As such, the definition of the prepositional inflection is too narrow to cover the first prepositional inflection, denotative of the state of being addressed.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Being addressed means being the object of the desire of the speaker of the kind 'let the act of going by *caitra* be accomplished', that brings about the relation thereof with the act of going. As such, 'the state of being addressed' as such is not comprehended as a feature against the said act.[3]

Opponents argue : The knowledge of what a sentence means is recognised as a cause of the use thereof. For there is simplicity in admitting such a cause and the use of a sentence is essentially rooted in such knowledge. Hence instead of saying that the state of being addressed means the state of being a content of desire of the kind suggested, it is more reasonable to hold that the state of addressed means the state of being a substantive of the verbal knowledge caused by a sentence that leads to the comprehension of the state of being addressed.[4]

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1. न च कारकविभक्तेरपि तदन्यार्थकत्वादतिप्रसक्तिः, उपाधेयसङ्करेऽप्युपाधेरसाङ्कर्य्यात्। ibid., p. 353.
2. ननु 'चैत्र व्रजे'त्यादौ सुबर्थसम्बोध्यत्वस्य धात्वर्थं एव प्रकारत्वमवश्यं वाच्यम न प्रकृत्यर्थे संख्यातिरिक्तसुबर्थस्य प्रातिपादिकार्थविशेष्यत्वनियमात्, तथा च सम्बोध्यत्वार्थकप्रथमाविभक्तावव्याप्तिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 353.
3. तच्च क्रियाकरणाय वक्त्राभिप्रेतत्वम्। श. श, प्र. p. 353.
4. ननु वाक्यप्रयोगे वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वेन लाघवादावश्यकत्वाच्च तादृशज्ञानविशेष्यत्वमेव तथास्तु। कृष्णकान्ती p. 353.

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Jagadīśn replies : No. The state of being addressed does not mean the state of being embraced as a substantive in the verbal knowledge caused by a sentence leading to the comprehension of the state of being addressed. It may mean at the most, the state of being embraced as a substantive in the knowledge inherent in the speaker of such a sentence, by way of the determinant of what occasions the use of such a sentence by him. The state of thus being embraced, again, means the state of what is liable to comprehension as the (invariable) substantive in the verbal knowledge occurring from such a sentence, being addressed. Hence the sentence, *caitra* ! *Vraja* gives the verbal knowledge of *caitra*, possessed of such a state of the addressed being possessed of the act of going that has been approved of (by the speaker of the said sentence).[1]

Opponents argue : But such an explanation wonld involve violation of the principle of semantics. For none other than a number, denoted by a declensional suffix is held liable to comprehensioa as a feature against the meaning of the base of the said suffix.

Jagadīśa replies : There is no such hard and fast rule that everything other than a number, denoted by a declensional suffix is to be comprehended as a substantive of the meaning of the base thereof.[2] .

Opponents argue : The state of the addressed must be said to have the invariable substantive as its substantive. For otherwise the relation of the state of the addressed cannot be singled out in cases like *chatrin* ! *tuṣṭo vraja* bringing in the risk of verbal knowledge not occnrring from such a sentence, at all.

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1. वक्तृनिष्ठविलक्षणबोधविशेष्यत्वं वा, तथा च तादृशसम्बोध्यत्ववांश्चैत्रोऽनुमतव्रजनवानित्याकारस्तत्र बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 353.

   तथा च स्वप्रयोजकतावच्छेदकस्ववक्तृबोधीयविशेष्यत्वं स्वजन्यशाब्दबोधविषयसम्बोध्यत्वमिति निष्कर्षः। कृष्णकांती p. 353.

2. संख्यातिरिक्तसुबर्थस्य प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यत्वनियमात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 353–54.

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Jagadīśa replies : In a sentence like *chatrin* ! *tuṣṭo vraja*, it is against the meaning of the word, *chatrin* that the meaning of the word, *tuṣṭa* is comprehended as a feature through the relation of identity. For the prepositional inflection carrying the sense of the vocative is capable of bringing about the syntactical relation of the state of being addressed, denoted by itself, posited as a feature against what being presented by the base thereof is embraced as the invariable substantive in the resultant verbal knowledge. Because otherwise, i.e. in case, the state of being addressed, denoted by the prepositional inflection carrying the sense of the vocative, is held capable of bringing about the syntactical relation of the said state of being addressed, posited as a feature against the meaning of the base thereof notwithstanding its being posited as a feature against what is other than the meaning of the base, the word, *chatriṇ* and the word *daṇḍin* in '*chatrin* ! *daṇḍin*' would come out to signify identical individuals as in the case of *chatrī daṇḍī*, being used in apposition. The syntactical relation of the state of being addressed with both would lead to the non-comprehension of the condition and the conditioned. Hence it is needless to point out that the state of being addressed, the meaning of the first prepositional inflection carrying the sense of the vocative is posited as a feature against the invariable substantive.[1]

Opponents argue : The apprehension of *chatrin* and *daṇḍin* in '*chatrin dandin*' being syntactically related through identity can be dispensed with by imagining that the said sequence is not to occasion such a situation. It is no argument that like *chatrī ḍaṇḍī*, *chatrin daṇḍin* too involve the two nominals used in apposition to call for

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1. 'छत्तिन् ! तुष्टो व्रजे'त्यादौ तु छत्रिण्येव तुष्टस्याभेदो भासते, न तु तुष्टे छत्रिणः, प्रकृत्यर्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव स्वार्थसम्बोध्यत्वस्यान्वये सम्बुद्धिसुपः सामर्थ्यात्, अन्यथा 'छत्री दण्डी'त्यत्रेव छत्रिन् दण्डिनित्यत्रापि छत्रिदण्डिनोरभेदबोधापत्तेः, तदुपयुक्तस्य नाम्नोः समानविभक्तिकत्वस्याविशिष्टत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 354.

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identical verbal knowledge. For in that case *ghaṭaṁ yatate* too should give the verbal knowledge of agency (of an act) that has a jar as its object, identically with *ghaṭam karoti.*[1]

Jagadīśa replies : Even then like *chatrin* ! *tuṣṭo vrajatu, chatrin* ! *daṇḍi vrajatu* would be used in language.[2]

Opponents argue : If the first prepositional inflection denotes the state of being addressed then *'he caitra* !' and the like cannot bear out any verbal knowledge. For the meaning of the first prepositional inflection viz, the state of being addressed cannot be syntactically related to what is possessed of the meaning of the word, *he* viz, the state of being addressed, expectancy lacking.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is uncalled for. Because neither of the synonyms combinedly used are redundant. For otherwise, *karoti* and the like would not give any verbal knowledge. Because the root-verb, *kṛ* and the verbal termination, *ti* are synonyms and combinedly used.[4]

In *sumitrāmātaḥ* ! *naitatte vtcitraṁ citrayodhinaḥ,* the first prepositional inflection carrying the sense of the vocative, denotes the state of being eulogised (*praśaṁśyatva*) in addition to the state of being addressed. For in the com-

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1. ननु तादृशान्वयबोधे उक्तकांक्षाया अप्रयोजकत्वकल्पनादेव तादृशवाक्यादभेदान्वयबोधापत्तिर्न सम्भवति, कथमन्यथा घटं करोतीति वाक्यादिव घटं यतते इत्यादिवाक्यात् न घटकर्मताककृतिबोधः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 354.

2. 'छत्रिन् ! तुष्टो व्रजतु' इतिवत् 'छत्रिन् दण्डी व्रजतु' इत्यपि प्रयोगापाताच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 354.

3. ननु सम्बोध्यत्वस्य प्रथमार्थत्वे 'हे चैत्र !' इत्यादौ हेशब्दार्थसम्बोध्यत्वविशिष्टे प्रथमार्थस्य तस्यान्वये निराकांक्षत्वेन शाब्दबोधः कथं स्यात्? कृष्णकान्ती p. 354.

4. हे चैत्र ! इत्यादौ तु सम्भेदे नान्यतरवैयर्थ्यात्। श. श. प्र. p. 354.

अन्यथा करोतीत्यादौ शाब्दबोधो न स्यादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 354.

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pound, *sumitrā-mātṛka* the vowel, *ṛ* and the letter *ka* have been substituted by the vowel *a* to bear out the said sense.[1]

In *dhṛtiḥ svāhā*, the first prepositional inflection is used in place of the fourth one. If however, such an explanation is not accepted, it may be so said that the first prepositional inflection in this case bears out the sense of the state of being in view (*uddeśyatva*).[2]

In *dakṣiṇena grāmaṁ, uttareṇa panthānaṁ*, the second prepositional inflection is provided for by the rule *dakṣiṇottarābhyām eno'pañcamyāḥ*. It means 'in the vicinity of'. Hence the verbal knowledge that occurs from such a sentence is like this : what is (situated) on the south or the north of the village or of the road.[3]

Opponents ask : How then, the use like '*tatrāgāraṁ dhanapati-gṛhāduttarenāsmadiyam*, is made in the face of the said rule providing for the use of the second prepositional inflection when used with a the word, *dakṣiṇa* or *uttara* ending in the suffix, *ena* (*enap*).

Jagadīśa replies : An exception to a general rule ts overridden by the said general rule itself, at itmes. Hence the general rule that provides for the fifth prepositional inflection to a radical used in juxtaposition with a word, denotative of a direction over-rides in the present instance, the exception thereto providing the second prepositional inflection, to give the said form.[4]

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1. 'सुमित्रामात ! नैतत्ते विचित्रं चित्रयोधिन'इत्यादौ सम्बोध्यत्वमिव प्रशंस्यत्वमपि सम्बुद्धिसुपामर्थः; तत्रैव मातृकस्य ऋकारादेरकारोद्देशात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 354-55.
2. 'धृतिः स्वाहा' इत्यादौ प्रथमादेश्चतुर्थ्याद्यनादेशे तस्या एव उद्देश्यत्वमर्थः। ibid., p. 355.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 355; Vide also पा. II. 3. 31.
4. तत्रागारं धनपतिगृहादुत्तरेणास्मदीयमि'त्यादौ तु 'क्वचिदपवादविषयेऽप्युत्सर्गः' इति न्यायात् दिगर्थयोगित्वात् पञ्चम्यपि। श. श. प्र. p. 355. Vide also पा. II. 3. 29.

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According to the followers of Pāṇini, the said use is justified by the rule, *dūrāntikārthaiḥ ṣaṣṭhyanyatarasyām.*[1]

In *vṛkṣambhi* (*pari prati anu vā*) *dyotate vidyut*, the particles, (not connected with a verb) that govern a noun in some case, like *abhi*, *pari*, *prati* or *anu* (collectively known as *karmapravacanīyas*) mean 'having aimed at' (*lakṣīkṛtya*). Hence the said expression gives the verbal knowledge like this : lightening flashes having aimed at (i.e. resting on) the tree. The second prepositional inflection (suffixed to the word, *vṛkśa*), therefore, means the state of being the counter-co-relate of the state of what rests (thereon).[2]

Opponents argue : Only when a particle like *abhi* means pervasion (*vīpsā*), the second prepositional inflection can present the said meaning.[3] But in case, it happens to mean 'betraying' (*lakṣaṇa*) and the like, the said inflection cannot be claimed to have the said denotation.

Jagadīśa replies : In such cases, the second prepositional inflection is to serve as what indicates the relation of *vṛkṣa* and the like with the meaniag of the particle concerned through the state of being the counter-co-relate.[4]

Opponents argue : In *prājñaṁ pratibhoyamarthaḥ* or in *prājñam pratibhāya vartate*, if the word, *prati* means 'having aimed at', it cannot be regarded a prefix (*upasarga*) and unless it is a prefix, it cannot call for the suffix, *ḍa* or *lyap* to be added to the word, constituted thereof. Conversely, if it is a prefix, it

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1. पा. II. 3. 34.
2. वृक्षमभि, परि, प्रति, अनु वा द्योतते विद्युदित्यादावभ्यादेः कर्मप्रवचनीयस्य लक्ष्यीकृत्येत्यर्थः, तेन वृक्षं लक्ष्यीकृत्याश्रित्य प्रकाशते विद्युदित्येव वाक्यार्थ इत्याश्रितत्वान्वयिनिरूपितत्वमेव तत्र द्वितीयया बोध्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 355.
3. अभ्यादेर्वीप्सार्थस्थले द्वितीयायास्तदर्थकत्वसम्भवात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 355.
4. 'अभ्यादेर्लक्षणाद्यर्थे निरूपितत्वादिसम्बन्धेन वृक्षादेरन्वयधियं प्रत्येव वा तदर्थकपदोत्तरं द्वितीयाऽपेक्षिता। श. श. प्र. p. 355.

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cannot call for the use of the second prepositional inflection to be added to the word, *prājña*.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *prati* in the said instance is only a prefix (*upasarga*) forming into the root-verb, *prati-bhā* bearing the sense of quick realisation.[2]

Opponents ask : How then should the second prepositional inflection be suffixed to the word, *prājña* ?

Jagadīśa replies : The second prepositional inflection is used as a substitute of the sixth one as provided for by the rule '*ṣaṣṭhyarthe dvitīyā vā pratibhāteḥ*. The said expression, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge like this : this matter is a content of quick realisation, the genius of the wise.[3]

In *Vṛkṣamabhi* (*pari, prati, anu vā*) *Vāyasāḥ*, the particle *abhi* means pervasion (*vyāpti*) and the second prepositional inflection means the state of abiding (*niṣṭhatva*) to give the comprehension of birds abiding all over the trees.[4]

In *pitaramabhi pari* (*pratyanu vā*) *caitraḥ*, the particle means 'being thus' and the second prepositional inflection means the state of abiding to give the verbal knowledge of *caitra* being thus to his father i.e., *caitra* being thus possessed of the community of properties abiding his father.[5]

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1. ननु प्राज्ञप्रतिभोऽयमर्थ इत्यादौ प्रतिशब्दस्य लक्ष्यीकरणार्थकत्वे उपसर्गत्वाभावेन डप्रत्ययो न स्यात् , उपसर्गत्वे तु कर्मप्रवचनीयताविरहेण द्वितीया न स्यात् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 355.
2. प्रतिभातेस्त्वरया स्फुरणमर्थः, न तु प्रतेर्लक्ष्यीकरणम्, उपसर्गे त्वातो डस्य, क्त्वो ल्यपश्च विधानानुपपत्तेः । श. श. प्र. pp. 355-56.
3. परन्तु प्रतिभातेर्योगे षष्ठ्येव द्वितीययापि तदर्थः सम्बन्धोऽनुभाष्यते, 'षष्ठ्यर्थे द्वितीया वा प्रतिभाते'रित्यनुशिष्टेः, तेन प्राज्ञस्य या प्रतिभा झटिति स्फुर्त्तिस्तद्विषयतावानयमर्थ इत्येवं तत्र बोधः । श. श. प्र. p. 356.
4. 'वृक्षं वृक्षमभि परि प्रति अनु वा वायसा' इति वीप्सास्थलेऽपि प्रतिवृक्षवृक्षत्वो वायसा इत्यर्थः । ibid., p. 356.
5. 'पितरमभिपरि प्रत्यनु वायसा चैत्र' इत्यत्र इत्थम्भूतार्थकैरभ्यादिभिः 'पितरीत्थम्भूतश्चैत्र' इत्यन्वयबोधः । ibid., p. 356.

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In *yanmāṁ prati* (*pari vā*) *taddehi*, the particle, *prati* means 'share' and the second prepositional inflection means 'relation' thereof to give the verbal knowledge like this : give my share.[1]

In *kārīrīmanuvṛṣṭiḥ*, the particle, *anu* means causality and the second prepositional inflection means the state of abiding to give the verbal knowledge of rains, the causality (in resepect) of which abides the sacrifice named *kārīrī* i.e. rains caused by the sacrifice called, *kārīrī*.[2]

The word, *anu* in *śūramanuyudhyate*, *daridramanuyācate* and the like means 'with' to give the verbal knowledge like (one) fighting with (one's) enemy, begging along with the poor and so on.[3]

In *upārjunam kṣatriyāḥ*; *anu devaṁ dānavāḥ* the particle, *upa* or *anu* means 'weaker in strength' to give the verbal knowledge of *kṣatriyas* (being) weaker in strength than Arjuna or of demons' (being) weaker in strength than gods.[4]

Opponents argue : The grammarians hold that the particles, *abhi* carrying the sense of betraying (*lakṣaṇa*) or of pervasion (*vīpsā*) or of being thus(*ithambhūta*) and the particle, *prati*, *pari* or *anu* carrying the sense of all these and of share (*bhāga*) and in the sense of 'with' and of weaker in strength in addition thereto and the particle, *upa* meaning weaker in strength, are *karmapravacanīyas*. The particle, *anu* is not admitted to be denotative of causality.[5]

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1. 'यन्मां प्रति परि वा तद्देहि' इत्यादौ प्रतिपरिभ्यामुपस्थिते भागे मत्सम्बन्धो द्वितीयया बोध्यते, तेन यो मदीयो भागस्तं देहीत्येवं तत्र बोधः । ibid., p. 356.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 356.
3. ibid., p. 356.
4. ibid., p. 356.
5. न च—

लक्षणवीप्सेत्थम्भूतेष्वभिर्भागे च परिप्रती ।
अनुरेषु सहार्थे च हीने च उपश्च कथ्यते ॥

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Jagadīśa replies : The word, *lakṣaṇa* denotes causality too.[1]

In view of the uses like *naramadhi guṇa-doṣayościntā* (virtue and vice are taken account of only in respect of man) or *ntśārdham vā pūjā-samayamadhivā yastu paṭhati* (one who recites (the *kālikā-stava,* read in *mahākāla-saṁhitā*) at dead of night or keeping in view the time of worship) in which the particle, *adhi* is found to mean 'in respect of' or 'keeping in view' (i.e. having aimed at, *lakṣī-kṛtya*), it is reasonably held to be included in the list of *karma-pravacanīya,* calling for the use of the second prepositional inflection.[2]

The indeclinables like *samayā*; *nikaṣā* are denotative of proximity. Hence a sentence like *samayā grāmaṁ* gives the verbal knowledge of what is close to the village, the second prepositional inflection meaning the state of being the limit (*avadhi*) of proximity or the state of being the counter-corelate thereof.[3]

In *vidyāmṛte, antarā'ntareṇa vinā vā naraḥ śocyaḥ,* the indeclinable like *ṛte* (or *antarā* or *vinā* or *antareṇa*) means absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) or the state of being possessed thereof to give the verbal knowledge like this : a man possessed of the absolute negation of learning is to be

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इत्यत्रानोहंतुतार्थे कर्मंप्रवचनीयत्वस्याकथनात् नेदं युक्तमिति वाच्यम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 356.

1. तत्र लक्षणशब्दादेर्हेतुताया अपि प्राप्तेः । ibid., p. 356.

Vide also पा. I. 4. 84; I. 4. 86; I. 4. 90; I. 4. 90.

2. 'नरमधि गुणदोषयोश्चिन्ता, निशार्द्धं वा पूजासमयमधि वा यस्तु पठती'त्यादिप्रयोगात् लक्ष्यीकृत्यार्थकस्याधिशब्दस्यापि योगे द्वितीयामिच्छन्ति । श. श. प्र. p. 357.

3. समया निकषा चाव्ययं सामीप्यार्थकं, तेन तद्योगे 'समया ग्राममि'त्यादौ च ग्रामस्य समीपमित्यन्वये ग्रामाद्यवधिकत्वं तत्प्रतियोगिकत्वं वा द्वितीयया बोध्यते । ibid., p. 367. Vide also पा. II. 3. 32.

Vide also अभितः परितः समयानिकषाहाप्रतियोगेऽपि । (वार्तिक) Vide सि. कौ. 544.

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pitied upon; the second prepositional inflection meaning the state of being the counter-positive of the said negation.[1]

In *gaganamṛte dravyaṁ na śabda-vat*, the indeclinable, *ṛte* means difference (*bheda*) to give the verbal knowledge like this : A substance other than ether is not characterised by sound, the second prepositional inflection meaning the state of the counterpositive of such difference.[2]

In *hā ! putraṁ*, the indeclinable, *hā* means misery to give the verbal knowledge like this : 'alas ! my son, misery has befallen you', the second prepositional inflection meaning the state of being inherent.[3]

In *dhik ! putraṁ*, the indeclinable, *dhik* means censure giving the verbal knowledge of a father stretched out to censure his son, the second prepositional inflection signifying (the son as) the object (of censure).[4]

Opponents ask : How then in *hā ! pitaḥ kvāst, he subhru*, the second prepositional inflection is not suffixed to the word, *pitṛ* ?

Jagadīśa replies : In it, misery that has befallen oneself is conveyed by the word, *hā* and not the misery befallen one's father. As such, the said inflection is not suffixed to the word, *pitṛ*.[5]

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1. 'विद्यामृते, अन्तरेणाऽन्तरा विना वा नरः शोच्यः' इत्यादौ ऋतेप्रभृत्यन्ययानामत्यन्ताभावस्तद्वैशिष्टयं वाऽर्थ इति 'विद्यात्यन्ताभाववान् नरः शोच्यः' इत्यन्वयेऽत्यन्ताभावेऽन्वितं प्रतियोगित्वम् द्वितीयार्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 357.
   Vide also पा. II. 3. 4.
2. गगनमृते द्रव्यं न शब्दवदित्यादौ तूक्ताऽव्ययानां भेदोऽप्यर्थः, तेन गगनभिन्नं द्रव्यं न शब्दवदित्याकारकस्तत्र बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 357.
3. 'हा पुत्रमि'त्यत्र हाऽव्ययस्यार्थे कष्टे द्वितीयान्तेन पुत्रसमवेतत्वं बोध्यते। ibid., p. 357.
4. 'धिक पुत्रमि'त्यत्र धिगर्थंगर्हायां पुत्रविषयित्वम्। ibid., p. 357.
5. 'हा पितः क्वासि हे सुभ्रु वल्गेवं विललाप स' (भट्टिकाव्यम् 8. 11.)। इत्यादौ स्वगतमेव कष्टं हाशब्देन बोध्यते, न तु पित्रादिगतम्। ibid., p. 357.

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Opponents ask : How then in *putrasya dhikkāraḥ*, the second prepositional inflection is not suffixed to the word, *putra* ?

Jagadīśa replies : In it, the meaning of the word, *putra* is not syntactically related to the meaning of the indeclinable, *dhik* but to that of the word, *dhikkāra*. Hence the said inflection is not used.[1]

In *putreṇa vināकṛtaḥ*, too, the third prepositional inflection is suffixed to the word, *putra*. For the meaning of the word, *putra* is not syntantactily related to the meaning of the indeclinable, *vinā* but to that of the word, *vinā-kṛta*.[2]

Others, however, hold that the indeclinable, *vinā* calls for the third or the fifth prepositional inflection too, as in *ghaṭena vinā* or *ghaṭād vinā*. Hence in their view, the use of the third prepositional inflection in the instance, cited is grammatically sound, otherwise too.[3]

In *uparyupari gṛham patākā*, the particle, *upari* is doubly used to signify the nearest half to give the verbal knowledge of flags (flying) on the nearest (to the ground) half of a building. In *adho'dho meghamambhaḥ, adhyadi śikharaṁ ghanaḥ* also the particle, *adhaḥ* or *adhi* means the nearest half. The use of the second prepositional inflection in all such cases is called for by the particles like *upari* or *adhaḥ* or *adhi* doubly used to mean nearness as provided for grammarians.[4]

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1. 'पुत्रस्य धिक्कार' इत्यादौ तु न धिगित्यस्यार्थे पुत्राद्यन्वयः किन्तु धिक्कारादिपदस्य । ibid., p. 357.
2. एवं 'पुत्रेण विनाकृतश्चैत्र' इत्यादौ न विनेत्यस्यार्थे, परन्तु विनाकृतपदस्य । श. श. प्र. pp. 357-58.
3. विनाऽव्ययस्य योगे द्वितीयामिव तृतीयापञ्चम्यावपीच्छन्ति, 'घटेन विना, घटाद् विना' इत्यपि प्रयुक्तेः । ibid., p. 358.
4. द्विरुपर्य्यधोऽधीनां सामीप्यवाचितायां तद्योगे द्वितीयाऽनुशिष्टेः । ibid., p. 358.

Vide also 'उपर्य्यधोऽधीनां सामीप्य एवे'ति वृत्तिकारोक्तेरिति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 358.

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Opponents argue : In *sarvesām madyamamlānāmuparyyupari vartate / atrātā śaraṇaṁ yātaṁ yātaṁ yātyadhodhaśca durgateḥ*, the particles, *upari* and *adhaḥ* have been doubly used. But the second peepositional inflection is not used.

Jagadīśa replies : In this instance, the said particles although doubly used do not convey the sense of nearness but of extremity. Hence the use of the second prepositional inflection has not been called for.[1]

In *gṛhamabhitaḥ puratarunāḥ*, the indeclinable *abhitaḥ* through different powers of denotation means 'all around'. Thereupon, the state of the parts (*avayavatva*), denoted by the second prepositional inflection is syntactically related to 'all', a constituent of the said meaning of the wod, *abhitaḥ*. Hence the said sentence gives a verbal knowledge like this : the youths of the city are all the parts of the house, around.[2]

As such, although the word, *abhitaḥ*, denotative of such a meaning is not regarded as a *karma-pravacauiya*, it calls for the use of the second prepositional inflection.[3] Similar are the cases in *gṛhaṁ paritaḥ sarvataḥ ubhayato vā* and the like.[4]

In *nadīm yāvad mama puraṁ* and in *gṛhaṁ yāvaddhanaṁ tava*, the indeclinable, *yāvat* means limit conclusive (*maryādā*) and iimit inceptive (*abhividhi*) respectively, to give the verbal knowledge like this : my city extends upto the river and your wealth is inclusive of the house. By extending upto the river means being close thereto, not being remote from

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1. सर्वेषां मद्यमम्लानाम्.....इत्यादौ द्विरुक्तस्याप्युपर्य्यादेर्न सामीप्यमर्थः परन्त्वतिशयः। श. श. प्र. p. 358.
2. 'गृहमभितः पुरतरुणाः' इत्यत्र अभितःशब्दस्य खण्डशो वृत्त्या सर्वावच्छेदेनेत्यर्थः, तदेकदेशे च सर्वस्मिन् गृहावयवत्वं द्वितीयायाऽनुभाव्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 351.
3. अत्रेदमवधेयम्—एतादृशार्थेऽभितःशब्दस्य कर्मप्रवचनीयत्वाभावेऽपि द्वितीयानुशिष्टैर्वक्तव्यत्वमिति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 358.
4. 'गृहं परितः, सर्वत उभयतो'वा इत्यत्राप्युक्तरीत्यैवान्वयः। श. श. प्र. p. 358.

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its limit and by 'inclusive of the house' means being associated with all, constituting the house.[1]

In '*māsam supyate, krośam gamyate*' and the like the second prepositional inflection, provided for by the rule, *kālādhvanor-atyanta-saṁyoge* (Pā II. 3. 3) denotes limit inceptive. Hence the sentences, cited give 'the verbal knowledges of' sleep extending over a month and of the state of the object of movement extending over two miles (*krośa*).[2] By extending over a month means being in the time that has been the locus, through the relation of collective extensity (*paryāpti*), of totality (*yāvattva*), the determinant of the state of locus, abiding a month. A month is the locus of the totality of the days that constitute it. Totality, the determinant of the state of locus, abiding a month is in the days that constitute a month, through the relation of collective extensity. Sleep extending over a month, therefore, means extending over the number of days, constituting a month, the locus of the totality (of days constituting a month), the determinant of the state of locus abiding a month through the relation of collective extensity. Or it may mean being qualified by what is other than the determinant of counterpositiveness of the negation, abiding the locus of totality of days, constituting a particular single month through the relation of collective extensity, (*vyāpakatva*). Being extended over two miles, in the same manner, may either mean being in the space, the locus, through the relation of collectlve extensity, of totality, the determinant of the state of

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1. 'नदीं यावन्मम पुरं, गृहं यावद्धनं तव' इत्यत्र यावदित्यव्ययस्य मर्यादा अभिविधिश्च क्रमेणार्थः, तेन नदीपर्य्यन्तं मत्पुरं, गृहाभिव्याप्तं त्वद्धनमित्याकारस्तत्र बोधः । तत्पर्य्यन्तत्वञ्च तदवधिकविप्रकर्षशून्यत्वे सति तत्सन्निकृष्टत्वम् । तदभिव्याप्तत्वमपि प्रकृते तदारब्धकयावदवयवावच्छेदेन तत्संयुक्तत्वम् । ibid., p. 358-59.

2. 'मासं सुप्यते, क्रोशं गम्यते' इत्यादौ कालाध्वनोरत्यन्तसंयोगे (पा. II. 3. 3) इत्यनुशिष्टेर्द्वितीययाऽभिव्याप्तिरुच्यते, तेन मासाभिव्याप्तः स्वापः, क्रोशाभिव्याप्तं गतेः कर्मत्वमित्यादिकस्तत्र बोधः । श. श. प्र. p. 359.

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locus, abiding the space of journey of two miles or being qualified by what is other than the determinant of counter-positiveness of the negation, abiding the locus of totality of the points of space, constituting the particular two miles, through the relation of collective extensity.[1]

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1. तत्र मासादेरभिव्याप्तिर्मासवृत्त्यधिकरणतावच्छेदकीभूतयावत्त्वपर्य्याप्त्यधिकरणकालवृत्तित्वं तथाविधयत्किञ्चिद्यावत्त्वव्यापकत्वं वा, क्रोशादेस्तु क्रोशगम्यदेशवृत्त्यधिकरणतावच्छेदकीभूतयावत्त्वपर्य्याप्त्यधिकरणदेशवृत्तित्वं यथाविधयत्किञ्चिद्यावत्त्वव्यापकत्वं वेतिमन्तव्यम्। ibid., pp. 359-60.

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CHAPTER XXIV

PREPOSITIONAL INFLECTION
(TṚTĪYĀ)

The oft-quoted instance of the third prepositional inflection is *akṣṇā kāṇaḥ*. In it, the word, *kāṇaḥ* signifies a person who being possessed of an eye-ball, devoid of sight is possessed of an eye-ball with sight.[1] It does not denote being possessed of an eye-ball, devoid of sight. For in that case, a person, blind since birth would also be signified by it.[2] Nor should it signify a person, gone blind later. Hence has the clause 'possessed of eye-ball with sight, been incorporated in the body of the meaning of the word, *kāṇa*.[3]

The third prepositional inflection has a two-fold meaning, viz., being perverted (or deformed) and being or abiding. Of these, the first one, viz., being perverted is embraced as a feature, like 'being addressed', against the meaning of the radical of the prepositional inflection. The other one viz., being or abiding is posited as a feature against a constituent of the meaning of the word, *kāṇa*, viz., being devoid of sight. Hence the verbal knowledge from the sentence, cited embraces one who being possessed of an eye-ball, marked by (the state

1. 'अचणा काण' इत्यत्र चक्षुःशून्यगोलकवत्वे सति सचक्षुर्गोलकवान् काणः। श. श. प्र. p. 360.
2. प्रसवान्धस्य काणत्वाभावात्। ibid-, p. 360.
3. पश्चादन्धस्य सचक्षुर्गोलकवत्वविशेषणेन वारणसम्भवात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 361.

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of) being devoid of sight, abiding the perverted eye-ball, is possessed of sight'[1].

Opponents argue: Such kind of a verbal knowledge might have the sanction of the followers of the *kalāpa* school of grammar. But the rules of Pāṇini does not approve of any such verbal knowledge from the sentence, cited.

Jagadīśa replies: The purport of the relevant rule, provided for by Pāṇini is in agreement with what the rule of *kalāpa* provides for. For the word, *vikāra* in Pāṇini's rule, means the loss of usual configuration.[2]

Opponents argue: The word, *kāṇa*, then should signify a person, possessed of an eye-ball with sight coupled with the loss of sight, abiding the ball of the other eye, not externally formed.[3]

Jagadīśa replies: The loss of sight means the destruction of sight, abiding the locus of the absolute negation of sight, collocatively abiding with the counter-positive thereof. The idea is this: Sight and the absolute negation of sight is in the perverted eye-ball in reference to different periods of time. As such, the perverted eye-ball is the common locus of sight and the absolute negation of sight. At the same time, the said eye-ball is the common locus of the absolute negation of sight and the destruction of sight. In the case of a person, possessed of an eye-ball with sight, coupled with the loss of sight, abiding the ball of the other eye not externally formed,

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1. गोलकार्थकाक्षिपदोत्तरतृतीयायास्तु विकृतत्वं वृत्तिमत्त्वबद्धार्थः, तत्राद्यं सत्त्वोद्देश्यत्वमिव प्रकृत्यर्थे विशेषणविधयान्वितम्, काणत्वैकदेशे च चक्षुःशून्यत्वे प्रकृत्यर्थं निरूपितं चरमम्, तथा च विकृतगोलकवृत्तित्वविशिष्टं यच्चक्षुःशून्यत्वं तद्वद्गोलकवान् सचक्षुष्क इत्याकारस्तत्र बोधः। श. श. प्र. pp. 360–361.
2. पाणिनेरपि येनाङ्गविकार (2. 3. 20) इति सूत्रस्योक्तार्थे एव तात्पर्यात्। विकृतत्वन्तु विरूपत्वमयथासंस्थानत्वपर्य्यवसितं 'कुत्सितेऽङ्गे' इति कलापस्यैकवाक्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 361.
3. नन्वेवं महाचक्षुर्नाशेऽपि काणत्वापत्तिः। कण्ठकान्ती p. 361,

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such collocation is wanting. There is no reason, therefore, to apprehend that the word, *kāṇa* should signify such a person.[1]

Opponents argue : Loss or drstruction and absolute negation are never collocative.

Jagadīśa replies : It is matter of hard experience that *ghaṭo nāsti* is used in language to signify the absolute negation, in the two halves, of a jar, prior to the appearance of the jar or subsequent to the destruction of the jar, equally abiding therein.

In *pādena khañjaḥ*, the word, *khañja* means one, possessed of legs devoid of normal configuration. The third prepositional inflection means deformity and abiding. Of these, deformity is embraced as a feature against the meaning of the base, viz., *pāda* and abiding against the state of being devoid of normal configuration, a constituent of the meaning of the word, *khañja*, Hence the said sentence gives the verbal knowledge of one, possessed of legs, marked by the loss of normal configuration, abiding the deformed leg. It may also be so held that the third prepositional inflection, suffixed to the word, *pāda* means the state of being occasioned by deformity of a leg, to be related as a feature against the loss of normal configuration, a constituent of the meaning of the word, *khañja* to give the verbal knowledge of one, having the leg, the locus

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1. यद्वा स्वाधिष्ठानवृत्तित्वसम्बन्धेन चक्षुःशून्यो यश्चक्षुर्विनाशस्तद्वान् सचक्षुष्कः काणपदस्यार्थस्तादृशे च विनाशे अस्तिपदस्यार्थस्य गोलकस्य विकारप्रयुक्तत्वं तृतीयया बोध्यते, तथा च गोलकविकारप्रयुक्तस्य निरुक्तसम्बन्धेन चक्षुःशून्यस्य चक्षुर्नाशस्याश्रयः सचक्षुष्क इत्याकारस्तत्र बोधः, विकारस्तु कनीनिकाद्यपगमरूपो ग्राह्यः। श. श. प्र. p. 361.

तथा च स्वाधिकरणवृत्तित्वसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकात्यन्ताभावविशिष्टो यश्चक्षुर्नाशस्तद्वान् सचक्षुष्क इत्यर्थः। तथा च महाचक्षुर्नाशेऽपि तादृशनाशस्य निरुक्तसम्बन्धेन चक्षुरत्यन्ताभावत्वाभावात् न काणत्वापत्तिरिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 361.

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of the loss of usual configuration, occasioned by the deformed leg.[1]

The sentence like *śrotreṇa vadhiraḥ* gives the same kind of verbal knowledge—viz., of one possessed of ears, having the loss of normal structure, abiding the deformed ear or of one possessed of ear, the locus of the loss of normal structure, occasioned by the deformity of ear.

Similarly *kāyena vāmanaḥ* also bears out the comprehension of one, possessed of body, marked with the negation of(normal), structure thereof, (although) not due to deformity (caused by the removal of any part of the body or the like as in other cases referred to).[2]

Opponents argue : The aphorism that provides for the use of the third prepositional inflection in all such cases reads '*yenāṅga-vikārāḥ*[3] (or *kutsiteṅge*)[4] and the word *aṅga* signifies a part of the body. As such the word, *kāya* cannot be suffixed with the said inflection.

Jgaadīśa replies : The word, *aṅga* in the said aphorism is used in the sense of what functions as the locus of physical efforts.[5]

In *mukheṇa trilocanoḥ, kāyena daśavaktraḥ,* the third prepositional inflection means deformity in case possession of three

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1. 'पादेन खञ्ज' इत्यत्र सहजसंस्थानशून्यचरणवान् खञ्जः, तथा च तत्राप्युक्तरीत्या विकृतपादवृत्तित्वविशिष्टं यत्सहजसंस्थानशून्यत्वं तद्वच्चरणवान्, चरणविकारप्रयुक्तस्य यथोचितसंस्थानवैधुर्यस्याश्रयीभूतचरणवानिति वा तत्र बोधः। Ibid., pp. 361-62.
2. 'श्रोत्रेण वधिरः' 'कायेन वामन' इत्यादावप्युक्तैव रीतिः। श. श. प्र. p. 361.
3. पा. II. 3. 20.
4. Vide श. श. प्र. p. 361.
5. अङ्गपदस्य प्रयत्नावच्छेदकोपलक्षकत्वादिति वदन्ति। ibid., p. 362.

स्वमतेऽङ्गपदं शरीरपरं, शरीरस्वन्तु चेष्टावन्मात्रत्वम्, अतो वदन्तीत्युक्तम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 362.

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eyes or ten heads is considered as a mark of deformity of face; otherwise the said inflection, in such cases, may be taken to mean the state of being possessed of.[1]

In *jaṭābhistāpasaḥ*, a mendicant, possessed of tufts of hair is comprehended and thus the third prepositional Inflection being suffixed to a word, signifying an attribute, is virtually denotative of the state of being possessed of. The state of being possessed of, however, in such an instance does not mean the state of being the locus or substratum or of being related as such but of being possessed of the negation of the meaning of the base of the said inflection. For otherwise, the uses like *meyatvena ghaṭaḥ* would come to be validly used in language, notwithstanding the fact that the state of being comprehensible (*meyatva*) is no attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of jar for not excluding jar from what are other than jar.[2] Hence the said sentence gives the verbal knowledge of a mendicant, singled out from those, possessed of the negation of tufts of hair.[3]

Opponents ask : The tufts of hair cannot be comprehended as an attribute of mendicant. At the most, it may be liable to comprehension as a distinctive feature (*uplakṣaṇa*) thereof.

Jagadīśa observes : The meaning of the base of the third prepositional inflection is liable to comprehension as an attribute in case the said inflection bears out the apprehension thereof as contemorary (with the predicate) and as a distinct-

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1. 'मुखेन त्रिलोचनः, कायेन दशवक्त्र' इत्यादौ तु यदि लोचनत्रयादिमत्तया मुखादिवैकृत्यमवबुध्यते, तदा विकार एव तृतीया, नोचेद्वैशिष्ट्यमात्रे। श. श. प्र. p. 362.
2. 'जटाभिस्तापस'इत्यादितो जटाविशिष्टस्तापस इत्याद्यनुभवेन विशेषणेऽनुशिष्टतृतीयाया वैशिष्ट्यवाचितायां पर्यवसितेः। वैशिष्ट्यञ्चात्र नाधिकरणत्वं सम्बन्धितामात्रं वा, 'मेयत्वेन घट' इत्यपि प्रयोगापत्तेः, परन्त्वतद्व्यावृत्तत्वम्। श. श. प्र. pp. 362-63.
3. तथा च अजटव्यावृत्तिमांस्तापस इत्याकारस्तत्र फलितार्थः। ibid., p. 363.

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ive feature, if otherwise as in *sikhayā parivrājako vartate, guruṇā ṭikā* or *kuruṇā kṣetram* and so on.[1]

In *putreṇa sahā'gataḥ, sūpena sārdham bhuktaḥ, cakreṇa sārdham daṇḍena janitaḥ, putreṇa samam mitrāya dānam* and so on, the indiclinable, *saha* and the like mean temporal co-existence with the act involved, qualified by the state of the agent or some such case, posited as a feature against itself (the act). The third prepositional inflection bears out the comprehension of the state of abiding what the base thereof means, posited as a feature against the state of the agent or any other relevant case, a constituent of what the indeclinable, *saha* means. The said sentences, therefore, give the verbal knowledges like this : (He is) possessed of agency of the act of coming, contemporary with the act of coming, the agency of which is in the son; (it is) the object of the act of eating, contemporary wlth the act of eating, the state of the object of which is in the curry; (its) origin is rooted in the state of instrumentality, abiding the staff of the act of origination, contemporary with the act of origination, the state of instrumentality of which is in the wheel; the act of going to a friend, contemporary with the act of giving to one's son.[2]

Opponents arguee : Co-existence (*sāhitya*) cannot mean the state of being contemporary. For the elders say that co-existence means the state of being identically related to one and the same act.

Jagadīśa replies : The purport of what the elders say is that co-existence means the state of being contemporary. The state of being contemporary, again means the state of two acts of identical nature, because of being liable to comprehension as related to one and the same case-(relation) involved, being

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1. इदन्तु बोध्यम्–प्रकृत्यर्थस्य निरूक्तवैशिष्ट्यं यदि वर्त्तमानतया तया प्रत्याय्यते, तदेदं विशेषणत्वेन, यदि चावर्त्तमानत्वेन तदोपलक्षणत्वेन व्यपदिश्यते, यथा शिखया परिव्राजको वर्त्तते' इत्यादौ यथा वा 'गुरुणा टीका, कुरुणा क्षेत्रमित्यादौ। श. श. प्र. p. 363.

2. श. श. प्र. pp. 363–64.

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comprehended as related to each other. The acts of going (*āgati* in *putreṇa saha āgataḥ*), undertaken by son and father are of identical nature in *view* of *their* being liable to comprehension as related to the state of the agent (cf *kartṛtakā'gati*) and thus being comprehended as mutually related.[1]

Opponents argue : If by co-existence is meant the state of being comprehended as related to a case, then in an impersonal statement like *putreṇa saha gatam caitreṇa*, there would be no co-existence. For the suffix, *kta* does not identify any case.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In such an instance, the third declensional suffix denotes the state of the agent, posited as a feature against the act of going.[3]

Opponents argue : The indeclinable, *saha* in the said instance, means the state of being contemporary with the act involved viz, the act of going and the third declensional suffix added to the word, *putra* means the state of the son's being the agent, posited as a feature against the act of going, a constituent of what the said indeclinable means.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : The state of the agent, presented by the third declensional suffix is expectant of what the root-verb *gam*, a constituent of the word, *gata*, means and as such it is unreasonable to hold that it is related to the meaning of an indeclinable like *saha*.[5]

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1. 'तुल्यवदेककियान्वयित्वं साहित्यमि'ति प्रवादस्याप्येककारकान्वयित्वेन तुल्ययोरेकजातीयक्रिययोरन्वयित्वं समानकालीनत्वमित्यत्र तात्पर्यात्। ibid., p. 364.
2. यदि सान्वयित्वं स्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वं तदा भावप्रत्ययस्थलासंग्रहः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 364.
3. 'पुत्रेण सह गतं चैत्रेणे'त्यादावपि तृतीयार्थ एव कर्तृत्वे गतिक्रियाऽन्विता। श. श. प्र. p. 364.
4. यत्तु—'पुत्रेण सह गत' इत्यत्र समभिव्याहृतगत्यादिक्रियाकालीनत्वमेव सहाद्यन्ययस्यार्थस्तन्निविष्टगतौ पुत्रादिपदात्तृतीयालब्धस्य पुत्रनिष्ठकर्तृत्वस्यान्वयादेव पुत्रकर्तृकगतेर्लाभात् इति। ibid., p. 364.
5. तच्च, तृतीयार्थकर्तृत्वस्य धात्वर्थ एव साकांक्षत्वेन सहाद्यर्थे तदन्वयस्याप्युपपन्नत्वात्। ibid., p. 364.

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Opponents argue : what should be the meaning of the indeclinable, *saha* in a sentence like *putreṇa samaṁ* (*saha*) *mitraṁ prāptaścaitraḥ* ? For the act involved viz., the act of obtaining is liable to comprehension as related to two different cases viz., the state of the agent and the state of the object.

Jagadīśa replies : In view of the purport or rather of context[1], the said sentence is liable to giving rise to the verbal knowledge of the state of *caitra's* being the agent of the act of obtaining a friend, contemporary with the act of obtaining a friend, undertaken by (one's) son and of the state of *caitra's* being the agent of the act of obtaining a friend, contemporary with the act of obtaining (one's) son, at times. For the indeclinable, *saha* (*samaṁ*) has the potency of bearing out the comprehension of the state of the act involved viz., the act of obtaining, being contemporary with the act of obtaining, qualified by both the state of the agent and that of the object, because of the said act being liable to comprehension as the substantive of the state of the agent and that of the object alike.[2]

Opponents argue : This would mean that in reference to one obtaining wealth and to another obtaining a village *dhanena saha'yaṁ grāmaṁ prāptaḥ* should be validly used in language. For it also, equally, bears out the verbal knowledge of one as the agent of the act of obtaining a village, contemporary with the act of obtaining wealth (although by another).

Jagadīśa replies : Such arguments are based on false analogy. For unlike in *putreṇa samaṁ mitraṁ prāptaścaitaḥ*,

1. तात्पर्य्यादिति प्राचीनमतानुसारेण, स्वयं तात्पर्य्यज्ञानस्य हेतुतानङ्गीकारात्। स्वमते तु प्रकरणज्ञानवशादिति बोध्यम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 364.
2. पुत्रेण समं मित्रं प्राप्तश्चैत्र' इत्यादौ तु तात्पर्य्यवशात् पुत्रकर्त्तृकमित्रप्राप्तिकालीनमित्रकर्मकप्राप्तिकर्त्तृत्वं कदाचिच्च पुत्रकर्मकप्राप्तिकर्त्तृत्वं चैत्रस्य बुध्यते, समभिव्याहृतायाः प्राप्त्यादिक्रियायाः कर्त्तृत्वे इव कर्मत्वेऽप्यन्वयितया तत्प्रत्येकावच्छिन्नप्राप्त्यादिकालीनत्वबोधने सहाद्यव्ययस्य सामर्थ्यात्प्रत्यवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 364.

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the indeclinable, *saha* as a rule, means the state of being undertaken by the same agent (*samāna-kartṛkatva*) in case the act, the state of which being contemporary, it denotes, is qualified by the state of the objective case. Conversely, it is only at times, that the said indeclinable means the state of being undertaken by the same agent in case the act, the state of which being contemporary, it denotes, is qualified by the state of the agent as in *ghaṭatvena saha ghaṭamavagāhate buddhiḥ* while in *putreṇa sahāgaṭaḥ* the state of the two acts of coming, being undertaken by the same agent is not presented by the indeclinable, *saha*. Hence although in *putreṇa saha mitram prāptaścaitraḥ*, the state of the two acts of obtaining are undertaken by two different agents, there is no bar to its bearing out a valid verbal knowledge. But in the present instance, as the state of the two acts of obtaining are to be as a rule, undertaken by one and the same agent, *dhanena saha'yaṁ grāmaṁ prāptaḥ* cannot be validly used in language.[1]

Opponents argue : The indeclinable, *saha* uniformally denotes the act involved, as qualified by the state of the objective case and the like, syntactically related thereto. Thereupon, the said meaning of that indeclinable is related to the other act, involved, through the relation of the state of being contemporary and that of the state of being undertaken by the same agent.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For in that case, *śākasya bhojanaṁ na sudhayā* would not bear out any verbal knowledge. For the negation of the act of taking honey through the relation of the state of being undertaken by the same agent cannot be borne out by the said sentence. Because

1. घटत्वेन सह घटसमवगाहते बुद्धिरित्यादौ क्वचित् कर्तृत्वावच्छिन्नायाः समानकर्तृकत्वस्येव सर्वत्र कर्मत्वावच्छिन्नायाः समभिव्याहृतक्रियायाः समानकालीनत्वस्येव समानकर्तृकत्वस्यापि सहार्थे निवेश्यत्वात् । ibid., p. 365.
2. स्वान्वयिकर्मत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ना समभिव्याहृतक्रियैव सर्वत्र सहाद्यव्ययस्यार्थस्तस्याश्च समानकालीनत्वैकर्तृत्वोभयसम्बन्धेनैव समभिव्याहृतक्रियायामन्वयान्नोक्तदोषः । श. श. प्र. p. 365.

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the said relation is what is called a *vṛttyaniyāmaka-sambandha* and the counter-positive of negation qualified by any such relation is not admitted of.[1]

In *paṭaḥ paṭatvena saha bhāsate*, the third prepositional inflection means the state of abiding (*niṣṭhatva*) and the root-verb, *bhāsa* means being a content of knowledge. The indeclinable, *saha*, therefore, signifies that cloth is embraced as a content simultaneously and identically with clothness. The said sentence, therefore, gives the knowledge of cloth being simultaneously embraced as a content with clothness and of being identically embraced by the knowledge that embraces clothness. For in case of cloth being embraced by knowledge, different from the one that embraces clothness as its content, such use is not used in language.[2]

Opponents argue : In *putreṇa saha gatiḥ* and the like where there is no suffix to identify a case, liable to comprehension as a feature against the act, the state of being contemporary with which, the indeclinable, *saha* is held to signify, no verbal knowledge should occur. For the said indeclinable in such a case cannot denote any such meaning.

Jagadīśa replies : The indeclinable, *saha* in such cases presents the state of being contemporary with the act, qualified by a case through frozen metaphor.[3]

In *putreṇa saha sthūlaḥ* too the indeclinable, *saha* signifies the state of being contemporary with the determinant of denotation of the nominal in view, viz., bulkiness (*sthaulya*). The said

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1. तत्तुच्छम्; 'शाकस्य भोजनं न क्षुधया सहे'त्यादिवाक्यानां समानकर्तृकत्वादि-सम्बन्धेन क्षुधाकर्मकभोजनाद्यभावस्य बोधकतायामप्रामाण्यापत्तेः, वृत्त्यनियामकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वाप्रसिद्धेः। ibid. p. 365.
2. 'पटः पटत्वेन सह भासते' इत्यादौ पटत्वनिष्ठविषयतायाः समानकालीनत्व-मिव समानप्रतियोगिकत्वमप्यर्थः, विभिन्नज्ञानीयविषयतायां तादृशा-प्रयोगात्। ibid., pp. 365–66.
3. 'पुत्रेण सह गतिरि'त्यादौ कर्तृत्वाद्यन्वयिक्रियासमभिव्याहारविरहेण शक्त्या-पुत्रकर्तृकगतिकालीनत्वादेर्बोधयितुमशक्यत्वादनन्यगत्या सहादेस्तादृशार्थे निरूढलक्षणा। श. श. प्र. p. 365.

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sentence, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one, having the bulkiness, contemporarily with the bulkiness, abiding one's son, the third prepositional inflection meaning only the state of abiding.[1]

Opponents argue : The indeclinable, *saha* cannot mean whether by denotation or by implication, the state of being contemporary in *patnyā sahāgnimādadhīta*. For the consecretion of the sacrificial fire by a wife never occurs.

Jagadīśa replies : In such a situation, the said indeclinable only means co-existence of the kind of collocation as it so happens in *ghaṭena saha paṭavad gṛham*. The sentence, cited bears out the comprehension of a husband only collocatively occupying a seat with his wife to consecret the sacrificial fire.[2] With this, the rule or injunction viz, *yat kartavyam tadanayā saha* is also explained i.e. the word *saha* signifies only collocation and the injunction does not state any qualification of a wife to do vedic rites.[3]

Opponents ask : How then verbal knowledge occurs from a sentence without the indeclinable, *saha* being in use as in *putrenā'gataḥ* ?

Jagadīśa replies : In such cases, the third prepositional inflection itself is taken to mean the state of being contemporary with the act in view, qualified by agency and the like. The meaning of the base of the said inflection, thereupon, gets related to agency, a constituent of the said meaning of the said inflection through the relation of *ādheyatā*, arising out of syntax.[4]

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1. ibid., p. 365.
2. 'पत्न्या सहाग्निमादध्यादि'त्यादौ पत्नीकर्तृकस्याग्न्याधानस्याकालीकत्वेन तत्समानकालीनत्वस्य प्रमापयितुमशक्यत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्यपर्य्यवसितसहभावमात्रं तत्र सहस्यार्थः यथा घटेन सह पटवद् गृहमित्यादौ । ibid., p. 367.
3. एतेन 'यत्कर्त्तव्यं तदनया सहे'त्यादिको विधिरपि व्याख्यातः । ibid., p. 368.
4. 'पुत्रेणागत' इत्यादौ विनापि सहादिप्रयोगं तदर्थस्य प्रतीतेस्तृतीया एव तत्र कर्तृत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नागतिसमानकालीनत्वादिकमर्थः तन्निविष्टे च कर्तृत्वादौ प्रकृत्यर्थस्य पुत्रादेराधेयत्वेनान्वयः । श. श. प्र. p. 366.

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In *dhanena kulaṁ, daṇḍena ghaṭaḥ* and the like, the third prepositional inflection means causation (*hetutā*). It does not bear out the comprehension of instrumentality in such cases. For an instrument involves an intermediary (*vyāpāra*) like physical motion while *dhana* or *daṇḍa* does not involve any such intermediary. Hence *dhanena kulaṁ* gives the verbal knowledge of respectability due to wealth and *daṇḍena ghaṭaḥ* of a jar (occuring) due to a stick.

In *abhighātena kriyā* in the like manner, the third prepositional inflection denotes causation (*hetutā*). For the comprehension of instrumentality in this case, is totally inconsistent since a stroke (*abhighāta*) which is conjunction in essence, cannot accomodate motion (*vyāpāra*). Hence the said sentence leads to the verbal knowledge of an act due to a stroke.[1]

Opponents argue : In that case, as *gotvam na dhanena* is not used in language, so also *kulaṁ na dhanena* should not be used. For the relation involved being that of *nirūpakatva* which is of the kind of what is called a *Vṛttyaniyāmaka* and the negation qualified thereby is inconceivable.[2] Conversely, if the relation is that of conjunction and the like, the uses like *kulaṁ na dhanena* comes ont to be valid.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The relation of *nirūpakatva* is admitted to be a *Vṛttiniyāmaka-sambandha*, at times. For in the instances like *kule dhanasya hetutvaṁ, gavi dvijasya sampradānatvaṁ*

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1. 'धनेन कुलं, दण्डेन घटः' इत्यादौ व्यापारगर्भस्य करणत्वस्याप्रतीतावपि हेतुत्वप्रत्ययात्, 'अभिघातेन क्रिया'इत्यादौ करणत्वस्य बाधाच्च तत्र जनकत्व-रूपं हेतुत्वमेव तृतीयार्थः, तथा च धननिष्ठहेतुताकं कुलमित्याकारस्तत्र बोधः। ibid., p. 367.

3. न च 'गोत्वं न धनेने'तिवत् 'कुलं न धनेने'त्यपि न स्यात्, निरूपकत्वादेः सम्बन्धस्य वृत्त्यनियामकतया तदवच्छिन्नाभावस्य प्रत्येतुमशक्यत्वादिति वाच्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 367.

4. सुतरां संयोगादिकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाभावस्य प्रत्येतव्यत्वात् इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 367.

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patane vṛkṣasyāpādānatvaṁ, vahnau dhūmasya jñāpakatvaṁ, dhane caitrasya svāmitvaṁ, ghaṭe bhūtalasyādhikaraṇatvaṁ, causation and the like, abiding through the relation of *nirūpakatva* are well borne out.[1]

Opponents argue : In the instances cited, the seventh prepositional inflection denotes the state of being in respect of (*nirūpitatva*) and the sixth one, that of abiding (*niṣṭhatva*). Hence the sentence, *kule dhanasya hetutvaṁ* bears out the verbal knowledge of causation in respect of respectability, abiding wealth and not the other way round viz, causation in respect of wealth, abiding respectability is not comprehended. How could then the relation of *nirūpakatva* be ever conceived of as a *vṛttiniyāmaka-sambandha* ?[2]

Jagadīśa replies : It is arbitrary to hold that causation alone as of being in respect of respectability, abiding wealth and the like is embraced in the verbal knowledge occuring from a sentence like *kule dhanasya hetutvaṁ.* For it is equally reasonable to hold that causation, abiding wealth and so on is liable to being embraced therein, as of being in respectability through the relation of *nirūpakatva.*[3]

Conversely, even if the relation of *nirūpakatva* is regarded as what is called a *vṛttyaniyāmaka-sambandha,* there is no bar to its being a relation, qualifying the state of the counter-positive of negation (*pratiyogitā'vacchedaka-sambandha*). For otherwise, sentences like *patanamidaṁ vṛkṣāt, na tu gṛhāt, gamanamidaṁ grāmasya, na tu gṛhasya,* cannot bear out any verbal knowledge.[4]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 367.
2. ननु कुले धनस्य हेतुत्वमित्यादिषु सर्वत्र दर्शितस्थलेषु सप्तम्यर्थो निरूपितत्वं, षष्ठ्यर्थो निष्ठत्वं, तथा च कुलनिरूपितं हेतुत्वं धननिष्ठमित्यन्वयबोधो न तु वैपरीत्येन धननिरूपितं हेतुत्वं कुलवृत्तीत्यन्वयबोधः तथा च कुतो निरूपकत्वसम्बन्धस्य वृत्तिनियामकता । कृष्णकान्ती p. 367.
3. न हि कुलादिनिरूपितंहेतुत्वादिकमेव धनादिनिष्ठत्वेन तासु भासते, धनादिनिष्ठहेतुत्वादेः सम्बन्धविशेषेण कुलादिवृत्तिताया अप्यनुभावकत्वेनैकशेषस्य दुष्करत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 367.
4. ibid., pp. 367-68.

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Opponents argue : The relation involved in such cases is that of *svarūpa*, a *vṛtti-niyāmaka* relation. For the fifth prepositional inflection in all such cases, mean 'being conducive to disjunction (*vibhāgā'nukūlatva*).

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, in *dhanena na kulaṁ* and the like too, the third prepositional inflection also may imply 'being the determinant of causation (*hetutā–nirūpakatva*) making room for the relation of *svarūpa* to qualify the state of the counter–positive of negation involved.[1]

Opponents argue : It is unreasonable to hold that the third prepositional inflection should present the said meaning through implication, only if used with the negative particle (*nañ*). For that would mean that implication may go unheeded at times bringing in the possibility of no verbal knowledge occuring therefrom at times.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the third prepositional inflection or any other inflection provided for in the sense of causation may be held to mean the state of being caused. The sentence, *dhanena kulaṁ*, therefore, should bear out the comprehension of respectability (having the state of) being caused by wealth.[3]

Opponents argue : In *dhūmena vahniḥ* or in *aṇutvena dravyaṁ* then no verbal knowledge should occur. For fire or substance is not caused by smoke or atom.

Jagadīśa replies : In such cases, the third prepositional inflection only means secondary causation viz, the state of being possessed of indication, (the middle term). *Dhūmena vahniḥ*, therefore, leads to the comprehension of fire, possessed of indication abiding smoke, through the relation of *sva-*

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1. ibid., p. 368.
2. नन्वसमभिव्याहारस्थलमात्र एव लक्षणास्वीकारोऽनुभवविरुद्ध इति लक्षणाग्रहस्यासार्वत्रिकत्वेन यत्र लक्षणाऽग्रहस्तत्र शाब्दबोधानुपपत्तिः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 368.
3. ibid., p. 368.

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pratiyogi-viṣayatva; (*sva* meaning causation abiding smoke, the determinant thereof (*tat-pratiyogin*) is inference, the content of which is fire).[1]

Opponents argue : Smoke is not the cause of the knowledge (inference) of fire. For the middle term is not regarded as the cause of inference by the Neo-logicians.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Smoke is liable to comprehension as the cause of the knowledge of fire and of the perception of the negation of fire. For it is embraced as a content in the synthetic knowledge (*sāmūhālambanātmaka-jñāna*) of smoke and fire (*vahnt-dhūmau*) and it brings about the sense-object contact called for the ocular perception of the negation of fire in smoke through the relation of conjunction.[3]

In *dhūmena vahniḥ*, the word, *dhūma* implies the knowledge of smoke and the third prepositional inflection means indication abiding the said knowledge, according to the author of the *Tattva-ctntāmaṇi*.

Opponents argue : In *aṇutvena dravyaṁ*, *aṇutva* is a sentence. As such, it cannot imply the knowledge of atom.

The author of the *tattvacintāmani* replies : The suffix, *tva* should imply the knowledge of atom, in that case.[4]

Opponents argue : Fire too, in that case, due to false knowledge of concomitance, would come out to be the middle

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1. 'धूमेन वह्निरणुत्वेन द्रव्यत्वमि'त्यादौ तु वह्न्यादेर्धूमाद्यजन्यत्वेन धूमादिनिष्ठजनकत्वानिरूपकत्वादनायत्या ज्ञापकत्वलक्षणं गौणमेव हेतुत्वं तत्र तृतीयार्थः, तेन धूमनिष्ठं यज्ज्ञापकत्वं तद्वान् वह्निरित्याकारस्तत्र बोधः। तद्वत्त्वञ्च स्वंप्रतियोगिविषयत्वसम्बन्धेन ग्राह्यम्। ibid., pp. 368.
2. न च धूमादेर्वह्ल्यादिभानजनकत्वं बाधितं लिङ्गस्यानुमितावहेतुत्वादिति वाच्यम्। ibid., p. 368.
3. वह्ल्याद्यवगाहिनि स्वसाक्षात्कारे विषयविधया स्वनिष्ठत्वेनाभावप्रत्यक्षे च सन्निकर्षघटकतया धूमादेर्जनकत्वसम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 368–69.
4. धूमेनेत्यत्र धूमपदस्य धूमज्ञाने, अणुत्वेनेत्यादौ च त्वादिप्रत्ययस्य स्वार्थज्ञाने लक्षणया तन्निष्ठत्वेन ज्ञापकत्वमुक्तस्थले तृतीयया बोध्यते इति तु चिन्तामणिकृतः। ibid., p. 369.

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term leading to the inference of smoke to make room for the use of *vahninā dhūmaḥ* validly in language.

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For the third prepositional inflection is the cause of the verbal knowledge of indication, abiding the meaning of the word to which it is suffixed, through the relation of *svapratiyogi-viṣayatva*, abiding what is determined by what is other than the determinant of the counter-positive of the negation, abiding the locus of the said meaning of the word to which the third prepositional inflection is suffixed. In *dhūmena vahniḥ*, for an example, the third prepositioaal inflectlon bears out the verbal knowledge of smoke, indicating fire through the relation of *sva-pratiyogi-viṣayatva* (*sva* meaning indication, *tatpratiyogin* is inference, *tad-viṣaya* is fire,) for fire is determined by what is other than the determinant of the counter-positive of the negation, abiding the locus of smoke. But *dhūma* is not determined by what is determined by what is other than the determinant of the counter-positive of the negation, abiding the locus of fire. Hence the third prepositional inflection suffixed to the word, *vahni* cannot bear out the comprehension of fire indicating smoke through the relation of *sva-pratiyogi-viṣayatva*.[1]

Opponents argue : In *vahninā dhūmaḥ*, *dhūma* or smoke may be taken as what is determined by substance-hood (*dravyatva*). As such, smoke happens to be determined by what is other than the determinant of the counter-positive of the negation, abiding the locus of fire. *Vahninā dhūmaḥ*, therefore, should reasonably be used in language making room for the fallacy referred to, again.[2]

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1. यद्यप्युक्तदिशा व्याप्तिभ्रमेण च वह्न्यादेरपि धूमाद्विज्ञापकत्वमस्यतो वह्निना-धूमवानित्यादेरपि प्रामाण्यापत्तिः, तथापि तत्तदर्थकतद्योत्तरतृतीयायास्तत्तदर्थ-व्यापकनिष्ठेनैव स्वप्रतियोगिविषयत्वादिसम्बन्धेन तत्तदर्थनिष्ठज्ञापकत्वादेर-न्वयबोधं प्रति हेतुत्वात्, धूमादेश्च वह्न्याद्यव्यापकत्वान्न तथा। ibid., p. 369.

2. न च धूमादेरपि द्रव्यत्वादिरूपेण वह्न्यादिव्यापकत्वादुक्तदोषतादवस्थ्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 369.

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Jagadīśa replies : No. Smoke cannot be taken as what is qualified by substancehood. The meaning of the third prepositional inflection is to be syntactically related to what is inclusive (*vyāpaka*) of the meaning of the word, the said inflection is suffixed to, as implied by the relation, *sva-pratiyogi-viṣayatva.* By inclusiveness, again, is meant what is qualified by a property other than what is the determinant of the counter-positive of the negation, abiding the locus of what is meant by the word, the said inflection is suffixed to. By being qualified by a property, again, being qualified by the determinant of the state of being inferred (*sādhyatāvacchedaka*) is understood. Hence smoke is to be taken as what is qualified by smokeness, in the context of the syntactical relation of indication abiding fire, with smoke.

Opponents argue : In that case *vahninā na dhūmaḥ* cannot be validly used in language. For the syntactical relation of the negation of indication abiding fire, with smoke also is to be brought about through the said relation i.e., the negation of the indication abiding fire, qualified by fireness is to be related to smoke, qualified by smokeness and comprehended as what is inclusive of fire. But this is not possible, since the said relation has not come about in view of smoke's not being inclusive of fire.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : What has been held so far is this. The meaning of the third prepositional inflection qualified by the meaning of the base thereof is syntactically related to the meaning of the negative particle, *nañ.* Thereupon, the whole thing is posited as a feature against the other word-meaning through *sva-pratiyogi-viṣayatva-sambandha* provided, however, the other word-meaning be inclusive of the meaning of the base of the third prepositional inflection. In *vahninā dhūmaḥ*, the

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1. धूमत्वावच्छिन्नस्य वह्निव्यापकत्वस्य सम्बन्धत्वे च धूमो न वह्निनेत्यादेरप्रामाण्यापत्तिर्निरूक्तसंसर्गस्याप्रसिद्धया, तेन वह्निनिष्ठज्ञापकत्वाभावस्य नञा बोधयितुमशक्यत्वादिति वाच्यम् । ibid., p. 369.

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said relation has not come about. For smoke is not inclusive of fire. Because smoke is held to be qualified by smokeness, one with the determinant of the counter-positive of the negation, abiding the locus of fire. As such, the said relation does not operate to bring about the syntactical relation of indication abiding fire, with smoke. The said relation, thus wanting, the negation of indication abiding fire, too cannot be syntactically related to smoke.

Such contingency can, however, be ruled out. For the said relation is an established fact in respect of jar, in view of its being inclusive of fire. For, in this case, inclusiveness means negation of what is qualified by two-fold property, viz, the state of being the counter-positive, qualified by smokeness and the state of being the counter-positive, not qualified by a property (substancehood, knowlableness), abiding smoke, other than smokeness, qualifying the counter-positive of the negation, abiding the locus of fire, which is (simultaneously) other than the locus of smoke, qualified by smokeness. Jar, although, is not marked with the negation of the state of the counter-positive, not qualified by a property, abiding smoke, other than smokeness qualifying the counter-positive of the negation, abiding the locus of fire which is simultaneously other than the locus of smoke, qualified by smokeness, it is marked by the negation of the negation of the state of the counter-positive, qualified by smokeness. Hence, technically speaking, jar, comes out to be inclusive of fire. In other words, through the relation of inclusiveness or the relation of *sva-pratiyogi-viṣayatva*, needed to bring about the syntactical relation of the negation of indication by fire, posited as a feature against smoke gets established to make room for the verbal comprehension of the said negation posited as a feature against smoke.[1]

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1. धूमत्वादिविशिष्टे तृतीयार्थस्य वह्न्यादिज्ञापकत्वस्य बोधने विशिष्टप्रतियोग्य-नधिकरणवह्न्यादिमन्निष्ठाभावीयधूमत्वान्यधूमवृत्तिधर्मानवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वस्य धूमत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वस्य च द्वित्वावच्छिन्नाभावरूपाया एव वह्न्यादि-व्यापकतायाः संसर्गत्वेन घटादावेव तादृशव्यापकतायाः सुप्रसिद्धात्।

श. श. प्र. pp. 369–70.

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Opponents argue : What then it comes to is this. The third prepositional inflection used in the sense of causation in *dhūmena vahnih* and the like, means indication, against which the meaning of the base thereof is posited as a feature. Thereupon, it is syntactically related to the other word-meaning (the invariable substantive) through the relation of inclusiveness, described so far as *sva-pratiyogi-viṣayatva*. By inclusiveness, again is understood the negation of what is qualified by the state of being the counterpositive, qualified by the determinant of being inferred and by the state of the counterpositive, not qualified by a property, abiding what is to be inferred, other than the determinant of the state of being inferred, one with the determinant of the counterpositive of the negation, abiding the locus of the middle term, not simultaneously accomodating the said counterpositive, qualified by the determinant of the said counter-positive. But in that case, *dhūmena vahniḥ* should cause no verbal knowledge. For fire would cease to be inclusive of smoke. Because fire cannot be taken as what is marked by the negation of the state of the counterpositive, qualified by fireness and the state of the counter-positive, not qualified by a property (like substancehood) other than fireness, qualifying the counterpositive of the negation of fire, abiding the locus of smoke, not simultaneously accomodating fire, the counterpositive of the said negation. For the negation of fire through a relation other than one involved as the qualifying relation of what is to be inferred is fairly available in the locus of smoke. As such, fire ceases to be liable to comprehension as what is qualified by the state of the counterpositive, qualified by fireness and the state of the counterpositive, not qualified by a property, abiding fire, other than fireness, the determinant of the counterpositive of negation, abiding the locus of smoke, not simultaneously accomodating fire, the counterpositive of the said negation.

Jagadīśa replies : There is no such contingency. For the negation of the state of the counterpositive, qualified by fireness and of the state of the counterpositive, not qualified

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by a property, abiding fire, other than fireness qualifying the counterpositive of the negation (of fire), abiding the locus of smoke, not simultneously accomodating fire, the counter-positive of the said negation, qualified by fireness, is to be understood to abide through the relation of self-sameness (*svarūpa*) that has the state of the counter-positive, qualified by the relation of the state of being inferred, as its counter-co relate (*sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitā-nirūpita-svarūpa*). In *dhūmena vahniḥ*, the relation, quaiifying the state of being inferred is, obviously conjunctian (*saṁyoga*) through which, the negation of fire cannot be availed of in the locus of smoke. As such, fire is liable to comprehension as what is marked by the negation of what is qualified by the aforesaid two-fold property viz, the state of the counterpositive, qualified by fireness and the state of the counterpositive, not qaalified by a property, abinding fire, other than fireness, qualifying the counter-positive of the negation of fire, abiding the locus of smoke, qualified by smoke, not simultaneously accomodating fire qualified by fireness. Hence fire is liable to comprehension as what is inclusive (*vyāpaka*) of smoke.[1]

Opponents argue : The third (or the fifth) prepositional inflection in *vahninā* (in *vahninā dhumaḥ*) means the state of being indicated (*jnāpyatva*) by fire, qualified by the determinant of inclusion of fire. The state of being indicated (*jñapyatva*) is expectant to be in smoke through the relation of *dhūmatvā-vacchinnānuyogika-dhūma-niṣṭha-prakāratā-pratiyogika-svarūpa* so that the determinant of inclusion be in the state of being indicated through the relation of collocation (*sāmānādhikar-anya*) to make the state of being indicated, qualified by the determinant of inclusion. But as smoke is not actually inclusive of fire, the state of being indicated by fire, does not come out to be qualified by the determinant of inclusion of fire,

1. निरुक्तप्रतियोगितान्वयोरभावश्च साध्यताघटकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता-निरूपितेनैव स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन ग्राह्यः, तेन व्यधिकरणसम्बन्धद्वयावच्छिन्नयो-र्वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वयोर्वह्नौ सत्त्वेऽपि वह्निर्धूमेनेत्यादेर्नायोग्यत्वमिति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः। श. श. प्र. p. 370.

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through the relation of collocation. Hence *vahninā dhūmaḥ* is not liable to being validly used in language.

Conversely, *vahninā na dhūmaḥ* is validly used in language. For, the state of being indicated by fire, as borneout by the third prepositional inflection qualified by fireness, the determinant of inclusion of fire, through the relation of collocation, is liable to comprehension as a feature against what is qualified by substancehood through the relation of *dravyatvā'vacchinnā-nuyogika-dravya-niṣṭha-prakāratā-pratiyogika-svarūpa*. As such, the negation of the state of being indicated, qualified by the determinant of inclusion of fire, through the relation *dhūmatvā'vacchinna'nuyogika-dhūma-niṣṭha-prakāratā-pratiyogika-svarūpa* is easily availed of in smoke. For this negation is what is called a *vyadhikaraṇa-sambandhā'vacchinnā'pratiyogikā'bhāva* and thus universally present.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This view is unreasonable. For in *vahninā dhumaḥ*, the state of what is inclusive of fire is not liable to comprehension as a feature. Becauee, it is not an unanlysable property and thus not liable to being presented as a word-meaning to be comprehended thus. Not only that. Smoke is not liable to comprehension as what is inclusive of fire.[2] In *dhūmena vahniḥ*, the state of being inclusive is comprehended as what arises out of syntax and thus there is no contingency.

Opponents argue : *Ayah-piṇḍam dhūmena vahnimat*, then should be regarded a valid proposition. For the state of indication, abiding smoke, through the relation of *sva-pratiyogi-viṣayatva*, is in fire, located in the red-hot iron-ball.

Jagadīśa replies : Such an apprehension is uncalled for. Because in *dhumena vahnimat*, fire is to be in the locus of fire

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 370.
2. तच्चिन्त्यम्, 'वह्निना धूम' इत्यादौ वह्न्यादिव्यापकत्वस्य प्रकारतया भानेऽनुभवविरोधादिति दिक् । ibid., pp. 370-71.

   अनुभवविरोधादिति । व्यापकत्वस्याखण्डस्याप्रसिद्धया तदन्तर्भावेण तृतीयापञ्चम्योर्वृत्तिकल्पनासम्भवात् खण्डशो वृत्तिकल्पनापत्तिरिति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 371.

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through the relation of *dhuma-vadanuyogika-dhūma-vyāpakatā-ghaṭakatva* (i.e., the *hetumadanuyogika-sādhyatā'vacchedaka-sambandha*). In other words, fire is to be in its own locus not through the relation of mere conjunction but through the relation of coujunction, the counter-co-relate (*pratiyogin*) of which is fire and substratum (*anuyogin*) of which is what is possessed of smoke. In *ayah-piṇḍah dhūmena vahnimat*, the locus of fire viz., the red-hot iron-ball is not possessed of smoke. As such, the relation, viz, *dhūmavad-anuyogika-sādhyatā-vacchedaka-sambandha* is not there to bring about the relation of the state of being indicated by smoke with the state of being possessed of fire. Hence *dhūmena ayaḥ-piṇḍam vahnimat* is not validly used in language.[1]

In *ghaṭena śūnyaḥ* (*vidhuraḥ, rahitaḥ*), the third prepositional inflection means the state being of the counterpositive (of negation), the verbal knowledge being of what is possessed of the negation, determining the state of being the counter-positive (thereof), abiding jar, qualified by jarness (i.e., jar as such).[2]

In *prakṛtyā kṛpaṇaḥ, svabhāvena saralaḥ* and the like, the word like, *prakṛti* means the characteristic that abides throughout the substratum thereof; the third prepositional inflection means non-difference or identity. Hence the sentence, *prakṛtyā kṛpaṇah* gives the verbal knowledge of one, having the miserliness (as one's characteristic) throughout the length of one's life-time, the substratum of oneself, the locus of itself (the miserliness).[3]

In *suratho nāma rājā*, the word, *suratha* means 'liable to denotation by the word, *suratha* and the indeclinable, *nāma*

1. धूमादिनिष्ठपञ्चम्यर्थज्ञापकत्वादिविशिष्टस्य च वह्न्यादेर्धूमादिमदनुयोगिकेनैव-तद्व्यापकताघटकसंयोगादिसम्बन्धेन मतुबाद्यर्थे साकांक्षत्वादयःपिण्डं धूमेन वह्निमदित्यादिको न प्रयोगः। श. श. प्र. p. 371.
2. ibid., p. 371.
3. ibid., p. 371.

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means 'proper noun' and third prepositional inflection, suffixed to the said indeclinable and subsequently elided, means identity. The meaning of the word, *nāma* viz, identity of proper noun, thereupon, gets syntactically related to the word, *suratha*, a constituent of the meaning of the word, *suratha* to give the verbal comprehension of a king liable to denotation by the word, *suratha* (having identity of) a proper noun.[1]

Some hold that the indeclinable, *nāma* means being liable to being known to be syntactically related to *suratha* giving the verbal knowledge of king, *suratha* liable to being known[2].

Jagadīśa replies : Such a view is unreasonable. For there is no rule that provides for the use of the third prepositional inflection in the said sense.[3]

In *nāmnā candramukhī*' the word, *nāma*, although not an indeclinable, also bears out the said kind of a verbal-knowledge.[4]

In *dhānyena dhanam*, *ghaṭatvena sājātyam*, *vājapayena yajanam*, the third prepositional inflection means identity to to be syntactically related to the meaning of the word, *dhana* giving the verbal knowledge of wealth, one with *paddy*[5] and so on.

Opponents argue : In *dhānyena dhanam* and the like too, the third prepositional inflection means the state of being the indicator as it so happens in *dhūmena vahniḥ*.[6]

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1. सुरथो नाम राजेत्यत्र सुरथः सुरथशब्दवाच्यः, तदेकदेशे च शब्दे लुप्ततृतीयाकेन संज्ञार्थकनामेत्यव्ययेन प्राप्तस्य संज्ञातादात्म्यस्यान्वयः, 'तेन संज्ञातादात्म्यवत-सुरथशब्दवाच्यो राजेत्यर्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 371.
2. ibid., p. 371.
3. नामेत्यस्य सम्भाव्यत्वार्थकत्वेऽनुशासनाभावात् कश्चिदित्युक्तम्। कृष्णकान्ती pp. 371-72.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 371.
5. ibid., pp. 371-72.
6. तत्र धूमेन वह्निरित्यादाविव ज्ञापकत्वं तथेत्यपि वदन्ति। ibid., p. 372.
7. धनान्तरतात्पर्येण तादृशप्रयोगस्य सम्प्रदायविरुद्धत्वाद् 'वदन्ती'त्युक्तम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 372.

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Jagadīśa replies : Such a view is unreasonable. For to indicate wealth, comprising of articles, other than paddy, such an use is not admittedly made.[1]

In *jātyā brāhmaṇaḥ*, the word, *brāhmaṇa* implies one, having the property (peculiar to oneself), due to the transcendental merit of one's action. It is against such property that identity of caste, the meaning of the word, *jātyā*, (the third prepositional inflection being denotative of identity), is posited as a feature to give the verbal knowledge of one, having the property, due to the transcendental merit of one's action, one with the caste.

Opponents argue : The word, *brāhmaṇa* should mean *brāhmaṇatva* or the state of *brāhmaṇa per se*, against which the meaning of the word, *jāti* qualified by the state of being a caste (*jāti*) may be posited as a feature. There is no reason, therefore, to take resort to implication.

Jagadīśa replies : This is not possible. The word, *brāhmaṇa* cannot mean the state of *brāhmaṇa per se*. It has to denote the said state as qualified by its determinant. For the said state is liable to comprehension as the substantive and nothing left unqualified by its determinant is ever comprehended either as a feature or a substantive.[2]

In *ghaṭatvena janyatvaṁ na* (*prakārakatvaṁ*) and the like, the third prepositional inflection means the state of being a determinant.

Opponents argue : Then in *ghaṭatvena janyatva naṁ paṭatvena*, no verbal knowledge should occur.

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1. धनान्तरतात्पर्येण तादृशप्रयोगस्य सम्प्रदायविरुद्धत्वाद् 'वदन्ती'त्युक्तम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 372.
2. 'जात्या ब्राह्मण' इत्यादौ ब्राह्मणपदस्यादृष्टविशेषप्रयोज्यधर्मवत्परतया तादृश-धर्म एव जात्यभेदस्यान्वयः, स्वरूपत उपस्थिते ब्राह्मण्ये तदन्वयायोगात्। श. श. प्र. p. 372.

   Vide also कृष्णकान्ती p. 372.

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Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the said inflection may be taken to mean the state of being determined.[1]

In '*caitreṇa* (*caitrasya vā*) *tulyaḥ*' and the like the third prepositional inflection means the state of (being) the counter-positive, to be posited against difference, constituting the meaning of the word, *tulya*.

Opponents argue : But the difference, the counter-positive of which is *caitra*, is in *caitra* too, to call for the use, *caitreṇa tulyaścaitraḥ*.

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is uncalled for. For the word, *tulya* means 'one, having difference (thereform), possessed of the characteristics (thereof). The third prepositional inflection has two-fold meaning, viz., the state of the counterpositive and the state of abiding. The state of the counterpositive is posited as a feature against difference and the state of abiding against characteristics. Hence the said sentence gives the verbal knowledge of one who is different from *caitra* and (at the same time) is possessed of the characteristics of *caitra* (*caitra-pratiyogika-bheda-vattve sati caitra-niṣṭha-dharmavān*).[2] Similar is the case with the sentence, *caitreṇa* (*caitrasya vā*) *sādṛśyam*.[3]

Opponents argue : Pāṇini has ordained that the third prepositional inflection is not to be used in case the word, *tulā* or *upamā* is in use to carry the sense of comparison.[4]

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1. घटत्वेन जन्यत्वम्, प्रकारकत्वमित्यादौ अवच्छेदकत्वमवच्छेद्यत्वं वा तृतीयार्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 372.
2. 'चैत्रेण चैत्रस्य वा तुल्य' इत्यादौ भिन्नत्वे सति धर्मवत्त्वं तुल्यता, तन्निविष्टे च भेदे तृतीयाद्यर्थस्य प्रतियोगित्वस्य धर्मे चाधेयत्वस्यान्वयात् चैत्रत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नान्यत्वे सति चैत्रवृत्तिधर्मवानित्यर्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 372.
3. ibid., p. 372.
4. 'तुलोपमयोर्योगे तृतीया नेष्यत इति पाणिनीयाः। ibid., p. 372.

   Vide also तुल्यार्थैरतुलोपमाभ्यां तृतीयान्यतरस्याम्। पा. II. 3. 72.

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Jagadīśa replies : In spite of the said prohibitory rule, the said inflection is found in use in the instances like, *tulāma-ghāreṇa śarad-ghanena, kenopamā bhavatu te'sya parākramasya.*[1]

Opponents argue : If the third prepositional inflection is denotative of the aforesaid two-fold meaning, then in *gajena tulya-gamanaḥ*, no verbal knowledge should occur. For the peculiar characteristics of an elephant cannot be in gait.

Jagadīśa replies : In such an instance, the third prepositional inflection means gait (*gati*) to give the Verbal knowledge of 'one, having the gait of an elephant.'[2]

In *bhogaiḥ prasitaḥ* (*utsukaḥ*) and the like, the third prepositional inflection alternatively provided for, with the seventh one denotes 'the state of being in respect of' to give the verbal knowledge of one, having the attachment in respect of pleasure.

In *puṣyeṇa snāyad*, the third prepositional inflection denotes a temporal locus, the sense, carried by the secondary suffix, added to the word, *pusyā* in *puṣye śnāyāt*, to give the verbal comprehension of the duty of one's bathing at the time, marked with the rise of the constellation, *puṣyā*.

This, however, does not mean that like *puṣyeṇa snāyāt* being alternativeiy used with *puṣye snāyāt*, *puṣyeṇa rūpaṁ* should be used alternatively with *puṣye rūpaṁ*. For in this case, colour (*rūpa*) is comprehended as what is inherent in *puṣya* and not in time marked therewith.[3]

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1. श. श. प्र. pp. 372–73.
   Vide also चण्डी IV. 72.
2. 'गजेन तुल्यगमनो, वृषस्य सदृशेक्षणः' इत्यादौ तु गत्यादिकं तृतीयार्थः, तेन गजगतितुल्यगतिमान्, वृषेक्षणतुल्येक्षणवानित्याकारस्तत्र बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 373.
3. ibid., p. 373.

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CHAPTER XXV

CLASSIFICATION OF PREPOSITIONAL INFLECTIONS (CATURTHĪ)

The fourth prepositional inflection is suffixed to a word that denotes the inanimate object of the verb, *manyate*, left unidentified, in respect of which, the sense of untoward inferiority is sought to be conveyed by the negative particle, *naÑ*, alternatively with the second one,[1] as in *na tvā tṛṇāya manye* and the like. In *na tvaṁ kiṭo mato mama*, the fourth prepositional inflection is not used. For the object, involved in this instance is identified.[2]

Opponents argue : The particle, *naÑ*, not constituting a compound does not convey the sense of infiriority.

Jagadīśa replies : In *drauṇirmaryādayā hīno brāhmaṇo naiṣo durmati*, the particle, *naÑ*, fairly conveys the sense of inferiority.[3]

In *jārajaṁ na dvijaṁ manye*, the word, *dvija* is not suffixed with the fourth prepositional inflection. For the inferiority in respect of *brahmin*, denoted by the said particle, of a bastard is not untoward.[4]

Opponents argue : In *na nāvaṁ manyate yo'śvaṁ na kākaṁ manyate śukaṁ|nānnaṁ sa manyate sarpirna śṛgālam sa mānuṣaṁ||*

1. मन्यतेः कर्मणो यस्मादयुक्तैवापकृष्टता।
नञ्बोध्याऽस्मात् द्वितीयावच्चतुर्थी प्राणिवर्जितात्। श. श. प्र. p. 373.
Vide also मन्यकर्मण्यनादरे विभाषाऽप्राणिषु। पा. II. 3. 17.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 374.
3. Ibid., p. 374.
4. Ibid., p. 374.

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the meanings of the words like *nāva* are inanimate. How then, the fourth prepositional inflection is not suffixed to these words ?

Jagadīśa replies : The things, denoted by these words are all animate, for being animate or inaminate is understood in a technical sense. For the grammarians hold that a boat, a crow, rice and a jackle are all animate.[1]

In *na tṛṇāya yuvāṁ manye, na tvāṁ tṛṇābhyāṁ manye* and the like are not used in language. For the words, denoting counter-co-relate (*pratiyogin*) and the substratum (*anuyogin*) of inferiority, signified by *nañ*, not forming into a compound, are not used in these instances, in identical number.[2]

Conversely, in *anyebhyo brāhmaṇo yastu śūdrāṇāmanna-pācakaḥ*, inspite of the counter-co-relate and the substratum of inferiority being denoted by words, not being used in identical number, the fourth prepositional inflection is used. For in the said instance, inferiority is signified by the negative particle, *nañ*, forming a compound.[3]

Āpiśala holds : The word, denoting the unidentified object of the root-verb, *man* (of the *divādi* class) is suffixed with the fourth prepositional inflection, alternatively with the second one to bear out the comprehension of untoward similarity of grass and the like. The expression, *tṛṇāya tvāṁ manyate*, therefore, rightly gives the verbal knowledge of similarity of grass. The use of *tṛṇāya matvā raghunandano'tha vāṇena rakṣaḥ pradhanānnirāsthat* made by *Bhaṭṭi* (II. 36) is grammatically valid.[4]

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1. नौकाकान्नश्वगालानां प्राणित्वं शाब्दिकस्मृतेः । ibid., p. 374.
   Vide also अप्राणिन्वित्यपनीय नौकाकान्नशुकश्वगालवर्जेन्विति वाच्यम् । (वार्त्तिक) सि. कौ. 583.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 374.
3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 374.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 375.

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In *puṣpamidaṁ viṣṇave namaḥ*, the verbal knowledge is like this : flower is the object of the act of giving away in association with the chanting of *mantras* with a view to bringing about pleasure to Lord, *viṣṇu*. In it, the meaning of the fourth prepositional inflection, viz., 'being with a view to' is syntactically related to the act of giving away in association with the chanting of *mantras*, as a feature. The meanig of the word, *viṣṇu*, the base of the inflection is posited as a feature against pleasure or the desire therefor.[1]

In the case of a cow being given to a brahmin, *brāhmaṇāya namaḥ* is not used in language. For *mantras* are not chanted to make such gifts.[2]

In *brāhmaṇebhyo namo nityaṁ*, the fourth prepositional inflection means 'being content' and the word, *namas* means an act contributing to the knowledge of superiority to oneself. The meaning of the fourth prepositional inflection is syntactically related to knowledge, a constituent of what the word, *namas* means. The said sentence, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one, undertaking an act contributing to the knowledge (or realisation) of brahmins as superior to oneself.[3]

In *puṣpamidaṁ paramātmane namaḥ*, although the 'Supreme Being' cannot be conceived of as one, being pleased by the flower, given to Him, there is no difficulty. For the desire to cause pleasure of Him, in one, offering a flower to Him is quite conceivable.[4]

In *idaṁ pitre svadhā* or in *idamagnaye svāhā*, the fourth prepositional inflection means 'having as (recepient') in view. The words, *svadhā* and *svāhā* mean the act of giving an object

1. ibid., p. 375.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 375.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 375.
   Vide also कृष्णकान्ती p. 375.
4. ibid., p. 375.

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to be given in oblaiion with the employment of themselves. Hence *idaṁ pitre svadhā* gives the verbal knowledge of 'its being given in oblation having the ancestor as the recipient in view, with the employment of (the magical formula), *svadhā*. Similarly, *idamagnaye svāhā* gives the verbal knowledge .of 'its' being given in oblation, having *Agni*, the god as the recipient in view, with the employment of (the magical formula), *svāhā*.[1] The use of *svadhā* is not provided for to accompany the act of giving oblation to gods and so also the use of *svāhā*, the act of giving oblation to ancestors.[2]

A similar kind of verbal knowledge is caused by *vaṣad-indrāya*.[3]

In *svasti prajābhyaḥ*, the fourth prepositional inflection means the state of abiding and the word, *svasti* denotes the state of being in happiness.[4]

In case of the word, *svasti* meaning 'wishing for the state of being in happiness', the sixth prepositional inflection too, is provided for, alternately, with the fourth one to make room for the use of *svasti prajānāṁ* along with *svasti prajābhyaḥ*, according to *Bhāguri*.[5]

In *caitrāya sukhaṁ, maitrāya hitaṁ*, alternatively used with *caitrasya sukhaṁ, maitrasya hitaṁ*, the fourth prepositional inflection means the state of abiding.[6]

In *sukhāya alaṁ bhojanaṁ*, the fourth prepositional inflection means, the state of being in respect of, to be syntactically related to ability, a constituent of what the word, *alaṁ* means viz., possessed of ability. The said sentence, therefore, gives the

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1. ibid., pp. 375–76.
2. ibid., p. 376.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 376,
4. ibid., p. 376.
5. ibid., p. 376.
   Vide also पा. II. 3. 73 (सि. कौ. 631).
6. श. श. प्र. p. 376.
   Vide also हितयोगे च। (वार्तिक) सि. कौ. 580.

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verbal knowledge of the act of eating, being able in respect of (causing) happiness.[1]

Opponents argue : In *alamanena*, the fourth prepositional inflection should have been provided for.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For the word, *alam* in this instance, does not signify ability. On the contrary, it means futility.[2]

In *yūpāya dāruḥ* or *randhanāya sthālī* and the like, the fourth prepositional inflection means 'the state of being for that purpose' or 'that of being conducive thereto'.[3]

In *pākāya vrajati*, the fourth prepositional inflection signifies the state of having the act of cooking in view or the state of being guided by the desire for the act of cooking, to be syntactically related to the act of going, as a feature. For the fourth prepositional inflection is provided for to be suffixed to a word, ending in a primary suffix, carrying the sense of self-abstraction, to bear out the comprehension of what the gerundial suffix, *tuman* means. Hence in reference to one, going to make others cook, *pākāya vrajati* is not used in language. For the said gerundial suffix bears out the state of being undertaken by the same agent as well.[4]

It is to be noted that Pāṇini has not provided for what is called *tādarthye caturthī* although he has indicated the use of the said inflection in the said sense by an independent aphorism in the context of compound.[5] The author of the *vārtika* however, is very clear on this point.[6] The state of being with

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 376.
2. ibid., p. 376.
3. ibid., p. 376.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 376.
   Vide also तुमर्थाच्च भाववचनात्। पा. 3. 15. (सि. कौ 582).
5. चतुर्थी तदर्थार्थ-बलि-हित-सुख-रक्षितैः। पा. II. 1. 36. (सि. कौ. 698).
6. तादर्थ्ये चतुर्थी वाच्या। (वार्त्तिक)। Vide सि. कौ. 580.

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a view to accomplishing that (*tādarthya*) carries the sense of the promoted (*upakārya*) and the promoter (*upakāraka*). The word, signifying the promoted is suffixed with the fourth prepositional inflection to bear out the sense of the promoted and the promoter. In *muktaye hariṁ bhajate*, for an example, the word, *mukti* signifies the promoted and the act of worshipping '*Hari*' has come out to be the promoter as borne out by the fourth prepositional inflection. The object of one's leaving off (*nivṛtti*) like that of one's attainment (*prāpti*), as well, (as in the instance cited), is comprehended as the promoted. Hence *pāpāya prāyaścittaṁ* or *maśakāya dhūmaḥ* are validly used in language. The modified object too, at times, turns out to be 'promoted' and hence the source material (*prakṛti*) thereof comes to be comprehended as the promoter, as in *yūpāyā dāruḥ*. At times, again, promotion means self-sacrifice. In *aśvāya ghāsaḥ*, for an example, grass by virtue of self-sacrifice turns out to be the promoter and horse, the promoted.

Sometimes, it so happens that the sense of the promoter and the promoted is borne out even prior to the fourth prepositional inflection being suffixed. Pāṇini provides for the use of a certain primary suffixes, denotative of self-abstraction, in the sense of what the gerundial suffix, *taman* denotes.[1] The words, ending in such primary suffixes call for the use of the fourth prepositional inflection as provided for, by the rule, *tumarthācca bhāva-vacanāt*. The word, *bhāva*, in the rules, cited means an act (*kriyā*). Words like *gamana*, *pāka*, *bhojana*, *yāga*, *darśana* and so on, although are nouns, these are none-the-less denotative of acts (*bhāva*) like that of going, cooking, eating and so on. As provided for by the rule, *bhāva-vacanāśca* the primary suffix, *ghañ* is suffixed to the root-verb, *yaji* to denote the sense of the gerundial suffix, *tuman*. Hence, in *yāgāya yāti*, although the sense of the promoted and the

1. भाववचनाश्च । पा. III. 3. 11. (सि. कौ. 1180).

2. पा. II. 3. 15. (सि. कौ.) 582.

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promoter is involved, the fourth prepositional inflection is not provided for to bear out the said sense to be known as what is called *tādarthye caturthī*. It simply indicates the fact that the primary suffix, added to the root-verb, *yaji* in the said instance is provided for in the sense of what the gerundial suffix, *tuman* means.

In *paṭāya yāti*, therefore, as cloth (*paṭa*) is not presented by a word ending in a primary suffix, denotative of self-abstraction, the fourth prepositional inflection does not bear out the comprehension of the act of going, being guided by the desire therefor. For like the gerundial suffix, *tuman*, the fourth prepositional inflection, provided for by the rule, *tumarthācca bhāva-vacanāt* is expectant of the meaning of a root-verb.[1]

Opponents ask : How then *pākāya sthālī* is so validly used in language ?

Jagadīśa replies : It is an instance of what is called *tādarthya-caturthī*. The fourth prepositional inflection, in the present instance, is not provided for by the rule, *tumarthācca bhāva-vacanāt*.[2]

In *phalebhyo vrajati*, the fourth prepositional inflection bears out the verbal comprehension of being guided by the desire for the act of plucking fruits, posited as a feature against the act of going. For it bears out an identical verbal knowledge with *phalānyāhartuṁ Vrajati*. The fourth prepositional inflection has been provided for to be suffixed to a word, signifying the object of a verb, abiding the gerundial suffix, *tuman*, left to be understood (viz. *phalaṁ āhartuṁ vrajati*) to bear out the comprehension of the accomplishment of the act,

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1. 'पटाय व्रजती'त्यादौ च पटादेर्भावकृदन्तानुपस्थाप्यत्वान्न तदिच्छाधीनत्वादेर्व्रजनादावगमः, तुम इव तदर्थकचतुर्थ्या अपि धात्वर्थं एव स्वार्थे साकांक्षत्वाच्च । श. श. प्र. p. 377.

2. 'पाकाय स्थाली'त्यादितो न पाकेच्छाधीनत्वादेः स्थल्यादौ (अवगमः) श. श. प्र. p. 377.

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denoted by the said verb as what is promoted by the act, denoted by the verb in use.[1]

The fourth prepositional inflection, it may be pointed out, bears out the comprehension of the promoted and the promoter under three different circumstances as seen above. Under different such circumstances, therefore, it may be designated as *tādarthye caturthī*, *tumannarthe caturthī* and *tumannartha-karmaṇi caturthī*. It is *tumannarthe caturthī*, in case it is suffixed to a word, formed of a primary suffix, provided for by the rule, *bhāvavacanāśca*. In case, the word to which the fourth prepositional inflection is suffixed, is liable to being comprehended as the object of a verb ending in the gerundial suffix, *tuman*, it is *tumannartha-karmaṇi caturthī*. In the rest of such instances, it is *tādarthye caturthī*.

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1. 'फलेभ्यो व्रजती'त्यादेः फलान्याहर्त्तुं व्रजतीत्यादिसमानार्थकत्वानुरोधात्तत्र-फलकर्मकाहरणेच्छाद्यधीनत्वं फलाद्युत्तरचतुर्थ्या व्रजनादौ बोध्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 378.

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CHAPTER XXVI

CLASSIFICATION OF PREPOSITIONAL INFLECTIONS (PAÑCAMĪ)

In *pūrvo grāmāt*, the fifth prepositional inflection bears out the verbal knowledge of what is close to the 'Eastern mountain' from the village. In *grāmāduttaro* (*dakṣiṇaḥ*) and the like, similarly, the said inflection leads to the verbal knowledge of what is close to the mount *kailāśa*, from the village and so on.[1]

In *grīṣmāt pūrvo vasantaḥ*, or in *kṛṣṇāt pūrvo halāyudhaḥ*, the word, *pūrva* means coming into being at the moment, marked with previous non-existenee. The fifth prepositional inflection signifies the state of the connterpositive, abiding village or *kṛṣṇa*, to be syntactically related to previous non-existence, a constituent of what the word, *pūrva* means. Hence the said sentences give the verbal knowledges of the spring season, coming into being at the moment, marked with the previous non-existence of summer or of *halāyudha's* coming into being at the moment, marked with the previous non-existence of *kṛṣṇa*.[2]

In *ghaṭādanyaḥ* (*bhinnaḥ, pṛthak*) and the like, the fifth prepositional inflection means 'the state of being in respect of' or that of being the counter-positive qualified by jarness, to be posited against difference (*bheda*), a constituent of what

1. श. श. प्र. p. 378.
   Vide also पा. II. 3. 29. (सि. कौ. 595).
2. श. श. प्र. p. 378.

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the words like, *anya* mean, through the relation of *nirūpitatva*. Hence the said kind of a sentence gives the verbal knowledge of what is possessed of difference, determined by the state of being in respect of or that of being the counterpositive, qualified by jarness, abiding jar.[1]

In '*gṛhād gaṅgā mama parā, kāśyāḥ saiṣyāparā mama*', the fifth prepositional inflection signifies the state of being in relation to house and *kāśī*, syntactically related to nearness and distance in respect of space, a kind of *svarūpa-sambandha* or an independent category by itself to give the verbal knowledge of the Ganges being remote from me in relation to the house and near in relation to *kāśi*.[2]

In *pari gṛhād gaṭaḥ, apa gṛhād bhuktaḥ* and the like, the particle, *pari* means 'having left out' and this is expectant of being syntactically related to the meaning of a root-verb only. As such, the uses like *gṛhāt pari caitraḥ* are not validly made in language.[3]

In *ādehād vastram* and in *āgṛhādudyānam, ān* means limit inceptive (*abhividhi*) and limit concuclusive (*maryādā*) respectively to give the verbal knowledge of clothes, pervading the whole body and of a garden, extending upto the outskirt of the house.[4]

In *vaiśyebhyo kṣatriyā sūrāḥ, śūdrebhyo dhanino viśaḥ*, the verbal knowledges that occur are like this : The *kṣatriyas* are in possession of strength, more than the strength of the *vaiśyas* and the *vaiśyas* are in possession of wealth, more than the wealth of the *śūdras*. For the fifth prepositional inflection, used in the instances, cited, has been provided for to carry the sense of the comparative degree of comparison.

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1. ibid., p. 378.
2. ibid., pp. 378–79.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 379.
4. ibid., p. 379.

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The strength of the *kṣatriyas* being comparatively more than that of the *vaiśyas*, for an example, means the *kṣatriyas* being the substratum, through the relation of collective extensity, of the number, possessed of the genus that has turned out to be the determinant of the state of the counterpositive of difference, abiding the number, pervasive than the number, inherent in strength of the *vaiśyas*.[1] Supposing the *kṣatrīyas* have two points of credit in respect of strength and the *vaiśyas* one. The *kṣatriyas*, in that case, turn out to be the exclusive substratum of two (*dvitva*), the number, possessed of the state of being two (*dvitvatva*), a genus that has come out to be the determinant of the state of the counterpositive of difference (viz, *dvitva-bheda*), abiding two, the number, pervasive than the number, (one) inherent in the strength of the *vaiśyas*.[2]

Opponents argue : The strength of the *kṣatrīyas* being more than that of the *vaiśyas* may mean being the locus of plurality qualified by the genus that has turned out to be the determinant of the state of the counter-positive of difference, abiding the number that pervades the number, abiding the strength of the *vaiśyas* through the relation of collective extensity.

Jagadīśa replies : No. This is not possible. For in case the *vaiśyas* have only one point of credit in respect of his strength and the *kṣatriyas*, two, the use like *vaiśyebhyaḥ kṣatriyāḥ śūrāḥ* could not be made in language. For the *kṣatriyas* are neither the locus of plurality (particularised as suggested) nor is the number, abiding the strength of the *vaiśyas* involve the relation of collective extensity.[3]

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1. ibid., p. 379.
2. शौर्यादेर्वैश्यशौर्य्यद्यधिकत्वञ्च वैश्यशौर्य्यादिमात्रवृत्तिसंख्यासामान्यनिष्ठभेद-प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभूतजातिमत्संख्यापर्य्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वम् । ibid., pp. 379–80.
3. तच्छौर्य्यपर्य्याप्तसंख्यासामान्यनिष्ठ-भेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभूतजाति-मद्बहुत्ववत्त्वन्तु न तथा, यस्यैकमेव शौर्य्यं यस्य च शौर्य्यद्वयमेव तद्बहुतः 'स शूर' इत्यादेरयोग्यतापत्तेः, तदुभयशौर्य्ययोः पर्य्याप्तसंख्याबहुत्वयोरप्रसिद्धेः । श. श. प्र. p. 380.

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Opponents argue : In *Vaiśyabhyaḥ kṣatriyāḥ śūrāḥ*, how could the state of the counter-positive of difference, the state of the substratum (locus), the genus, the number be comprehended ? For so many words are not there to present all these meanings.

Jagadīśa replies : The base of the fifth prepositional inflection viz., the word, *vaiśya* presents the *vaiśyas* and the said inflection through multiple power of denotation (*khaṇḍa-śakti*) presents the said meanings.[1]

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[1] 'इदन्तु बोध्यम्—निरूक्तवैश्यादिशौर्य्याद्याधिकत्वे वैश्यादेः प्रकृतिलभ्यत्वादित-रभागः खण्डशो वृथा पञ्चम्या प्रतिपाद्यते' इति। ibid., p. 380.

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CHAPTER XXVII

CLASSIFICATION OF PREPOSITIONAL INFLECTIONS (ṢAṢṬHĪ)

In *caitrasya dhanaṁ, vṛkṣasya śākhā, sphaṭikasya lauhityaṁ*, the sixth prepositional inflection denotes a specific relation, severally. *Caitrasya dhanaṁ*, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of wealth, possessed of by *caitra, vṛkṣasya śākhā* of the branches, inherent in a tree and *sphaṭikasya lauhityaṁ* of redness, superimposed on a crystal.[1]

The sixth prepositional inflection, in no case, denotes relation as such. For in that case, an use like *nedaṁ caitrasya dhanaṁ* could be validly made in language, in reference to *caitra*, being in contact with other's wealth. For through the relation of conjunction or *ādheyatva, caitra*, being related to such wealth, compatibility calling for syntactical relation between the word-meanings involved remains wanting, in that case.[2]

Not only that. It is difficult to conceive of relation as such.[3]

In *narāṇām kṣatrīyaḥ śūraṭmaḥ*, the sixth prepositional inflection cannot denote the whole of specification (*nirdhāraṇa*). For specification means the state of the specified, being possessed of a property by virtue of being other than the whole as

1. चैत्रस्य धनं, वृक्षस्य शाखाः, स्फटिकस्य लौहित्यमित्यादौ स्वत्वस्य समवेतत्वादिकं प्रातिस्विकरूपेणैव षष्ठ्यर्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 380–81.
2. सम्बन्धत्वेन तथात्वे चैत्रस्य परधने नेदं चैत्रस्येत्यादेरयोग्यत्वापत्तेः। ibid., p. 381.
3. सम्बन्धत्वस्यानुगतस्य दुर्वचत्वाच्च। ibid., p. 381.

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distinguished from the self and the whole and the property, determining it are presented by the word, denotative of the whole. The sixth prepositional inflection, therefore, should reasonably be held to mean 'being other than the specified and being other'. By specified is understood, the *kṣatriyas* (an individual tribe of men), read alongwith and by being other is understood 'being the counter-positive of difference'. Hence in the present instance, the *ksatriyas* being only an individual tribe of men, the said inflection means the state of being other than the *kṣatriya* that qualifies the meaning of the base of the said inflection viz, *nara*, Thereupon, through the relation of *kṣatriyānya-naratvā'vacchinnādheyatā*, the meaning of the word, *nara* gets syntactically related to difference and thus the state of the counterpositive of the difference abiding men, other than *kṣatriyas*, thereupon, gets related through the relation of self-sameness (*svarūpa*), to the meaning of the word, *śūratama* and the whole thing, thereupon, gets related, through identity, to the meaning of the word, *kṣatriya*. Hence the verbal knowledge from the said sentence is of *kṣatriya*, one with the most valourous, possessed of the state of the counter-positive of difference, abiding men, other than *kṣatriya*.[1]

Opponents argue : Instead of imagining *kṣatriyānya-naratvā'vacchinnā'dheyatā*, it is simpler to conceive of mere *ādheyatā* as the relation between men, other than *kṣatriya* (*kṣatriyānya-nara*) and difference (bheda).

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, '*narāṇām kṣatriyaḥ sundaraḥ*' would be liable to valid use in language. For the state of the counter-positive of difference, abiding an ugly man, other than *kṣatriya* is available in the meaning of the word, *sundara*. Conversely, the state of the counter-positive of difference abiding men, other than *kṣatriyas*, through the relation of *kṣatriyānya-naratvā'vacchinnā'dheyatā* is not availed of in

1. श. श. प्र. pp. 381–82.

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sundara. For it is not a fact that *kṣatriyas* are the most handsome of man as such.[1]

Opponents argue : The meaning of the word, *nara*, then, need not be further particularised by *kṣatriyānyatva.*

Jagadīśa replies : It has to be thus particularised. For the state of the counter-positive of difference, abiding what is determined by manhood is inconceivable of being syntactically related to the most valourous.[2]

Opponents argue : Then *ghaṭānāṁ kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ* too, should be validly used in language in-as-much-as the state of the counter-positive of difference, abiding jar, qualified by jarness, inherent in jar, that are other than *kṣatriya*, is availed of.

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is unreasonable. For as in *rāhoḥ śiraḥ*, so also in the present instance, the sixth prepositional inflection bears out the comprehension of identity of what is denoted by the base thereof, to be syntactically related to *kṣatriya.*[3]

Opponents argue : Being other than *kṣatriya* (*kṣatriyānyatva*), the meaning of the sixth prepositional inflection cannot be posited as a feature against the meaning of the base thereof. For the rule is that except number, no other meaning of a declensional suffix is embraced as a feature against the meaning of the base thereof.

Jagadīśa replies : Being addressed, the meaning of the first declensional suffix being found liable to comprehension as a

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1. क्षत्रियान्यनरस्याधेयतामात्रेण भेदेऽन्वये 'नराणां क्षत्रितः सुन्दर' इत्यपि प्रयोगापत्तेः, क्षत्रियान्यकुरूपनरनिष्ठभेदप्रतियोगित्वस्य सुन्दरे सत्त्वात्। ibid., p. 382.
2. एवञ्च नरत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्तिकभेदप्रतियोगित्वस्य शूरतमे बाधादुक्तवाक्यस्यायोग्यत्वापत्तिरतः षष्ठ्यर्थेन क्षत्रियान्यत्वेन तत्प्रकृत्यर्थो नरो विशेषितः। श. श. प्र. p. 382.
3. न च 'घटानां क्षत्रियः शूर' इत्यपि स्यात्, क्षत्रियान्यघटत्वावच्छेदेन शूरभेदस्य सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम्। 'राहोः शिर' इत्यादाविव प्रकृतेऽपि क्षत्रियान्वयिनः स्वप्रकृत्यर्थतादात्म्यस्य षष्ठ्या बोध्यत्वात्। ibid., p. 382.

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feature against the meaning of the base thereof, the said rule is only approximate, it has been.[1]

Ooponents argue : *Narāṇām kṣatriyo dravyam* appears to be valid. For it is likely to give the verbal knowledge of *kṣatriya* as one with substance, possessed of the state of the counter-positive of difference of what is qualified by duality, abiding men, other than *kṣatriya*.

Jagadīśa replies : This is untenable. For the sixth prepositional inflection, provided for, in the sense of specification has the potency to denote the state of the counterpositive of the difference of what is qualified by substancehood only, to be related to substance, the invariable substantive in the present instance.[2]

Opponents argue : The sixth prepositional inflection should not be held to be denotative of 'being other than *kṣatriya* (*kṣatriyā'nyatva*), and 'being the counter-positive of difference'. On the contrary, it is more reasonable to hold that the word, *kṣatriya* means *kṣatriya*. Thereupon, *kṣatriya* is related to difference, a meaning of the said inflection. These two taken together i.e. being other than *kṣatriya* (*kṣatriyanyatva*) is then related to man, the meaning of the word, *nara*, the base. Thereupon, man other than *kṣatriya* for a second time, is related to difference. Such difference (*kṣatriyānya-nara-bheda*), then is related to being the counter-positive and the said state of the counter-positive is related to the meaning of the word, *śūratama*, through identity.

Jagadīśa replies : It is true. But the fact is that *kṣatriya*, the meaning of the word, *kṣatriya* is admittedly related only to the meaning of a declensional suffix, added thereto, through a relation of difference. As such, it is not reasonable to hold

1. सम्बोध्यत्वादौ व्यभिचारेण तादृशव्याप्तेः प्रायिकत्वस्य प्रागुक्तत्वात् । ibid., p. 383.
2. द्रव्यत्वादिविशिष्टे धर्मिणि द्रव्यत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नस्यैव भेदप्रतियोगित्वस्य बोधने निर्धारणषष्ठ्याः समर्थत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 382.

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that *kṣatriya*, the meaning of the word, *kṣatriya*, be related to difference, the meaning of the sixth prepositional inflection, suffixed to the word, *nara*. Hence the said inflection has been rightly held to mean being other than *kṣatriya* and not mere difference.[1]

Opponents argue : *Narasya kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ* too, then should be validly used in language to give the sense of specification.

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection.[2]

Opponents ask : But does the sixth prepositional inflection, used in the singular number, carry the sense of specification ?

Jagadīśa replies : Yes, it does carry the said sense as in. *pāṇipādasya pāṇiḥ pavitraḥ*. The use of the said inflection in the singular number in the verse of the *Gitā* (X. 33), *dvandvaḥ sāmāsikasya ca* also bears out snch a possibility.[3]

Opponents argue : The use, *pāṇi-pādasya pāṇih pavitraḥ* is wrong. For the difference of *pāṇi* does not abide what is qualified by the duality of *pāṇi* and *pāda* to bear out the comprehension of difference, abiding what is qualified by the duality of *pāṇi* and *pāda*, that is other than *pāṇi* (*pāṇyanya-pāṇi-pādo'bhayatvā'vacchinna-vṛttika-bheda*).[4]

Jagadīśa replies : The difference of *pāṇi* well abides the aggregation of *pāṇi* and *pāda*.

Opponents argue : The difference of the aggregation of *pāṇi* and *pāda* cannot be in *pāṇi*, one with what the word, *pavitra* means.[5]

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1. तथापि क्षत्रियादिनामोपस्थाप्यस्य क्षत्रियादेस्तादृशनामोत्तरविभक्तयर्थं एव भेदेनान्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात् नरपदोत्तरषष्ठयर्थे तदन्वयासम्भवात् क्षत्रियान्यत्वं विशिष्टमेव षष्ठयर्थो न त्वन्यतामात्रम् । ibid., pp. 382–83.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 383.
3. ibid., p. 383.
4. 'ननु 'पाणिपादस्य पाणिः पवित्रः' इति प्रयोगोऽसिद्ध एव पाणिपादोभयत्वावच्छिन्ने पाणिभेदासत्त्वात् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 383.
5. तत्समाहारे पाणिभेदसत्त्वेऽपि समहारभेदस्य पाणावभावात् । ibid., p 383.

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Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the sixth prepositional inflection, provided for, in the sense of specification may be held to bear out the comprehension thereof only if used in the dual and plural numbers. In *narasya kṣatriyaḥ śuraḥ* or *pāṇi-pādasya pāṇiḥ pavitraḥ* or *dvandvaḥ sāmāsikasya ca* and the like, the sixth prepositional inflection is to be understood to have been provided for in the sense of *śeṣa*.[1]

Opponents argue : In *pāthaḥ-pṛthvyorjalaṁ snehavat*, water and earth, as other than water, being inconceivable, the initial step towards the verbal knowledge, if any, to occur thereform, viz, water and earth, as other than water (*jalānya-pāthaḥ-pṛthvī*) folds up. Not only that. The state of the counter-positive of the difference of both water and earth cannot be syntactically related to the meaning of the word, *snehavat*, identically related to water. Hence the said sentence cannot bear out the verbal comprehension of water, one with what is possesed of viscidity, the counter-positive of difference, abiding what is determined by the duality of water and earth, other than water, as called for by the sixth prepositional inflection, in accordance with the principles, suggested so far.[2]

Jagadīśa argues : The sixth prepositional inflection, provided for, in the sense of specification, suffixed to an instance of the *dvi-pada-dvandva* compound, denotes the state of the counter-positive of difference, abiding what is other than what is other than the meaning of the two constituents thereof. Hence, the meaning of the said inflection viz, 'being other than water' (*jalānyatva*), is likely to be syntactically related to the state of the counter-positive of difference, abiding earth or what is other than *tejas* that is other than water and earth and the said state of the counrer-positive gets related to what is possessed of viscidity, one with water.[3]

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1. एकवचनभिन्नयोरेव षष्ठीसप्तम्योरुक्तनिर्धारणबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तिस्वीकाराद्वा। श. श. प्र. p. 383.
   किन्तु सम्बन्धे षष्ठी। कृष्णकान्ती p. 383.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 383.
3. ibid., p. 383.

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Opponents argue : Even then, there is no escape. For water and earth, taken together are not identical with water, the invariable substantive, on grounds of which *ghaṭānāṁ kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ* has been discarded as invalid.[1]

Jagadīśsa replies : Such identity was insisted upon in *ghaṭānāṁ kṣatriyaḥ śūratamaḥ* to withhold an use like that. In the present instance, the situation is different. For the sixth prepositional inflection, here, is suffixed to an instance of the *dvandva* compound.[2]

Opponents argue : The sixth prepositional inflection, provided for, in the sense of specification invariably denotes such identily as otherwise *pāthaḥ-pṛthivyosteja uṣṇaṁ* would have been validly used in language.

Moreover, it is wrong to hold that the sixth prepositional inflection, provided for, in the sense of specification denotes the state of the counter-positive of difference, abiding what is other than what is other than the meanings the constituents of a *dvandva* compound. For in *ghaṭa·tad-bhinnayorghaṭaḥ kambu-grīvādimān*, nothing is conceivable as what is other than what is other than jar and other than jar (*anyatartva* meaning *tad-bhiṇa-bhinnaḥ*), as a result of which, difference, abiding what is other than what is other than jar and other than jar is not borne out by the said sentence.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The sixth prepositional inflection, provided for, in the sense of specification, suffixed to an instance of the *dvandva* compound, is denotative of the locus of a number that collectively extends (in addition to being other than what is meant by the word, presenting the specified individual and

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1. ibid., p. 383.
2. (ननु) घटेषु क्षत्रियः शूर इति प्रयोगवारणाय तत्रत्यषष्ठ्यास्ताद्शार्थकत्वेऽपि पाथःपृथिवीतिद्वन्द्वोत्तरषष्ठ्यास्ताद्शार्थकत्वं (न वाच्यम्)। कृष्णकान्ती p. 383.
3. 'घटतद्भिन्नयोर्घटः कम्बुग्रीवादिमानि'त्यादौ घटतद्भिन्नान्यतरत्वाप्रसिद्धया ताद्शान्यतरवृत्तिभेदस्य बोधयितुमशक्यत्वाच्च। श. श. प्र. pp. 383-84.

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being the counterpositive of difference) as well. Hence in the instance *pāthaḥ-pṛthivyorjalaṁ snehavat*, being other than water (*jalānyatva*) is syntactically related to the substratum of the collectively extensive number (*saṁkhyātva*) of water and earth. Thereupon, the state of the counterpositive of difference, abiding such a substratum (viz., earth), gets syntactically related to what is possessed of viscidity, one with water.

Opponents argue : The substratum of the collective extensive number of water and earth is to be water and earth, taken together. For duality (*dvitva*) collectively extends to two, taken together only.

Jagadīśa replies : The determinant of attribution is not duality but the state of being a number (*saṁkhyatva*), abiding the number (two) of water and earth. The substratum thereof would be one viz., earth that can safely accomodate the difference of water.[1] The same is the situation, in *ghaṭa-paṭa-maṭhānāṁ ghataḥ kambu-grīvādimān*.[2]

Jagadīśa points out : The sixth prepositional inflection, provided for, in the sense of specification means 'being the counterpositive of difference, only in case the subject and the predicate are identically related. In case, however, these are related otherwise, it means absolute negation. In *narāṇāṁ kṣatriye śauryyaṁ*, therefore, being the counterpositive of the absolute negation, abiding what is qualified by manhood, inherent in men, other than *kṣatriya* is comprehended as a feature against valour. For otherwise, *narāṇāṁ kṣatriye rūpaṁ* would be validly used in language. Because in case the sixth prepositlonal inflection means 'being the counterpositive of difference', grace would reasonably come to be comprehended as the counter-positive of the difference (*rūpaṁ na*), abiding

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 384.
   Vide also तादृशसंख्याया द्वित्वरूपत्वेऽपि संख्यात्वस्य व्यासज्यवृत्तितानवच्छेदकत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 384.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 384.

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what is qualified by manhood, inherent in men, other than *kṣatriya*. But in case, the said inflection is taken to mean absolute negation, there would be no such contingency. For grace cannot be comprehended as the counter-positive of the absolute negation of grace, abiding in men, other than *kṣatriya*.[1]

Opponents argue : In *narāṇām madhye kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ*, the sixth prepositional inflection should be deemed redundant. For the sense of specification is well conveyed by the word, *madhye*.

Jagadīśa replies : When two synonyms are used to convey a single idea, it is not that one of them becomes redundant, as it has been seen in the use, *he ! caitra*.[2]

In *nareṣu kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ* too, the seventh prepositional inflection bears out an identical kind of verbal knowledge.[3]

Opponents argue : In *narāṇām kṣairiyaḥ śūraṭamaḥ*, the sixth prepositional inflection denotes non-difference or identity as in *rāhoḥ śiraḥ*. Hence the verbal knowledge from the said sentence should be like this : Identity of the most valourous is in those who are qualified by *kṣatriyatva*, not other than men. Hence *narāṇām kṣātriyo'rjunaḥ* cannot be used in language. For the identity of Arjuna does not abide those who are qualified by *kṣatriyatva*, not other than men. Nor could *narānām vānaraḥ paśuḥ* and the like too, be validly used in language. For although a beast (*paśu*), can be comprehended as identical with monkey (*vānaraḥ*), its identity with man remains wanting.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : All this is unreasonable. For *narāṇāṁ kṣatriyaḥ prāṇī*, *kṣatriyāṇāṁ naraḥ śūraḥ* and the like other uses cannot be ruled out in that case.[5]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 384.
2. ibid., p. 384.
3. ibid., p. 384.
4. श. श. प्र. pp. 384-85.
5. ibid., p. 385.

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Others hold : In *narāṇāṁ kṣatriyaḥ śūraḥ*, the verbal knowledge is like this : Men, other than *kṣatriyas* are other than the valourous and *kṣatriyas*, not other than men are valourous. Hence the sixth or seventh prepositional inflections, provided for, in the sense of specification mean both identity and difference.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For it militates against the principle that the word, ending in the first declensional suffix, is comprehended as the invariable substantive,

Not only that. Difference, a meaning of the sixth prepositional inflection, left unqualified by the meaning of the base thereof, cannot be embraced as a feature against the valourous in the face of the settled rule of semantics that no meaning, other than a number, of a declensional suffix, without being qualified by the meaning of the base thereof, is syntacticaliy related to another word-meaning.[2]

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1. ibid., p. 385.
2. ibid., p. 385.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

CLASSIFICATION OF PREPOSITIONAL INFLECTIONS (SAPTAMĪ)

In *kṣitau ghaṭaḥ, tantuṣu paṭaḥ, spathike lāuhityaṁ* and the like, the seventh prepositional inflection means the state of abiding through the relation of spatial self-sameness (*daiśika-svarūpa*). For it is not used with a word, denotative of temporal conjunction, used therewith.[1]

Opponents argue : The seventh prepositional inflection should mean only the state of abiding as such.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, *kriyāyāṁ paṭatvaṁ* would be liable to vaild use in language. For through the relation of temporal self-sameness, the state of abiding of clothness is available in action since clothness is in action through the said relation.[2]

Opponents argue : In that case, the seventh prepositional inflection, in such cases, may be held to mean the state of abiding through a relation other than that of temporal self-sameness.[3]

Not only that. The seventh prepositional inflection in *kriyāyām paṭatvaṁ* is of the same kind with that used in *idānīṁ paṭatvaṁ*. Hence what has been said so far in respect of the denotation of the seventh prepositional inflection, used in the aforesaid instance is not reasonable.[4]

1. श. श. प्र. p. 385.
2. ibid., pp. 385–86.
3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 385.
4. कृष्णकान्ती p. 386.

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Jagadīśa replies : Even then, *mūrtānya-dravye paṭatvaṁ* would remain to be validly used. For through the relation of *viṣayitā*, *paṭatva* or clotheness is in knowledge.[1]

Opponents ask : How then *ghaṭe kālikena dik-kṛtena vā sambandhena paṭatvaṁ* is used ?

Jagadīśa replies : Because the seventh prepositional inflection in such an instance is used along with a word or words denotative of the relation of temporal self-sameness or the like.[2]

Thus as the seventh prepositional inflection, not used in association with a word, denotative of time, bears out the comprehension of only the state of abiding through the relation of spatial self-sameness and as it does not bear out the comprehension of the state of abiding through the relation of temporal self-sameness and the like, a special rule has been formulated, providing for the said inflection, suffixed to a word, denotative of what involves time, bearing out the comprehension of the state of abiding through the relation of temporal self-sameness.[3]

Hence in *śaradi puṣpanti saptacchadāḥ*, the verbal knowledge is like this : The seven-leaf trees are possessed of the yeild of flowers, abiding autumn.

Opponents argue : Then *śaradi puṣpanti palāśāḥ* too, should be validly used in language. For the *palāśa* flowers that blossom in spring, also abide autumn.

Jagadīśa replies : No. It cannot be. For in *śaradi puṣpanti saptacchadāḥ*, the verbal suffix denotes 'yeild', one with agency of the act, denoted by the verb, *puṣpanti* and it is because of semantic pecularity that the state of abiding, presented by the prepositional inflection, is posited as a feature thereagainst alone. Hence as the yeild of the *palāśa* flowers does not abide

1. श. श. प्र. p. 385-86.
2. ibid., p. 385.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 386.

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autumn, *śaradi puṣpanti palāśāḥ* is not used, the flowers being retained till autumn, notwithstanding.[1]

Opponents argue : *Śaradi puṣpanti padminyaḥ* should be used in that case. For the ponds with lotus-plants (*padminyaḥ*) are possessed of the yeild of lotus, abiding autumn.

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection.[2]

Opponents argue : Then in *śaradi sundaraścandramā* and the like, the seventh prepositional inflection is to be understood to have the potency of bearing out the comprehension of the state of abiding through the relation of temporal self-sameness.

Jagadīśa replies : This also is a welcome objection.[3]

The elders hold : In *śaradi puṣpanti saptacchadāḥ*, the seventh prepositional inflection means 'yeild' (*utpatti*) and the verbal suffix means 'being the procreator.' Hence the verbal knowledge from the said sentence is like this : The seven-leaf trees are the procreators of the flowers that have their yeild in autumn.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable.[5] For the seventh prepositional inflection, provided for, in the sense of the temporal locus (*kālādhikaraṇa*), elsewhere denotes the state of abiding (*ādheyatā*).

Not only that. There is no sense in holding that the verbal suffix should mean 'being the procreator'.[6]

When an act is stated for the purpose of determining the time at which or the circumstances under which, another action takes place, the words, constituting the clause which

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1. ibid., pp. 386-87.
2. ibid., p. 387.
3. ibid., p. 387.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 387.
5. तच्चिन्त्यम् । ibid., p. 387.
6. तस्य तिङर्थत्वे प्रयोजनाभावेनाधेयत्वापेक्षयोत्पत्तेर्गुरुत्वच्चेति चिन्ताबीजम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 387.

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signifies the former action, may be suffixed with the seventh prepositional inflection to be known as absolute prepositional inflection (*bhāve saptamī*).

Such an absolute construction involves manifold implications. Firstly, the two acts, involved, are to be accomplished by two different agents. Secondly, of the two verbs, one has to be infinite and the other finite. Thirdly, the time of the said two acts are to stand related as the determined and the determinant. Fourthly, the absolute prepositional inflection is to be suffixed to the word, signifying the identified agent, or the identified object, as the case may be, of the determinant act. *Nirdasyurabhavat loke Rāme rājyam praśāsati* and *goṣu duhyamānāsu prāptaḥ śyāmaḥ govardhanaḥ* are the instances in point.

In *goṣu duhyamānāsu āgataḥ*, according to Jagadīśa, the absolute seventh prepositional inflection, suffixed to the nominal, *duhyamāna*, ending in a primary suffix, is denotative of time (or tense), expectant of syntactical relation with *go*, through identity. As such, the said inflection means 'abiding the present time', the determinant of denotation of the nominal ending in the said primary suffix (*duhyamāna*, meaning the act of milking at the present time, *vartamāna-kāla-vṛtti-dohana-karma*).[1]

Opponents argue : The rule of grammar, providing for such prepositional inflection reads, *bhāve saptamī*. The word, *bhāva* cannot ever mean the determinant of denotation of a word or an act. Even if *bhāva* should denote an act, time (*vartamāna-kāla*) is not an act and thus it is wrong to hold that the determinant of denotation of the word, *duhyamana* that has been suffixed with the absolute seventh prepositional inflection (*bhāve saptamī*), is abiding the present time (*vartamāna-kāla-vṛttitva*).

Not only that. *Duhyamāna* is a sentence. As such, it has no power of denotation. Hence the idea of the determinant of denotation thereof is only a far cry.[2]

1. श. श. प्र. p. 387.
2. कृष्णकान्ती p. 387.

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Jagadīśa replies : In *pācakatva*, the suffix, *ktva* is provided for, by the rule, *tattvau bhāve* and the said suffix means the determinant of denotation of the word, *pācaka*. In the present instance, too, the determinant of denotation of the word, *duhyamāna* is understood to have been signified by the word, *bhāva*. The fact that the determinant of denotation in the present case has come out to be abiding the present time (or constituent of time) should not matter. The arguments to the effect that *duhyamāna* is not a word are also applicable to the instance, *pācakatva*.[1]

The sentence, *goṣu duhyamānāsu āgataḥ*, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of one who came at the present time, related to the objects of the contemporary act of milking, one with the cows.[2]

Opponents argue : An uniform concept of the state of being present in respect of time as the locus of each individual use is not possible.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The vebal knowledge from the said sentence is actually like this : (he) came the time, related to the cows, the objects of the act of milking, being accomplished the same time.[4]

Opponents argue : In view of the uniform concept of the state of being present in respect of time, wanting, a sentence like *goṣu dugdhāsu āgataḥ* should not bear out any verbal knowledge then.

Jagadīśa replies : The said sentence would bear out the comprehension of one who came the time, related to the object of the act of milking, the counter-positive of the contemporary destruction, one with cows.[5]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 387.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 387.
3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 387.
4. श. श. प्र. pp. 387-68.
5. ibid., p. 388.

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Similarly, *goṣu dogdhavyāsu āgataḥ* gives the verbal knowledge of one who came the time, related to the object of the act of milking, the counterpositive of the contemporary previons non-existence, one with cows.[1]

Opponents ask : The determinant of denotation of the word, *dugdhā* or *dogdhovyā* is not the state of abiding the present time unlike the word, *duhyamāna.* As such, it is unreasonable to hold that the absolute seventh prepositional inflection, suffixed thereto should bear out the verbal comprehension thereof as in *duhyamānāsu.*[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Such arguments are unreasonable. For pastness or futurity involves presentness.[3]

Opponents argue : In the case of the seventh prepositional inflection, used in an absolute construction, the verbal knowledge should embrace the present time as the locus of the agent or of the object of the determinant act. Hence *goṣu duhyamānāsu āgataḥ* should give the comprehension of one who came the time that had been the locus of the objects of the act of milking, one with cows.

Jagadīśa replies : Such a view would bring in difficulties in the case of an instance like *naṣṭesu goṣu āgataḥ.* For the present time cannot be the locus of cows that are lost. Hence the verbal knowledge like 'he came the time, the locus of the cows, the counter-positive of the destruction, existing' cannot be brought about by such an expression. Conversely, the said time can well be conceived of as of being related to cows, the counterpositive of destruction through *sva-pratiyogika-nāśa-sambandhitva, sva* meaning cows, *tatprayogika-nāsa* is destruction of cows, *tat-sambandhi* is the present time. Hence the said sentence bears out the verbal knowledge of one who came the

1. ibid., p. 388.
2. कृष्णकान्ती p. 388.
3. ibid., p. 388.

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time, related to the cows, the counterpositive of destruction, existing.[1]

Kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare, in the like manner, gives the verbal knowledge like this : the deeds of this individual soul (*jīvātmā*), are the counter-positives of termination (*kṣaya*), abiding the present time, related to the supreme soul, the object of perception (or realisation), the counterpositive of the destruction, existing.

So also *bhuktavatsu ca vipreṣu piṇḍān darbheṣu nirvapet* bears out the verbal knowledge like this : The offering of *piṇḍas* on *kuśas* in the present time, related to the brahmins, the agents of the act of eating, the counterpositive of the destruction existing, is a means to welfare.[2]

The words like, *pācaka*, although ends in a primary suffix, the primary suffix is not denotative of time. Similarly, the words like, *dṛṣṭacara*, although, ends in a suffix, denotative of time, the suffix is not a primary one. Hence uses like *caitreṣu pācakeṣu vrajati, maitreṣu dṛṣṭa-careṣu paśyati* and so on are not used in language.[3]

Opponents ask : Should the seventh prepositional inflection in *stokaṁ maitrasya gate tiṣṭhati*, be regarded to have been used in the sense of absoluteness (*bhāva*) ?

Jagadīśa replies : No. The said sentence gives the verbal knowledge of one, being at the time of the act of going a little, undertaken by *maitra* in the past only. For the primary suffix, *kta*, provided for, in the sense of self-abstraction, to be used in an impersonal construction, is not a primary suffix, identifying a case.

Hence it is reasonable to deduce that the word, *bhāva* in the rule, *bhāve saptamī*, means the present time (tense) the

1. 'नष्टेषु गोषु आगत' इत्यादौ वर्त्तमानकालस्य नष्टाधिकरणत्वाभावेऽपि यथा-कथञ्चित्सम्बन्धिधर्मत्वमस्त्येव । श. श. प्र. p. 388.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 388.
   Vide also कृष्णकान्ती p. 388.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 388.

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determinant of denotation or conveyance of a word, ending in a primary suffix, identifying a case.[1]

Opponents argue : Then *goṣu duhyamānāsu ghaṭaḥ* and the like should be validly used in language. For a jar concurrently exists with the act of milking of cows.

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is unfounded. For the meaning of the seventh prepositional inflection in an absolute construction is posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb only and not against the meaning of a nominal, as called for by expeetancy.[2]

Opponents argue : In *goṣu duhyamānāsu āgataḥ*, the seventh declensional suffix, added to the word, *go* means 'being the object' and the seventh prepositional inflection suffixed to the word, *duhyamānā* means 'being at time' and the primary suffixes like, *śānac*, provided for in the sense of self-abstraction, only means the present time (tense). Hence the verbal knowledge from the sentence, cited, is like this : (He is) possessed of the act of coming, concurrently occurring with the act of milking of cows, being presently accomplished.

Jagadīśa replies : This is wrong. For such a view is faught with a host of inconsistencies viz.

(i) the syntactical relation of the meaning of the word, *go* with that of the word, *duhyamāna*, through identity as called for by the said two words being used in apposition would have to be shunned;

(ii) the primary suffix, added to the word, *dugdha* cannot be held to have been used in the sense of self-abstraction, for in that case, it should have been used in neuter gender and not in the feminine gender.

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1. कारककृदन्तबोध्यतावच्छेदक एव वर्त्तमानकालो भावपदार्थो वाच्यः। श. श. प्र. p. 388.

2. निरुक्तश्चायं भावसप्तम्यर्थो धात्वर्थ एवान्वेति न तु नामार्थे तथैव साकांक्षत्वात्, अतएव घटादेर्दुह्यमानगवाद्यधिकरणवर्त्तमानकालवृत्तित्वेऽपि 'गोषु दुह्यमानासु घट' इत्यादिको न प्रयोगः। ibid., pp. 388-89.

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(iii) like *goṣu caitreṇa dugdhāsu āgataḥ, goṣu caitrasya dugdhāsu āgataḥ* too, should be validly used In language, the sixth declensional suffix being optionally called for with the third one to be added to the word, signifying the agent of the act, presented by a root-verb, suffixed with *kta*, provided for in the sense of self-abstraction.

(iv) the seventh declensional suffix, added to the word, *go* in *goṣu duhyamānāsu āgataḥ* cannot mean 'being object', there being no provision therefor.

(v) the primary suffixes like, *śatṛ* too, provided for in the sense of agency would have to be admitted to carry the sense of self-abstraction.[1]

The seventh prepositional inflection is also provided for to be suffixed to the word, denotative of a thing, aimed at,as a substitute of the third one, carrying the sense of *hetu* and of the fourth one, conveying the sense of *tādarthya*, provided the thing aimed at (*nimitta*) is related to the object of the act, involved, through conjunction or inherence. The instances like, *carmaṇi dvīpinaṁ hanti, dantayorhanti kunjaraṁ, keśeṣu camarīṁ hanti; sīmni puṣkalako hataḥ* are cited as cases in point.

Conversely, in *vetanena dhānyaṁ luṇāti*, as the thing, aimed at (*vetana*) is not related to the object (*dhānya*) of the act, involved, through conjunction or inherence, the word, signifying the thing, aimed at, is suffixed with the third prepositional inflection.[2]

Bhartṛhari observes : As held by Curni, Bhāguri and Vāgbhaṭa, the seventh prepositional inflection substitutes the fourth one, to be suffixed to the word, signifying what is aimed at, provided the purpose of such aim is to acquire the said thing and it is related to the object of killing, denoted by the root-

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 389.
2. निमित्तात् कर्मयोगे च। (वार्त्तिक)
   Vide सि कौ. 633.

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verb, *han*, through what is called *upaṣṭambha*[1], a kind of conjunction that subsits between an animal and its teeth, hair and skin.

The sentence, *carmaṇi dvīpinaṁ hanti*, therefore, means (one), killing the spotted tiger for the purpose of acquring the skin thereof.[2]

In *carmaṇe dvīpinaṁ badhnāti* or *hinasti*, the root-verb, involved is other than *han* and hence the seventh prepositional inflection has not been used substituting the fourth one.[3]

Similarly in *vittāya vipraṁ hanti*, although, the root-verb, involved is *han*, the relation between the thing aimed at and the object of the act of killing is other than *upaṣṭambha* and hence the seventh prepositional inflection is not called for.[4]

Opponents argue : Then *śṛṅge hariṇaṁ hanti* too, should be vaiidly used in language.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For the horns are related to the deer through inherence; *upaṣṭambha*, standing for the relation that subsists between an animal and its teeth, hair and skin only.[5]

Opponents argue : The use of the fourth prepositional inflection in the verse, *muktāphalayā kariṇaṁ hariṇaṁ palāya siṁhaṁ nihanti bhuja-vikrama-sūcanāya|kā nītiriyatī raghuvaṁśa-vīra ! śākhāmṛge jarati yastava vāna-mokṣaḥ||* then should be held wrong.

Jagadīśa replies : The fourth prepositional inflection, used in the sentence has not been substitued by the seventh one

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1. हन्तेः कर्मण्युपष्टम्भात् प्राप्तुमर्थे तु सप्तमीम्।
चतुर्थीबाधिकामाहुश्चुर्णि-भागुरि-वागभटाः॥ भर्तृहरि, Vide श. श. प्र. p. 389.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 389.
3. ibid., p. 389.
4. ibid., p. 389.
5. दन्तकेशत्वगादिष्वेव प्राणिनामुपष्टम्भाख्यसंयोगस्योपगमात्, अतएव शृङ्गं प्राप्तुमित्यर्थे 'शृङ्गे हरिणं हन्ती' त्यादिको न प्रयोगः, समवायिना समं द्रव्यस्य तदभावात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 389-90.

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since the things aimed at, are not for the purpose of acquiring these but these are only sought to be collected.[1]

In *uparāge snānaṁ, vivāhe śraddhaṁ* and the like, the seventh prepositional inflection, only denotes 'the state of being occasioned by'. The sentence, *uparāge snānaṁ*, for an example, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of bath being occasioned by eclipse, the idea, being that the instrumentality in bath in respect of what is wished for has its roots in eclipse.

In *govadhe prāyaścittaṁ*, too, the seventh prepositional inflection denotes 'the state of being occasioned by' to give the verbal knowledge of expiation, occasioned by the killing of a cow. Expiation, means what is prescribed as a means of doing away with the evil merit, and it is against evil merit, a constituent of the meaning of the said word that the killing of cow is posited as the cause.[2]

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1. ibid., p. 390.
2. ibid., p. 390.

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CHAPTER XXIX

VERBAL INFLECTION (ĀKHYĀTA)

A suffix, capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of a number, denoted by itself, posited as a feature against the meaning of a nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection as distinguished from itself, is called a verbal inflection.[1] In other words, a suffix, possessed of the sequence of letters, that has been the locus of the feature of the determinant of causality in respect of the verbal comprehension of a number, posited as a feature against the meaning of a nominal, ending in a suffix, other than itself, is known as verbal inflection.[2]

Although, the first nominal inflection in *caitraḥ*, bears out the verbal comprehension of oneness (*ekatva*), a number, posited as a feature against *caitra*, the meaning of a nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection, the definition of verbal inflection does not unwarrantedly over-extend thereto. For the first nominal inflection at the end of the nominal, *caitra*, is not other than what bears out the verbal comprehension of oneness, the number, posited as a feature against the meaning of a nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection.[3]

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1. स्वेतरप्रथमान्तस्य नाम्नोऽर्थे बोधनक्षमाः।
प्रत्ययाः स्वार्थसंख्यायास्तिङो दशविधाश्च ताः॥ श. श. प्र. p. 390.
2. स्वभिन्नप्रत्ययान्तनामार्थधर्मिकस्वार्थसंख्याप्रकारकान्वयबोधजनकतावच्छेदक-प्रकारताश्रयानुतूर्वीमत्-प्रत्ययत्वं तिङ्त्वमिति पर्यवसितम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 391.
3. प्रथमा तु प्रथमान्तस्य नाम्नोऽर्थे स्वार्थसंख्याबोधिकाऽपि न स्वेतरप्रथमान्त-स्येति तद्व्युदासः। श. श. प्र. p. 391.

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Nor is the definition of verbal inflection, too wide to cover *tathā* in *caitrastathā*, on grounds of its bearing out the verbal comprehension of oneness, a number, posited as a feature against *caitra*, the meaning of the nominal, *caitra*, ending in first nominal inflection. For it is only a particle (*nipāta*) and not a suffix.[1]

Opponents argue : In *caitraḥ pacati*, the first nominal inflection bears out the verbal comprehension of oneness, a number, posited as a feature against *caitra*, the meaning of the nominal, *caitra*, ending in a nominal inflection. For it is known to have the potency to denote the said number, in *caitraḥ*. Conversely, there is no proof in respect of a verbal inflection having the power to denote a number. For there is no cororborative evidence thereto.[2]

Jagadiśa replies : In *caitro maitraśca gacchataḥ* the first nominal inflections in *caitraḥ* and *maitraḥ* cannot obviously bear out the comprehension of the number, duality and as such, it is the verbal inflection, *tas* in *gacchataḥ*, that has to be admitted to have the power to bring about the comprehension of the said number. In consequence, the said verbal inflection evinces the fact that it is denotative of duality. Verbal inflectionness, therefore, is the determinant of the state of being denotative (*śaktatā'vaccheda*) of number.

Opponents argue : The number, duality is not presented by the said verbal inflection, to be embraced in the resultant verbal knowledge. On the contrary, the said number is presented by the particle, *ca*, to be posited against the meanings of the nominals, *caitra* and *maitra*. It is wrong to imagine, therefore, that the verbal inflection, *tas* is known as what is denotative of the said number or that verbal inflectionness is

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1. 'चैत्रस्तथा'इत्यादौ स्वार्थैकत्वबोधकोऽपि तथादिनिपातो न प्रत्ययः। ibid., p. 391.
2. ननु 'चैत्रः पचती'त्यादौ प्रथमयैवान्यत्र क्लृप्तशक्तिकया चैत्रादेरेकत्वाद्यवगमादाख्यातस्य संख्यावाचित्वे मानाभावः। श. श. प्र. p. 391.

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the determinant of the state of being denotative of number, on that score.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : What is liable to comprehension as the (invariable) substantive of agency, presented by the verbal inflection, *tas*, in the example, cited, as qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, involved, is, as a rule, presented by a nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection of the number, identical with that of the verbal inflection, *tas*. Otherwise, *caitraḥ pacataḥ* (*pacanti*) would bear out the verbal comprehension of agency of the act of cooking, posited against *caitra*.[2]

Moreover, the number, signified by the verbal inflection, involved is liable to comprehension as a feature against agency, comprehended as the substantive. In *caitro maitraśca gacchataḥ*, agency, not being comprehended in any case, as the substantive, therefore, the number, signified by the verbal inflection goes uncomprehended.[3]

Opponents argue : All this is unreasonable. For the rule is that when the verbal comprehension of what is qualified by the meaning of a root-verb, posited as a feature against the meaning of a nominal, not qualified by duality and the like, is borne out by a verbal inflection like, *tas*, the substantive is presented by a nominal having an identtcal number therewith. Conversely, when the meaning of the nominal, involved is qualified by duality and the like, the said nominal i.e. the

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1. 'चैत्रो मैत्रश्च गच्छतः' इत्यादावपि चेनैव निपातेनोपस्थितस्य द्वित्वादेश्चैत्र-मैत्रादावनुभवात्। ibid., p. 391.
2. न च तसाद्युपस्थाप्यस्य धात्वर्थावच्छिन्नकृत्यादेर्विशेष्यविधयाऽन्वयबोधं प्रत्यवश्यं तसादिसमानवचनप्रथमान्तनामोपस्थाप्यत्वं तन्त्रमन्यथा 'पचतः, पचन्ति वा चैत्र' इत्यादितोऽपि चैत्रादौ पाककर्तृत्वादेरन्वय-बोधापत्तेः। ibd., p. 391-92.
3. तथा चाक्तस्थले तिङर्थसंख्याया अन्वयधीरेव न, भावनाविशेष्य एव तिङः स्वार्थसंख्याबोधकत्वस्य वाच्यत्वादिति वाच्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 392.

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nominal, presenting the substantive, only ends in the first declensional suffix.[4]

Hence *caitro maitro gacchataḥ* is not validly used in language. For the meanings of the nominals, against which, the meaning of the verbal inflection, *tas*, qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, *gam*, is likely to be posited as a feature are not qualified by duality or the like. As such, the said two nominals should have been qualified by the number identical with that of the verbal inflection, *tas*. The use like *caitraḥ pacataḥ* (or *pacanti*) too is thus ruled out.

Conversely, *caitro maitraśca gacchataḥ*, the meaning of the nominals, involved are qualified by duality, presented by the particle, *ca* and as such the identity in respect of number, between the nominal inflection and the verbal inflection is not insisted upon.

In *sa ca tvañca gacchataḥ, sa ca tvañcāhañca gacchāmaḥ*, and the like, therefore, where one and the same act is simultaneously posited against the agents of different persons, the identity of numbers, between the nominal inflection and the verbal one, is not insisted upon.[1] For the meanings of the nominals, involved are qualified by duality or the like, presented by the particle, *ca*. The substantives have been presented by nominals, ending in the first nominal inflection and that is considered sufficient for the syntactical relation of the word-meanings involved.

Jagadīśa replies : The particle, *ca*, under such circumstances, is not known to have the power to denote duality or the like. Even if it be denotative thereof, the situation does not change.

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1. द्वित्वाद्यनवच्छिन्न एव नामार्थे तसादिना धात्वर्थविशिष्टस्वार्थान्वयबोधने तत्समानवचनान्तनामोपस्थाप्यत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात्तदवच्छिन्ननामार्थे तु तसादिना तादृशस्यार्थबोधने प्रथमान्तनामोपस्थाप्यतामात्रस्य तन्त्रत्वात् । ibid., p. 392.
2. अतएव 'स च त्वञ्च गच्छथः, स च त्वञ्चाहञ्च गच्छाम' इत्यादौ युगपन्नानापुरुषेष्वपि एकक्रियान्वयस्थले सुबाख्यातयोर्न वचनैक्यादरः । श. श. प्र. p. 392.

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For both the views being well-matched, the position of verbal inflection being denotative of number, remains unassailed.[1]

Opponents argue : Even if it is admitted that a verbal inflection is denotative of number, there is no logic to hold that a verbal inflection of the singular number is denotative of oneness.[2]

Jagadiśa replies : In case of one, having the knowledge that the nominal inflection is not denotative of oneness, error not-withstanding, the verbal inflection, *tip* fairly appears to be denotative of oneness, in view of the comprehension thereof in such a case.

Opponents argue : This is not reasonable. For an inference like, a verbal inflection of the singular number is denotative of oneness; because it bears out the comprehension thereof, in case of the knowledge of import of the nominal inflection being that it is not denotative of oneness, is faught with fallacy. Because the middle term has not been known for certain to have been pervaded by the major premise.[3] If otherwise, such arguments may well be stretched out to hold that the first nominal inflection, provided for by the head rule, *prātipadikārtha-liṅga parimāṇa-vacana-matre prathamā*[4] or, that a conjugational transformation like, *śap* even, is denotative of agency, on the ground that in an instance like *caitraḥ pacati*, to one, having the knowledge that the verbal inflection is not denotative of agency, error not-withstanding, the knowledge of agency of the act of cooking, posited as a feature against *caitra* fairly occurs.[5]

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1. ननूक्तस्थले चकारस्य द्वित्वादिवाचकत्वं न दृष्टचरम्, अस्तु वा तस्य तथात्वं विनिगमनाविरहात् तस्मादेस्तत्त्वं सिध्यति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 392.
2. अस्तु वाऽऽख्यातस्य द्विवचनादेर्द्वित्वादिवाचकत्वम्, तथापि तदेकवचनस्य नैकत्वाचित्वं मानाभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 392.
3. सुपामेकत्वाशक्तत्वग्रहदशायां तिपा चैत्रादावेकत्वानुभवस्य सन्दिग्धत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 392.
4. पा. II. 3. 46.
5. अन्यथा तिङः कर्तृत्वाद्यशक्तधीदशायामपि 'चैत्रः पचती'त्यादिषु पाककर्तृत्वादेश्चैत्रादावन्वयानुभवानुरोधेनाभिहिताधिकारीयप्रथमायाः शपादेर्वा कर्तृत्वादिवाचितापत्तेः। ibid., pp. 392–93.

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Jagadīśa argues : The verbal inflection of the singular number may well be inferered to be denotative of oneness, on grounds of their being of the singular number.

Opponents argue : This is unreasonable. For any such inference is not supported by any corroborative argument. Because as the state of being one of sixty of the sixty verbal inflections, begining with *tip* is more complex a property in comparision to the state of being one of seven begining with *su* or the state of *su* or *aṁ* or *ṭā* and the like, it cannot be the determinant of the state of being denotative of oneness. As such, with the knowledge of words (*pada-jñāna*), determined by the state of *su* and the like, oneness is presented forthwith to be embraced in the resultant verbal knowledge.[1]

Others hold : A verbal inflection of the singular number, signifies oneness either through the power of denotation or through frozen metaphor. For the mere expression, *pacati* bears out the verbal comprehension of the agent of the act of cooking, as one.[2]

Opponents argue : This is absurd. The mere expression, *pacati* cannot bear out such knowledge. For even the grammarians who hold that a verbal inflection is denotative of oneness, are of the view that the number, denoted thereby is to be related to the substantive to which, agency, the other meaning thereof, as qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, involved is syntactically related. Otherwise, in *caitraḥ pacati*, the twofold comprehension of oneness, would be inevitable. For

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1. न चाख्यातैकवचनान्येकत्वशक्तान्येकवचनादित्येवमनुमानं मानम्, अप्रयोजकत्वात्, स्वमूटादिसप्तान्यतमत्वं सुत्वाम्त्वात्वादिसप्तानां प्रत्येकं वा धर्ममपेक्ष्यातिगुरोस्तिवादिषष्टयन्यतमत्वरूपस्यैकत्वशक्तानवच्छेदकत्वात् सुत्वादिप्रत्येकरूपेण ज्ञानादुपस्थिताया एवैकत्वादिसंख्यायाः शाब्दमतावनुप्रवेशाच्च । ibid., p. 393.

2. यत्तु–केवलादपि 'पचती'त्यतः पक्तैकत्ववानित्यनुभवादाख्यातैकवचनस्यापि संख्यावाचित्वं शक्त्या निरुढलक्षणया वा, तिपा कर्तुरूपस्यापनात्–इति । श. श. प्र. p. 393.

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oneness, denoted by the nominal inflection in *caitraḥ*, is related to *caitra* and the said number, denoted by the verbal inflection, *tip*, is related to the agent of the act of cooking, in that case, contrary to experience.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : It is arbitrary to hold that oneness, being presented by the knowledge of a word, determined by the state of *su* or the like would forthwith be embraced in verbal comprehension. For there is no logic to deny the same privilege to oneness, presented by the knowledge of a word determined by the state of being *tip* or the like.[2] The problem is thus not solved in spite of all the arguments adduced so far. Be that as it may.[3]

The definition given, therefore, could not be assailed on that score. The real threat, however, lies elsewhere. In *matsyaṇḍī phānitaṁ khaṇḍa-vikārau* or in *devo viprāśca vibudhau*, the verbal knowledges respectively occurring are like this : *Matsyaṇḍī* and *phānitaṁ* are denotative of part and change and god and brahmin are denoted by the word, *vibudha*. In other words, the first nominal inflection of the dual number in the words, *khaṇḍa-vikārau* or *vibudhau* bears out the verbal comprehension of duality, the denoted meaning of itself, posited as a feature against the meaning of a nominal viz, *matsyaṇḍī* or *deva* ending in the first nominal inflection as distinguished from itself, making room for the over-extension of the definition of verbal inflection to the first nominal inflection of the dual number.[4]

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1. तत्तुच्छम्—आख्यातस्यैकत्वशक्तिवादिनामपि धात्वर्थान्वितस्वार्थान्वयिन्येव स्वार्थसंख्याबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तेर्वक्तव्यत्वात्, अन्यथा 'चैत्रः पचती'त्यादौ सुपा चैत्रादौ तिपा च पक्तृत्यैकत्वबोधनेऽनुभवबाधितस्य द्वित्वबिधैकत्वभानस्य दुर्वारतापरोः। ibid., p. 393.
2. ननु तिप्त्वादिना पदज्ञानजन्यैकत्वोपस्थितेः शाब्दाजनकत्वे मानाभावः, विनिगमनाविरहेणापि तस्यास्तथात्वं सेत्स्यति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 393.
3. अस्तु वा तत्र यथा तथा। श. श. प्र. p. 393.
4. तथापि 'मत्स्यण्डी फाणितं खण्डविकारौ, देवो विप्रश्च विबुधावित्यादौ स्वप्रकृत्यर्थभिन्नेऽपि मत्स्यन्डीप्रभृतौ सुपो द्वित्वादिबोधकत्वात् तस्यामति-व्याप्तिरेव। श. श. प्र. p. 393-94.

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Jagadīśa, therefore, defines verbal Inflection thus : The kind of suffixes that is potentially incapable of bearing out a verbal comprehension, embracing what is already related to another word-meaning as the substantive, qualified by the meaning of itself, is called verbal inflection.[1]

The suffixes, beginning with *tip*, one hundred and eighty in number are potentially incapable of bearing out the above kind of a verbal knowledge. For the verbal knowledge of one, already qualified by the agency of the act of cooking, being embraced as the substantive, qualified by the ageney of the act of going does not have the slightest possibility of being borne out from *pacati caitro gacchati* unlike from *pacañścaitro gacchati.*[2] Because a verbal inflection is potentially capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension, embracing, what being the meaning of itself is qualified by the root-verb, involved, as the predicate of assertion in a sentence, and the relation exclusively binding what is embraced as the substantive, syntactically thereto.[3] There is, therefore, absolutely no scope of what is already related to some other word-meaning, being embraced as the predicate of assertion in the verbal knowledge, borne out by verbal inflection.

Opponents argue : If so, then, agency, a meaning of a verbal infiection should in no case be embraced as the determinant of the state of the predicate of assertion. As such, in *caitro na pacati*, the verbal knowledge, embracing agency (*kṛti*),

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1. स्वेतरार्थयुतस्वार्थावच्छिन्नार्थविशेष्यके ।
शाब्दे स्वरूपायोग्यो वा प्रत्ययस्तिङिति स्मृतः ॥
ibid., का. 96.

2. तिबाद्याः साशीतिशतं पदार्थान्तरविशिष्टस्वार्थावच्छिन्नावगाहिताकं शाब्दं प्रति स्वरूपायोग्याः, 'पचंश्चैत्रो गच्छती'त्यादित इव 'पचति चैत्रो गच्चती'त्यादितो जात्वपि पक्तृत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नधर्मिकान्वयमतेरनुत्पादात्। ibid., p. 393.

3. धात्वर्थावच्छिन्नस्वार्थविधेयताके तत्तुल्ययोगक्षेम एव चान्वयबोधे तिङः स्वरूपयोग्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 394.

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qualifying negation (*abhāva*), borne out by the verbal inflection, *tip* cannot be explained.

Jagadīśa replies : It is true that in cases like *caitro na pacati* (*pacatyeva, pacatīva*) and so on, agency, a meaning of the verbal inflection, *tip* is embraced as the determinant of the state of the predicate of assertion. For the verbal knowledge, thereform, is of *caitra,* qualified by the negation of agency of the act of cooking (*pākāuukūla-kṛtyabhāva-vān caitraḥ*). But this is only an exception to the general rule. In *caitraḥ pacati puruṣaḥ,* although the verbal knowledge is of *caitra,* one with the person, having the agency, of the act of cooking, (*pākānukūla-kṛti-viśiṣṭa-puruṣābhinnaḥ caitraḥ*), agency is not embraced as the determinant of the state of the predicate of assertion but as the predicate itself. For a person cannot be the predicate of assertion in a sentence. Hence it is in keeping with the general situation in view that a verbal inflection has been held capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of a meaning of itself, qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, involved, embraced as the predicate of assertion, the substantive being exclusively related thereto.[1]

Conversely, the nominal suffixes like *sup,* as in *pīṭaḥ, pārāśaryyeḥ,* (*pācakaḥ, pīpakṣuḥ*), or so, bear out the verbal comprehension of a person (*puruṣa*), embraced as the substantive, qualified by the meaning of the suffix, concerned, like identity, progeny and so on, (already) related to (or qualified by) the meaning of the base of the said suffix, only.[2]

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1. अतएव 'चैत्रः पचती'त्यत्रैव 'चैत्रो न पचति, पचत्येव, पचतीवे'त्यादौ निपातार्थे निषेधादौ विधेयतावच्छेदकत्वेन तिङर्थस्य कृत्यादेर्बोधो न तु सर्वत्र, 'चैत्रः पचति पुरुषः' इत्यादितश्चैत्रादौ पचतः पुरुषादेरबोधात्। ibid., p. 394.

   अत एवेति। प्रायशस्तद्विधेयताकान्वयबोधे तिङः स्वरूपयोग्यत्वादेवेत्यर्थः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 394.

2. सुबाद्यास्तु प्रत्ययाः 'पीतः पाराशर्य्यः, पाचकः पिपक्षुर्वा पुरुषस्तिष्ठती'त्यादौ प्रकृत्यर्थविशिष्टे तादात्म्यापत्त्यादिस्वार्थैरवच्छिन्नपुरुषादिधर्मिताके एव शाब्दे स्वरूपयोग्याः। श. श. प्र. p. 394.

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The particles like *ca*, although are equally incapable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of what is qualified by a meaning, thereof, already related to (or qualified by) some other word-meaning, the situation does not change. For these are only particles and not suffixes.[1]

Opponents argue : In *yo yo śūdrasya pacati dvijo'nnaṁ so'tininditaḥ*, the verbal knowledge is like this : The brahmin having the agency of the act of cooking a meal for a *śūdra*, is possessed of the agency of being, as qualified by the state of the censured (*śūdrānna-pākānukūla-kṛti-mattva-viśiṣṭa-dvioj'tin-inditatvā'vacchinna-sthityanukūla-kṛtimān*). In other words, the verbal inflection, *tip* (in *pacati*) bears out the verbal comprehension that embraces the brahmin, as the substantive, related to the agency of being, as qualified by the state of being censured, as what is qualified by the agency of the act of cooking. As such, although agency of the act of cooking or a meaning of the verbal inflection, as qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, is embraced as the predicate of assertion, the relation exclusively binding the substantive *(dvija)*, syntactically related, thereto, is wanting. For the substantive is simultaneously related to the agency of being, qualified by the state of being censured.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Let then, verbal inflection be defined thus :

A word capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of agency, denoted by itself, qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, involved, embraced as the predicate of assertion in a sentence, is a verbal inflection.[3]

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1. चादयस्तु निपाताः पदार्थान्तरविशिष्टस्वार्थावच्छिन्नविषयताकबोधं प्रति असमर्था अपि न प्रत्ययाः । ibid., pp. 394-95.

2. 'यो यः शूद्रस्य पचति द्विजोऽन्नं सोऽतिनिन्दितः' इत्यादौ वीप्सादिसमभिव्याहाराद् यदि शूद्रान्नपक्तृद्विजत्वाद्यवच्छेदेन निन्दितत्वादेरन्वयस्तदोक्तनिरुक्तेरसम्भवापत्तेः । ibid., p. 395.

3. धात्वर्थेन विशिष्टस्य विधेयत्वेन बोधने ।
समर्थः स्वार्थयत्नस्य शब्दो वाऽऽख्यातमुच्यते ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 97.

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In *pākaścaitrasya*, although the verbal comprehension embracing agency, denoted by itself, as the predicate of assertion is borne out by the sixth nominal inflection, the definition of verbal inflection does not over-extend thereto. For in it, agency is not qualified by ths meaning of a root-verb, but by that of a nominal (the verbal knowledge being, *pākaḥ caitra-kartṛkaḥ*).[1]

In *caitraḥ pacati*, although the nominal, *caitra* and the root-verb, *paci* bear out the verbal comprehension of agency, qualified by the meaning of a root-verb, embraced as the predicate of assertion, the definition in view, does not over-extend thereto. For agency is denoted neither by the said nominal nor by the said root-verb.[2]

In *caitraḥ pācakaḥ*, what is comprehended as the predicate of assertion is the agent and not agency, qualified by the meaning of a root-verb. For primary suffixes are, as a rule, denotative of what are possessed of attributes (*dharmin*) and not the attributes (*dharma*).[3] Had it been otherwise, an use like, *pācako bhuṁkte* would not have been used in language. For the agency of the act of cooking cannot be the agent of the act of eating.[4] Conversely, *guṇaḥ pācakaḥ* would be liable to valid use, agency and quality being compatible of mutual relation.[5]

Not only that. In semantics, the meanings of any two nominals, not being liable to mutual relation through difference

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1. पाकश्चैत्रस्थे'त्यादौ नामार्थेनैव विशिष्टस्य स्वार्थकर्तृत्वस्याभिधायकः षष्ठयादिको न तु धात्वर्थेन विशिष्टस्य । ibid., p. 395.
2. 'चैत्रः पचती'त्यादौ धात्वर्थावच्छिन्नस्य यत्नस्य विधेयतया बोधकावपि नामधातू न स्वार्थस्य । inid., p. 395.
3. 'चैत्रः पाचक'इत्यादौ तु धात्वर्थ-विशेषितस्य यत्नस्य न विधेयत्वं किन्तु कर्तुरेव, कृतां धर्मिशक्तत्वात् । ibid., p. 395.
4. अन्यथा 'पाचको भुङ्क्ते' इत्यादिकमयोग्यं स्यात् । ibid., p. 395.
5. स्याच्च 'गुणः पाचक' इत्यादिकं योग्यमिति । idid., p. 395.

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agency, the meaning of the primary suffix, could not be comprehended as what is inherent in *caitra.*[1]

In *ayaṁ paktuṁ kālaḥ,* the particle, *tuman* bears out the verbal comprehension of the state of being conducive to' (*anukūlatva*), qualified by the meaning of a root-verb, embraced as the predicate of assertion and not agency.

Similarly, in *iyaṁ cikīrṣā,* the desiderative particle bears out the comprehension of desire as qualified by the meaning of a root-verb, embraced as the predicate and not agency. Hence the definition of verbal inflection does not over-extend to all such suffixes.[2]

The idea is this : The determinant of denotation of a verbal inflection is the state of agency, inherent in all the agencies involved in each and every kind of human activities–both volitional and involitional. Hence by agency, being engaged in or what is understood as the cause of endeavour (*ceṣṭā*) and the effect of desire in the series of cause-effect relation of knowledge, (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*), volition (*kṛti*), endeavour (*ceṣṭā*) and accomplishment (*phala*) is not understood. For *caitro niḥśvasiti,* bears out the verbal knowledge of agency, contributing to respiration, that does not involve (the idea of) 'being engaged.[3]

The meaning of the root-verb, involved, again is related to agency, the meaning of the verbal inflection, through *sādhyatā-khya-viśeṣyatā-viśeṣa.* The idea is this : In *pacati,* for an example, *tip* means agency that contributes to the accomplishment of

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1. प्रातिपदिकार्थयोः प्रयत्न-चैत्रयोर्भेदेनान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नतया कृदर्थकृतेश्चैत्रादान्वयायोगाच्च । श. श. प्र. p. 395.
2. 'अयं पक्तुं कालः' इत्यादौ तुमादिना धात्वर्थावच्छिन्नोऽनुकूलत्वादिः, 'इयं चिकीर्षा' इत्यादौ च सनादिनेच्छादिरेव विधेयत्वेनानुभाव्यते इति न तेष्वतिप्रसङ्गः । ibid., pp. 395–96.
3. अत्रेदं तत्त्वम्–जीवनयोन्यादिनिखिलयत्नगतं यत्नत्वमेव तिङः शक्यतावच्छेदकम्, न तु चेष्टाया जनकत्वस्य चिकीर्षाया वा जन्यत्वस्यावच्छेदकतया सिद्धं प्रवृत्तित्वम्, 'चैत्रो निःश्वसिती'त्यादितोऽपि निःश्वासाद्यनुकूलप्रयत्नस्य प्रतीतेः । ibid., p. 396.

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the act of cooking. In other words, the act of cooking is what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*) by the agency in view. The state of being accomplished (*sādhyatā*), abiding the act of cooking, therefore, is determined (*nirūpita*) by agency. Hence the agency is the determinant of the state of being accomplished, abiding the act of cooking. The act of cooking is, thus, related to agency through the relation of *sādhyatā-nirūpakatva*, otherwise, described as *sādhyatākhya-viśeṣyatā-vtśeṣa* (*sādhyatākhya-viśeṣyatā* is in *pāka*, the *viśeṣa* or *nirūpaka* is *kṛti*), arising out of syntax.

Opponents argue : In that case, the meaning of the root-verb would be virtually liable to relation to the meaning of the verbal inflection, through the two-fold relation of *sādhyatva* and *annkūlatva*.

Jagadīśa replies : The meaning of the root-verb, then, may well be held liable to syntactical relation with agency, denoted by verbal inflection, through *sādhyatva-viśiṣṭa-phalopadhāyakā'nukūlatva*, arising out of syntax, as called for, by expectancy.[1] As such, in reference to one, refraining from going, *sa gacchati* is not used in language. For, such 'going' is not meant to be accomplished (*sādhyatva-viśiṣṭa*).[2] Similarly, in reference to one, fallen, into a ditch, having the agency of the act of coming up, *sa uttiṣṭhati* is not used in language. For such agency is not efficiently contributive to the act of coming up (*phalopadhāyakā'nukūla*).[3]

Opponents argue : In *caitraḥ ṇiḥśvasiti* 'the verbal inflection means the state of the substratum, to give the

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1. तिङर्थकृतौ च धात्वर्थस्य 'तं करोमी'ति प्रतीतिनियामकः साध्यताख्यविशेष्यताप्रभेदस्तद्विशिष्टं फलोपधायकत्वलक्षणमनुकूलत्वं वा संसर्गमर्यादया भासते तथैव साकांक्षत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 396.
2. अतो गत्यादिगोचरनिवृत्तिदशायां गच्छतीत्यादिको न प्रयोगः। ibid., p. 396.
3. निविड़निखातस्थस्तु पुरुषः समुत्थानगोचरप्रयत्नवानपि न तदुपधायकप्रयत्नवान्, अतस्तत्र 'अयमुत्तिष्ठती'त्यादिको न प्रयोगः। ibid., p. 397.

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verbal know-ledge of *caitra* as the substratum of the act of respiration.

Jagadīśa replies : Even then the determinant of denotation of verbal inflection remains to be the state of agency. 'The state of being volitionally disposed' cannot be the determinant thereof. For it is the agent of the act of cooking that is comprehended from the sentence, *pacati* and not one, 'volitionally disposed to the act of cooking.[1]

Opponents argue : Agency and being volitionally disposed are identical in essence.

Jagadīśa replies : No. The state of agency and that of being volitionally disposed are not identical. For it is universally admitted that the contents of the verbal comprehension from *pākaṁ karomi* are distinct from those occuring due to *pāke nivṛtto'smi pāke pravṛtto'smī* and the like. Not only that. As eternal agency does not accomodate the state of being volitionally disposed rooted in passion, the sentence, *'Īśvaraḥ karoti,* could not be validly used in language, compatibility lacking.[2]

Opoonents argue : In case, the determinant of denotation of verbal inflection is the state of agency as such, inclusive that of eternal agency then *Īśvaraḥ pacati* should be validly used in language.

Jagadīśa replies : Such an apprehension is unfounded. For agency, denoted by a verbal inflection, is related to the meaning of the nominal, presenting what is liable to comprehension as the invariable substantive, through *avacchedaktva.* In other words, agency, denoted by a verbal inflection, is embraced in respect of the distinguished substratum(*avacchedaka*)thereof viz.,

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1. तत्र निःश्वासवत्त्वमात्रप्रतीतावपि प्रयत्नत्वमेव तिङः शक्यं न् तु प्रवृत्तित्वम्, पचतीत्यतः पाककृतिमानित्येव प्रतीतेः। श. श. प्र. pp. 396-97.
2. न हि प्रवृत्तित्वमेव कृतित्वम्, 'पाके निवृत्तोऽस्मी'त्यस्येव 'पाके प्रवृत्तोऽस्मी'त्यस्याप्यनुभवस्य 'पाकं करोमी'त्यतो विषयवैलक्षण्यस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वात्, नित्यकृतौ रागप्रयोज्यस्य प्रवृत्तित्वस्य बाधादीश्वरः करोती'त्यादिवाक्यस्यायोग्यता-पाताच्च। ibid., p. 397.

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the body. As such, as God has no body, there is no reason why such a statement be made in respect of Him.[1]

Opponents argue : *Aṅgulī pacati*, then should be validly used in language.

Jagadīśa replies : This is a welcome objection.

Opponents argue : But it is contradicted by experience.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, it may be held that agency, denoted by a verbal inflection is related to the invariable substantive through *antyā'vayavi-niṣṭhā'vacchedakatva*. In other words, the invariable substantive is to be the invariable whole (*antyā'vayavin*) to be comprehended as the substratum of agency, presented by a verbal inflection.[2]

Opponents argue : The relation through which the meaning of the root-verb, involved, is syntactically related to agency, presented by a verbal inflection may be *anukūlatva-viśeṣa*. As such, eternal agency would cease to pose any problem. There is no reason, therefore, to imagine the relation of *avacchedakatva* and the like, syntactically binding the agency, presented by a verbal inflection and the invariable substantive, presented by a nominal.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The relation of *avacchedakatva* has to be imagined of in a sentence like, *caitraḥ pacati*.

Opponents argue : The word, *caitra* means what is qualified by the body of *caitra*, since the said imagination is not inevitable.

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1. न चैवमीश्वरः पचतीत्यपि स्यात्, तस्यापि पाकानुकूलप्रयत्नवत्त्वादिति वाच्यम्। तिङर्थकृतेरवच्छेदकत्वेनैव संसर्गेण नामार्थेऽन्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। ibid., p. 397.

   तथा च शरीरस्यैव तदवच्छेदकत्वात्, ईश्वरकृतेरवच्छेदकाभावात् न तथा प्रयोग इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 397.

2. 'अङ्गुली पचती'त्यादिप्रयोगस्येष्टत्वादन्त्यावयविनिष्ठावच्छेदकत्वस्यैव तादृशतिङर्थकृतेः संसर्गत्वेऽपि क्षत्यभावाच्च। श. श. प्र. p. 397.

3. नित्यप्रयत्नव्यावृत्तस्यैवानुकूलत्वविशेषस्य तिङर्थकृतौ धात्वर्थस्य संसर्गत्वमित्यप्याहुः। ibid., pp. 397–98.

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Jagadīśa replies : In that case, *ātmā pacatt* would be validly used in language.

Opponents argue : It is a welcome objection.

Jagadīśa replies : It cannot be so. For it goes against experience.[1]

Opponents argue : The idea that a verbal inflection denotes agency, qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, involved and that such agency is embraced as the predicate of assertion in the verbal comprehension, borne out by a verbal inflection is wrong. For in *Īśvaro jānāti*, *ratho gacchati* and the like such agency does not form a content of comprehension.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : *Īśvaro jānāti* gives the comprehension of God, possessed of knowledge. The verbal inflection, *tip*, therefore, is taken to imply, through frozen metaphor, the state of being inherent (i.e. the state of abiding eternally). *Ratho gacchati* gives the comprehension of a car, possessed of movement. The verbal inflection is taken to imply, through frozen matter, the state of being inseparably connected. In *caitro jānāti*, in the like manner, *tip* implies *avacchedakatva*; in *budhiravagāhate* or in *ghaṭo bhāsate*, *daiśikāśrayatva* i.e. *viṣayatva* or the state of being a content. In *naśyati*, it implies the state of being the counterpositive (*pratiyogitva*).[3]

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1. आहुरित्यस्वरससूचनाय। स च चैत्रः पचतीति प्रयोगानुरोधेनावच्छेदकतायाः कृतिसम्बन्धत्वमावश्यकमिति। न च चैत्रादिपदं चैत्रशरीरावच्छिन्नत्वपरमिति वाच्यम्। तथा सति आत्मा पचतीति प्रयोगापत्तेः। इष्टापत्तावनुभवविरोधादित्यलमनुकूलत्वविशेषस्य संसर्गत्वस्वीकारेणेति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 398.
2. ननु कृतेस्तिङ्शक्यत्वे ईश्वरो जानातीति प्रयोगो न स्यात्, ज्ञानानुकूलकृतेरप्रसिद्धेः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 398.
3. 'ईश्वरो जानाती'त्यादौ, 'रथो गच्छती'त्यादौ च ज्ञानादिमत्त्वमात्रप्रतीतेः समवायित्वे, 'चैत्रो जानाती'त्यादाववच्छेदकत्वे, 'बुद्धिरवगाहते', 'घटो भासते' इत्यादौ दैशिकाश्रयत्वे 'नश्यती'त्यादौ च प्रतियोगित्वे तिङो निरूढलक्षणा। श. श. प्र. p. 398.

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Opponents argue : The elders are of the view that the verbal inflection in *jānāti* and the like denotes the state of the substratum (*āśrayatā*). As such, the imagination of frozen metaphor in the said inflection is uncalled for.

Jagadīśa replies : In case the state of the state of the substratum is possible to be conceived of as a unitary concept (an unalysable characteristic) like agency (*kṛtitva*), the verbal inflection in such cases, may be held to signify the state of the substratum or what is qualified by the state of the state of the substratum, through the power of denotation.[1]

Opponents argue : If *jānāti* bears out the verbal knowledge of the state of the substratum of knowledge, *hasto jānāti* and the like should be validly used in language like *caitro jānāti*. For like *caitra*, *hand* too, is the substratum of knowledge.

Jagadīśa replies : No. Such an apprehension is unreasonable. For hands and the like other limbs may be regarded as the substratums (*avaccheda*) of physical effects only and not of knowledge or desire and the like. Alternatively, it may be said that the state of the substratum is to be related to the invariable substantive through *antyā'vayavi-niṣṭhā'vacchedakatva*, as it has been pointed out earlier.[2]

Opponents ask : How then *Īśvaro janāti* could be validly used in language ?

Jagadīśa replies : The relation of *avacchedakatva* is insisted upon only in respect of the state of the substratum of caused knowledge.[3]

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1. कृतित्ववदाश्रयतात्वेरखण्डत्वे तदवच्छिन्नेऽपि तिङः शक्तिरेव । ibid., p. 398.

   Vide also प्राचीनमतानुसारेणाह–कृतित्ववदिति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 398.

2. हस्तादिकस्त्ववयवः प्रयत्नस्यैवावच्छेदको न तु ज्ञानेच्छादेरपि प्रमाणाभावादतः 'करो जानाती'त्यादिको न प्रयोगः, प्रागुक्तैव वा रीतिरत्रापि । श. श. प्र. p. 398.

3. ईश्वरे जन्यज्ञानवारणाय जन्यज्ञानं प्रति शरीरस्य हेतुतायां आवश्यकत्वमित्यत आह–प्रागुक्तैव वेति । तद्व्यावृत्तमवच्छेदकत्वमेव संसर्ग इति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 398.

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Opponents argue : In *payaḥ patati*, the verbal inflection, *it* may be held to denote weight (*gurutva*) like *kṛti* in *pacati*. For the determinant of denotation in both the cases, is of identical complexity or of simplicity. Moreover, weight is particularly contributive to the act of falling as is agency to that of cooking.

Jagadīśa replies : Such arguments are unreasonable. For in such cases, the verbal Inflection bears out the comprehension of the state of being inherent only.[1]

Opponents argue : If a verbal inflection, suffixed to a root-verb like *pati*, denotes the state of being inherent, then the use like, *paṭānāṁ śataṁ patati* can not be validly used in language. For *patana*, an act, cannot inhere in a number.

Jagadīśa replies : In *paṭānāṁ śataṁ patati*, the sixth nominal inflection means collective extensity (*paryāpti*) to be syntactically related to the number, *śatatva*, a constituent of what the word, *śata* means viz, *śatatva-viśiṣṭa*. Hence the verbal knowledge from tne said sentence is like this : The act of falling is inherent in the clothes, possessed of the collective extensity, abiding the number, hundred (*śatatva*). As such, even if an act like that of falling is not inherent in a number, there is no harm.[2]

Opponents argue : The word, *śata* cannot denote *śatatva*, a quality. For it is denotative of *śata*, the qualified.

Jagadīśa replies : In *paṭānāṁ śataṁ saṁkhyā*, the word, *śata*, is well known to have the power to denote, *śatatva*, the quality.[3]

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1. 'पयः पतति, स्यन्दते'इत्यादावपि पतनादेः समवायित्वमेव तिङानुभाव्यते, न तु तदनुकूलगुरुत्वद्रवत्वादि, येन कृतितुल्यशरीरेषु तेष्वपि तिङः शक्तिरापद्येत । श. श. प्र. pp. 398-99.
2. 'पटानां शतं पतती'त्यादौ च शतपदार्थस्यैकदेशे एव शतत्वसंख्यायां षष्ठ्यर्थपर्यासेरन्वयात् संख्यायाः पतनादिसमवायित्वविरहेऽपि न क्षतिः । श. श. प्र. p. 399.
3. 'पटानां शतं संख्ये'त्याद्यनुरोधेनैव शतादेर्गुणवाचित्वसम्भवात् । ibid., p. 399.

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Prabhākara argues : A verbal inflection does not denote agency (*kṛti*) and the like. For these are liable to comprehension, otherwise. Conversely, it signifies only number and tense, as these are not liable to comprehension, otherwise.[1]

Opponents argue : How then agency and the like are to be comprehended ?

Prabhākara replies : These are liable to comprehension arising out of syntax. In *'caitraḥ pacati', ratho gacchati* and the like, the act of cooking or that of going, the meanings of the root-verbs, involved are related to *caitra* or to the car through *kṛtimattva* or *svāśrayatva. Caitraḥ pacati,* therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of *caitra* as one who is possessed of the act of cooking through the relation of *anukūlakṛtimattva.* Similarly, *ratho gacchati* gives the verbal knowledge of a car as what is possessed of the act of going through the relation of *āśrayatva.*[2]

Opponents argue : If agency is not denoted by a verbal inflection, *maitraḥ pacyate* may be validly used in language in reference to *maitra,* undertaking the act of cooking.

Prabhākara replies : Such apprehension is unfounded. For the meaning of a nominal and that of a root-verb cannot be related through difference.

Opponents argue : Then *caitraḥ pacati* should bear out no verbal knowledge.

Prabhākara replies : *Maitraḥ pacyate* or *taṇḍulaḥ pacati* and the like are not validly used in language. Because *maitra* or *taṇḍula* is not syntactically related to the meaning of a root-verb like the act of cooking. For the meaning of a nominal is not related as a feature, to the meaning of a root-verb.

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1. ननु कृत्यादिकं नाख्यातस्यार्थः, किन्तु कालः संख्या च, तयोः प्रकारान्तरालभ्यत्वात्। ibid., p. 399.

2. 'चैत्रः पचति रथो गच्छती'त्यादौ धात्वर्थस्यैव पाकगत्यादेः कृतिमत्त्वस्वाश्रयत्वादिसम्बन्धेन चैत्रादौ प्रकारत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 399.

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Conversely, *caitraḥ pacati* is validly used in language. For the meaning of a root-verb is admittedly comprehended as a feature, against the meaning of a nominal.[1]

Opponents argue : Then *jñānaṁ caitraḥ* should be validly used in language to give the verbal knowledge of knowledge, the meaning of the root-verb, *jñā*, posited as a feature through the relation of *āśrayatā*, against *caitra*, the meaning of the nominal, *caitra*.

Prabhākara replies : No. For the word, *jñāna* is only a nominal, meaning knowledge and as the meaning of one nominal cannot be related to the meaning of another nominal through difference, there is no reason as to why such an use be made in language.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : All this is wrong. For it is admitted that a verbal inflection of the present tense, bears, out the verbal knowledge of presentness, a meaning presented by itself, posited as a feature against agency only, a meaning of itself again, qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, involved. Such a situation does not come about unless agency is held liable to denotation by a verbal inflection. For otherwise, *caitraḥ pacati* would be liable to valid use in language even in reference to *caitra* having the ageney of the act of cooking in the past.[3]

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1. 'मैत्रः पच्यते'इत्यादितो मैत्रादेः कर्त्तृत्वादिना, 'तण्डुलः पचती'त्यादौ तण्डुलादेः कर्मत्वादिना संसर्गेण पाकादावन्वयेन धात्वर्थे एव धर्मिणि नामार्थस्य भेदेनान्वयोऽव्युत्पन्नो न तु नामार्थेऽपि धात्वर्थस्य । ibid., p. 399.

2. न चैवं 'ज्ञानं चैत्र'इत्यादितोऽपि बोधरूपस्य धात्वर्थस्याश्रयत्वसम्बन्धेन चैत्रे धर्मिण्यन्वयप्रसङ्गः, तत्र ज्ञानादिपदस्य बुद्ध्यर्थकनामतया तदर्थस्य नामान्तरार्थे भेदेनान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वादेव तदसम्भवात् इति प्राभाकराः । श. श. प्र. p. 399.

3. तदसत्, धात्वर्थान्वयिस्वार्थकर्त्तृतायामेव लडादेः स्वोपस्थाप्यवर्त्तमानत्वाद्यनुभावकत्वव्युत्पत्तेः कृत्यादेस्तिङर्थत्वं विना तदनुपपत्तेः, अन्यथाऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । ibid., p. 399.

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Opponents argue : A verbal Inflection may well be held to bear out the comprehension of presentness, a meaning denoted by itself, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case in reference to *caitra*, engaged in the midst of cooking, in some other act (like reading a novel) even, *caitraḥ pacati* would be validly used. For the act of cooking is still present.[2]

Opponents argue : No. There is no such contingency. For the meaning of the root-verb, *paci* or the like, ending in a verbal inflection of the present tense, like *tip*, is expectant of syntactical relation with the meaning of the nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection, through *vartamāna-kṛti*, arising out of syntax.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, there is no logic in imagining that a verbal inflection is denotative of a tense. For it is held liable to comprehension otherwise vlz, arising out of syntax.[4]

Opponents argue : It is a welcome objection.

Jagadīśa replies : It cannot be so. For it is a matter of bare experience that *pacati* or the like, bears out a verbal knowledge, embracing presentness as a feature.[5]

Opponents argue : The experience talked of may not be universally shared.

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1. न च प्रकृत्यर्थ एव तिङां स्वार्थवर्त्तमानत्वाद्यनुभावकत्वनियमः । ibid., pp. 399-400.
2. पाकं निष्पाद्य (निष्पादयतः) ? क्रियान्तरव्यासक्तेऽपि पुरुषे 'पचती'ति प्रयोगापत्तेः, तदानीमपि पाकस्यानुवर्त्तमानत्वात् । ibid., p. 400.
3. तिबाद्यन्तधात्वर्थस्य पाकादेर्वर्त्तमानकृत्यादिसम्बन्धेनैव प्रथमान्तस्य नाम्नोऽर्थे साकांक्षत्वात् नैवमिति । श. श. प्र. p. 400.
4. किं कालस्यापि तिङर्थत्वप्रत्याशया । संसर्गविधयैव तस्य लब्धत्वात् । ibid., p. 400.
5. 'पचती'त्यादितो वर्त्तमानत्वादिप्रकारकप्रतीतेरानुभविकत्वाच्च । ibid., p. 400.

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Jagadīśa replies : Even then it cannot be held that the meaning of a root-verb, ending in a verbal inflection is syntactically related to the meaning of the nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection, through (the relation of) *kṛti* and the like. For in that case even in reference to one, engaged in cooking, the expression, he is not cooking (*nāyaṁ pacati*) should be used validly in language. Because *nāyaṁ pacati* cannot bear out the verbal comprehension of one, being possessed of the negation of the act of cooking, abiding through the relation of *kṛti* or *kṛtimattva* or *vartamāna-kṛtimattva*. For the said relation is what is called a *vṛttya-niyāmaka-sambandha* and a negation that has its counterpositive, abiding through such a relation is not admitted of. Hence the said sentence has to bear out the comprehension of negation that has the act of cooking as its counterpositive, abiding its locus through the relation of conjunction or any of the other *vṛttiniyāmaka-sambandhas* i.e. a negation, the state of the counterpositive of which is determined by a relation other than one through which the act of cooking is in (*caitra*), the substantive. Such negation is known as *vyadhikaraṇa-sambandhāvacchinnā'bhāva* that abides everywhere and thus in *caitra* too, notwithstanding the fact that he is engaged in the act of cooking at the moment.[1]

Maṇḍana Miśra argues : The (ultimate) result, involved, being presented by a root-verb, a verbal inflection brings about the verbal comprehension of an act, bearing out the said result, poited as a feature against *caitra* and the like. Hence the definition of verbal inflection, given, is wrong. For a verbal inflection does not denote agency.

Jagadīśa replies : This stands refuted with what has already been said i.e. *pacati* and the like bear out the comprehension

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1. किञ्च धात्वर्थस्यैव कृत्यादिसम्बन्धेन चैत्रादावन्वये पचत्यपि चैत्रे 'नायं पचती'ति प्रयोगप्रसङ्गः, संयोगादिसम्बन्धेन पाकाद्यभावस्य तत्र सत्त्वात्, कर्तृत्वादेर्वृत्त्यनियामकतया तत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नपाकाद्यभावस्यालीकत्वेन प्रत्येतुमशक्यत्वात्। ibid., p. 400.

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of agency, contributing to (the accomplishment of) the act of cooking, as corroborated by experience.[1]

Not only that. If the ultimate result, involved, is held to be the meaning of a root-verb, then *gati*, the meaning of the root-verb, *gaṁ* would come out to be identical with conjunction, the result (of the act of going) making room for the use, *gatirguṇaḥ*, on par with *saṁyogo guṇaḥ*.[2]

Maṇḍana argues : Such apprehension is unfounded. For the root-verb, *gaṁ*, constituting the expression, *gati* means conjunction and the primary suffix, *kti*, provided for, in the sense of an abstract noun means the act, contributing thereto.

Jagadīśa replies : The view that a primary suffix, provided for, in the sense of an abstract noun means an act is unfounded. For it is well admitted that such a suffix means self-sameness.[3]

Maṇḍana asks : If a verbal inflection of the present tense, as a rule, is to bear out the comprehension of presentness, posited as a feature against agency, denoted by itself, then how should presentness be liable to comprehension as a feature against the act of cooking from *pacyate* only.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : It is wrong to imagine that logicians hold that *pacyate* bears out the comprehension of presentness, posited as a feature against the act of cooking. Conversely, they hold that even in this instance (as in *pacati*), presentness is borne out to be comprehended as a feature against agency,

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1. एतेन मण्डनमते फलस्य धात्वर्थत्वात् तदनुकूलक्रियैवाऽऽख्यातेन चैत्रादावनुभाव्यते इति कृतेस्तिङर्थत्वाभावादुक्तलक्षणमसम्भवि–इत्यपि प्रत्युक्तम्। श. श, प्र. p. 400.
2. फलस्य धात्वर्थत्वे 'संयोगो गुण' इतिवत्, गतिर्गुणोऽनेकाश्रित इत्यादि प्रयोगापत्तेश्च। ibid., p. 400.
3. न हि भावकृतामपि क्रियार्थः, प्रमाणाभावात्। ibid., p. 400.
4. ननु यदि स्वार्थकर्तृत्व एव लडादिना वर्त्तमानत्वमनुभाव्यत इति नियमः, कथं तर्हि केवलात् 'पच्यत' इत्यादितः पाकादौ वर्त्तमानत्वधीरिति चेत्। pp. 400-401.

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presented, by the verbal inflection of the passive voice, both being denoted by the same word.[1]

Opponents argue : If it is held that a verbal inflection of the active voice and that of the possive voice too, are denotative of agency, then these should be regarded as synonyms only.

Jagadīśa replies : Although both the verbal inflections are denotative of agency, these are distinguished from one another. For the verbal inflection of the active voice bears out the comprehension of agency, denoted by itself, posited as a substantive of the meaning of the root-verb, it is suffixed to. The verbal inflection of the passive voice, on the contrary, brings about the verbal knowledge of agency posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, it is suffixed to, as called for by expectancy.[2]

Śiromaṇi holds : In *caitreṇa pacyate*, the third nominal inflection denotes agency, as in *caitreṇa pakvaṁ* and not the verbal inflection. For agency, denoted by a verbal inflection is, as a rule, liable to comprehension as the substantive of the meaning of the root-verb, the said inflection is suffixed to.

Jagadīśa points out : It has already been laid bare that agency, denoted by a verbal inflection has the prospect of being comprehended as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, the said inflection is suffixed to.[3]

Opponents ask : Is there any obstacle to the occurance of the verbal comprehension from *caitreṇa pacyate*, embracing

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1. क एवमाह, तत्राप्येकपदोपात्तत्वेन कर्मारव्यातोपस्थापिते कर्तृत्व एव वर्त्तमानत्वस्यान्वयात्। श. श. प्र p. 401.
2. इयान् परं विशेषो-यत् कर्तृविहितेन लटा धात्वर्थस्य विशेष्यत्वेन, कर्मविहितेन तु तस्य विशेषणत्वेन स्वार्थकर्तृत्वमनुभाव्यते, तथैव साकांक्षत्वात्। ibid., p. 401.
3. एतेन-चैत्रेण पक्वमि'त्यादाविव 'चैत्रेण पच्यते' इत्यत्रापि तृतीययैव कर्तृत्वमनुभाव्यते न तु स्वाख्यातेन, तिङर्थकृतेर्धात्वर्थविशेष्यत्वनियमात्-इति दीधितिकृन्मतमप्यनादेयम्। ibid., p. 401.

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agency, presented by the third nominal inflection, posited as a feature ?

Jagadīśa replies : In case, agency, presented by the nominal inflection is embraced as a feature in the verbal comprehension from *caitreṇa pacyate*, it has to be admitted that presentness, denoted by the verbal inflection, *te*, is posited as a feature against the said agency. But this is impossible. For the meaning of a verbal inflection is never comprehended as a feature against the meaning of a nominal inflection. Conversely, a verbal inflection of the present tense like the gerundial suffixes, *śatṛ* or *śanac*, bears out the comprehension of presentness, posited as a feature against agency, both being presented by one and the same word.[1]

Grammarians argue : In *caitraḥ pacati* and the like, the verbal inflection, *tip* denotes both agency and the agent. For *caitra* is also admittedly, comprehended as one, the agent of the act of cooking like *caitra* having the agency of the act of cooking.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the determinant of denotation of a verbal inflection, also comes out to be agency (*kartṛtva* or *kṛti*). Conversely, according to the logicians, the said determinant of denotation is the state of agency (*kṛtitva*). There is simplicity in conceving the state of agency as the determinant of denotation. For it is a universal while agencies are only individuals.

Grammarians refute : Such arguments have no relevance.[3] For according to the neo-logicians themselves, as the deter-

1. एकपदोपात्तत्वेन स्वार्थ एव कर्तृत्वे शतृशानजादेरिव लडादेर्वर्तमानत्वबोधकतया सुबर्थकृतौ तदन्वयासम्भवात्, सुबर्थे तिङर्थान्वयस्याहृष्टचरत्वाच्चेति। श. श. प्र. p. 401.
2. शाब्दिकास्तु—'चैत्रः पचती'त्यादितः पाकादिकृतिमत्तयेव तत्कर्त्रभेदेनापि चैत्रादेरन्वयस्यानुभविकत्वात् कृतिरिव कर्त्तापि तिङर्थः। ibid., p. 401.
3. कृतित्वमपेक्ष्य कर्तृत्वस्य गुरुत्वान्न तदाख्यातस्य शक्यताव च्छेदकमिति तु रिक्तं वचः। ibid., p. 401.

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minant of implication is not implied, the determinant of denotation too, is not denoted by a word. Because unlike the elders who hold that a word is denotative of a universal, the individual and the relation binding these two, the neo-logicians admit that the individual alone although qualified by a universal, is denoted by a word. Moreover, if on grounds of the law of parsimony, a complex property is discarded as the determinant of denotation, then there is no logic in conceiving such a property as the determinant of implication either.[1]

Not only that. There is simplicity in holding the view that a verbal inflection denotes all individual agents as qualified by agency in comparison to the view that it denotes individual agencies severally.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The claim that a verbal inflection is denotative of the agent on grounds of its bearing out the verbal comprehension thereof is not convincing. For such a view is not an established one.[3]

Grammarians argue : This is not correct. For in case, a verbal inflection bears out the comprehension of the agent, the said inflection must be admitted to have been endowed with God's will, embracing the agent as its feature and God's will embraces only what exists in reality.[4] Conversely, if a verbal inflection is held to be potentially incapable of bearing out the comprehension of the agent and thus claimed not to be denotative of the agent, then the arguments to the effect that

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1. लघ्यतावच्छेदके लक्षणाया इव शक्यतावच्छेदकेऽपि शक्तेरसत्त्वमते तद्गुरुत्व-स्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 401.
2. एकैकात्मनिष्ठानामनन्तकृतीनां शक्यत्वमपेक्ष्य निरिवलात्मनामेव कर्तृत्वेन शक्यतायां विपरीतलाघवाच्च। ibid., p. 401.
3. न च कर्त्रनुभवजनकतया सङ्केतितत्वरूपं कर्तृशक्तत्वमेव तिङामप्रसिद्धम्। ibid., p. 402.
4. कर्त्रन्वयानुभवजनकतासत्त्वे तत्प्रकारकेश्वरसङ्केतस्य तत्रावश्यम्भावादीश्वरेच्छायाः सदर्थावगाहित्वनियमात्। ibid., p. 402.

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the idea of a verbal inflection, denoting the agent is faught with complexity in comparison to its denoting agency *ip so facts* falls through.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the word, *paṭa*, on grounds of its bearing out the verbal comprehension of jar, presented thereby, through the faculty of implication may be claimed to have the power to denote jar, in view of its having been endowed with God's will embracing it as its feature.[2]

Grammarians argue : No. For the verbal comprehension of jar is borne out by the word, *ghaṭa* only and not by the word, *paṭa* for it is the word, *ghaṭa* that is endowed with God's will to denote jar. Because the authoritative usage, *paṭa-padaṁ ghaṭe na śaktaṁ* is an obstacle to the word, *paṭa* being denotative of jar.

Conversely, there is no such usage like *ākhyāta-padaṁ na kartṛ-śaktaṁ* to bar the occurance of the verbal comprehension of the agent from a verbal inflection. As a matter of fact, Pāṇini and the like other authorities have used a verbal inflection in the sense of the agent.[3]

Hence there is simplicity in holding the state of the attributed (*guṇitva* i.e. *kartṛtva*) as the determinant of denotation in comparison to holding the state of the attribute (viz., *kṛtitva*) as such. It is in view of such simplicity that the word, *nīla* denotative of the attribute, blueness (*nailya*) is also held to be denotative of what is qualified by bluness.[4]

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1. अन्यथा कर्त्रनुभवस्वरूपायोग्यत्वादेव तिङां कर्तर्यशक्तत्वसम्भवे कृत्यपेक्षया कर्त्तरि गुरुत्वोपन्यासस्योन्मत्तप्रलपितत्वापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 402,
2. अथैवं पटपदस्यापि लक्षणादिना घटाद्यन्वयानुभावकत्वात् तत्प्रकारकनित्य सङ्केतवत्त्वेन तदपि घटशक्तं स्यात्। ibid., p. 402.
3. न स्यात्, 'पटपदं घटे न शक्तमित्यादिव्यवहारस्य प्रामाणिकत्वेन घटादिपद-निष्ठस्यैव घटानुभावकतया नित्यसंकेतितत्वस्य घटशक्तित्वात्। इह त्वाख्यातं न कर्तृशक्तमित्येवं व्यवहारस्यासत्वात्, प्रत्युत पाणिन्यादिप्रामाणिकै-स्तिङः कर्तृशक्तत्वेन व्यवहृतत्वात्। ibid., p. 402.
4. एतेन गुणवचनस्य नीलादेर्गुण्यशक्तत्वमपि व्याख्यातम्। ibid., p. 402.

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Grammarians further argue : The nominal, the meaning of which is embraced as the (invariable) substantive, against which, the agent presented by a verbal inflection is posited as a feature, is provided for, with the first nominal inflection to be suffixed thereto. For the said agent is held to have been identified by the verbal inflection. Conversely, the, nominal, the meaning of which is embraced as a feature against the agent, comprehended as a substantive, is provided for, with the third nominal inflection to be suffixed thereto. For the said agent is left unidentified by a verbal inflection and the like.

It is incumbant, therefore, to admit that a verbal inflection is denotative of the agent, in order to determine the use of the said two nominals signifying identified and unidentified agents.[1]

Jagadīśa concludes : This is not correct. For the use of the said two nominal inflections suffixed to nominals, provided for to signify identification and non-identification, can be well determined in the manner given, even if a verbal inflection is held to be denotative of agency.[2]

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1. (यत्तु)—यस्य नाम्नोऽर्थे विशेषणत्वेन तिङा स्वार्थः कर्त्ताऽनुभाव्यते, तस्योक्तार्थत्वात् प्रथमान्तत्वमपेक्षितं, यस्य च नाम्नोऽर्थे विशेष्यविधया तस्यानुक्तार्थत्वात् तृतीयान्तत्वमित्युक्तानुक्तस्थलीयसुपो व्यवस्थार्थमवश्यं कर्त्तुराख्यातवाच्यता—(इति) । श. श. प्र. p. 402.
2. तन्न, यस्य नाम्नोऽर्थे तिङा स्वार्थः कृतिरूक्तदिशाऽनुभाव्यते तत्रैव प्रथमातृतीययोरपेक्षेत्येवमभिहिताधिकारीयसुपां व्यवस्थासम्भवादिति प्राहुरित्यास्तां विस्तरः । ibid., p. 402.

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CHAPTER XXX

TENSES AND MOODS
(PRESENNT INDICATIVE)

The Sanskrit verb has ten different forms, corresponding to the tenses and moods of western grammar. The technical names of these ten forms, *laṭ*, *loṭ*, *laṅ*, *liṅ*, *liṭ*, *luṅ*, *lṛṭ*, *luṭ* *lṛṅ* and *leṭ*, coming under the general name, *lakāra*.

Of these ten forms, six may be called tenses viz, *laṭ*—present tense, *laṅ*–Imperfect tense, *liṭ*—Perfect tense, *luṅ*—Aorist tense, *lṛṭ*—Future tense and *luṭ*—Periphrastic tense.

The remaining four viz., *liṅ*–Potential or optative mood, *loṭ*–imperative, *lṛṅ*–conditional and *liṭ*–Subjunctive. *Liṅ* is of two different form–*vidhi-liṅ* and *āśirliṅ*; the former one standing for the Potential or optative mood while the latter one for what may be called 'Benedictive'.

The *leṭ* forms occur only in the Vedas.

The six forms, singled out as tenses, nevertheless, represent a mood viz, the indicative mood.

There are two sets of verbal inflections, called *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada*.

The verbal inflections that, for not being followed by the particle, *sma*, do not (efficiently) bring about the comprehension of pastness, liable to being signified thereby (if followed by the said particle) are called the verbal inflections of the present indicative forms (*laṭ*) of a verb. In view of

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the two-fold classification of verbs, these are eighteen in number and so are those of other forms too.[1]

Opponents argue : The definition of the verbal inflections of the present indicative forms of a verb is too wide. For the verbal inflections of other forms too, not followed by the particle, *sma* do not bring about the comprehension of pastness.

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is unfounded. For in *jānāti*, *jānīte*, *pacati*, *pacate* and the like, the verbal inflections like *ti* or *te* do not bear out the verbal comprehension of pastness due to the fact that these are not followed by the particle, *sma*. In other words, these inflections are potentially capable of bearing out the comprehension of pastness, if followed by *sma*. Hence these inflections, if not followed by the said particle, are only efficiently incapable to bear out the said comprehension. Converssely, the inflections of other forms are even potentially incapable of bearing out such comprehension. For inspite of being followed by the particle, *sma*, the inflections of other forms do not bring about such comprehension.[2]

Opponents argue : The verbal inflections, *e* (*te*) and *āte* of the perfect tense (*liṭ*) being identical in form, with those of the present indicative form, the definition, given is too wide to cover these inflections.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The verbal inflections of the present indicative form are to be further qualified as what are not suffixed to a reduplicated root-verb,

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1. स्मयोगाभावतः स्वार्थातीतत्वानवबोधिका।
लडियं पदभेदेन द्विविधान्या अपीदृशः॥ श. श. प्र. का. 98.

2. 'जानीयादि'त्यादौ लिङादेर्लक्षणादिना स्वोपस्थाप्यस्यातीतत्वस्यानुभावकत्वाभावो न स्मशब्दसन्दंशाभावप्रयुक्तः, सत्यपि तत्सान्निध्ये, 'जानीयात् स्मे'त्यादितस्तादृशबोधानुत्पत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 403.

3. ननु परोक्षाया 'ए आते' इतिवचनद्वयस्य वर्त्तमानायास्तादृशवचनद्वयादवैलक्षण्येन तत्रातिव्याप्तिरिति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 403.

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Opponents argue : The verbal inflection, *tip* in *juhoti* is suffixed to a reduplicated root-verb.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, by the verbal inflections of the present indicative forms are to be understood those such inflections that are not suffixed to a root-verb, carrying the sense of remoteness (*parokṣatva*) of the act, it denotes.[1]

Jagadīśa further observes : Verbal inflections, as such, are denotative also of presentness, to be embraced as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved, in case agency is not liable to comprehension. In case agency, presented by the verbal inflection itself is found liable to comprehension, presentness, denoted by it, is embraced as a feature against the agency, contributing to the accomplishment of the act, denoted by the root-verb, concerned, in the verbal knowledge, borne out by a verbal inflection of the present indicative form and the like.[2]

Opponents ask : In *apacat* or *pakṣyati* and the like, the verbal inflection of the imperfect tense or of the future tense cannot be held to denote presentness.

Jagadīśa replies : The verbal inflection of the imperfect past form in *apacat* means presentness and being the counterpositive of subsequent non-existence and it is against subsequent non-existence, a constituent of being the counterpositive of subsequent non-existence, that presentness is posited as a feature. The verbal knowledge from *apacat*, therefore, is of 'being the counterpositive of the presently abiding subsequent non-existence of the act of cooking.

Similarly in *pakṣyati*, the verbal inflection of the future tense, means presentness and being the counterpositive of the previous non-existence and it is against previous non-existence

1. द्विरुक्तधात्वनाकांक्षत्वेन प्रकृत्यर्थे परोक्षत्वनिराकांक्षत्वेन वा विशेषणीया, 'नातो बुभुजे, बुभुजाते' इत्यादिस्थलीयलिट्व्यतिप्रसङ्गः । श. श. प्र. p. 403.
2. आख्यातसामान्यस्य च वर्त्तमानत्वमर्थः, तद्धि 'पचती'त्यादौ धात्वर्थे तदनुकूलस्वार्थकृत्यादौ वा लडादिनाऽनुभाष्यते । श. श. प्र. p. 403.

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that presentness is posited as a feature to give the verbal knowledge of being the counterpositive of the presently abiding previous non-existence of the act of cooking.[1]

Opponents point out : The grammarians hold that the verbal inflections of the present indicative forms alone are denotative of presentness.

Jagadīśa replies : This involves complexity. For in that case, the verbal inflections of the imperfect past tense or of the future are to be imagined to be endowed with an additional power of denotation to signify presently abiding previous non-existence.[2]

Opponents argue : In '*samprati pacati*', if the verbal inflection, *tip* denotes presentness, the word, *samprati* should be held redundant or presentness should be taken to have been lialbe to dual comprehension.

Jagadīśa replies : There is no such contingency. For neither of the synonymous words, used, to signify one and the same thing are ever held redundant.[3]

Jagadīśa further observes : Presentness, denoted by a verbal inflection does not mean abiding time as such. For in that case, *ayam pacati* would be validly used in language, in reference to one who has already accomplished the act of cooking. Conversely, presentness, denoted by a verbal inflection means abiding the individual moments of time, innumerableness of such individuals and complexity on that score, notwithstanding, in view of its inevitablity.[4]

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1. 'अपचत्, पचयती'त्यादौ तु लङ्लृङादिभिः स्वार्थयोरेव ध्वंसप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वयोरेकदेशे ध्वंसादौ। श. श. प्र. p. 404.
2. अन्यथा वर्त्तमानध्वंसाद्यन्तर्भावेन तासु शक्त्यन्तरकल्पने महागौरवापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 404.
3. 'सम्प्रति पचती'त्यादौ सम्प्रति-लटोः सम्भेदे नान्यतरवैयर्थ्यम्। ibid., p. 404.
4. इदन्तु बोध्यम्–वर्तमानत्वमत्र न कालवृत्तित्वं, कृतपाकेऽपि 'अयं पचती'ति प्रयोगापत्तेः, परन्तु तत्तत्कालवृत्तित्वमनन्तमेव, गौरवस्य प्रामाणिकत्वात्। ibid., p. 404.

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Hence in view of the comprehension of the act of cooking, abiding the past or the future from the expression, *pacati*, uttered in the past or to be uttered in the future, the verbal inflection of the present indicative form, are admitted to have the power to denote the state of abiding the past or the future. The verbal inflection in *pacati*, uttered now, may, therefore, be taken to denote, 'abiding the past or the future.' Hence the state of an individual verbal inflection being uttered at a certain point of time or rather the knowledge of an individual verbal inflection being uttered at a certain point of time, is taken to be the determinant factor of the verbal comprehension of the act, denoted by the root-verb, involved, abiding the said point of time, borne out by the said verbal inflection. As a result i.e. the knowledge of an individual verbal inflection being uttered at a certain point, being regarded as the determinant factor of the aforesaid kind of a verbal comprehension, the verbal comprehension of the act of cooking, abiding the past or the future from the expression, *pacati*, presently made, being occasioned by the wrong knowledge of the individual verbal inflection in view, viz., *tip*, being uttered in the past or likely to be uttered in the future, universally shared, is explained.[1]

Opponents argue : Then in view of the absence of agency, presently abiding *caitra*, of the act of cooking, being liable to conception in respect of some other point of time (like the agency thereof), *caitro na pacati* should be used in language, in reference to *caitra*, engaged in the act of cooking (like *caitraḥ pacati*).[2]

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contingency. For in this case, presentness, the meaning of the verbal inflection

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 404.

2 न च पचत्यपि चैत्रे 'नायं पचती'ति प्रयोगः स्याद्, वर्त्तमानायाः पाककृतेरभावस्य समयान्तरावच्छेदेन चैत्रे सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम्। ibid., pp. 404–405.

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of the present indicative forms, is comprehended as a feature against absence, the meaning of the particle, *nañ*.

Hence the agency of the act of cooking, being presently abiding *caitra*, (he being engaged in the said act), the absence of the agency of the said act cannot be conceived of being in *caitra*, in respect of the present time.[1]

Opponents argue : No meanings of a verbal inflection other than agency, are ever admitted liable to comprehension as a feature against the meaning of the negative particle, *nañ*.

Jagadīśa replies : In *na kalañjaṁ bhakṣayet* the verbal comprehenslon, according to *prabhākara* is like this : The eating of *kalañja*, is possessed of the negation of the instrumentality towards one's welfare, coupled with the non-instrumentality towards one's non-welfare of larger dimension.[2] In other words, instrumentality towards welfare and so on, the meanings of a verbal inflection, other than agency is liable to of comprehcnsion as a feature against the meaning of the negative particle, *nañ*.

Opponents argue : According to the logicians, the meaning of a nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection alone, is liable of comprehension as the invariable substantive. As such, in *na kalañjaṁ bhakṣayet* (*na*, the indeclinable, being a nominal, ending in the first nominal inflection) the verbal comprehensinn is like this : The negation of the eating of *kalañja* is an instrument of (one's) welfare simultaneously not being an an instrument of non-welfare of larger dimension.[3]

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1. तत्र नञर्थ एव लडर्थवर्त्तमानत्वस्यान्वयेन वर्त्तमानकालावच्छेद्यस्य पाककृत्यभावस्य चैत्रे बाधेन तदसम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 405.
2. गुरुमते 'न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यादाविवास्मन्मतेऽपि 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं न गृह्णाति' इत्यादौ नञर्थेऽपि तिङर्थान्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। ibid., p. 405.
   गुरुमत इत्यादि। तत्र कलञ्जभक्षणं बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वविशिष्टेष्टसाधनत्वाभाववदिति बोधस्य सम्मतत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 502.
3. न्यायमते तु तत्राभावे एव विध्यर्थबोधात् स्थलान्तरमाह। ibid., p. 505.

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Jagadīśa replies : In *atiratre ṣoḍaśinaṁ na gṛhṇāti*, the verbal knowledge, according to the logicians even is like this, night having dawned, the taking up of the *ṣoḍaśi* (ladle, with a view to making oblation), is possessed of the negation of the instrumentality of (one's) welfare (*atirātre ṣoḍaśi-grahaṇaṁ iṣṭasādhanatā'bhāvakaḥ*). For the negation of taking up of the said ladle cannot be conceived of as having the instrumentality of welfare in view of the contigency of option, provided for by the conjunction, *atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti.*[1]

Hence the individual points of time, being liable to syntactical relation with the meaning of the negative particle, *nañ*, there is no reason why the uses like *bhāvidine caitro nāpakṣīt* or *atītadine caitro na pakṣyati* should be made. For in such cases too, the past or the future, the individual points of time, being posited as a feature against the meaning of the negative particle, *nañ*, the negation of the agency of the act of cooking, having the past as its locus cannot be in *caitra*, having the future as its locus.[2]

Jagadīśa further points out to an instance of the syntactical relation of an individual point of time with the meaning of the negative particle, *nañ*. In *niṣpannānnaṁ na pakṣyati*, for example, the future agency of the act of cooking of the rice already cooked, is inconceivable. But as the sentence, cited leads to the verbal comprehension of the negation of the act

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1. अस्मन्मतेऽपि 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं न गृह्णाति'इत्यादौ नञर्थे तिङर्थान्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 405.

   अस्मन्मते इत्यादि। अत्र तादृशग्रहणाभावस्येष्टाजनकतया नञर्थे विध्यर्थान्वयासम्भवेन धात्वर्थं एव विध्यर्थान्वित-नञर्थान्वयस्योपगन्तव्यत्वादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 405.

2. एतेन—'भाविदिने चैत्रो नापाक्षीत् अतीतदिने चैत्रो न पचयती'त्यपि समाहितम्. तत्राप्यतीतादिकालस्य नञर्थं एवान्वयेनातीतादिकालावच्छेद्यत्वविशिष्टस्य पाककृत्यभावस्य भाव्यादिदिनावच्छेदेन चैत्रादावसत्त्वादेव तादृशाप्रयोगात्। श. श. प्र. p. 405.

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of cooking of the rice already cooked, having the future as its locus, there arises no contingency.[1]

A verbal inflection of the present indicative form, at times, means proximity to the present time. Such proximity, again is two-fold, viz, having the point of time, immediately following the present time, as the locus or having the point of time, immediately preceding the present time as the locus. Hence in reply to the querry 'when will *caitra* go ?', the statement 'just going' is found to be made to mean that *caitra* is possessed of the agency of the act of going, having the point of time, immediately following, as its locus.[2] In reply to the query 'when did *caitra* come ?' sometimes it is said 'just coming' to mean that *caitra* is possessed of the (the agency of the) act of going having the point of time, immediately preceding the present time, as its locus.[3]

In Sanskrit, there are two sets of verbal inflections, the *parasmaipadi* inflections and the *ātmanepadi* inflections. Some root-verbs take the *parasmaipadi* ones only, others *ātmanepadi* ones alone while others again take both. The verbs with *parasmaipadi* inflections prevailingly denote an action that affects a person or a thing, other than the agent. The verbs with the *ātmanepadi* inflections, on the contrary, denote an action that affects the agent of the said act, himself. The *ātmanepadi* form of a verb, therefore, is otherwise called as what constitutes the *reflective voice* also known as *middle voice.*

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1. अतएव च 'निष्पन्नान्नं न पचयती'त्यादौ निष्पन्नान्नकर्मकभाविकृतेरप्रसिद्धावपि न क्षतिः, भविष्यत्कालावच्छेदेन तादृशान्नकर्मकपाककृतेरभावस्यैव तत्र बोध्यत्वादिति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः। श. श. प्र. p. 405.

2. क्वचिद्वर्त्तमानसामीप्यमपि लटोऽर्थः, तच्च द्विविधम्—वर्त्तमानक्षणाव्यवहितोत्तरकालावच्छेद्यत्वं तादृशक्षणाव्यवहितप्राक्कालावच्छेद्यत्वञ्च, तेन चैत्रः कदा गमिष्यतीति जिज्ञासायामेष गच्छतीत्युत्तरस्य वर्त्तमानक्षणोत्तरकालावच्छेद्यगतिमांश्चैत्र इत्यर्थः। ibid., p. 405.

3. ibid., pp. 405-406.

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Jagadīśa classifies verbal inflections into two, keeping in mind the two-fold division of *padas* viz., *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada*. The verbal inflection that is capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of what a root-verb, ending in the suffix, *kyac*, to from into a nominal verb, posited as a feature against agency, presented by itself, is known as a verbal inflection of the *parasmaipadi* type. The verbal inflection, similarly, that is capable of bringing about the verbal knowledge of what a root-verb, ending in the frequentative suffix, *yaṅ*, posited as a feature against agency, presented by itself is called a verbal inflection of the *ātmanepadī* type.[1]

The verbal inflection, *tip* alone, suffixed to the nominal verb, *putrīya*, constituted of the nominal, *putra* and the suffix, *kyac*, bears out the verbal comprehension of the desire for a son for oneself or of what the nominal verb, to which the said inflection is added, denotes, posited as a feature against agency, the meaning of the said inflection. By agency, again in the present instance, *kṛtimattva* not being liable to comprehension, *āśrayatva* is understood. As such, there arises no contingency. The verbal inflection, *te* in *putrīyate* does not have the potential capability, even, to bear out the said kind of a verbal knowledge and thus there is no reason as to why the definition of the verbal inflection of the *parasmaipadi* type should over-extend thereto.[2]

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1. धातोरर्थस्य कर्तृत्वबोधकं क्यङ्यङन्तयोः।
परस्मैपदमाख्यातमात्मनेपदमेव च ॥
श. श. प्र का. 99.

2. 'पुत्रीयती'त्यादावेव पुत्रादीच्छाकर्तृत्वमाश्रयत्वलक्षणं बोध्यते, न तु पुत्रीयते इत्यादौ। ibid., p. 406.
एवकारेणात्मनेपदस्य स्वरूपयोग्यत्वशंका निराकृता। यथाश्रुतकर्तृत्वशब्दात् कृतिमत्त्वप्रत्यायनात् निरूक्तधात्वर्थस्य तादृशकर्तृत्वमसम्भवीति तत्तात्पर्यार्थमाह—आश्रयत्वलक्षणमिति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 406.

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Opponents argue : In *citrīyate*, meaning one, doing the miracle, the nominal verb, *citrīya* formed of the nominal, *citra* and the suffix, *kyac* is a verb that takes both a *parasmaipadī* and an *ātmanepadī* verbal inflection. As such, by virtue of bearing out the verhal comprehension of what the nominal verb, *caitrīya*, ending in the suffix, *kyac* means, posited as a feature against agency, or what the verbal inflection, *te*, is potentially capable of presenting, the said inflection should be covered by the definition of verbal inflection of the *parasmaipadī* type.

Jagadīśa replies : The suffix, *kyac* is to signify desire. In *citrīyate*, therefore, although the nominal verb is constituted of the said suffix, the definition of verbal inflections of the *parasmaipadī* type would not over-extend thereto. For the meaning of the nominal verb, posited as a feature is not derived from a root-verb, ending in the suffix, *kyac*, used in the sense of desire.[2]

Opponents argue : The verbal inflections, *tā, tārau, tāras* of the periphrastic tense (*luṭ*) of both the *padas*, being identical, the definition of these verbal inflections of the *parasmaipadī* type is likely to over-extend to the counter-parts thereof of the *ātmanepadī* type.

Jagadīśa replies : The definition of the verbal inflection is to be understood to have been further qualified by the clause, 'being other than those of the *ātmanepadī* type.'[3]

In *caitraḥ pāpacyate*, in the like manner, the verbal inflection *te*, alone suffixed to the frequentative verb, *pāpaci* or the

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1. ननु आश्चर्यं चित्रं करोतीत्यर्थे चित्रीयधातोरुभयपदित्वात् आत्मनेपदस्यापि तादृशस्वरूपयोग्यतयातिव्याप्तिरित्यत आहेच्छार्थस्योति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 406.
2. इच्छार्थस्य क्यचो निवेशात् 'चित्रीयते'इत्यादौ आत्मनेपदे नातिप्रसङ्गः सम्पद्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 406.
3. 'घातिता, घातितारौ'इत्यादावात्मनेपदानां निरुक्ताख्यातत्वेऽपि तदन्यत्वेन विशेषणान्न प्रसङ्गः। ibid., p. 406.

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root-verb, *paci* ending in the suffix, *yaṅ* bears out the verbal knowledge of the agency of the frequent act of cooking. The verbal inflection, *tip* is just incapable of bearing out such a knowledge and hence *pāpacyati* is not used in language.[1]

Opponents argue : The definition of the verbal inflection of the *ātmanepadī* type would over-extend to the inflection, *ti* in *bobhavīti*. For it bears out the verbal comprehension of what a verb, ending in *yaṅ* means, posited as a feature against agency, denoted by itself.

Jagadīśa replies : The definition reads 'a verb, ending in *yaṅ*' which means 'a verb ending in *yaṅ*, in use'. In the present case, the suffix, *yaṅ* is not in use. It has gone elided, making room for the use of a verbal inflection of the *parasmaipadī* type. There is no reason, therefore, as to why the definition of the verbal inflection of the *ātmanepadī* type should over-extend thereto.[2]

Opponents argue : The verbal inflection of the plural number of the second person imperative mood (*loṭ*) viz, *ta* (*pañcamī-madhyama-puruṣa-bahuvacana-ta-kāra*) of the *parasmaipada* form and the verbal inflection of plural number of the third person of the imperfect tense (*hyastanī* = *laṅ*) of the *ātmanepada* type are identical. The definition of the *ātmanepada* type of verbal inflection, as given above, therefore, would over-extend to the said inflection of the *parasmaipada* type.[3]

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1. 'चैत्रः पापच्यते'इत्यादिकमेव पौनःपुन्यविशिष्टस्य पाकादेः कर्त्तृत्वं बोधयति, न तु 'पापच्यती'त्यादिकम् । ibid., p. 406.
2. बोभवीतीत्यादौ तु यङो लुकि धातोर्न तदन्तत्वं श्रुतिगर्भत्वादिहान्तत्वस्य । श. श. प्र. p. 406.

   तथा च श्रूयमाणयङन्तत्वं लक्षणे निविष्टमिति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 406.
3. ननु पञ्चमीमध्यमपुरुषबहुवचनतकारस्य ह्यस्तन्यात्मनेपदतकारसमत्वात् तत्रातिव्याप्तिः । ibid., p. 406.

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Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is uncalled for. For as on previous occasions, the present definition too, is understood to read the clause, 'being other than the said individual inflections.'[1]

Opponents argue : There are root-verbs that take the verbal inflections of both the *padas* and in both cases, these bear out the verbal knowledge of the meaning of the root-verb, involved, posited as a feature against agency, the meaning of the verbal inflection. But there are no criteria to determine the circumstances under which a root-verb should take the verbal inflection of one *pada* or the other.

Jagadīśa resplies : An *ubhayapadī* root-verb takes the verbal inflections of the *ātmanepadī* type, if the result of the act, denoted by the said verb accrues on the agent of the said act. In case, however, such a result happens to accrue on one who is other than the agent, the verb takes the inflections of the *parasmaipada* type.[2]

Opponents argue : The rule of Pāṇini that provides for the verbal inflections of the *ātmanepadī* type reads—*svaritañitaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale* (Pā. I. 3. 72) does not signify the meaning, given above.

Jagadīśa replies : The said rule of Pāṇini does signify the said meaning. For the expressions, *kartrabhiprāye* means having relation with the agent (*kartṛ-sambandhe*). Apiśala also endorses this view. In practice too, during the time of making gifts, one reads *dade*, if the result (viz,,

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1. 'पचते'त्यादौ परस्मैपदस्य वारणं पूर्ववत्। श. श. प्र. pp. 406-407.

   पूर्ववदिति । तत्तद्व्यक्तिभेदनिवेशेनेत्यर्थः । कृष्णकान्ती pp. 406-407.

2. अत्रोभयपदिधातूनां यत्र क्रियाफलं कर्त्तृनिष्ठं तत्रात्मनेपदम्, यत्र च कर्त्तृभिन्ननिष्ठं तत्र परस्मैपदं साधु । श. श. प्र. p. 407.

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merit) of gift is sought to accrue on oneself and if otherwise, *dadāni*.[1]

Opponents ask : How then the root-verb, *yaji* in *svargakāmo yajeta* takes the *ātmanepadi* type of verbal inflection ? For the result of the act of sacrifice, denoted by the said root-verb is not indicated to be accuring on the agent of the said act.

Jagadīśa replies : The elders hold that following the general rule of *Mīmāṁsā* that a result, enjoined by the *śāstras*, but for a provision otherwise, accrues on the agent, the result of sacrifice, though not specified as to on whom it should accrue, it is understood that it accrues on the agent.[2]

The author of the *tattva-cintā-maṇi*, however, holds a different view. The aphorism of Pāṇini means that in case the result of the act, involved, is sought after by the agent of the said act, then the verbal inflections of the *ātmanepadi* type is suffixed to the root-verb, presenting the said act. Hence in reference of priests performing a sacrifice and the like with the sole desire for fees only, *yajanti yājakāḥ*, *paṭhanti pāṭhakāḥ* and so on are used in language. For the result of sacrifice, viz., heaven and the like are not sought after by the priests.

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1. 'स्वरितञितः कर्त्रभिप्राये क्रियाफले' (१।३।७२) इति सूत्रेण कर्त्तारमभिप्रैति सम्बध्नातीति व्युत्पत्त्या कर्त्तृसम्बन्धे क्रियाफले एवात्मनेपदस्य विधानात्। अतएव—

स्वरिञ्जिण्ण्यन्तधातूनां कर्त्तृनिष्ठे क्रियाफले।
आत्मनेपदमुद्दिष्टं तदनिष्टे पदान्तरम्॥

इत्यापिशलीयाः पठन्ति। तदनुसृत्यैव दानादिस्थले स्वगते फले 'ददे'इत्येवं परगते तु 'ददानी'त्येव वाक्यं प्रयुञ्जते वृद्धाः। ibid., p. 407.

2. 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत'इत्यादौ च सामान्यतः श्रुतमपि फलं कर्त्तृनिष्ठमेव शास्त्रदेशितं फलमनुष्ठातरी'ति मीमांसयोत्सर्गतस्तथाकल्पनादिति प्राञ्चः।' श. श. प्र. p. 407.

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Opponents argue : Then even when the desire for the result of an act is sought to be accruing on one, other than the agent, the verbal inflections of the *ātmanepadī* type should be used.

The author of the *tattva-cintāmaṇi* replies : This is a welcome objection. For *yajante yājakāḥ* under such a circumstance is validly used in language. In *Pitṛsvargakāmaḥ puṣkariṇyā yajeta, dhana-kāmo gaṇa-patiṁ mokṣa-kāmo'rcayeddhariṁ* and the like other uses of the verbal inflections of the *ātmanepadī* one also are thus validly made.[1]

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1. ibid.; p. 407.

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CHAPTER XXXI

TENSE AND MOODS
(IMPERATIVE)

The verbal inflections that are capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of being authorised by the speaker of itself, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, these are suffixed to, are called verbal inflections of the imperative mood (*loṭ*).[1]

In *karotu*, *kurutām*, *kurvantu* and the like the verbal inflections like *tām*, alone and not the inflections like *tip* and so on, supported with the knowledge of these, being uttered by *caitra* and the like, bring about the verbal comprehension of being authorised by *caitra* and the like, posited as a feature against the meaning of the bases thereof, like agency and so on.[2]

Opponents argue : The definition of the verbal inflection of the imperative mood is too wide. For in *arthāpattirgurūṇām*, the sixth nominal inflection, also bears out the verbal comprehension of being authorised against the meaning of the base thereof.

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1. स्ववक्त्रनुमतत्वस्य धात्वर्थेऽन्वयबोधने ।
अनुकूला यादृशी तिङ् सैव लोट् परिभाष्यते ॥
श. श. प्र. का. 100.

2. 'करोतु, कुरुतां, कुर्वन्तु'इत्यादौ तु ताम्प्रभृतयश्चैत्राद्युक्तत्वधीसहकृताः कृत्यादौ, प्रकृत्यर्थे चैत्राद्यनुमतत्वं बोधयन्ति, न तु तिबाद्याः । ibid., p. 406.

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Jagadīśa replies : There is no such contingency. For the nominal inflection bears out the comprehension of 'being authorised' against the meaning of the word, *arthāpatti*, ending in the primary suffix, *ktin*, provided for in the sense of self-sameness (*svarūpa*) i.e., the invariable substantive being the meaning of the primary suffix, *ktin* and not the meaning of a root-verb.[1]

Opponents argue : The word, *asti* may be understood to have been read along therewith (viz., *arthāpattirgurūṇāmasti*) and the verbal knowledge, thereform, may be taken to be of 'being authorised', denoted by the verbal inflection, *tip*, to be posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *as*, the base thereof.

Jagadīśa replies : This is unreasonable. For the verbal inflection is not known to have been uttered by one, 'being authorised' by whom is comprehended as a feature.[2]

In *patnī pacatu*, the verbal inflection, *tu* denotes 'being enjoined' only. 'Being enjoined', again, means 'the state of what has been desired by the agent, being authorised by one, uttering the verbal inflection, *tu*. Hence the verbal knowledge from the sentence cited is like this : The wife is the agent of the act of cooking that, being desired by her, is authorised by the person, uttering the verbal inflection, *tu*.[3]

In *śūlaṁ viśa* or *viṣaṁ bhuṅkṣva* and the like other sentences uttered by a king, the verbal inflection cannot denote 'being enjoined'. For riding the stake of impalement or eating poison is not desired by the agent thereof. On the contrary, the said inflections, in such cases, mean only being ordered.

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1. 'अर्थापत्तिर्गुरूणामि'त्यादौ षष्ठ्यनुमतत्वं न धात्वर्थेऽनुभाव्यते किन्तु कृदर्थे। ibid., p. 408.
2. न वा स्ववक्तृत्वेन ज्ञातस्य। श. श. प्र. 408.
3. 'पत्नी पचतु'इत्यादौ अनुज्ञैव लोटोऽर्थः सा च कर्तुरिष्टत्वे सति वक्त्रनुमतत्वं, तेन चैत्रवक्तृकताद्दशवाक्याच्चैत्रानुमतस्वेष्टस्य पाकस्य कर्त्री पत्नीत्येवं बोधः। ibid., pp. 408-9.

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Being ordered, again, means being the cause of what being authorised by the speaker is not desired by the agent. The verbal knowledge, therefore, from the said sentence is like this : you are the agent of the act of ridding the stake of impalement, the cause of what being authorised by the king is not desired by you.[1]

In *parvatamutpāṭayāni*, *samudraṁ śoṣayāni* and the like, the Verbal inflection of the imperative mood, viz., *āni* denotes determination. Determination, again means one's knowing for certain that what is incapable of being performed by others, is capable of being performed by oneself. Hence the said kind of sentence gives the verbal knowledge of one, knowing for certain that the uprooting of a mountain that is incapable of being done by others, is capable of being effected by oneself.[2]

Opponents argue : It is unreasonable. For capability of being effected by oneself, a meaning of the verbal inflection, *āni* cannot be syntactically related to the meaning of the base thereof viz., the root-verb, qualified by another meaning of the said suffix, viz., incapability of being performed by others.[3]

Jgaadīśa replies : Agency and presentness, the two meanings of a verbal inflection of the present-indicative tense are well admitted to be liable to mutually syntactical relation and hence there is no contingency.[4]

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1. शूलं विश, विषं भुङ्क्ष्वेत्यादिराजवाक्यस्थले तु नानुज्ञा प्रत्ययार्थः, शूलप्रवेशादौ कर्त्तुरिष्टत्वाभावात् किन्त्वाज्ञैव सा च वक्त्रनुमतत्वे सति कर्त्तुरनिष्टहेतुरस्य, तथा च राजानुमतत्वानिष्टहेतुशूलप्रवेशकर्त्तृतावांस्वमित्याकारस्तत्र बोधः। Ibid., p. 409.

2. श. श. प्र. p. 409.

3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 409.

4. स्वीयैकार्थविशिष्टप्रकृत्यर्थान्वयित्वार्थान्तरबोधकत्वञ्च प्रत्ययस्य नाद्युत्पन्नमिति वक्ष्यते। श. श. प्र. p. 409.

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Opponents argue : The two meanings of a single suffix may be liable to mutual syntactical relation. But the syntactical relation of one of its meanings to what is qualified by the other meaning thereof, is unreasonable.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the particle, *api* may be held to denote incapability of being performed by others, to be related to the meaning of the root-verb, the verbal inflection meaning, knowing for certain the capability of being effected by oneself.[2]

In *jīvatu bhavān*, the verbal inflection of the imperative mood, means good wishes (*āśaṁsā*). Hence such a sentence uttered by *caitra* leads to the verbal knowledge of one having present life, the content of the good wishes of *caitra*.[3]

In *ghaṭo nīlo bhavatu, bhavān sukhī bhavatu* and the like, the root-verb, involved, alone through the faculty of implication, presents 'the state of being of the blue' against which, the desire (therefor), denoted by the verbal inflection is posited as a feature.

Opponents ask : Why should the root-verb, involved, present the said meaning through implication ?

Jagadīśa replies : For otherwise the root-verb, *bhū* would mean only 'betng' (*utpattī*) and the nominal, *nīla*, the blue. As a result, the said two word-meanings could not be syntactically related. For the meaning of a nominal cannot be related to the meaning of a root-verb, through difference. Conversely, the root-verb, *bhū*, if held to imply, 'being of the blue', there

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1. नन्वेकप्रत्ययार्थयोः कृतिवर्त्तमानत्वयोः परस्परमन्वयस्य वक्तव्यमाणत्वेऽपि एकार्थविशिष्टप्रकृत्यर्थेऽपरार्थान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वमेवेत्यत आह अस्तु वेति। कृष्णकान्ती p, 409.
2. अस्तु वा निपातस्यैवापेक्षार्थान्वितं पराशक्यत्वमर्थः, तिङस्तु स्वशक्यताध्यवसायमात्रम्। श. श. प्र. p. 409.
3. क्वचिद् वक्त्राशंसनमपि लोडर्थस्तेन चैत्रोक्ता'जीवतु भवानि'ति वाक्यात् चैत्राशंसाविषयवर्त्तमानजीवनवांस्त्वमित्येवं तत्र बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 409.

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arises no such contingency. As such, '*ghaṭo nīlo bhavatu*' bears out the verbal knowledge of a blue jar marked with the present state of being of the blue, the content of one's desire.[1] And if implication is sought to be dispensed with, the root-verb involved, in such cases, may be held to mean, 'being' that means the relation of the blue jar with the time that is other than the locus of the destruction of the time, the locus of itself, the word, *nīla* being placed between the word, *ghaṭa* and the root-verb, *bhū*. The first moment (*prathamakṣaṇa*) or the moment of the previous non-existence of jar (*ghaṭa-prāgbhāva-kṣaṇa*) is not the time that is other than the locus of the of destruction of the time, the locus of itself, the blue jar. For the said jar is yet to be. The third moment (*tṛtīya-kṣaṇa*) in the like manner, being the locus of the second moment (*dvitīya-kṣaṇa*) of the blue jar, cannot be conceived of as the time that is other than the locus of the destruction of the time, the locus of itself, the blue-jar. As such, the second moment is the said time and the relation of the blue jar, therewith, is what is meant by the being of the said jar.[2] The whole thing is borne out by the root-verb; the word, *nīla* being only a pointer to speaker's intention.[3]

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1. 'घटो नीलो भवतु,' भवान् सुखी भवतु'इत्यादौ तु धातुनैव लक्षणयोपस्थापितायां नीलाद्युत्पत्तौ तिङा आशंसनीयत्वं प्रतीयते, नामार्थस्य नीलादेर्धात्वर्थोत्पत्तौ भेदेनान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात्, एवञ्चाशंसाविषयवर्त्तमाननीलोत्पत्तिमाञ्नीलो घट इत्याकारस्तत्र बोधः। ibid., pp. 409–10.
2. अस्तु वा नीलादिपदसन्दंशवशान्नीलादिविशिष्टस्यैव स्वस्याधिकरणसमयध्वंसानधिकरणसमयसम्बन्धरूपोत्पत्तिस्तत्र धात्वर्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 410.
3. तथा च नीलपदं तात्पर्य्यग्राहकमिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 410.

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CHAPTER XXXII

TENSE AND MOODS
(POTENTIAL OR OPTATIVE)

The verbal inflectton which being other than that of the subjunctive mood (*leṭ*) or of the imperative mood (*loṭ*) is capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of injunction (*vidhi*) is called a verbal inflection of the potential or optative mood.[1]

By injunction (*vidhi*) again, is to be understoed the substratum of the individual state of the feature, abiding the determinant of causality in respect of desire that impels one to undertake the agency of the act involved.[2]

The said substratum again is threefold to be comprehended of, severally, viz., the state of being accomplished by (one's) agency (*kṛti-sādhyatā*), the state of being an instrument to one's welfare (*iṣṭa-sādhanatā*) and the state of being other than what is conducive to one's non-welfare of larger dimension (*balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva*).[3]

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1. लेड्लोडन्या विधेर्बोधे समर्था तिङ् लिङुच्यते । श.श. प्र. का. 101.
2. प्रवर्त्तकचिकीर्षाया हेतुधीर्विषयो विधिः । Op. cit.

   प्रवर्त्तकचिकीर्षायां यत्प्रकारकज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वं स तथा । ibid., p. 410.

   चिकीर्षाजनकतावच्छेदकप्रकारताविशेषाश्रयज्ञेत्यर्थः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 410.
3. तादृशञ्च कृतिसाध्यत्वमिष्टसाधनत्वं बलतदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वञ्च प्रत्येकमेव । श. श. प्र. p. 410.

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One is inclined to undertake the agency of the act of sacrifice or of cooking, only on one's having the desire for the said act, subsequent to one's having known for certain that the said act is capable of being accomplished by (one's) agency, that it is an instrument to one's welfare and that it is not an instrument to one's non-welfare (or hardship) of larger dimension. Hence *yajeta* or *paceta* gives the verbal knowledge of the act of sacrifice or of cooking, severally qualified by these three states.[1]

In *paṭamānaya* or *saptamaṁ padaṁ gṛhṇāti* and the like, the verbal inflections of the imperative mood or of the subjunctive mood bears out the verbal comprehension of injunction but the definition of the verbal inflection of the potential or optative mood does not over-extend thereto. For the definition thereof is qualified by the clause, being other than the verbal inflections of the imperative and the subjunctive mood.[2]

Similarly, the definition does not cover the suffixes like *tavya*, *yat* and so on, although in *yaṣṭavyaṁ*, *deyaṁ* and the like 'the state of being accomplished by (one's) agency and so on are verbally comprehended thereform. For these suffixes are not verbal inflections.[3]

Nor is the definition too wide to cover *yat* in *pacyāt* and the like, the verbal inflection of the 'benedictive' mood (*āśirliiṅ*). For the definition is understood to have been qualified with the clause 'what does not cause the verbal knowledge of futurity.[4]

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1. यागपाकादिधर्मिकतन्निश्चयादेव यागादिधर्मिंकचिकीर्षोत्पत्त्या तत्र प्रवृत्तेः, एवञ्च 'यजेत पचेते'त्यादौ यागः कृतिसाध्यः इष्टसाधनं बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धी च इत्याकारको बोधः। ibid., p. 410.
2. श. श. प्र. pp. 410-411.
3. ibid., p. 411.
4. ibid., p. 411.

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Opponents argue : What impels one to action is not merely the knowledge of the state of being aceomplished by agency but that of the state of being accomplished by one's own agency and that too of the present one. For otherwise, such knowledge occuring to one in respect of the agency of some one else or occurring years ago would come out to call for one's implusion to an act. As such, the verbal inflections of the optative or potential mood are to be admitted to have the potency to denote agency of one's own and present-ness too, resulting in the imagination of multiple potency in such inflections. As such, it is enough that such a verbal Inflection should merely denote the instrumentality of what is wished for.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In *paṅguḥ samudraṁ na taret* and the like, the negative particle, *nañ*, admittedly, bears out the verbal knowledge of the negation of the act of crossing the ocean being accomplished by the agency of a paralysed person. As such, the state of being accomplished by agency has to be admitted liable to denotation by a verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood.[2]

Opponents argue : In that case, only the state of being accomplished by agency only should be regarded as the denoted meaning of a verbal infiection of the potential or optative mood.[3]

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1. यद्यपीदानीन्तनस्वकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्यैव प्रवर्त्तकत्वमन्यथा स्वस्यैव कालान्तरीणायाः परस्य चेदानीन्तन्याः कृतेः साध्यताग्रहादपि प्रवृत्त्यापत्तेः, तथापि इदानीन्तनस्वकृत्यन्तर्भावेणापि लिङः शक्त्यापत्तिरतः प्रवर्त्तकज्ञानप्रकारत्वं तत्राप्रयोजकम् । ibid., p. 411.
2. तथापि 'पङ्गुः समुद्रं न तरेदि'त्यादौ नञादिना समुद्रतरणादेः पङ्गु-प्रभृतिकृतिसाध्यत्वनिषेधानुरोधादवश्यं कृतिसाध्यत्वं लिङर्थः । श. श. प्र. p. 411.
3. ननु तन्मात्र एव तच्छक्तिरावश्यकत्वादस्तु किमपरयोर्द्वयोस्तत्व-कल्पनेन । कृष्णकान्ती p. 411.

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Jagadīśa replies : No. In *tṛptikāmo jalaṁ na tāḍayet*, or in *na kalañjaṁ bhuñjītā*, the negation of the instrumentality of what is wished for by one after pleasure or the eating of *kalañja*, being the cause of evil of larger dimension (i.e. hell), cannot be properly explained, unless, instrumentality or the state of being the cause of evil of larger dimension is admitted liable to denotation by a verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood.[1]

Opponents argue : In '*aṣṭamyāmupavaset*', the verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood cannot mean 'being liable to accomplishment by agency (*kṛtisādhyatva*). For fasting (*upavāsa*) which is of the nature of negation of eating, is not liable to accomplishment.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Fasting (*upavāsa*) means either the absolute negation of eating or the previous negation thereof and thus uncaused, no doubt. But the sustenance thereof is, of course, liable to accomplishment by agency. If, however, such an explanation is not accepted, fasting may be held to mean an act, going counter to the act of eating to bear out the syntactical relation of 'being liable to accomplishment' with the meaning of the root-verb.[3]

Opponents ask : How then statements like '*pākaṁ kuryāt*, *jalaṁ tāḍayet* or *śyenena yajeta* are regarded unauthoritative ?

Jagadīśa replies : *Pākaṁ kuryāt* is wrongly held to be unathoritative, the verbal inflection being taken to mean being liable to accomplishment by agency. Similarly *jalaṁ tāḍayet*

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1. तथा 'तृप्तिकामो जलं न ताडयेदि'त्यादौ तृप्तिकामेष्टसाधनत्वस्य, 'न कलञ्जं भुञ्जीते'त्यादौ च कलञ्जभक्षणादेर्बलवदनिष्टजनकत्वस्य निषेधानुपपत्त्या इष्टसाधनत्वादिकमपि। श. श. प्र. pp. 411–12.
2. न चाहोरात्रावच्छेद्यभोजननिवृत्तिरूपस्योपवासस्य कृत्यसाध्यत्वात् अष्टम्यामुपवसेदितिविधेर्बाधः। ibid., p. 312.
3. कृत्यधीनसमयसम्बन्धरूपस्य वैधिककृतिसाध्यत्वस्य नित्येऽप्यनपायात्, तादृशप्रयोगे भोजनादिप्रतिकूलव्यापारस्यैव वा धात्वर्थत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 412.

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is also wrongly so held, the verbal inflection being taken to mean 'being an instrument of welfare' and so also *śyenena yajeta*, the verbal inflection being taken to mean 'being not the cause of evil of larger dimension (or hell). For such meanings of the verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood are obviously incompatible with the meanings to the root-verbs involved in the sentences cited. Agency (*kṛti*), the meaning of the root-verb, *kṛ* is not liable of accomplishment by agency (for *sva* is not *sva-sādhya*). 'Beating against water' cannot be an instrument of welfare for one, looking for pleasure. Nor could the *śyena*-sacrifice be other than what causes an evil like hell. But otherwise, such statements are quite valid. For such a verbal inflection, it has been stated earlier, is capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension severally of the three-fold meaning, it denotes.[1]

Opponents argue : There is two-fold view in regard to the power of denotation. The elders hold that a word is denotative of the genus, the individual and the relation thereof, severally. Their view, is, thus known as *pratyeka-śakti-vāda*. According to the Neo-logicians, on the contrary, a word means what is determined by a genus. Hence their view is called *viśiṣṭa-śakti-vāda*. In the present case, following the view of those who hold *viśiṣṭa-śakti-vāda*, a verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood, should mean being an instrument of welfare qualified by being liable to accomplishment by agency and being other than what brings about on evil of larger dimension (i.e. hell). As such, *pākaṁ kuryāt* and *jalaṁ tāḍayet* come out to be non-authoritative statements. For the feature aspects or the substantive-aspect not being denoted by the verbal inflection, involved, the said sentences cannot bear out the com-

1. 'पाकं कुर्यादि'त्यत्र कृतिसाध्यत्वस्य, 'जलं ताडयेदि'त्यत्रेष्टसाधनत्वस्य, 'श्येनेन यजेते'त्यादौ च बलवदनिष्टाजनकत्वस्य धात्वर्थे बाधात्तत्र यथायोगमिष्टसाधनत्वादिकमेव लिङा प्रमाप्यते; तद्प्रामाण्यव्यवहारस्तु इष्टसाधनत्वादिभ्रमहेतुत्वप्रयुक्तः। ibid., p. 412.

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prehension of being an instrument of welfare qualified by being liable to accomplishment by agency and being other than what brings about an evil of greater dimension. (For *viśeṣaṇābhāva* leads to *viśiṣṭābhāva*).[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This is wrong. For the application of *viśiṣṭa-śakti-vāda*, here, would lead to six-fold power of denotation of the verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood. For by permutation and combination of the three-fold meaning, it is held to denote, six different meanings would come out therefrom. This would seriously tell upon the law of parsimony.[2]

Not only that. The vedic sentence *śyenenā'bhinaran yajeta* would cease to be an authoritative statement. For the *śyena*-sacrifice prescribed for one, desirous of killing one's enemy is bound to bring about hell, (an evil of larger dimension), in retribution to one's killing one's enemy.[3]

Opponents argue : No. There is no such contingency. For the verbal inflection here, implies being an instrument of welfare only and the *śyena* sacrifice is, of course, an instrument of welfare in respect of one, desirous of killing one's enemy.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : But implication involves a defect of composition (*pada-doṣa*).

Opponents argue : In your view too, the verbal inflection in *agamyām gacchet* admittedly implies being other than what brings about an evil of larger dimension (i.e. hell) only. For

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1. यत्तु—कृतिसाध्यत्व-बलवदनिष्टाजनकत्वाभ्यां विशिष्टमेवेष्टसाधनत्वं लिङर्थं इति तद्बोधकतया 'जलं ताड्येदि'त्यादेरप्रामाण्यमेव-इति। श. श. प्र. p. 412.
2. तन्न; कृतिसाध्यत्वादेर्विशेष्यविशेषणभावव्यत्यासेन गुरूतरशक्तिषट्कापत्तेः। ibid., p. 412.
3. 'श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेते'त्यादिश्रुतेरप्रामाण्यापत्तेश्च, श्येनस्य वैरिवधकाम-कर्त्तव्यत्वेन बलवदनिष्टस्य दुरितस्यानुबन्धित्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 412.
4. न च तत्रेष्टसाधनत्वमात्रे लक्षणा। ibid., p. 412.

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otherwise, the said statement would come out to be an authoritative one.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : In our view, there is no such implication. For a verbal knowledge borne out by a verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood does not embrace any implied meaning.[2] In *aganyāṁ gacchet*, therefore, being other than what causes an evil of larger dimension too, is presented by the verbal inflection through its powar of denotation. The statement, however, in any case, is not to be considered a valid one on that score. For a statement giving the verbal knowledge of what is in reality other than what causes an evil of larger dimension qualified by the state of being other than what causes an evil of larger dimension is considered a valid one.[3]

Opponents argue : In *śyenena yajeta* too, implication can be dispensed with. For the verbal inflection may be held to have presented the three-fold meaning, talked of, at the stage of the knowledge of import (*śakti-graha*) and 'being an instrument of welfare' only is embraced in the verbal knowledge occuring therefrom[4], as in *ghaṭo'nityaḥ* although both jarness (*ghaṭatva*) and jar (*ghaṭa*) are presented as the denoted

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1. त्वन्मतेऽपि 'अगम्यां गच्छेदि'त्यादेः प्रामाण्यस्य दुर्वारत्वापत्तेः। ibid., p. 412.

   तथा च बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वमात्रबोधानुरोधेन भवन्मतेऽपि लक्षणास्वीकार आवश्यक इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती pp. 412-3.

2. 'न विधौ परः शब्दार्थः' इत्यस्य व्याकोपापत्तेश्च। श. श. प्र. p. 413.

   तथा च विधिवाक्यघटकपदार्थः परो न=शक्यादन्यः न, शक्यार्थ एव विधिवाक्यविषय इति यावत् इति नियमव्याघातपरोऽित्यर्थः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 413.

3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 413.

4. ननु बलवदनिष्टाजनकत्वविशिष्टेऽपीष्टसाधनत्वे लिङः शक्तिग्रहादिष्ट-साधनतामात्रस्य श्येनादावनुभावकत्वसम्भवात् न तत्र लिङो लक्षणा। श. श. प्र. p. 413.

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meanings of the word, *ghaṭa*, the verbal knowledge from *ghaṭo' nityaḥ* embraces only jar in view of the incompatibity of non-eternality and jarness, a genus.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : No. It is not reasonable. For the knowledge of import embraces merely what is to be embraced as a feature in the verbal knowledge occurring therefrom, as a feature.

Opponents argue : It cannot be thus insisted upon. For it militates against the law of parsimony. Conversely, the rule is that a verbal knowledge does not embrace anything not embraced by the knowledge of import.[2]

Pakṣadhara Miśra, therefore, holds that although the word, *śruti* in '*śrotavyaḥ śruti-vākyebhyaḥ*' is denotative of only the *vedas* or the words of authority other than the *smṛtis*, it is held to bear out the verbal knowledge of the *vedas* and the *smṛtis* as words of authority, and that too without an implication. For otherwise, a precept of specification (*niyama-vidhi*) has to be imagined to the effect that listening to the vedas alone causes salvation and a separate invisible result has to be contemplated of.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : This is all absurd. For in that case, the word, *paśu* would turn out to bring about the verbal comprehension of a rat in the primary sense of the term, by virtue of its having primarily denoted an animal with a tail at the stage of the knowledge of its import.[4]

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1. यथा घटोऽनित्यः इत्यत्र घटपदवाच्यैकदेशघटत्वस्यायोग्यत्वेऽपि योग्यघटव्यक्त्या सहानित्यत्वान्वयः। वेदान्तपरिभाषा p. 165–66.
2. यद्रूपेणान्वयधीस्तन्मात्रप्रकारकशक्तिज्ञानत्वापेक्षया लघुत्वेन तत्प्रकारकशक्तिज्ञानत्वेनैव तत्र हेतुत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 413.
3. अतएव–'श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्य' इत्यत्र स्मृत्यादिभिन्नप्रमाणशब्दत्वेन शक्तमपि श्रुतिपदं प्रमाणशब्दत्वेन श्रुतिस्मृतौ बोधयन्न लाक्षणिकम्, अन्यथा श्रुतिपदस्य वेदमात्रपरत्वे तज्जन्यशाब्दत्वेन मुक्तिहेतुत्वे नियमादृष्टकल्पनापत्तेः–इति पक्षधरमिश्रैरप्युक्तमिति। श. श. प्र. p. 413.
4. पश्वादिपदस्यापि लाङ्गुलादिमत्तया मूषिकादिबोधने मुख्यत्वापत्तेः। ibid., p. 413.

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Opponents argue : In case, a verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood is denotative of 'the state of being an instrument of what is wished for,' then a sentence like '*svargakāmaḥ pacet*' would assume the authority of an injunction. For the act of cooking that is liable to accomplishment by the agency of one aspiring after heaven, is a fit instrument of having 'rice', the wished for object of him.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contigency. For the verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood read with the word, *svargakāma*, has the expectancy of bearing out the verbal knowledge of the state of being an instrument of heaven only, as the wished-for object and of none else. As such, the verbal inflection in *pacet*, in the sentence cited, although it has the potency to denote the state of the act of cooking being an instrument of accomplishing 'rice' cannot bear out the verbal knowledge of the state of being an instrument of what is wished for.[2]

The fact is that although a verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood is denotative of the state of being an instrument of what is desired for, the desired for object is not to be understood as the said object as such. In other words, the determinant of denotation of the said verbal inflection is not the desired-for object, qualified by the state of being the desired for. On the contrary, the said determinant of denotation is the desired-for object, qualified by the particular attribute embraced in the verbal comprehension, borne out by a sentence of injunction, constituted of the said

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1. स्यादेतत्, इष्टसाधनत्वं यदि विध्यर्थस्तदा 'स्वर्गकामः पचेते'त्यादेरपि प्रमाणतापत्तेः, स्वर्गकामकृतिसाध्ययस्य पाकादेरोदनादिरूपेष्टसाधनत्वादिति । ibid., p. 414.

2. स्वर्गकामादिसमभिव्याहृतविधिप्रत्ययस्य स्वर्गादिरूपेष्टसाधनत्वान्वयबोधं प्रत्येव साकांक्षत्वेनेष्टान्तरसाधनत्वे शक्तिमत्त्वेऽप्युक्तविधेस्तद्बोधकत्वासम्भवात् । श. श. प्र. p. 414.

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inflection.[1] In *svargakāmo yajeta*, therefore, the verbal inflection, *ta* is denotative of the state of (a particular) sacrifice being an instrument of heaven or the desired for object, qualified by the state of heaven, an attribute embraced in the verbal knowledge borne out by the sentence cited. In *svarga-kāmaḥ paceta* the inflection, *ta*, cannot bear out a similar verbal comprehension and as such, there is no renson why it should be regarded an authoritative statement.

In case, however, the desired for object is not comprehended as further qualified by any particular attribute like the state of heaven and so on from a sentence of injunction, the determinant of denotation of a verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood is only the state of being a desired for object. The elders, (i.e. the *Mīmāmsakas*), therefore, hold that in *viśvajitā yajeta*, the verbal inflection, *ta*, denotes the state of the *viśvajit* sacrifice being an instrument of what is desired for. But as the comprehension of the desired-for as such, as the result of a sacrifice, does not bring about the will of a person to perform a sacrifice, heaven is presumed by them, to be the result of the said sacrifice.[2]

Opponents argue : The will of undertaking the performance of a sacrifice is rooted in desire caused by the verbal comprehension from a sentence of injunction. As such, the presumtory knowledge of heaven cannot account for the rise of will in a person to undertake a sacrifice not known to be an instrument thereof, from the sentence of injunction. Nor could it be held that subsequent to the said presumtory knowledge, a fresh verbal knowledge embracing the sacrifice involved, as an instrument of heaven, occurs. For words, on bearing out a

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1. इयांस्तु विशेषो–यदिष्टस्य स्वर्गत्वांद्यवान्तररूपेणैव यदि विधिवाक्याद्-बोधस्तदा तादृशावान्तररूपेणैवेष्टं विधेः शक्यतावच्छेदकम् । ibid., p. 414.
2. अतएव 'विश्वजिता यजेते'त्यादौ इष्टसामान्यसाधनत्वस्यैव विधिना-बोधनात् प्रवर्त्तकस्येष्टविशेषसाधनत्वावगाहिज्ञानस्य सम्पत्तये प्राच्यैः-स्वर्गः फलं कल्प्यते । श. श. प्र. p. 414.

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verbal knowledge once, cease to operate to bring about another knowledge, afresh.

The Mīmāṁsakas reply : Verbal knowledge is not caused, as a rule, by words in use alone. For illiptical sentences (*padādhyahāra*) or words inferred from meanings comprehended (*arthādhyahāra*), lead to the occurance of verbal knowledge.

Opponents argue : A verbal inflection of the optative or potential mood denotes only the state of being an instrument and the state of a sacrifice being an instrument of heaven is comprehended through the syntactical relation of the said state of being an instrument with heaven, a constituent of what the word, *svargakāma*, used in association therewith, means.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : All this is absurd. For heaven, in that case, is not a word-meaning by itsetf and as such it cannot be syntactically related to the state of being an instrument of what is stipulated as the meaning of the verbal inflection. Because a word-meaning alone is syntactically related to another word-meaning. Expectancy lacking, heaven, a constituent of the meaning of the compound, *svarga-kāmaḥ* cannot be syntactically related to the aforesaid meaning of the verbal inflection. For any such syntactical relation involves the fault of 'breaking up of a syntactical unity' (*eka-prasaratā-bhaṅga*).[2]

Opponents argue : Such syntactical relation is not altogether unlikely, in view of semantic pecularity.[3]

Jagadiśa replies : But the fundamental difficulty is not overcome even then. For it is unreasonable to hold that a verbal

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1. यत्तु-साधनत्वमात्रं विध्यर्थः, स्वर्गादिफलसाधनत्वन्तु स्वर्गकामादिपदसमभिव्याहारलभ्यम्। श. श. प्र. p. 414.
2. तत्तुच्छम्, पदानुपस्थितस्य स्वर्गादेर्विध्यर्थसाधनत्वेऽन्वयायोगात्, स्वर्गकामादिवृत्तिशब्दैकदेशार्थस्य स्वर्गादेस्तत्रान्वये निराकांक्षत्वात्। ibid., pp. 414-15.
3. यदि च व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यात् तत्र तदन्वयः स्वीक्रियते। कृष्णकान्ती p. 415.

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inflection of the optative mood is denotative of the state of an instrument as such, without taking the effect into cognisance. For causality (or the state of an iastrument) means the specific state of being immediately precedent to the effect, involved, as a rule.[1]

As such, it is the characteristic attribute, other than what determines the state of the superfluous, qualifying what is related, through a relation of its own, severally to the individuals qualified by the state of heaven at the moment immediately preceding thereto, in respect of the individual substratums thereof, that should be the determinant of the state of instrument, through the said reiation of what is qualified by the state of heaven. The state of sacrifice, the characteristic attribute of sacrifice is other than what determines the state of the superfluous. For it is itself a superfluous unlike the state of the feature of a potter (*kulāla-pitṛtva*), determining the state of the superfluous in the father of the potter. The state of sacrifice, again qualifies a sacrifice that is related to all the individuals qualified by the state of heaven, severally, in respect of all the individual persons, the individual substratums of all the individuals qualified by the state of heaven. The state of sacrifice, therefore, is the determinant of the state of instrument of what is qualified by the state of heaven.[2]

Opponents argue : Such a state of instrument of what is qualified by the state of heaven in respect of sacrifice is contradicted.[3] For sacrifice or what is qualified by the state of sacrifice is not related to all the individuals of what are qualified by

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1. फलाव्यवहितनियतपूर्ववर्त्तित्वविशेषात्मनः कारणत्वस्य फलगर्भतया तदनन्तर्भाव्य साधनत्वशक्तेरशक्यवचनाच्च । श. श. प्र. p. 415.
2. नन्वेवं स्वर्गत्वावच्छिन्ना यावती व्यक्तिस्तत्प्रत्येकाधिकरणावच्छेदेन तत्प्रत्येकाव्यवहितप्राक्काले यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नस्य यादृशः सम्बन्धोऽन्यथासिद्धयनिरूपकस्तद्धर्मं एवं तादृशसम्बन्धेन स्वर्गत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नं प्रति साधनत्वं वाच्यम् । ibid., p. 415.
3. तच्च यागादौ बाधितम् । श. श. प्र. p. 415.

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the state of heaven, at the moment, immediately preceding thereto in respect of all the individual substratums thereof, through the relation of inherence govering sacrifice. Because *apūrva* or the transcendental merit borne out by sacrifice is more well-known as what is related to all the individuals of what are qualified by the state of heaven, at the moment immediately preceding thereto, in respect of all the individual substratums thereof through the relation of inherence governing the said transcendental merit.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contingency. For sacrifice is related to all the individuals of what are qualified by the state of heaven, at the moment immediately preceding thereto, in respect of the individual substratums thereof, through the relation of *apūrva*.[2]

Opponents argue : Sacrifice is not well known to be thus related to all the individuals of what are qualified by the state of heaven. For the state of sacrifice is not the determinant of the immediate precedence of all the individuals of what are quaiified by the state of heaven, in respect of all the individual substratums thereof, severally. Because, heaven is also caused by gift and the like.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : *Sattva*, the genus or the state of quality (*guṇatva* in view of a sacrifice being an effort or *payatna*) or the state of desire (in view of desire being of the kind of a sacrifice i.e., *yāgātmaka-icchā*) may be the said determinant of the state of instrument (or causality).[4]

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1. यागस्य स्वर्गान्यवहितप्राक्काले स्वर्गाधिकरणावच्छेदेन यागीयसमवाय-सम्बन्धस्यासत्त्वादपूर्वादौ प्रसिद्धस्य तादृशसाधनत्वस्य च यागादावभावा-दिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 415.
2. यदि चापूर्वसम्बन्धेन यागः कारणमित्युच्यते, तदा न बाधः। ibid., p. 415.
3. अप्रसिद्धं वा यागत्वादेर्निरुक्तस्वर्गान्यवहितपूर्ववर्त्तितानवच्छेदकत्वात्, दानादितोऽपि स्वर्गाद्युत्पत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 415.
4. ननु सत्त्वगुणत्वादेरेव तादृशधर्मस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् कुतोऽप्रसिद्धिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 415.

आदिनेच्छात्वपरिग्रहः। ibid., p. 415.

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Opponents argue : No. For *sattva* or *guṇatva* or *icchātva*, are the so many attributes determining the state of the superfluous (as causes) of what are qualified by the state of heaven[1] (like *kulāla-pitṛtva* of a jar). As such, a verbal inflection of the optative mood cannot denote the state of the instrument of heaven.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : All this is true. But even then, the view that a verbal inflection of the optative mood denotes the state of the instrument of heaven remains unassailed. For what is intended in the said view is that such a verbal inflection denotes the state of the instrument of heaven qualified by a certain attribute inherent in heaven and such a state of the instrument of heaven fairly abides a sacrifice. Because, *aśvamedha*, a sacrifice, for example, is qualified by the state of *aśvamedhatva*, the determinant of immediate precedence to each individual of what are qualified by the state of heaven determined by the characteristic attribute (viz, *aśvamedha-janya-svargatva*), inherent in heaven.[3]

Opponents argue : In case the characteristic attribute (*vaijātya*) is embraced in the verbal knowledge from (an injunction involved, constituted of) a verbal inflection of the optative mood, there is no scope of its being liable to inference, occurring subsequent to such verbal knowledge. As such, the view of the elders that such a characteristic attribute is only inferable is contradicted.

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contingency. For the characteristic attribute is embraced in the said verbal knowledge only as a characteristic attribute and not as the

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1. सत्त्वगुणत्वादेश्च तादृशस्य स्वर्गात्वाद्यवच्छिन्नं प्रति अन्यथासिद्धिनिरूपकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 415.
2. अतः कथमिष्टसाधनत्वं विधेः शक्यमिति चेत्। ibid., p. 415.
3. सत्यम्, स्वर्गवृत्तियत्किञ्चिद्धर्मावच्छिन्नं प्रति साधनस्य विध्यर्थत्वात् तस्य च स्वर्गवृत्तिवैजात्यविशेषावच्छिन्ना यावन्तस्तत्प्रत्येकाव्यवहित-प्राक्कालवृत्तितावच्छेदकीभूताश्वमेधत्वादिकमादायैव यागादौ सत्त्वात्। ibid., p. 415.

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genus that determines the state of being caused by a particular sacrifice (viz., *aśvamedha-yāga-janya-svargatvātmaka-vaijātya*). As such, the scope of the inference referred to, is not ruled out.[1]

Opponents argue : Firstly, the state of genus playing the role of the sense-object contact based on a common feature (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*), all the genuses are presented to be embraced in the knowledge of import. Thereupon, the state of being qualified by genus playing the said role, again, all that are qualified by genus are apprehended as what are qualified by genus. Subsequent thereto, heaven as qualified by the specific characteristic attribute *per se* is embraced in recollection and not as what is qualified by the said characteristic attribute as a characteristic attribute[2] notwithstanding the fact that the said characteristic attribute is embraced as a charateristic attribute in the knowledge of import. For proper stimulation lacking, the impression thereof does not flower into recollection.[3] Because the knowledge of import is the cause of recollection only by virtue of the fact that what is embraced as a feature in the knowledge of import is also embraced as such in recollection and not because of the fact that what is embraced as the determinant of the state of a feature in the knowledge of import is also embraced as such in recollection.[4]

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1. न चैवं वैध एव बोधे स्वर्गगतवैजात्यस्य भानादग्रकल्प्यत्वव्याकोपः, स्वर्गवृत्तियत्किञ्चिद्धर्मत्वेन गृहीतस्यापिवैजात्यस्य यागविशेषजन्यतावच्छेदकजातित्वादिना कल्पनस्योदीच्यत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 415-416.
2. यदि च—जातित्वसामान्यलक्षणया निखिलजात्युपस्थित्यन्तरं जातिमत्त्वप्रत्यासत्या जातित्वेन सकलजातिविशिष्टस्यानुभवे सत्युत्तरकालं श्रुद्धतत्तद्वैजात्येन विशिष्टस्य स्वर्गादेः स्मृतौ बाधकाभावः। ibid., p. 416.
3. संस्कारसत्त्वेऽपि जातित्वांशस्योद्बोधकाभावेनाग्रहसम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 416.
4. समानप्रकारत्वेनैव हि स्मृतावनुभवस्य हेतुत्वं, न तु समानप्रकारतावच्छेदकत्वेन, गौरवात्। ibid., p. 416.

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Jagadīśa replies : In that case, knowableness (*prameyatva*) functioning as the sense-object relation based on a common feature, as all that are knowable should be embraced in the knowledge of import and thereupon, with jarness, clothness and the like being embraced *per se* in recollection, the knowledge of everything would unwarrantedly occur. As such, it is reasonable to hold that the knowledge of import is the cause of recollection by virtue of the fact that what is embraced as the determinant of a feature in the said knowledge is also embraced in recollection.[1]

Opponents argue : The extra-ordinary perception through sense-object contact based on knowledge (*jñāna-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*) of pleasure qualified by the individual characteristic attribute occurring subsequently to the ordinary perception thereof through the relation of inherence governing heavenly pleasure of the (said) individual characteristic attribute, is admittedly a valid perception.[2]

The idea is this : The extra-ordinary perception of pleasure qualified by the individual characteristic attribute (*tat-tad-vaijātyā'vacchinna-sukha*) occurs subsequently to the ordinary perception, 'I' am with pleasure (*aham sukhī*) embracing pleasure as a feature against 'I' and the relation involved being inherence of pleasure qualified by the individual characteristic attribute (*tat-tad-vaijātyā'vanchinna-sukha-pratiyogika-samavāya*). The extra-ordinary perception embraces pleasure qualified by the individual characteristic attribute (*tat-tad-vaijātyā'vacchinna-sukha*) as a feature against 'I' and the relation involved is the recollection of pleasure qualified by the individual characteristic attribute (*tat-tad-vaijātyā'vacchinna-sukha-*

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1. नन्वेवं प्रमेयत्वसामान्यलक्षणया निखिलप्रमेयज्ञानात्, स्वरूपतो घटत्व-पटत्वादिस्मृत्युत्पत्त्या सार्वज्ञापत्तिरिति समानप्रकारकत्वेनैव स्मृत्यनुभवयो-र्हेतुमद्भाव आवश्यकः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 416.
2. यदि वा तत्तद्वैजात्यावच्छिन्नस्वर्गादिनिरूपितसमवायेन सुखादिमत्ता-ज्ञानानन्तरं तादृशवैजात्यावच्छिन्नसुखस्य उपनीतभानं प्रामाणिकम्। श. श. प्र. p. 416.

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smṛti). The striking feature of such an extra-ordinary perception is that the individual characteristic attributes are comprehended *per se*. For the said individual characteristic attributes having formed a part of the relations involved in the ordinary and the extra-ordinary perceptions, are reasonably liable to such comprehension.[1] Because in semantics, a relation unlike a feature or a substantive is comprehended *per se*; (*saṁyoga* is comprehended as *saṁyoga* and not as what is qualified by *samyogatva*).

Conversely, if such a situation is not admitted, there would be no knowledge of import in respect of the word, *manas*. For prior to such knowledge, mind must have been perceived. But as the mind is super-sensuous (*atīndriya*), the perception thereof *per se* is impossible. Hence it is admitted that the state of being genus (*jātitva*) playing the role of the sense-object contact based on a common feature, all the genuses are perceived extra-ordinarily. As such, mind is perceived qualified by mindness (*manastva*), the genus *per se*, the state of being genus, playing the role of a relation only or it may be held that subsequent to the knowledge of the soul as what is possessed of a substance through the relation of conjunction of what is qualified by mindness, mind is perceived as what is determined by mindness *per se*, mindness forming a part of the relation.[2]

The theory, therefore, that the characteristic attribute of heaven is first comprehended as an individual characteristie

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1. संसर्गतासाधारणविशेषणविषयताकज्ञानस्यैव विशिष्टधीहेतुतुल्यत्वात्। ibid., p. 416.
2. इत्थमेव च शुद्धमनस्त्वादिविशिष्टस्योपस्थितौ तत्र मनःपदादेः शक्तिग्रह— इति विभाव्यते। ibid., p. 416.

अन्यथाऽतीन्द्रियतया स्वरूपतो मनस्त्वादिविशिष्टस्य पूर्वं ग्रहासम्भवेन तत्र मनःपदशक्तिग्रहो न स्यात्, अधुना तु जातित्वसामान्यलक्षणया मनस्त्वज्ञानोत्तरं मनस्त्वावच्छिन्ननिरूपितसंयोगसम्बन्धेन द्रव्यवत्ताज्ञानोत्तरं वा स्वरूपतो मनस्त्वविशिष्टज्ञानसम्भवात्तत्र शक्तिः शक्यग्रहेति भावः। 'कृष्णकान्ती pp. 416–17.

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(*yat-kiñcid-dharma*) and thereupon as what is qualified by the state of a genus, that has come out to be the determinant of the state of what is caused by a specific sacrifice, does not gain ground.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the verbal inflection of the optative mood may be held to be denotative of the state of being an instrument of heaven qualified by the characteristic attributes and the said verbal inflection may bear out the verbal comprehension of the state of being an instrument of heaven qualified by the characteristic attributes, *per se.*

Alternatively, it may be said that being an instrument of heaven means being the counter-positive of the negation that occasions the negation of heaven. For it is only the negation of the cause that occasions the negation of the effect. The negation of a stick (*daṇḍābhāva*) occasions the negation of a jar (*ghaṭābhāvā-prayojaka*). Thus a stick is the counter-positive of the negation occassioning the negation of a jar. As such, the stick is the instrument of a jar. Similarly, the negation of a sacrifice occasions the negation of heaven and thereby a sacrifice happens to be an instrument of heaven. By the negation of heaven again, is meant the negation of heaven qualified by the characteristic attribute and by the negation of a sacrifice that of a sacrifice qualified by the state of being *aśvamedha* and the like.[1]

Opponents argue : Following the view that the state of being an instrument is a category by itself, a verbal inflection of the optative mood may be held to be denotative of the state of an instrument only, to be related to heaven presented by

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1. तदा तत्तद्वैजात्यावच्छिन्नस्यैव स्वर्गस्य निरूक्तसाधनत्वं विधेः शक्यं शक्यग्रहमिति तदेव यागादौ लिङाद्यैरनुभाव्यताम्, अनुभाव्यतां वा स्वर्गप्रतियोगिकाभावप्रयोजकाभावप्रतियोगित्वलक्षणमेव स्वर्गसाधनत्वम्, तच्च वैजात्यावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकस्यैव स्वर्गाभावस्य प्रयोजकीभूतो योऽश्वमेधत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नाभावस्तत्प्रतियोगित्वेन यागादेः सुघटमेव, कारणाभावस्यैव कार्याभावप्रयोजकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 416-417.

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the word, *svarga* constituting the compound, *svarga-kāma* due to semantic peculiarity.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : A verbal inflection of the optative mood cannot be held to be denotative of merely the state of being an instrument following the view that the state of being an instrument is a category by itself. For in that case, *jalaṁ na tāḍayet* and the like other prohibitory injunctions would come out to be without any authority.

The idea is this : In *jalaṁ na tāḍayet*, the state of an instrument is liable to comprehension. For the absolute negation of the said state is not there, because the beating of waters may fairly be an instrument of pain. As such, the verbal inflection, involved has to be understood to be denotative of the state of being an instrument of what is desired for (i.e. pleasure or welfare).[2]

The view of Jagadīśa may be summed up like this : A verbal inflection of the optative mood denotes being liable to accomplishment by agency, being other than what causes evil of greater dimension (i.e. hell) and being an instrument of the desired for (i.e. welfare) in the capacity of a mood. It also denotes agency (*kṛti*) in the capacity of a tense.

In verbal knowledge from a sentence of injunction constituted of such a verbal inflection, all the three are embraced either simultaneously (*khalekapota-nyāyena*) or severally (*pratyekaṁ*), as features against the meaning of the root-verb involved posited as a feature against agency (the meaning of the said verbal inflection in the capacity of a tense) through the relation of *anukūlatva*. The whole thing, thereupon, gets related to the invariable substantive through the relation of

1. ननु साधनतायाः पदार्थान्तरत्वमते केवलसाधनत्वे विधिकल्पनेऽपि व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण स्वर्गादिपदोपस्थापितस्यैव स्वर्गादेः साधनत्वेऽन्वयादेव विशिष्टलाभो भविष्यति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 417.
2. साधनतायाः पदार्थान्तरत्वमतेऽपि तन्मात्रस्य न लिङर्थत्वम्, 'जलं न ताडये'-दित्यादौ तस्य निषेधविधेरप्रामाण्यापत्तेः परन्तु स्वर्गादिनिरूपितस्येति सम्प्रदायविदः । श. श. प्र. p. 417.

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inherence (*kṛtisādhyatva-viśiṣṭa-balavadanubandhītva-viśiṣṭa-iṣṭa-sādhana-yāgānukūla-kṛtimān*).

The author of the *Ratnakoṣa* argues : A verbal inflection of the optative mood is denotative of the state of agency alone being an instrument of what is desired for (or welfare). The expression, *paceta* bears out the verbal knowledge of the state of the agency of the act of cooking, being an instrument of what is desired for. For the desire, at the root of one's being induced to the act of cooking embraces the agency of the act of cooking, as the subject i.e. the desire takes the from 'may the agency of the act of cooking be undertaken by me' (*pāka-kṛtirme bhavatu*) and such desire has been caused by the knowledge (borne out by the sentence of injunction constituted of the verbal inflection of the optative mood), embracing the state of being an instrument of what is desired for, posited as a feature against the agency of the act of cooking (*pāka-kṛtirme iṣṭa-sādhanam*). Conversely, the knowledge embracing the state of being an instrument or that of being liable to accomplishment by agency, posited as a feature against the act of cooking, the meaning of the root-verb involved, (*pākaḥ iṣṭa-sādhanaṁ* or *pākaḥ kṛti-sādhyaḥ*) not being ever the cause of the said kind of a desire, neither of the state of the act involved being an instrument nor the state of the act involved being liable to accomplishment, are ever denoted by a verbal inflection of the optative mood.[1]

Opponents argue : Desire embracing the state of being liable to accomplishment by agency posited as a feature against the act of cooking (*pākaḥ matkṛtisādhyo bhavatu*) may well induce one to the act of cooking and such desire may be rooted in the knowledge of being liable to accompiishment, posited as a feature against the act of cooking. As such, the state of an

1. रत्नकोषकृतस्तु—पाकादिकृतित्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यताकेच्छाया एव पाकादिचिकीर्षात्वात् सैव पाकादौ प्रवर्त्तिकेति, तस्याञ्च पाकादिकृतित्वावच्छिन्नधर्मिकेष्टसाधनताज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वात् कृतिगतमेवेष्टसाधनत्वं लिङर्थः, तादृशचिकीर्षाया क्रियाधर्मिकायाः कृतिसाध्यत्वस्येष्टसाधनत्वस्य वा धियः कारणत्वाभावेन क्रियागतयोस्तयोरविध्यर्थत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 417.

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act being liable to accomplishment by agency should be regarded as a meaning of a verbal inflection of the optative mood.[1]

Ratnakoṣakāra replies : Although, the said kind of a desire induces one to the act of cooking, there is no evidence to the effect that such a desire is rooted in the said kind of a knowledge. Conversely, such a desire is rooted in the knowledge of the state of being an instrument, posited as a feature against the act of cooking, (that is) liable to being accomplished by my agency (*mat-kṛti-sādhya-pākaḥ iṣṭa-sādhanam*).[2] For towards the said kind of a desire in respect of what is desired for, the knowledge of the state of being an Instrument of what is desired for, posited as a feature against what is qualified thereby (the state of being liable to accomplishment by one's agency, *kṛti-sādhyatva*), is admittedly the cause. In other words, the desire, 'may the act of cooking be accomplished by my agency' is occasioned by the knowledge, 'the act of cooking liable to being accomplished by my agency, is an instrument of what is desired for.[3]

Opponents argue : Although the knowledge of being liable to accomplishment by agency, posited as a feature against the act of cooking or the like is not admittedly the cause of the desire for the said act being accomplished by oneself, occasion demands that the knowledge of being liable to accomplishment by agency posited as a feature against the act involved be regarded the cause of desire for the act qualified by

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1. ननु पाकधर्मिककृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारकेच्छाया अपि प्रवर्त्तकतया तस्याञ्च पाकधर्मिककृतिसाध्यताज्ञानत्वेन हेतुतया क्रियानिष्ठकृतिसाध्यत्वस्यापि निरूक्तविधिलक्षणाक्रान्ततया विध्यर्थत्वमावश्यकमेवेति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 417.
2. 'पाको मत्कृत्या साध्यताम्' इतीच्छायाः प्रवर्त्तकत्वेऽपि न तस्यां पाकधर्मिककृतिसाध्यताज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वं मानाभावात्, किन्तु मत्कृतिसाध्यपाकत्वावच्छिन्नधर्मिकेष्टसाधनताज्ञानत्वेनैव। श. श. प्र. p. 417–18.
3. इष्टस्य तादृप्येण इच्छां प्रति तदवच्छिन्नधर्मिकेष्टसाधनत्वधियः कारणत्वस्य क्लृप्तत्वात्। ibid., p. 415.

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the state of being liable to accomplishment by (one's) agency.[1]

Ratnakoṣa-kāra replies : In that case, towards the desire for the act of cooking qualified by the state of abiding one's house (*madgṛhe pāko bhavatu*), the knowledge of the state of abiding one's house posited as a feature against the act of cooking (*pāko mad-gṛha-vṛttikaḥ*) has to be regarded as the cause. This way, innumeral cause-effect relations have to contemplated of and a complex situation will crop up.[2]

Hence *svargakāmo yajeta* gives the verbal knowledge of one aspiring after heaven as of having the agency of the act of sacrifice that has been (known as) an instrument of heaven.[3]

Opponents argue : In case, being an instrument of what is desired for', the meaning of a verbal inflection of the optative mood, is syntactically related to agency, the meaning of the said inflection, (presented in the capacity of a tense), the principle that the meaning of a suffix is related to the meaning of the base thereof, is dispensed with.

Ratnakoṣakāra replies : This is nothing new. For in *svarga-kamo yajeta*, the number, denoted by the verbal inflection (viz., oneness, *ekatva*) is syntactically related to the meaning of the word, *svarga-kāma*, comprehended as the substantive of agency. If otherwise, the verbal knowledge from the said sentence would come out to be of a sacrifice being liable to accomplishment by the agency of one aspiring after heaven, threatening the principle of the meaning of what ends in the first declensional suffix being embraced as the invariable

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1. ननु तादृशकारणत्वस्याक्लृप्तत्वेऽपि फलबलात्तद्धर्मविशिष्टपाकत्वप्रकारकेच्छायां तद्धर्मप्रकारकज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वमावश्यकम्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 418.
2. अन्यथा स्वगृहवृत्तित्वादिविशिष्टपाकत्वप्रकारकेच्छां प्रति पाकधर्मिकस्वगृहवृत्तित्वाद्यनन्तधर्मप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेनाप्यनन्तहेतुतापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 418.
3. एवञ्च 'स्वर्गकामो यजेते'त्यादाविष्टसाधनीभूतयागकृतिमान् स्वर्गकाम इत्याकार एव बोध इति। ibid., p. 418.

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substantive in verbal knowledge. Simultaneously, *svarga-kāmau yajeta* would be validly used in language.[1] And in case, the meaning of the word, (*svarga-kāmaḥ*), ending in the first declensional suffix, is not comprehended as the substantive of agency, the meaning of the verbal inflection involved (i.e. as the invariable substantive), the number, denoted by the said verbal inflection shall not posit itself as a feature thereagainst, as a rule. For a verbal inflection of the optative mood denotes the number only in respect of what is comprehended as the substantive of agency borne out by a verbal inflection of the optative mood.[2]

The state of being other than the cause of evil of larger dimension, another meaning of a verbal inflection of the optative mood is comprehended as a feature equally against agency, the meaning of the said verbal inflection (in the capacity of a tense) and the meaning of the root-verb involved.[3]

Opponents argue : In that case, the rule that a meaning of a suffix is not syntactically related to what is related to another meaning of the same suffix is forgone.[4]

Ratnakoṣakāra replies : Such a rule is not of universal application. For in *jānāti*, presentness, a meaning of the verbal

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1. भावनाविशेष्य एव स्वर्गकामादौ लिङ्‌दिना स्वार्थः संख्याऽनुभाव्यते, अन्यथा 'यागः स्वर्गकामस्य कृतिसाध्यः' इत्यन्वये प्रथमायाः प्रकृत्यर्थ-मुख्यविशेष्यकान्वयबोधकत्वभङ्गप्रसङ्गः,'स्वर्गकामौ यजेते'त्यपि प्रयोगापत्तिश्च । ibid., p. 418.

   स्वर्गकामद्वयकृतिसाध्ययागस्यैकत्वादिति भावः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 418.

2. स्वार्थभावनाविशेष्य एव लिङः संख्याभिधायित्वेन स्वर्गकामस्यातथात्वे तत्र तिङर्थसंख्याया उदासीनत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 418.

3. बलवदनिष्टाजनकत्वन्तु लिङर्थः स्वार्थकृताविव धात्वर्थेऽपि विशेषणत्वेनाऽन्वेतु-मर्हति । ibid., p. 418.

4. ननु प्रत्ययानामेकस्वार्थान्वययिपदार्थान्तरे स्वार्थान्तराबोधकत्वनियमो भज्येत । कृष्णकान्ती p. 418.

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inflection, *ti* is related to knowledge, related to *āśrayatva*; (so also being a content (*viṣayatva*) is related to knowledge related to presentness in *ghaṭo jñāyate* giving the verbal knowledge of a jar as what is the content of present knowledge).[1]

Opponents ask : There is no point, then in combating the view of Jagadīśa. For Jagadīśa or the logicians at large are of the view that the meanings of a verbal inflection of the optative mood are syntactically related to the meaning of the root-verb, involved.

Ratnakoṣakāra might reply : In the view of Jagadīśa or the logicians at large, all the meanings of such a verbal inflection are held liable to syntactical relation with the meaning of the root-verb, involved. Not only that. Being liable to accomplishment by agency too has been held liable to denotation by such a verbal inflection. Conversely, in my view, such a verbal inflection in the capacity of a mood, has two-fold meaning only viz, being an instrument of the desired for and being other than the cause of evil of larger dimension. The other meaning viz, being liable to accomplishment by agency is not denoted at all by the said kind of a verbal inflection. In the capacity of a tense, it only means agency. Of the two meanings of the said kind of a verbal inflection in the capacity of a mood, again, only (the state of) being other than the cause of evil of larger dimension is related to the meaning of the root-verb, involved.

Ratnakoṣa-kāra, therefore, partiably accepts the position held by Jagadīśa or the logicians at large.

Ratnakoṣakāra concludes : This way in *paṅguḥ samudraṁ na taret*, the verbal knowledge embraces a paralysed person not having the agency of the act of swimming over the ocean,

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1. प्रत्ययानामेकस्वार्थान्वयिपदार्थान्तरार्थान्वयित्वेन स्वार्थान्तरावोधकत्व-नियमस्य 'जानाती'त्यादावेव व्यभिचारात्। श. श. प्र. p. 418.

आश्रयत्वरूपकस्वार्थान्वयिनि ज्ञाने वर्त्तमानत्वरूपस्वार्थान्तरबोधनादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 418.

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(taken to be) an instrument of what is desired for; in *tṛpti-kāmo jalaṁ na tāḍayet*, a person aspiring after pleasure as the substratum of agency of the act of beating of waters, devoid of the state of being an instrument of what is desired for; in *paradārānna gacchedāstikaḥ*, a pious person, as the substratum of the agency of the act of going at the wife of another, devoid of the state of being other than the cause of evil of larger dimension.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : This is not reasonable. For in *paṅguḥ samudraṁ na taret*, the state of being liable to accomplishment by (one's) agency goes uncomprehended while to arrest one's inclination to what is incapable of being accomplished by one's agency, the knowledge or comprehension of the state of being liable to accomplishment by one's agency is to be regarded as the cause of one's inclination. As such, the state of being liable to accomplishment by (one's) agency should reasonably be regarded as the meaning of a verbal inflection of the optative mood.[2]

Opponents argue : What is understood by the state of being other than the cause of evil of larger dimension ?

Jagadīśa replies : It obviously does not mean being other than what causes intense pain. For it is contradicted in a sacrifice that involves a lot of labour. Nor does it mean being other than what causes pain embraced in aversion (or malice) of greater or larger dimension. For to those who are averse to pain as such, do not discriminate between pain embraced in aversion of larger or smaller dimension.[3]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 418–19.

2. आहुरित्यस्वरससूचनाय, स च 'पङ्गुः समुद्रं न तरेदि'त्यादौ कृतिसाध्यत्वाभावबोधस्यापलाप्रसङ्गः, कृत्यसाध्ये प्रवृत्तिवारणाय कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्ति प्रति हेतुताया आवश्यकत्वेन तस्यापि विध्यर्थकल्पनस्यौचित्याच्चेति । कृष्णकान्ती p. 419.

3. श. श. प्र. p. 419.

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Not only that. Had being other than what causes evil of larger dimension meant being other than what causes pain embraced in intense aversion, it has to be admitted that prior to desire resulting in one's inclination for what is other than what causes pain embraced in intense aversion, a verbal knowledge of the state of being other than what causes pain embraced in intense aversian, has occurred. But there is no evidence of any such verbal knowledge having occurred and what does not form a content of the inducing verbal knowledge (*pravartaka-jñāna*) is not the meaning of a verbal inflection of the optative mood.[1]

Opponents argue : If the state of being other than what causes pain embraced in intense aversion is not held to have formed a content of the inducing verbal knowledge, then in-inclination to things of intense aversion too, has ito be admitted of.

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection.

Opponents ask : It cannot be so. For it militates against experience.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Inclination to things of intense aversion is arrested in view of either the knowledge of such things being the cause of pain or an intense aversion of such things is there as an obstacle thereto. For the negation of obstacles being the general cause of effects in general, inclination, an effect cannot take shape in the face of an obstacle thereto.[3]

As a matter of fact, being other than what causes an evil of larger dimension means, being other than what causes hell or sin. For in *na kalañjaṁ bhakṣayet* and the like, the negative particle, *nañ* bears out the verbal knowledge of the eating of

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1. तज्ज्ञानस्याप्रवर्त्तकतया तस्य विधित्वायोगात्। ibid., p. 419.
2. ननु तज्ज्ञानस्याप्रवर्त्तकत्वे बलवद्द्वेषविषयेऽपि प्रवृत्तिः स्यादिष्टापत्तावनुभव-विरोधात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 419.
3. यत्र च बलवान् द्वेषस्तज्जनकताज्ञानत्वेन बलवद्द्वेषविषयत्वेन वा प्रवृत्ति-सामान्यं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 419.

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kalañja only as what is other than what is other than what causes sin, (*pāpājanakatvā'bhāva-vat-kalañja-karmaka-bhakṣaṇānukūla-kṛtimān*).[1]

Opponents argue : *Jvarārto nānnamaśniyāt* and the like other statements should be regarded as meaningless expressions. For the eating of rice, obviously, is not a cause of hell.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : In these kinds of mundane statements, a verbal inflection of the optative mood implies the state of being other than what causes an adverse kind of pain due to fever and the like.[3] The said statement, therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of the eating of rice as what is other than what is other than what causes an adverse kind of pain due to fever and the like.[4]

Similarly in *aṣṭama-candre na gacchet*, the root-verb, *gam* implies 'demerit at the root of movement'. The sentence cited therefore, gives the verbal knowledge of the demerit at the root of the movement at a time when the moon is in the eighth position, is not other than what is other than what causes the respective evil.[5]

Opponents argue : There is hardly any occasion to imagine of implication in the root-verb, *gam*.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the statement cited loses all sense. For such movement is neither the cause of sin nor the

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1. परन्तु नरकाजनकत्वं पापाजनकत्वं वा, तद्विरहस्यैव कलञ्जभक्षणादौ नञा बोधनात्। ibid., p. 419.
   तद्विरस्यैवेत्येवकारेण बलवदनिष्टाजनकत्वत्वावच्छिन्नाभावव्यवच्छेदः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 419.
2. ननु ज्वरार्तो नान्नमश्नीयादित्यादेरप्रामाण्यापत्तिः, नरकाजनकत्वादेस्तत्र सत्त्वात्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 419.
3. 'ज्वरार्त्तो नान्नमश्नीयात्' इत्यादिलौकिकविधौ तु ज्वरादिप्रयोज्यतत्तद्विजातीयदुःखाजनकत्वे लिङो लक्षणा। श. श. प्र. p. 419.
4. तथा च ज्वरप्रयुक्तविजातीयदुःखाजनकत्वाभाववदन्नभोजनमिति तत्र बोध इति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 419.
5. श. श. प्र. 419-20.

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indirect cause of any subsequent pain through any such sin.[1] The injunctions like *sa pāpastulām nārohet* and the like provided for in respect of investigation of crimes (*parīkṣā-vidhi*) too are thus easily explained.[2]

Here also the root-verb implies the demerit at the root of a criminal getting on to a weighing machine[3] to give the verbal knowledge of the demerit at the root of a criminal getting on to the weighing machine as what is other than what is an instrument of the desired for.

Others argue : A verbal inflection of the optative mood denotes what is qualified by the state of being effected (*sādhyatva-viśiṣṭa*).[4]

Jagadīśa replies : What is meant by being qualified by the state of being effected ?

Others say : As being an instrument means being possessed of the determinant of the state of being invariably at the immediately preceding moment, so being qualified by the state of being effected means being possessed of the determinant of the state of being invariably at the immediate subsequent moment.

Jagdīśa replies : The state of being effected is not a uniform concept. As such, a verbal inflection of the optative mood cannot be held to be denotative of what is qualified thereby.[5]

Others argue : As the word, *eva* is admitted to have different powers of denotation to denote *anya* and *yoga* in view of a similar difficulty, a verbal inflection of the optative mood severally denotes the constituents of the said concept. The

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1. ibid., p. 420.
2. एतेन 'स पापस्तुलां नारोहेदित्यादिपरीक्षाविधयोऽपि व्याख्याताः। ibid., p. 420.
3. तत्रापि धातोरोहणहेत्वदृष्टलक्षकत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 420.
4. परे तु साध्यत्वविशिष्टमेव विध्यर्थः। ibid., p. 420.
5. ननु साध्यत्वं नियतोत्तरवर्त्तितावच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वं, तच्च नानुगतमिति कथं तद्विशिष्टे विधिशक्तिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 420.

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said constituents develop into an integral whole arising out of syntax.[1] As such, *svargakāmo yajeta* gives the verbal comprehension like this : The person aspiring after heaven has undertaken the agency of the act of sacrifice and he is possessed of the desired for object, that has been effected by a sacrifice. The rule, therefore, that the meaning of the word that ends in the first declension suffix should be comprehended as the invariable substantive is maintained in conformity with the view of the logicians who also hold the same view. For in so far as the portion 'possessed of agency of the act of a sacrifice' is concerned, there is complete parity between the views of the two schools. There is however, a difference. In the view of the logicians, sacrifice is qualified by the threefold meaning of the verbal inflection of the optative mood viz, being liable to accomplishment by one's agency, being other than what cause evil of larger dimension and being an instrument of the desiredfor object (welfare) while in this view, sacrifice is related to what is effected (i.e. the desired-for object inherent in the sacrifices), the meaning of the said inflection. But there is one advantage in holding this view; the popular saying viz, the fruit provided for by the *śāstras* (accrues) on one who performs (the act provided for by an injunction)[2].

Not only that, In case a verbal inflection of the optative mood, bears out the verbal comprehension of being an instrument of heaven posited as a feature against sacrifice, denoted by a root-verb, the provision that the meaning of the word

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1. तत्राप्येवकारस्थल इव नियतोत्तरवर्त्तितावच्छेदकधर्मवत्तालक्षणसाध्यताघटक-प्रत्येकवस्तुन्येव लिङादेः शक्तिः, विशिष्टन्तु वाक्यार्थमर्यादया लक्ष्यम्, अतएव सामान्यतो नियतोत्तरवर्त्तित्वस्य दुर्वचत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः। श. श. प्र. p. 420.
2. एवञ्च 'स्वर्गकामो यागानुकूलकृतिमान् यागसाध्येष्टवांश्च' इत्याकारक एव 'स्वर्गकामो यजेते'त्यादौ बोधः, तेन भावनायाः प्रथमान्तार्थान्वयित्व-नियमः सम्पद्यते; सम्पद्यते च 'शाश्वदेशितं फलमनुष्ठातरी'त्यादिकः प्रवादः। श. श. प्र. p. 420.

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ending in the first declensional suffix and the popular saying that the fruit provided for by the *śāstras* accrues on one, performing an act, provided for by an injunction is violated. For the agent neither governs the said syntactical relation nor does it get syntactically related to agency (*bhāvanā*), denoted by a verbal inflection of the optative mood in the capacity of a mood. For in this view, it is the agency, presented by the said verbal inflection in the capacity of a tense, as qualified by the meaning of the root-verb, involved, that gets related thereto (the agent).[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The popular saying that the fruit, provided for by *śāstra*, accrues on the performer of the act, provided for by an injunction is not of much relevance. For otherwise, an injunction like *pitṛ-svargakāmo gayāyāṁ piṇḍaṁ dadyāt* should bear out no verbal knowledge. Because here the fruit, provided for viz., heaven accrues on the ancestors and not on the son, the performer of the act, provided for by the said injunction (viz., *gayā-śrāddha*).

Opponents argue : In such a case where the fruit involved does not accrue on the performer of the act, provided for, by an injunction, directly, an indirect relation has to be contemplated of. Here, heaven accrues on the performer of the act concerned through the relation of *svāśraya-pitṛkatva*, (*sva* meaning heaven, the locus (*āśraya*) of which are the ancestors, *tat-pitṛkatva* is in the son, the performer). For only in cases where the fruit evidently does not go to accrue on one, other than the performer of the act involved, the fruit, provided for is syntactically related to the performer through a direct relation.[2]

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1. यागादौ स्वर्गादिसाधनत्वस्य विधिबोध्यत्वे तु तदुभयमेव व्याकुलीभवेत्, फलं प्रति कर्त्तुरौदासीन्याद्भावनाविरहाच्च, धात्वर्थावच्छिन्नतिङर्थस्यैव तथात्वादिति। श. श. प्र. p. 420.
2. न चैवं 'पितृस्वर्गकामो गयायां पिण्डं दद्यादि'त्यादिविधेर्बाधः, तत्र स्वाश्रय-पितृकत्वादिपरम्परासम्बन्धेनैव पिण्डदानजन्येष्टस्य कर्त्तर्यन्वयात्, इतरगतत्वे

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Opponents argue : A verbal inflection of the optative mood, in that case, should mean only what is effected and what is qualified by the state of being effected. In other words, it should mean only effect as effect and not the effect as what is desired for. For the desired-for object viz, heaven is presented by the word, *svarga* forming the compound, *svargakāma.*

Others reply : No. It cannot be. For in an injunction like *viśvajitā yajeta,* the desired-for object is not presented in the said manner.

Opponents argue : Even then, heaven is liable to comprehension as the desired-for object through presumtion.

Others reply : But in *tṛpti-kāmo-jalaṁ na tāḍayet,* difficulties would arise. For primarily, such an injunction cannot bear out the verbal comprehension of the absolute negation of effects as such to be brought about by the beating of waters by one, aspiring after pleasure in the face of pain, an effect, being there. Hence it is in view of heaven being verbally comprehended as what is desired for or as what is qualified by the state of heaven, it is more reasonable, that a verbal inflection of the optative mood should denote an effect as what is desired for, as held by the elders or as what is qualified by the state of heaven, as held by the Neos.

If otherwise, verbal inflection of the optative mood, has to be admitted to mean the desired-for object only. For the meaning of the root-verb, (the instrument) may well be syntactically related thereto through the relation of *sva-sādhyatva* (*sva* meaning what the root-verb, involved means).

Hence it is concluded that a verbal inflection of the optative mood being held to denote an effect (in particular) as what is desired for, the apprehension that such a verbal inflection is denotative of what is desired for as what is knowable and the like loses ground. For there is no evidence thereto.[1]

प्रमाणासत्त्वस्थले एव साक्षात्सम्बन्धेन कर्त्तरि तदन्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात् । ibid., p. 421,

1. श. श. प्र. p. 421.

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Prabhākara argues : From a sentence like *svarga-kāma yajeta*, the knowledge of a sacrifice as what is liable to accomplishment by the agency of a person (the sacrificer), aspiring after heaven does not initially occur. For what should occasion the knowledge of being liable to accomplishment by the agency of a person, aspiring after heaven is the knowledge of being an instrument of heaven or rather being an instrument of heaven and this is yet to be apprehended in (respect of) a sacrifice.[1]

Opponents argue : Why should being an instrument of heaven, go to occasion the knowledge of being liable to accomplishment by the agency of a person, aspiring after heaven ?

Prabhākara replies : What occasions a verbal knowledge is the compalibility of word-meanings. By compatibility again, is meant being the counter-positive of a negation resulting in the negation of a certain syntactical relation. For an example, being other than what is with a hole is the counterpositive of the negation of being other than what is with a hole (*chidre-taratvābhāva*) that results in the syntactical relation of (a jar) being an instrument and the act of fetching water in *ghaṭena jalamāhara*. Hence 'being other than what is with a hole' is the compatibility involved in the syntactical relation of (a jar) being an instrument and the act of fetching water in the said instance. In the present instance, in the like manner, being an instrument of what is desired for (viz. heaven) is the counter-positive of the negation, responsible for the negation of the syntactical relation of a sacrifice and being liable to accomplishment by the agency of a person aspiring thereafter, and that is the compatibility that should call for the syntactical relation of a sacrifice with being liable to accomplishment by

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1. प्राभाकरास्तु—स्वर्गकामो यजेते'त्यादौ यागः स्वर्गकामस्य कृतिसाध्यतावा-निश्याकारकः प्रथमं न बोधः, तत्कामकार्यत्वस्यान्वये प्रयोजकस्य तत्साधन-तया ज्ञातत्वस्य तत्साधनत्वस्य वा पूर्वं यागेऽगृहीतत्वात्। श. श. प्र. pp. 421-22.

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the agency of a person, aspiring after heaven (what is desired for).[1]

In other words, *svargakāmo yajeta* can bear out the verbal knowledge of a sacrifice as what is liable to accomplishment by the agency of one, aspiring after heaven only in case, a sacrifice is known, for certain, as what is an instrument of heaven.

The knowledge of being liable to accomplishment by the agency of a person, aspiring after heaven, posited as a feature against a sacrifice is the knowledge that is responsible for one's inclination to a sacrifice. Such a knowledge occurs to one, subsquent to one's knowing, for certain. that a sacrifice is an instrument of heaven, the desired-for object. The knowledge of being an instrument of the desired-for object (viz. heaven), posited as a feature against a sacrifice, therefore, is held to be what occasions the knowledge of the state of being liable to accomplishment, posited as a feature against a sacrifice.

But the difficulty is that a sacrifice is not a direct instrument of heaven and thus the knowledge of a sacrifice as what is an instrument of heaven is not possible. Nor is a sacrifice known to have the intermediary remaining in force till the rise of heaven. For such an intermediary, not being presented by any word. constituting the injunction cited, cannot come up to be embraced in the verbal knowledge, occurring therefrom.[2]

Opponents argue : The knowledge of being an instrument of the desired-for object is not what occasions the

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1. एतन्मते अन्वयप्रयोजकरूपत्वं योग्यत्वम्, तदन्वयप्रयोककत्वञ्च तदभावप्रयोजकाभावप्रतियोगित्वम्, 'घटेन जलमाहरे'त्यादौ जलाहरणसाधनत्वान्वयप्रयोजकं छिद्रेतरत्वमिव स्वर्गकामकृतिसाध्यत्वाभावप्रयोजको य इष्टसाधनत्वाभावः तत्प्रतियोगीष्टसाधनत्वं तत्र योग्यत्वमिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 422.
2. साक्षात् स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य तत्रासत्त्वात् स्वर्गपर्यन्तस्थायिस्वव्यापारवत्त्वस्य ताहशव्यापारानुपस्थित्या ग्रहासम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 422.

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knowledge of being liable to accomplishment by (one's) agency.[1]

Prabhākara replies: In that case, *svarga-kāmaḥ paceta* should cease to be unauthoritative and should have the force of an injunction instead. For the act of cooking is liable to accomplishment by one's agency. Conversely, if the knowledge of being an instrument of the desired-for object is admitted to be what occasions the knowledge of being liable to accomplishment by (one's) agency, there is no such contingency. For the act of cooking, not being known to be an instrument of the desired–for object of one, aspiring after heaven (viz., heaven), cannot be comprehended as what is liable to being accomplished by his agency. Otherwise *svarga-kāmaḥ pacet*, remains to be authoritative.[2]

Opponents argue: No. There is no such contingency. For being an instrument of the desired–for object is a meaning of the verbal inflection of the optative mood (viz., *ta*) itself.[3]

Prabhākara replies: No. In that case, the injunctions that provide for the obligatory duties (*nitya-karma-vidhi*) would cease to be authoritative. For such duties are not instruments of anything, desired for.[4]

Opponents argue: The injunction, *svārga-kāmo yajeta* should bear out the verbal knowledge of a sacrifice, the determinant of a person, aspiring after heaven, being enjoined, as what is liable to accomplishment by his agency.

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1. ननूक्तयोग्यत्वज्ञानं न हेतुः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 422.
2. 'स्वर्गकामः पचेते'त्यादावप्रामाण्यानुरोधेन उक्तरीत्या योग्यताधियः कारणत्वस्यावश्यकत्वात्। श.श. प्र. p. 422.
3. ननु इष्टसाधनत्वस्य विध्यर्थत्वादेव तदप्रामाण्योपपत्तिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 422.
4. नित्यस्य कर्मणः फलाभावेन 'प्रत्यहं शुचिः सन्ध्यामुपासीते'त्यादिविधेरप्रामाण्यभिया इष्टसाधनत्वस्य विध्यर्थत्वांभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 422.

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Prabhākara asks : How should 'being the determinant of (a person) being enjoined be comprehended ? For there is no word in the injunction, to present any such meaning.

Opponents argue : In that case, it may be held that the said injunction gives the verbal knowledge of a sacrifice of a person, aspiring after heaven through the relation of *niyojyatākatva* arising out of syntax, as what is liable to accomplishment by his agency.

Prabhākara replies : This is not possible. For the state of being the determinant of (a person) being enjoined has not been spelt out as yet. Does it mean being liable to accomplishment by his agency ? If so then expectancy lacking, there would arise no verbal knowledge from the injunction cited. For the subject and the determinant of the predicate would be identical in that case. What ls liable to accomplishment by the agency of one, aspiring after heaven (viz, a sacrifice) cannot be further embraced as the substantive of being liable to accomplishment by agency as derived from the verbal inflection of the optative mood in the verbal knowledge, occurring therefrom.[1]

Nor could the state of being the determinant of being enjoined mean being embraced as the substantive in the knowledge of being liable to accomplishment by his agency. For in that case, a sentence like *svargakāmo paceta* would assume the force of an injunction.[2]

As a matter of fact, the state of being the determinant of being enjoined means being embraced as the substantive in the know-

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1. अतएव (स्वर्गकामनियोज्यताको नियोज्यताकत्वसम्बन्धेन स्वर्गकामीयो वा यागः कार्यतावान् इत्यपि नादिमो बोधः, स्वर्गकामस्य नियोज्यत्वं हि न तत्कृतिसाध्यत्वम्, स्वर्गकामकार्य्यताविशिष्टे यागे लिङर्थकार्य्यत्वस्यान्वये निराकांक्षत्वापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 422.

उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेययोरैक्यादिति भावः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 422.

2. नापि तदीयकृतिसाध्यत्वधीविशेष्यत्वम् 'स्वर्गकाम पचेते'त्यादेः प्रमाणतापत्तेः। श. श. प्र. p. 422.

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ledge of being liable to accomplishment by his agency, having its root in the knowledge of being an instrument of heaven, occurring to him.[1] What should occasion the knowledge of being liable to aecomplishment by one's agency in respect of a sacrifice, is the state of a sacrifice being an instrument of heaven. But a sacrifice is not a direct instrument of heaven. Nor is it an indirect instrument thereof. For the intermediary that lasts till the rise of heaven and through which it is conceived of as an indirect instrument thereof is not presented by any word, constituting the injunction, cited and as such not liable to being embraced in the verbal knowledge, occurring thereform, at the very outset.[2]

Hence a verbal inflection of the optative mood is denotative of what is liable to being effected by one's act (*kārya*). As such, a sacrifice, the meaning of the root-verb, *yaji* (in *svarga-kāmo-yajeta*) and the state of being the determinant of being enjoined in respect of a person, aspiring after heaven are simultaneously posited as features thereagainst (i.e. the *kārya*) to give the verbal knowledge in the first instance like this : the effect of a sacrifice, is the determinant of a person, aspiring after heaven being enjoined (i.e., the effect of a sacrifice is embraced, as the substantive of the verbal knowledge of the state of being liable to accomplishment by one's agency, posited as a feature, caused by the knowledge of the state of being an instrument of heaven the desired for object, posited as a feature against a sacrifice, occuring to a person aspiring after heaven; *niyojya-tva* or the state of being enjoined meaning—*svarga-kāma-niṣṭha-*

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1. परन्तु स्वर्गकामनिष्ठस्य स्वर्गसाधनताधीजन्यकार्य्यताज्ञानस्य विशेष्यत्वम् । ibid., p. 422.

   स्वर्गकामनिष्ठा या स्वर्गसाधनत्वधीस्तजन्यं यत्कार्य्यताज्ञानं तद् विशेष्यत्वमित्यर्थः । कृष्णकान्ती pp. 422–23.

2. तदन्वयप्रयोजकञ्च स्वर्गसाधनत्वं साक्षादसाधनस्य यागादेः स्वर्गपर्य्यन्त-स्थायिव्यापारानुपस्थित्या परम्परासम्बन्धेन साधनत्वाग्रहेण प्रथमं दुर्ग्रह-मेवेति । श. श. प्र. p. 423.

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yāga - dharmika-svargeṣṭa - sādhanatā-prakāraka-jñāna-janya - kṛti-sādhyatā-prakāraka-(śabda)-jñāna-viśeṣyatva), or that the effect of a sacrifice is what is liable to being accomplished by one, aspiring after heaven.[1]

Opponents argue : Such kind of a verbal knowledge cannot occur. For the knowledge of the state of being a direct instrument of heaven, the knowledge that should occasion the knowledge of the state of being the determinant of a person, aspiring after heaven being enjoined, has not occurred prior to such knowledge.

Prabhākara replies : Prior to the said kind of a verbal knowledge from an injunction like *svarga-kāmo yajeta*, the state of being a direct instrument of heaven or what should occasion such a verbal knowledge, is apprehended in respect of one's contact with-*Śaci*, the wife of *Indra*, an effect (*kārya*) (through verbal testimony).

Thereupon, backed by the (presumptive) knowledge to the effect that the effect of a sacrifice (*kārya*), the determinant of a person aspiring after heaven, being enjoined, is unreasonable but for a sacrifice being an instrument of heaven, occurring subsequently to the said kind of a verbal knowledge, the injunctian, cited (*svarga-kamo yajeta*) bears out the verbal knowledge of a sacrifice as what is the determinant of a person, aspiring after heaven, being enjoined or as what is liable to accomplishment by the agency of a person, aspiring after heaven, the knowledge embracing meanings other than what are expressed and responsible for his being inclined to (the performance of) a sacrifice.[2]

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1. तस्मात् कार्य्य एव लिङः शक्तिः, अतस्तत्रैव धात्वर्थयागस्य स्वर्गकामनियोज्यताकत्वस्य च युगपदन्वयात् यागस्य कार्यं स्वर्गकामनियोज्यताकं स्वर्गकामकृतिसाध्यं वेत्याकारक एव प्रथमं बोधः। ibid., p. 423.

1. स्वर्गकामनियोज्यताद्यन्वयप्रयोजकस्य साक्षात्स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्यैव शचीसम्पर्कादिके कार्य्ये पूर्वं गृहीतत्वात्, उत्तरकालन्तु यागकार्य्यस्य स्वर्गकामकृतिसाध्यत्वं स्वर्गकामनियोज्यताकत्वं वा यागस्य तथात्वं

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For the intermediary of itself (*kārya*) lasting till the rise of heaven has been presented as a word-meaning, prior to the verbal knowledge from the injunction (*svarga-kāmo yajeta*) and what should occasion the verbal knowledge of the state of being the determinant of a person, aspiring after heaven being enjoined viz., the state of being an instrument is so easily comprehended in respect of a sacrifice.[1] The initial verbal knowledge viz, *yāgasya kāryaṁ svarga-kāma-niyojyatākaṁ* or *kṛtisādhyaṁ* is occasioned by the knowledge (*yogyatā-jñāna*) of one's contact with *śacī*, a *kārya* resulting in heaven derived from verbal testimony (*āgama*) and the *kārya* of sacrifice being presented by the verbal inflection of the optative mood. The secondary knowledge viz, *yāgaḥ svarga-kāma-niyojyatākaḥ* or *kṛtisādhyaḥ* is occasioned by the presumtive knowledge (*yogyatā-jñāna*) to the effect that unless a sacrifice is an instrument of heaven, it cannot be liable to accomplishment by the agency of one, aspiring after heaven.

Opponents argue : In an instance like *tṛpti-kāmo·bhuñjīta*, used in ordinary language, *kārya* or the said kind of an intermediary, not being in view, the verbal inflection of the optative mood is held to denote the state of being liable to accomplishment by one's agency.

Not only that. Such a situation is also backed by the law of parsimony. For otherwise, such verbal inflection would turn out to be denotative of innumerable things severally, Hence the verbal inflection of the optative mood, used in the vedas too should denote the same and through implication

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विनाऽनुपपन्नमित्यनुपपत्तिधीसहकृताद्युक्तवाक्यात् यागः स्वर्गकामस्य कृतिसाध्य इत्याकारकः स्वर्गकामनियोज्यताको यागः कृतिसाध्य इत्याकारको वा प्रवृत्त्यौपयिक औपादानिको बोधः । श. श. प्र. p. 423.

1. स्वर्गाव्यवहितप्राक्कालवृत्तिस्वव्यापारस्य पूर्वमुपस्थित्या स्वर्गकाम-नियोज्यत्वाद्यन्वयप्रयोजकस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य यागे सुग्रहत्वात् । श. श. प्र. p. 423.

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it may mean *kārya* to bring about the verbal knowledge in view.[1]

Prabhākara replies : No. Such a veiw cannot be admitted of. For in that case. *apūrva* could not be embraced in the verbal knowledge, borne out by a verbal inflection of the optative mood, as what is liable to accomplishment by one's agency. For a word, being known to be denotative of what is determined by the state of being lible to accomplishment can bear out such knowledge.[2]

Opponents argue : This almost amounts to saying that the river-bank, the implied meaning of the word, *gaṅgā* in *gaṅgāyām ghoṣo dṛśyatāṁ* is not embraced in the verbal knowledge, borne out thereby.[3]

Prabhākara replies : This is a welcome objection.[4] For the other word, having the power of denotation (viz, the word, *ghoṣa*), bears out the verbal knowledge of what it denotes (viz, the hamlet of *ghoṣas*) as related to the river-bank, (*itarānvitasvārtha*), otherwise (i.e., through recollection) presented.[5]

Opponents argue : The river-bank, presented through recollection cannot be embraced as a feature against the hamlet of *ghoṣas*, presented by a word.[6]

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2. न च 'तृप्तिकामो भुञ्जीते'त्यादिलौकिकस्थले लघुनि कार्य्यत्वे शक्तस्य लिङादेः 'स्वर्गकामो यजेते'त्याद्यलौकिकस्थले कार्य्यत्वविशिष्टे लक्षणैवाऽस्तु तावतैव स्वर्गकामनियोज्यताकान्वययोग्यतासम्पत्तेरिति वाच्यम् । ibid., p. 423.
कार्यत्वं = कृतिसाध्यत्वम् । कृष्णकान्ती p. 423.

2. कार्य्यत्वावच्छिन्नशक्तत्वेन पदज्ञानस्य तदवच्छिन्नानुभावकत्वांत् । श. श. प्र. pp. 423-24.

3. न चैवं 'गङ्गाया घोषो दृश्यताम्'इत्यादौ लक्ष्यस्य तीरादेरन्वयधीविषयत्वं न स्यात् । ibid., p. 424.

4. इष्टत्वात् । ibid., p. 424.

5. शक्तपदान्तरस्यैव तत्रोपस्थिततीरादिसाकांक्षस्वशक्यार्थानुभावकत्वात् । Ibid., p. 424.

6. ननु तीरादेः कथं शाब्दबोधे घोषांशे विशेषणत्वम् ! कृष्णकान्ती p. 424.

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Prabhākara replies : Why not ? As in *pākaṁ karoti*, the act of cooking, presented through perception is embraced as a feature against the rest, presented as word-meanings, so the river-bank, presented through recollection may well qualify the meaning of the word, *ghoṣa*.[1] Such a view also enjoys the support of udayana too. He says that what is embraced as a feature in verbal knowledge is not always a content of a synthetic knowledge; conversely, a content of knowledge of what is qualified by what is other than that even is so embraced, in case conditions, therefor, prevail.[2]

Opponents ask : How should then the verbal knowledge in an instance like *tṛptikāmo bhuñjīta*, used in ordinary language, be explained ?[3]

Prabhākara replies : A verbal inflection of the optative mood used in an instance like that may be held to have the power to denote the state of being liable to accomplishment (*kāryatva*) by one's agency in case it is admitted that such a verbal inflection, used in ordinary language bears out the verbal knowledge of the state of being liable to accomplishment by one's agency. If otherwise, the same principle (i.e. the principle adhered to in *gaṅgāyaṁ ghoṣo dṛśyatām*) should be followed.[4] Hence keeping in view the idea that a verbal inflection of the optative mood does not have the power to denote the state of an act being liable to accomplishment by one's agency, the elders hold that such a verbal inflection, used

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1. 'पाकं करोती'त्यादिप्रत्यक्षे पाकादेरिव तत्रापि तीरादेस्तटस्थज्ञानविषयत्वेनैव विशेषणत्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 424.
2. अतएव—न तावद्विशिष्टधीविषयस्यैव विशेषणत्वम्, क्वचित्तदभिनिवेशस्तु सामग्रीवशात्-इत्याचार्यैरप्युक्तम्। श. श. प्र. p. 424.
3. ननु तृप्तिकामो भुञ्जीतेत्यादौ लौकिकलिङ्प्रत्ययस्थले का गतिः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 424.
4. लौकिकलिङ्क्रियायां कार्य्यत्वानुभावकत्वे तु तादृशलिङ्त्वावच्छेदेन कार्य्यत्वे शक्त्यन्तरं वाच्यम्, नो चेत्तत्रापि उक्तैव गतिः। श. श, प्र. p. 424.

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in ordinary language bears out the verbal knowledge of what it does not denote.[1]

Jagadīśa refutes : With the state of being an instrument of what is desired for, being held to be the denoted meaning of a verbal inflection of the optative mood, the possibility of a statement like *svargakāmo paceta* assuming the force of an injuncion is ruled out. As such, the state of being an instrument must not be imagined as what should occasion the verbal knowledge of the state of being liable to accomplishment by the agency of a person, aspiring after heaven or of the state of being the determinant of a person, aspiring after heaven, being enjoined with a duty. For such imagination is uncalled for.[2]

Prabhākara argues : If the state of being an instrument be the denoted meaning of a verbal inflection of the optative mood, then an injunction like '*pratyaham sandhyāmupāsīta*, providing for an obligatory act as one's duty would turn out to be an unauthoritative statement. For an obligatory act bears out nothing in retribution.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : Such obligatory acts, of course, bear out fruit as evidenced in so many, laudatory verses (*arthavāda-vākya*).[4]

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1. अतएव 'लोके लिङ् लाक्षणिकी'ति गुरूणां सिद्धान्तः सङ्गच्छते–इत्याहुः। ibid., p. 424.

   लाक्षणिकीति। शक्तिं विनाप्यन्वयबोधजनिकेति तदर्थः। कृष्णकान्ती p. 424.

2. तच्चिन्त्यम्, इष्टसाधनत्वस्य विध्यर्थत्वादेव 'स्वर्गकामः पचेते'त्यादेरप्रामाण्य-सम्पत्तावुक्तक्रमेण यागादौ स्वर्गकामकृतिसाध्यत्वस्य तत्कामनियोज्यताकत्व-स्य वाऽन्वये स्वर्गसाधनत्वादेः प्रयोजकत्वे मानाभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 425.

3. नन्विष्टसाधनत्वस्य विध्यर्थत्वे 'प्रत्यहं सन्ध्यामुपासीते'त्याद्विधेरप्रामाण्या-पत्तिः, नित्यकर्मणः फलाभावात्। कृष्णकान्ती pp. 424–25.

4. 'प्रत्यहं सन्ध्यामुपासीते'त्यादि नित्यविधेरपि 'सन्ध्यामुपासते ये तु' इत्यर्थवादेनोपस्थितब्रह्मलोकप्राप्त्यादिसाधनतावाचित्वात्। श. श. प्र. p. 425.

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Prabhākara argues : Laudatory statements are no evidence.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : Even Prabhākara, himself admits a laudatory statement completing the sense of an injunction (*vīdhiśeṣībhūtā'rthavāda-vākya*) to be evidential.[2]

Prabhākara argues : In case an obligatory act is admitted as what bears out a fruit, it comes out to be an optional act. An optional obligatory act involves a contradiction in terms.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contingency. For obligatoriness does not mean being performed with no desire for anything in retribution thereof. For any such act is unknown. Because the knowledge of the state of being an instrument of the desired-for object is the cause of inclination as such. Conversely, it means the state of being what not being performed brings about sin. An obligatory act, therefore, even it comes out to be optional in view of its bearing a fruit in retribution, nonetheless remains what not being performed brings about sin. Hence there is no contradiction whatsoever.[4]

Prabhākara argues : In *svarga-kāmo yajeta*, it is a matter of bare experience that the state of being the determinant of a person, aspiring after heaven, being enjoined with a duty is embraced in the verbal knowledge, occurring thereform. Hence it is essential that a verbal inflection of the optative mood be admitted to have the power to denote the effect (*kārya*).[5]

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1. ननु गुरुमते अर्थवादस्याप्रामाण्यात् कथमेतत्। कृष्णकान्ती p. 425.
2. विधिशेषीभूतार्थवादस्य गुरूणापि प्रामाण्योपगमात्। श. श. प्र. p. 425.
3. न च नित्यकर्मणां काम्यत्वे नित्यत्वविरोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 425.
4. न हि फलकामनां विना क्रियामाणत्वं नित्यत्वमप्रसिद्धेः, प्रवृत्तिसामान्यं प्रत्येव काम्यसाधनताधियः कारणत्वात्, किन्तु यदकरणात् प्रत्यवायस्तत्त्वम्; तच्च काम्यत्वेऽप्यविरुद्धम्। श. श. प्र. p. 425.
5. ननु नियोज्यांन्वयस्य गुरूणामनुभवसिद्धतया तन्मते कार्ये शक्तिरावश्यकी। कृष्णकान्ती p. 425.

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Jagadīśa replies : There is no evidence that a verbal inflection of the optative mood bears out the verbal knowledge of the state of being the determinant of being enjoined with a duty. For there is no corroborative evidence thereto.

Conversely, even if such a situation is admitted of, it is not necessary that a verbal inflection of the optative mood, be recognised to denote—*kārya*. For the state of being an instrument as such, of heaven, abiding the direct and the indirect kinds of causes, thereof, in common, is cognised by way of compatibility in a sacrifice, prior to the verbal knowledge of the effect of a sacrifice as what determines the state of a person, aspiring after heaven, being enjoined with a duty. For the state of being an instrument of heaven means the state of being possessed of an attribute that determines what being other than a superfluous, immediately precedes heaven, as a rule.

Opponents argue : Being immediately precendent is not a uniform concept. For it varies with the variance of the individuals involved. As such, the state of being an instrument of what is qualified by the state of heaven is unknown.

Jagadīśa replies : No. The state of being an instrument of heaven or what is desired for, is an independent concept by itself. As such, there is no bar to its being cognised in a sacrifice, independent of an intermediary in view of its not being an instrument by virtue of being a cause with an intermediary for itself. Hence there is no reason to hold that a verbal inflection of the optative mood is denotative of the effect of an act, (*kārya*).[1]

In *Śrāddhe bhuñjīta bhavān, ihabhuñjithāstvaṁ* and the like, verbal inflection of the optative mood denotes being invited

1. नियोज्यान्वयस्य प्रामाणिकत्वेऽपि साक्षात्परम्परासाधारणस्वर्गसाजनतामात्रस्य तद्योग्यताविधया प्रागेव यागादौ सुग्रहत्वाच्च, स्वर्गादिनियतपूर्ववर्त्तित्वावच्छिन्नसम्बन्धवत्ताकान्यथासिद्धयनिरूपकधर्मवत्तारूपस्यातिरिक्तरूपस्य वा सामान्यतः स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य व्यापारत्वाद्यघटितत्वेन तद्ग्रहे बाधकाभावादित्येषा दिक्। श. श. प्र. p. 425.

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in view of the comprehension, thereof, corroborated by one's experience. Being invited, again, means being addressed by a sentence, bearing out the verbal knowledge of the state of one's duty, embraced as a feature. The meaning of the root-verb, thereupon, is related to the knowledge of the state of one's duty, as a substantive. Hence the verbal knowledge from such a sentence is like this : You are addressed by the sentence, bearing out the knowledge of the state of one's duty (or obligation), posited as a feature against the act of attending a dinner on the occasion of a funeral rite. Furthermore, as it is an obligation on the part of an invited person to a dinner on the occasion of a funeral rite, being invited further means being addressed by a sentence that one cannot dishonour. For invitation, (*nimantraṇa*), according to the elders, means what cannot be dishonoured without incurring sin. Hence in '*putrotsave āmantriio bhavān*, the verbal inflection of the optative mood, means only being greeted (*āmantraṇa*) by a sentence that may be dishonoured without the risk of incurring sin, bearing out (although) the knowledge of the state of one's duty, embraced as a feature. In *bālaṁ yuddhāttārayet* or in *jalād vipraṁ samuddharet*, in the like manner, the verbal inflection of the optative mood denotes being addressed by a sentence, bearing out the knowledge of one's duty, posited as a feature.[1]

In *dhenuṁ dadyāstvaṁ asmabhyaṁ*, the verbal inflection of the optative mood denotes prayer. By prayer, again, is meant the state of being the substantive of the speaker's desire, embracing the state of being the duty of the addressed as a feature against the act of making a gift to oneself. Hence such a sentence, uttered by *caitra* would give a verbal knowledge like this : You have the agency of the act of making a gift, embraced as the substantive of the desire of *caitra*, with the state of being the duty of you, posited as a feature therein, the desire determined by the state of being a gift to *caitra* of a cow.[2] Such

1. श. श. प्र. p. 426.
2. श. श. प्र. pp. 426-27.

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a meaning is also, at times, derived from a verbal inflection of the imperative mood as in *bhikṣām dehi tvamarthibhyaḥ*.[1]

In *hrado yadi dhūmavām syāt*, the root-verb, through frozen metaphor, means difference (*bheda*) and the verbal inflection of the optative mood, suffixed thereto denotes the state of being the locus. The word, *yadi* indicates the said metaphor. Hence the verbal knowledge from the said sentence is of a lake as what is the locus of difference of what is with smoke. [2]

Opponents argue : The meaning of a nominal and that of a root-verb are not likely to be mutually related through difference. As such, the meaning of the word, *dhūmavān* cannot be related to difference, the meaning of the root-verb, through *pratiyogitva*, a relation of difference.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The rule is that the meaning of a nominal other than a particle is not related to the meaning of another nominal or that of a root-verb through difference and a nominal has been further qualified as what is other than a particle in view of the fact that the meaning of a particle is related to the meaning of a nominal. Similarly in view of the fact that the meaning of a nominal is related to the meaning of a root-verb, at times, through a relation of difference, the said rule should make further concesson to the effect that the meaning of a nominal other than a particle is not related to the meaning of a nominal or that of a root-verb other than what enforces such relation.[4]

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1. ibid., p. 427.
2. ibid., p. 427.
3. ननु नामार्थधात्वर्थयोर्भेदान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नतया कथं धात्वर्थे भेदे प्रतियोगितया नामार्थस्य धूमवदादेरन्वयः । कृष्णकान्ती p. 427.
4. 'धूमवानि'त्यत्र निपातार्थ इव धात्वर्थेऽपि भेदे प्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन नामार्थस्य धूमवदादेः क्वचित् व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येणान्वये क्षत्यभावात् । श. श. प्र. p. 427.

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In *hrado yadi dhūmavān*, the particle, *yadi* itself means difference and the locus thereof.[1]

Hence in *hrado yadi dhūmavān syāt, vahnimān syāt*, the verbal knowledge is like this : 'the lake that is other than what is with smoke is not with fire that pervades smoke', the word, *vahni* implying 'fire that pervades smoke' through a frozen metaphor.[2]

Opponents ask : How is frozen metaphor indicated in such an instance ?[3]

Jagadīśa replies : As in *sa vahnimān yo dhūmavān*, the association of the word, *dhūmavān* with the word, *yat* or as in *ya dhūmavān sa vahnimān*, the priority in use of the word, *dhūmavān*, gives the comprehension of pervasion in respect of smoke (*dhūma*), the association of the word, *dhūmavān* with the word, *syāt* or the priority of the word, *dhūmavān* indicates that fire is pervasive of smoke.[4]

The word, *vahni* in such instances, therefore, having implied fire that pervades smoke through a frozen metaphor, there is no reason why *'hrado yadi' dhūmavān syāt ghaṭa-vān syāt* or the like other uses be made in language. For jar (*ghaṭa*) is obviously not pervasive of smoke.[5]

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1. 'ह्रदो यदि धूमवानि'त्यादौ तु यद्यादिनिपातस्यैव भेदादिरर्थः। ibid., p. 427.
2. इत्थञ्च 'ह्रदो यदि धूमवान् स्यात् वह्निमान् स्यात्' इत्यत्रापि धूमवद्भिन्नो ह्रदो धूमव्यापकवह्निमद्भेदवानित्याकारको बोधः। ibid., p. 427.
3. ननु वह्निपदस्य तादृशवह्नौ लक्षणाया निरूढत्वसम्पादकं किम् ? कृष्णकान्ती p. 427.
4. 'स वह्निमान्, यो धूमवान्'इत्यादौ 'यो धूमवान् स वह्निमानि'त्यादौ च यद्योगप्राथम्यादिवशादिव प्रकृतेऽपि स्याद्योगप्राथम्यादिवशात् धूमादिव्यापकतथा वह्न्यादेर्भानसम्भवात्। श. श. प्र. p. 427.
5. अतएव 'ह्रदो यदि धूमवान् स्यात् घटवान् स्यादि'त्यादिको न प्रयोगः, घटादेर्धूमाद्यव्यापकत्वात्। ibid., pp. 427–28.

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Opponents argue : In the sense of a lake that is the locus of difference of what is with smoke, is also the locus of difference of what is with a jar, such an use should be made.

Jagadīśa replies : This is a welcome objection. For smoke, here has not been inserted in what constitutes the subject.[1]

In *sa śūraḥ sa ca vikrānto yastvayā devi* ! *Vikṣita* or in *'na ṣaṭpado'sau na juguñja yaḥ kalaṁ*, valour and the like are comprehended as what pervades the look of goddess *Lakṣmī*, notwithstanding the fact that the word, *yat* has not been used in the first part of the sentence to indicate pervasion. For the association with the word, *yat* and its being in the first part of a sentence severally indicates such pervasion. In both the sentences cited pervasion has been indicated by the association of the word, *yat*.[2]

The verbal comprehensions, therefrom, are like this : *yo yo lakṣmī-vīkṣitaḥ, sa sa śūraḥ; yo yo kala-guñjana-kaṭṛtvābhāvavān sa sa ṣat-pada-bheda-vān.*

In *guṇatvaṁ yadi ghaṭe syāt, dravye syāt* and the like the root-verb means absolute negation, through frozen metaphor. The verbal inflection of the optative mood means 'being the locus'. Hence the verbal knowledge from the sentence is like this : The state of being a quality determined by the state of what abides a jar is other than what is with the state of abiding a substance, that pervades the state of abiding a jar.[3]

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1. तत्र धूमस्योद्देश्यकुक्षावनिक्षेपात्। ibid., p. 428.
2. ibid., p. 428.
3. गुणत्वं यदि घटे स्यात्, द्रव्ये स्यादि'त्यादौ तु धातोरत्यन्ताभाव एवार्थः, तदुत्तरलिङस्तु पूर्ववदाश्रयत्वम्, तथा च घटवृत्तित्वाभाववद्गुणत्वं घटवृत्तित्वव्यापकीभूतस्य द्रव्यवृत्तित्वस्याभाववदित्येवं तत्र बोधः। श. श. प्र. p. 428.

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Others hold : In *hrada yadi dhūmavān syāt vahnimān syāt*, the word, *syāt* used in the first part thereof means a hypothesis and the second one, the hypothetic. Hence the verbal knowledge to occur therefrom is like this : The lake is the hypothetical substantive as of being possessed of such fire (i.e. fire that pervades smoke) as occasioned by the hypothesis that it is possessed of smoke. The word, *yadi* is only indicative of such a meaning. In *yadyayam dhūmavān vahnimān syāt*, however, the word, *yadi* only means the state of a hypothesis.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : It is unreasonable. For in *yadyayaṁ dhūmavān vahnimān syāt*, the word, *syāt* is used only once. The word, *yadi* cannot bear out the said knowledge. For a word, other than a verb does not carry any such sense.[2]

In *yo brāhmaṇāyāvaguret taṁ śatena yātayāt*, the verbal inflection of the optative mood has been provided for by the rule, *hetu-hetumatorliṅ*.[3] It gives the verbal knowledge of being fined for one hundred rupees for having assaulted a brahmin, of one who is guilty of assaulting a brahmin, the cause of being fined for one hundred rupees.[4]

Prabhākara holds : The verbal inflection of the optative mood in such a sentence means oniy sequence of events and not cause-effect relation. For the cause-effect relation here, is a matter of conjecture. Had the verbal inflection meant cause-effect relation, the transcendental effect of an evil act would be liable to denotation by a verbal in-

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1. ibid., p. 428.
2. आहुरित्यस्वरससूचनाय, स च स्याच्छब्दस्यातिरिक्तस्याभावात्, अक्रियापदस्य तादृशार्थकत्वं न सम्भवतीति। कृष्णकान्ती p. 428.
3. पा. III. 3. 156.
4. श. श. प्र. pp. 428-29.

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flection of the optative mood. For that is the direct cause of one's being thus fined.

Opponents argue : It is a welcome objection.

Prabhākara replies : No. It cannot be so said. For the transcendental effect (*apūrva*) as such (i.e. *apūrvatvena apūrva*) is supersensuous and a supersensuous object is not liable to denotation. Because what is known otherwise alone, is liable to denotation. Hence the transcendental effect is known only as an effect (*kāryatvena*)[1].

In *ṛtau svadārānupeyāt*, the verbal inflection of the optative mood cannot denote the state of being the instrument of what is desired for (viz, welfare). For 'going at' one's wife is known as such through ordinary means of knowledge and what is known through an ordinary means of knowledge is not liable to Vedic injunction. Because the Vedas prescribe what are not liable to comprehension otherwise, only. Hence the said verbal inflection, in this sentence, means specification (*niyama*). Such specification again, means ruling out the possibility of being associated as a means. In other words, it means being the counterpositive of the negation that causes sin (like *avaghāta*, the counterpositive of the negation viz., *avaghātābhāva* causing sin in the context of a sacrifice to be performed by rice-cakes). Thus, the period of ovulation being syntactically related to negation, constituting the said meaning through the relation of *avacchedyatva*, the verbal knowledge from the said sentence is like this: Going at one's wife is the counterpositive of the negation, modified by ovulational period, causing sin.[2]

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1. पौर्वापर्यमात्रं तत्र लिङर्थः न हेतुहेतुमद्भावः, पश्चात्तस्य कल्प्यत्वात्, अन्यथा दुरितापूर्वस्य वाच्यतापत्तेरिति तु प्राभाकराः। ibid., p. 429.

2. श. श. प्र. p. 429.

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Opponents argue : In that case, negation of going at one's wife, as such, is not the cause of sin. As such, one should not have the inclination of going at one's wife during the said period. For the cause of such inclination viz, getting rid of sin is wanting. Not only that; even at his wife at that period, there remains the negation of one's going at his wife along with one's going at her.[1] Hence there is no guarantee that going at one's wife during the period of her ovulation is the counter-positive of the negation, modified by ovulational period, causing sin.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the said verbal inflection might be taken to severally mean the state of the cause of sin and negation. Thereupon, with the said negation embraced as the substantive of the meaning of the root-verb, the counterpositive thereof and of the period of ovulation as the modifiers thereof, the state of being the cause is syntactically related. Hence the said sentence gives the verbal knowledge of the negation of one's going at one's wife, during the period of ovulation as the cause of sin.[2]

Opponents argue : The sentence, *'ṛtau svadārānupeyāt* does not convey the idea that sin does not occur to one for whom going at one's wife is not possible, due to one's not going at her during the period of ovulation.

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contingency. For the expression, *sva-dāra* means a woman other than one else than the wife of oneself, living contemporarily with oneself. Thus the said sentence bears out the comprehension of the negation of going at a woman other than one else than the wife of oneself, living contemporarily with oneself, during the period of her ovulation as the cause of sin. Similar is the kind of verbal knowledge from (*śrāddha-dine*) *pitṛśeṣaṁ bhuñjita.*[3]

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1. कृष्णकान्ती p. 429.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 429.
3. ibid., p. 429–30.

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In *pañca pañcanakhān bhuñjīta* too, the verbal inflection of the optative mood does not denote the state of the instrument of the desired for (viz, welfare). For the act of eating is instinctive by nature and thus not liable to being provided for by an injunction. Nor does it mean specification. For the negation of (i.e. refraining from) the act of eating the five five-nailed animals is not the cause of sin, there being no evidence thereto.[1]

In *ṛtau svadārānupeyāt*, on the contrary, the negation of (i.e. refraining from) the act of going at one's wife during the period of her ovulation is admittedly a cause of sin. For there is a statement of censure to the effact that one refraining from such an act during the said period commits the sin of murdering an embryo. As such, the said injunction is rightly construed as an injunction of specification.

The verbal inflection of the optative mood in *pañca pañcanakhān bhuñjītā*, therefore, is taken to mean exclusion and the said sentence as an injunction of exclusion. Exclusion does not mean that only the five five-nailed animals are to be eaten. For it cannot mean that the five five-nailed animals like the hare, alone are to be eaten. For that would imply that rice and the like are not to be eaten. But, evidence lacking, such prohibition is without any authority. Thus the sentence means that the eating of any such five-nailed animal other than those five (viz., the hare and the like) is a cause of sin. The verbal inflection of the optative mood in such a case, therefore, virtually comes to mean only the state of being a cause of sin and the word, *pañca*, heading the sentence implies the five five-nailed animals like the hare.

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1. 'पञ्च पञ्चनखान् भुञ्जीते'त्यादिलिङोऽपि नेष्टसाधनत्वे तात्पर्यं भोजनस्य रागप्राप्तत्वेनाविधेयत्वात्, नापि प्रागुक्तनियमे; पञ्चनखानां पञ्चानामभोजनस्य प्रत्यवायहेतुत्वे मानाभावात्। श. श. प्र. p. 430.

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Opponents argue : In case the verbal inflection of the optative mood means only exclusion to bear out the verbal knowledge of the act of eating a five-nailed animal other than those five as a cause of sin, there is two-fold metaphor. For in that case both the word, *pañca* and the verbal inflection of the optative mood turn out to be indicative by nature. It is reasonable, therefore, to hold that the said sentence holds out an instance of the injunction of specification, to bear out the verbal knowledge of the negation of the act of eating of the five five-nailed animals like the hare is a cause of sin.

Jagadīśa replies : No. It cannot be an injunction of specification. For nothing is prescribed thereby. Because the object involved is availed of otherwise.

Opponents argue : But neither the act of eating of such an animal nor the negation thereof is ever known as a cause of sin. Hence there is no bar to the said sentence being an injunction of specification.

Jagadīśa replies : In that case, the word, *pañca-nakha* should be held redundant. For in that case, *śaśādi-pañca bhuñjīta* only could bear out the knowledge of the negation of the act of eating the five animals like the hare, as a cause of sin.

Not only that. In the verse of Manu (V. 14) viz, *śvāvidhaṁ śalyakaṁ godhāṁ khaḍga-kūrma-śaśāṁstathā / bhakṣyān pañca-nakheṣvāhuranuṣṭrāmścaikato dataḥ //* the seventh declensional suffix meaning specification admittedly bears out the comprehension of the act of eating of a five-nailed animal other than the five such animals like procupine (*śalyaka*) as a cause of sin.[1]

Similarly, the verbal inflection of the optative mood in *yājanā'dhyāpana-pratigrahairdvijo dhanamarjayet*, means exclu-

1. श. श. प्र. p. 431.

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sion. Hence the said sentence bears out the verbal comprehension of the act of earning wealth by a brahmin through a means other than officiating in a sacrifice and the like as a cause of sin. For in the injunction, *na kṛṣyādairanāpanno brāhmaṇo dhanamarjayet*, earning wealth by a brahmin through any other means is well known as a cause of sin. The sentence, therefore, cannot be held an instance of the injunction of specification. For there is no evidence in support of the idea that the negation of the act of earning wealth through officiating in a sacrifice and the like is a cause of sin.[1]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 431.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

TENSES AND MOODS (IMPERFECT, PERFECT AND THE AORIST TENSE)

A verbal inflection that bears out the verbal knowledge of pastness, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb involved, ending in the conjugational transformation, *śap*, even without the use of the particle, *sma* in addition, is called an inflection of the imperfect tense.[1]

A verbal inflection of the present tense bears out the verbal knowlepge of pastness, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved, ending in the conjugational transformation, *śap* but only with the use of *sma* in addition. Similarly, a verbal inflection of the perfect tense bears out the verbal knowledge of pastness, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved, not ending in the conjugational transformation, *śap*. Hence, the definition of the verbal inflection of the imperfect tense, given above, does not unwarrantedly overextend to such inflections.[2]

In *apacat*, on the contrary, the verbal inflection bears out the verbal knowledge of pastness, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *paci*, ending in the conjugational transformation, *śap*, even without the use of

1. ष. श. प्र. का. 102.
2. ibid., p. 432.

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sma, in addition. As such, the verbal inflection, *t*, is the verbal inflection of the imperfect tense.[1]

Opponents argue : In *adivyat*, the verbal inflection, *t* does not bear out the verbal knowledge of pastness, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, ending in the conjugational transforman, *śap*. As such, the definition of the verbal inflection of the imperfect tense is too narrow.

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contingency. For the said verbal inflection suffixed to the root-verb, *div* (of *divādi-gaṇa*) is possessed of the sequence identically with the one, added to the root-verb, *paci* as the determinant of causality towards the knowledge of pastness, as in *apacat*, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, ending in the conjugational transformation, *śap*. In other words, the verbal inflection, *t* in *apacat* is the efficient (*phalopadhāyaka*) cause of the verbal knowledge of pastness, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *paci*, ending in the conjugational transformation, *śap*, while the said inflection in *adivyat* is only a potential (*svarūpa-yogya*) cause thereof, but otherwise these two inflections are essentially the same.[2]

Opponents argue : The same logic should be unevenly applied to the inflection, *am* suffixed to the word, *taṇḍula* in *taṇḍulamapacat*. For *am*, the verbal inflection of the imperfect tense and *am* the nominal inflection are essentially the same in view of the identical sequence viz. *amtva*, the determinant of causality towards the knowledge of pastness, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb ending in the conjugational transformation, *śap*.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For *am* suffixed to the word, *taṇḍula* in the instance cited is not a verbal inflection.[3]

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1. ibid., p. 432.
2. 'अदीव्यत्'इत्यादौ शबन्तस्य धातोरर्थे स्वार्थमबोधयन्नपि दिवादिस्तत्सजातीय एव । श. श. प्र. p. 432.
3. तण्डुलमपचत्'इत्यादावमो निरूक्ततत्सजातीयत्वेऽपि न तिङ्त्वमतस्तद्व्युदासः । ibid., p. 432.

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Opponents argue : The definition is too wide. For *tām* or *ātām*, the verbal inflections of the imperfect tense of the *parasmaipadi* and *ātmanepadi* kinds respectively, having the identical sequence with the verbal inflection of the imperative mood viz., *tām* or the verbal inflection of the aorist tense viz., *ātām*, these two fairly come to be coverved by the said definition.

Jagadīśa replies : No. Such apprehension is unfounded. For the definition is to be understood to have been further qualified by the clause, other than what is expectant with imperativeness or the state of occurring presently in respect of the meaning of the base viz, the root-verb.[1]

It should also be noted that the verbal Inflection of the imperfect tense as in *apacat*, for an example, denotes the past time and the state of occurring the previous day as well according to the followers of the *kalāpa* school of Grammarians. According to the followers of the Pāṇini school too, although such a verbal inflection does not denote the state of occurring the previous day, it nontheless, denotes the state of being other than occurring presently as evidenced in the aphorism *anadyatane laṅ*.[2]

Hence according to the *kalāpa* system, the verbal knowledge from the sentence is of one having the agency of the act of cooking occurring the previous day, the counterpositive of the destruction abiding[3] and according to that of Pāṇini, of one having the agency of the act of cooking, occurring at a time other than the present day, the counter-positive of the destruction abiding.[4]

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1. प्रकृत्यर्थेऽनुमतत्वाद्यतनत्वाद्यनाकांक्षितत्वेन विशेषणाच्च पच्यताम्, पचयेताम्, पचतामि'त्यादावपक्त्रां, अपचतामित्यादौ च लोटो लुङस्तामाताम्प्रभृतौ न प्रसङ्गः । श. श. प्र. p. 432.
2. पा. III. 2. 111.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 433.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 433.

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Opponents argue : A verbal inflection of the imperfect tense is authoritatively used to bear out the comprehension of pastness as such and hence the provisions made by *kalāpa* or by Pāṇini are not reasonable.[1]

Jagadīśa replies : The provisions made by them are only approximate and not absolute. As such, a verbal inflection of the imperfect tense is used also to denote a time other than the previous day (as in *āsīdrājā nalo ṇāma*).[2]

Opponents argue : In *hya'pacat*, the word, *hya* itself denotes the previous day. The verbal inflection, *t*, therefore, is redundant, if it is to mean the state of occurring the previous day.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contingency. For here, the word, *hya* and verbal inflection, *t* taken together bear out the verbal knowledge of the state of occurring the previous day. Two synonyms used to convey a single meaning in unison rules out the possibility of redundance of either of them. For otherwise, expectancy wanting in view of the determinant of the state of the subject and the predicate being identical as in *paktā pacati*, no verbal knowledge would occur thereform.[4]

Perfect tense :

A verbal inflection that is not capable of bearing out the verbal knowledge of what it means, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, not undergoing reduplication is designated as the verbal inflection of the perfect tense (*liṭ*).[5]

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1. कृष्णकान्ती p. 433.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 433.
3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 433.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 433.
5. श. श. प्र. का. p. 104.

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The verbal inflections of the aorist tense in *aśiśriyat adudruvat*, although bear out the verbal knowledge of what these mean, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, undergoing reduplication, the definition of the verbal inflection of the perfect tense would not over-extend thereto. For the said inflections of the aorist tense also bear out the verbal knowledge of what these mean, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, not undergoing reduplication as in *apākṣīt*.[1]

Conversely, a verbal inflection of the perfect tense bears out the verbal knowledge of what itself means, posited as a feature against only the meaning of a root-verb, undergoing reduplication as in *jaghāna, jaghnatuḥ* and so on.[2]

In *pipakṣati* or *pāpacyate* and the like, although the suffixes, *san* or *yaṅ* bears out the verbal knowledge of what these mean, posited as a feature against the meaning of a root-verb, undergoing reduplication, the definition does not unwarrantedly over-extend thereto. For these are only suffixes and not verbal inflections.[3]

The definition also does not unwarrantedly overextend to cover the verbal iuflections of the present tense as in *pace, pacāvahe, pacāva* and the like on grounds of identical sequence. For here also the definition is to be understood to be qualified by the clause, not being expectant with presentness or the state of occurring presently in respect of the meaning of the base thereof viz., the root-verb.[4]

The perfect tense is either formed by reduplication of the root-verb or in a periphrastic way i.e. by joining the

1. ibid., pp. 434-35.
2. ibid., p. 435.
3. idid., p. 435.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 435.

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termination, *ām* to the root-verb and by adding to the base thus formed, the reduplicated *parasmaipadī* perfect of the root-verb, *as* or *bhū* or the reduplicated *parasmaipadi* or *ātmanepadī* perfect of the root-verb, *kṛ*.

Monosyllabic roots beginning with consonants or with vowels, *a*, *a*, *i*, *u* and *ṛ*, provided these vowels are followed by one consonant only, take the reduplicated perfect. The root-verbs, *ay*, *day*, *ās* and *kās*, however, take the periphrastic perfect only. Monosyllabic roots beginning with a long vowel (except *ā*) or a short vowel (except *a*), followed by more than one consonant, all roots of more than one syllable, all roots of the tenth class (*curādi*) and derivative verb (such as causatives) take the periphrastic perfect. The root-verbs *uṣ*, *vid*, *jāgṛ*, *bhī*, *hrī*, *bhṛ*, *hu* and *daridrā* form both the perfects.

In *kāsāñcakre*, *lolūyāmāsa* *ṭkṣāmbabhūva* and the like, therefore, the verbal inflections of the perfect tense have no occasion to bear out the verbal knowledge of what these mean posited as feature against the meaning of the root-verbs only formally used like *kṛ* or *as* or *bhū* that these are suffixed to. As such, the definition is incomprehensible.[1]

The verbal inflection of the perfect tense, therefore, is alternatively defined as follows: A verbal inflection that causes the verbal knowledge of what it means, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *yaji* undergoing reduplication or against that of the root-vesb *cakāsa*, suffixed with *ām* is designated as the verbal inflection of the perfect tense.[2] In other words, the state of a verbal inflection of the sequence, the state of

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1. 'कासाञ्चक्रे, लोलूयामास, ईक्षाम्बभूव'इत्यादावाम इव कृञादेरप्यनुप्रयुक्तस्य पदसाधुतामात्रपरत्वादसम्भवापत्तेरन्यथा निर्वक्ति । ibid., p. 435.

2. श. श. प्र. का. p. 105.

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the knowledge of which is the determinant of causality towards the verbal knowledge of the meaning of itself, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, undergoing reduplication or against the meaning of the root-verb, *cakāsa* is the verbal inflection of the perfect tense.[1]

In *juhoti*, although the verbal inflection, *ti* bears out the verbal knowledge of what it means, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *hu* undergoing reduplication, the definition of the verbal inflection of the perfect tense does not over-extend thereto. For the root-verb, involved is not *yaji*. So also in *cakāsti*, although the verbal inflection, *ti* bears out a similar kind of verbal knowledge, against, the meaning of the root-verb, *cakāsa*, the definition does not over-extend thereto. For the said root-verb is not suffixed with *ām*.[2]

In *manaścacāla, surabhi-bhāga ājagāma*, and the like, the verbal inflection of the perfect tense denotes imperceptibility (*parokṣatva*) in addition to pastness of what the root-verb, involved means. By imperceptibility, again, is meant supersensuousness. Hence the verbal knowledge occurring from the sentence, *manaścacāla* is like this : The mind is possessed of the movement that is past and supersensuous.[3] In *caitraścāru papāca*, although the verbal inflection presents imperceptibility, compatibility lacking, it is not syntactically related to the act of cooking. The use like *vyātene kiraṇāvalīsamudayan* is also explained thus.

Aorist tense :

A verbal inflection that bears out the verbal knowledge of pastness, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, *han*, substituted by *vadh*, or against the mean-

1. कृष्णकान्ती p. 435.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 435.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 436.

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ing of a root-verb, ending in the conjugational transformation, *sic*, is called the verbal inflection of the aorist tense.[1]

In *jaghāna*, *hanti sma*, although, the verbal inflections involved bear out the verbal knowledge of pastness, the definition of the verbal inflection of the aorist tense does over-extend thereto. For the root-verb, *han* has neither been substituted by *vadh*, nor does it end in the conjugational transformation, *sic*.[2]

In *avadhīt*, *avadhiṣṭām*, *avadhiṣu* and the like, the verbal inflections, come under the category of these of the aorist tense. In *vadhyāt*, *vadhyastām vadhyāsu*, although the verbal inflections bear out the verbal knowledge of their meaning or what these denote, posited as a feature against the meaning or the root-verb, *han*, substituted by *vadh*, the definition of the verbal inflection of the aorist tense does not overextend thereto. For these do not denote pastness. The definition also is not too wide to cover the verbal inflections in *pacyatām*, *apacat*, *apactām* and so on. For the definition is to be understood to be further qualified by the clause, other than what is expectant with imperativeness, the state of occurring the previous day and so on.[3] In *apākṣit*, the verbal inflection of the aorist tense denotes the verbal knowledge of pastness and the state of occurring presently to give the verbal knowledge of one having the agency of the act of cooking, occurring presently, the counter-positive of the destruction presently abiding. This provision is only approximate and not absolute. As such, even in reference to what has occurred in remote past, a verbal inflection of the aorist tense is used as in *abhūnnṛpo vibudhasakhaḥ parantapaḥ*. An expression like *adyāpākṣiḥ* too is validly made in language. For of the two synonyms used to convey a single meaning in unison, none are redundant.[4]

1. श. श. प्र. का. 103.
2. ibid., p. 433-34.
3. ibid., p. 434.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 435.
Vide also कृष्णकान्ती p. 435.

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CHAPTER XXXIV

TENSES AND MOODS (FUTURE, PERI-FUTURE, BENE. AND COND. MOODS)

A verbal inflection bearing out the verbal comprehension of the relation of future time posited as a feature against the negation of the act, presented by the root-verb, involved is called the verbal inflection of the future tense (*lṛṭ*).[1] In other words, a verbal inflection bearing out the verbal comprehension of the state of being circumscribed, posited as a feature against the negation of the act, involved is the verbal inflection of the future tense. In *taṇḍulañcet prāpsyatyodanamapi pakṣyati caitraḥ*, for an example, the verbal termination, *syati*, bears out the verbal comprehension of *caitra* as one having the negation of the possession of rice (*taṇḍula*), circumscribed by the time to come. For the said sentence leads to the verbal knowledge like this : *caitra* is with the negation, circumscribed by the time to come, of the state of the objective case in respect of rice and is with the negation of the act of cooking, circumscribed by the said time.[2]

A Verbal inflection bearing out the verbal comprehension of the relation of the time gone by, posited as a feature against the negation of the act involved is the verbal inflection of the conditional mood (*lṛṅ*)[3]. In *edhaṁścedaprāpsyat odanam-*

1. श. श. प्र. का. 107.
2. ibid., p. 439.
3. ibid., का. 107.

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āpyapakṣyat, the state of having the negation of the possession of fuel, circumscribed by the time gone by, is borne out.

The verbal inflections of the future tense and of the conditional mood, therefore, respectively denote, the future time and the past time and the negation of the act involved.[1]

As a matter of fact, in *taṇḍulañcet prāpsyatyodanamapi pakṣyati caitraḥ*, the verbal inflection of the future tense or of the conditional mood bears out the verbal knowledge of the negation of the act of cooking rice, circumscribed by the time to come, brought about by the negation of the possession of rice, circumscribed by the time to come, or by the time gone by, in *caitra*. For by *kriyātipāta* or negation (transgression) of the act, as provided for in the definition of the verbal inflections of the future tense and of the conditional mood is meant the negation of one act, brought about by the negation of another act. Hence an use like *caitraścedapaṭhiṣyat grāmamapyagamiṣyat* is not validly used in language. For the negation of *caitra's* going to the village is not brought about by the negation of his study. The use *tīrthāñcedagamiṣyat svārthamapyalapsyata* may be held justified on the ground that the negation of one's attaining one's own end is brought about by the negation of one's not going on pilgrimage.[2]

In *taṇḍulañcet pacedodanamapi bhuñjīta*, the verbal inflection of the optative mood bears out the verbal comprehension of presentness of the negation (or transgression) of the act of cooking and that of eating and neither futurity nor pastness thereof. As such, the definition of the verbal inflections of the future tense or of the conditional mood does not over-extend thereto.[3]

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1. ibid., p. 439.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 439–40.
3. ibid., p. 440.

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Periphrastic future tense and benedictory mood:

A verbal inflection bearing out the verbal knowledge of the state of occurring the next day, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved is the verbal inflection of the periphrastic future (*luṭ*).[1] A verbal inflection bearing out the verbal knowledge of benediction and of futurity too, is the verbal inflection of the benedictory mood.[2]

In *śvaḥ pakṣyati*, although the word, *śva* bears out the verbal comprehension of the state of occurring the next day, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved, the definition given above does not over-extend thereto. For the said word is not a verbal inflection.[3]

The definition also is not too wide to cover the verbal inflections of the future tense. For although these bear out the verbal comprehension of futurity, posited as a feature against the meaning of the root-verb, involved, the state of occurring the next day, as well is not borne out thereby.[4]

In *jivatu bhavān*, the verbal inflection, *tup*, although it bears out the verbal comprehension of benediction does not bring about the verbal comprehension of futurity. As such, the definition of the verbal inflection of the benedictory mood does not over-extend thereto. Similarly, the verbal inflections of the future, although these bear out the verbal comprehension of futurity do not bring about the verbal comprehension of benediction. Hence, the definition does not over-extend thereto even.[5]

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1. ibid., p. 106.
2. श. श. प्र का. 106.
3. ibid., pp. 436-37.
4. ibid., p. 437.
5. ibid., p. 437.

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Conversely, the eighteen verbal inflections as in *bhūyāt*, *bhūyāstām* and the like bear out the verbal knowledge of futurity, posited as a feature against the benediction or desire for the meaning of the root-verb.[1]

Opponents argue : In that case, in view of one's agency of some subsidiary act involved in the act of cooking being either past or is yet to be, one engaged in some subsidiary act of cooking, should be described as one who cooked in the past or as one who is yet to cook.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : No. There is no such contingency. For one engaged in some subsidiary act of cooking cannot be referred to by the words, *papāca* or *pakṣyati* in view of his agency of some other subsidiary act of cooking being either over or is yet to be. Because pastness or futurity is syntactically related to the agency of cooking as the agency of cooking, the agency of this or that subsidiary act of cooking whether gone by or is yet to be does not matter.[3]

Opponents argue : In that case, in no case, a man, once cooking, should not be referred to as one who cooked or as one who is to cook. For the agency of cooking as the agency of cooking is inherent in one to resist pastness or futurity being ever syntactically related thereto.[4]

Jagadīśa replies : Such apprehension is unfounded. For in reference to one, engaged in cooking, *papāca* or *pakṣyati* cannot be used in language. Because the verbal inflections of the past tense or of the future tense bear out the verbal comprehension of pastness or of futurity posited as

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1. ibid., p. 437.
2. अथ पाकगोचरैककृतिदशायामपि तद्गोचरापरकृतेरतीतत्वाद्भविष्यत्वाच्च 'तदानीमयं पपाच, पचयतीत्यादिप्रयोगप्रसङ्गः। ibid., p. 437.
3. पाककृतित्वावच्छेदेनातीतत्वादेरन्वयोपगमेन तद्वारणे। श. श. प्र. p. 437.
4. 'पपाच पचयती'त्यादेरयोग्यत्वापत्तिः, एतदवच्छेदेनातीतत्वभविष्यत्वयोर्बाधादिति चेन्न। ibid., p. 437.

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a feature only against what is determined by the state of agency of the act of cooking through the relation of self-sameness, circumscribed by the state of agency of the individual act of cooking.[1]

Opponents argue : Putting the woven on, placing the utensil on fire and the like other subsidiaries are severally the acts of cooking. Hence one engaged in cooking may well be referred to by the words, *papāca* or *pakṣyati* keeping in mind, one's engagement in these subsidiaries.

Jagadīśa replies : No. This cannot be. For the act of cooking does not mean these subsidiaries, severally, but these acts taken together-[2]

Opponents argue : In that case in reference to one having finished cooking the vegetables, *papāca* should be validly used in language, one's engagement in the act of cooking notwithstanding[3] since the endeavour (*kṛti*) in its entirity in respect of the cooking of vegetables has gone by.

Jagadīśa replies : It is a welcome objection. For at such a situation, *sūpamapākṣīt* is a valid form of expression although *taṇḍulaṁ papāca* cannot be validly used under such circumstances.[4]

Not only that. In reference to one, having accomplished the act of cooking the vegetables earlier, *sūpamapākṣīt* is validly used, one's engagement in the act of cooking vegetables at the moment not-withstanding. Under such circumstances, however, *adya sūpamapākṣīt* cannot be validly used. For pastness, circumscribed by the state of agency of the present act of cooking of vegetables is incomprehensible.[5]

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1. पाककृतित्वावच्छिन्नधर्मिकायां तत्तत्पाकगोचरकृतित्वाच्छेद्यस्वरूपसम्बन्धेनैवातीतत्वाद्यन्वयबुद्धौ पाकार्थकधातूत्तरलिटस्वादिना हेतुतयैव उक्तदोषव्युदाससम्भवात् । ibid., p. 437.
2. ibid., pp. 437-38.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 438.
4. ibid., p. 438.
5. ibid., p. 438.

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CHAPTER XXXV

DENOMINATIVE VERBS
(NĀMA-DHĀTUS)

There are certain suffixes other than the verbal ones, that bear out the verbal comprehension of what these mean not related to the meaning a declensional suffix. These suffixes are known as what form part of a root-verb. These may, therefore, be described as what form the ultimate part of a root-verb.[1] These include the suffixes like *kyac*, *kyaṅ*, *kāmyac*, *ṇic*, *san*, *yaṅ* and the like.

In *putriyati*, for an example, the suffix, *kyac* bears out the verbal knowledge of desire (for the thing, denoted by the nominal base thereof), not related to the meaning of a declensional suffix. Although, the suffix, *ti* in *pacati* bears out the verbal comprehension of agency (of what is denoted by the base thereof), not related to the meaning of a declensional suffix, the said suffix is only a verbal suffix.[2]

Opponents argue : In *pipakṣayā kurute*, the suffix, *san* (in *pipakṣayā*) fairly bears out the verbal comprehension of what it means, as related to instrumentality, the meaning of the third declensional suffix[3] and hence the definition is too narrow.

Jagadīśa replies : No. The meaning of the suffix, *san* is not related to the said meaning of the third declensional suffix.

1. श. श. प्र. का. p. 108.
2. ibid., p. 440.
3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 440.

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On the contrary, it is the meaning of some other primary suffix, subsequently added and denotative of the self-same desire (*icchāsvarūpa*) that is thus related.[1] Alternatively, it may be pointed out that such a suffix forms the ultimate part of a root-verb. The suffix, *san*, therefore, forming the said part of the root-verb *pipakṣā* turns out to be distinct by itself.[2]

Such suffixes again are of two kinds viz., those that are added to a nominal and those that are added to a root-verb. The suffixes like *kyac*, *kyaṅ* and the like are added to nominals and the suffixes like *san*, *yaṅ* and the like are added to root-verbs.[3]

The nominals, ending in such suffixes turn out to be known as denominative verbs (*nāmadhātus*). The sense of such verbs is being or acting like (the thing or person, denoted by the nominal involved) or treating (as the thing thus denoted) or desiring (the thing, denoted by the nominal involved).

In *caitraḥ putrīyati*, the suffix, *kyac* (in *putrīyati*) means desire, to be embraced as a substantive. The determinant of denotation of the nominal viz. *putra* to which it is added is being a son (*putratva*). As such, it is through the relation of being embraced as the substantive of what is qualified by being a son, the determinant of denotation of the nominal, *putra*, that the meaning of the base viz., the nominal is posited as a feature against desire, the meaning of the suffix, *kyac*. The said desire, again, is embraced as a feature against the meaning of the verbal suffix, *ti* viz, *āśrayatā* through the relation of *nirūpakatva*. The verbal knowledge, therefore, occurring from the sentence cited comes out to be of *caitra* as one

1. 'पिपक्षया कुरुते'इत्यादौ तु भावकृद्भ्यस्य इच्छास्वरूपस्यैव सुबर्थकरण-त्वादावन्वयः न तु सनन्तार्थपाकेच्छामात्रस्य। श. श. प्र. p. 440.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 440.
3. ibid., का. 109.

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who is the substratum of the desire for a son as a son. Hence, in case the desire embraces 'being a man' as a feature, *putrīyati* is not validly used in language, on the contrary, *mānuṣāyati* is used.[1]

In *ātmanaḥ putrīyati*, being one's own son is not the determinant of denotation of the nominal, *putra* to which the suffix is added. As such, it cannot bear out the comprehension of desire for a son as one's own son.[2]

Opponents ask : But even when desire for a son as son is borne out from the expression, *putrīyati*, oneself is admittedly comprehended. As such, there is no reason why *ātmanaḥ putrīyati* should not be validly used in language.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : Such an use may be validly used in language in the sense that it is capable of bearing out the verbal comprehension of the desire for a son as son, oneself being related to the son only as the counter-co-relate, a part of what the verb, *putrīyati* means viz. a son as son being admittedly related to oneself, another word-meaning, the way *caitra* is related to a part of what the compound, *gurukulaṁ* means[4] in *caitrasya gurukulaṁ*.

In *ātmaputrīyati*, however, there is no bar to 'being a son of oneself (*ātmaputratva*)' being comprehended as the determinant of denotation of the base of the suffix, *kyac*. As such, the said expression admittedly bears out the comprehension of desire for a son as son of oneself.[5] This way also, the meaning of the suffix, *kāmyac* bringing out the formation a denominative verb like *putra-kāmyati* is borne out.[6]

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1. ibid., p. 441.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 441.
3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 441.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 441-42.
5. ibid., p. 442.
6. ibid., p. 442.

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In *putrīyati mānavakam*, the suffix, *kyac* means treating like a son, the meaning of the nominal, *putra*, the said suffix is added to. The meaning of the nominal, *putra* therefore, is related to the act of treating (*ācāra*) posited as a feature and as a substantive by way of an object. As such, the said expression gives the verbal knowledge of one having the agency of treating a child similar to one's treating a son. By treating one's son means rearing him with food and the like.[1]

In *sarpīyati śatrum*, the verbal comprehension is of one treating one's enemy similar to one's treating a snake. By treating, in this context, is meant beating and killing.[2]

In *prāsāde kuṭīyati*, the verbal knowledge is of one acting in the palace similar to one's acting in a cottage and by acting, here, is meant sleeping and the like in the cottage.[3]

The uses like *dhūlīrvahnikaṇīyati* or *cakreṇa daṇḍīyati* are not made in language. For the suffix, *kyac* in the sense of acting (or treating) similar to, is provided for only in case by acting similar to is meant acting similar to (the acting related to) something, posited either as an object or as a locus thereof. In the cases, cited, on the contrary, *dhūli* or *cakra* are only the agent or instrument of acting.[4]

The suffix, *kyac* is not used in cases like *idamicchati* or *svaricchati* and the like. For it is not to be used with what ends in *ma* or with an indeclinable.[5]

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1. श. श. २. p. 442.
2. ibid., p. 442.
3. ibid., p. 442.
4. ibid., p. 442.
5. 'मान्ताव्ययाभ्यां न स्यादित्यनुशिष्टेरिदमिच्छति स्वरिच्छतीत्याद्यर्थे इदमिवाचरतीत्याद्यर्थे च न क्यच्। ibid., p. 442.

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In *gavyati* or *nāvyati* and the like, the said suffix is provided for in the sense of desire or of acting similar thereto. Hence *gavyati* gives the verbal knowledge of one having the desire for a cow or acting similar to a cow.[1]

The suffix, *kyac* is provided for also in the sense of agency, of saluting, of causing grief and of serving, when added to the words, *namas*, *tapas* and *varivas*; *namasyati*, *devān*, *tapasyati śatruṁ*, *varivasyati gurum* are validly used in language to bear out the verbal knowledge of one saluting the gods, causing grief to the enemy aad serving the preceptor, respectively.[2]

In *śyenāyate kākaḥ* the suffix, *kyaṅ* too means acting like what is denoted by the nominal it is added to and the meaning of the said nominal viz., *śyena* being presented as the agent in the sentence cited, the verbal knowledge occurring thereform embraces the crow acting the way the falcon acts. By the acts of the falcon is meant taking away (pieces of) meat and the like.[3]

The suffix, *kyaṅ* carrying the sense of acting similar thereto, added to the word, *śyenī* as in *śyenī ivācarati* gives the form *śyenāyate* in view of the fact that the word, *syenī* that had assumed the corresponding feminine form of its masculine base is reverted to its original.[4]

The said suffix added to the word, *gārgya*, carrying the sense of acting like what the base thereof denotes gives the form, *gārgīyati* identically with the suffix, *kyac* carrying the sense of desire for what the base thereof denotes, the secondary suffix provided for in the sense of progeny having gone elided.[5]

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1. ibid., p. 442.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 443.
3. ibid., p. 443.
4. ibid., p. 443.
5. ibid., p. 443.

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The suffix, *kyaṅ* added to the word, *rājan* gives the form of *rājāyate* to give the sense of acting like a king. The verb, *rājīyati* formed of the suffix, *kyac*, added to the said word gives the sense of desire for a king;[1] the ultimate letter, *n* being identically elided in both the cases. Similarly the final letter, *s* in *ojas*, *apsaras*, is elided, as a rule, and optionally in *payas* with *kyaṅ*, added thereto in the sense of acting similar to what the base thereof means.[2]

Opponents argue : The word, *ojas* does not signify an animate being. It is unreasonable, therefore, to imagine that *ojasāyate* or the denominative verb with the suffix, *kyaṅ* added thereto should give the verbal knowledge of acting like what the word, *ojas* means.

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *ojas* here stands for one having vigour (*ojas*), as held by commentators.[3]

The suffix, *kyaṅ* in *gavyate* or *nāvyate* means acting like what is denoted by nominal base thereof.[4]

The said suffix in *unmanāyate* gives the meaning of one not listless (but) acting like a listless person. So also is the case with it in *durmanāyate* and the like.[5]

The said suffix in *vehāyate* gives the sense of a cow herself not barren but acting like a barren cow and the final letter, *t* in *vehat* having been elided, the verb *vehāyate* has been formed.[6]

The suffix, *kyaṅ* is also added to the nominal, *lohita* bringing about the form of the denominative verb, *lohitā-*

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1. ibid., p. 443.
2. ibid., p. 443.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 443.
4. ibid., p. 443.
5. ibid., p. 443.
6. ibid., p. 443.

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yati or *lohitāyate* bearing out the sense of what not being red has turned to be red.[1]

In *sukhāyate*, the said suffix bears out the comprehension of one, experiencing pleasure. Similar are the cases in *duḥkhāyate*, *alīkāyate* and so on.[2]

The said suffix added to the nominal, *śabda* presents the denominative verb, *śabdāyate* meaning what makes sound.[3] Similar are the cases in *vairāyate*, *kalahāyate* and the like.[4] The said suffix, added to the nominal, *romantha* gives the denominative verb, *romanthāyate* meaning one chewing the cud.[5]

The suffix, *ṇiḥ*, added to a nominal like *muṇḍa* gives the form of a denominative verb like *muṇḍayati* bearing out the comprehension of doing and added to a nominal like *kṛta*, it gives the form a denominative verb like *kṛtayati* to bear out the verbal knowledge of acknowledging; added to a nominal, like *satya* it gives the form of a denominative verb like *satyāpayati* carrying the sense of narrating and added to a nominal denotative of a part of the body, it gives the form of a denominative verb like *hastayate* meaning the act of removing, as it is held by *Bhāguri*.[6]

In *naraṁ muṇḍayati*, therefore, the verbal knowledge is of one doing the act of shaving in a person; in *jalaṁ miśrayati*, of one, doing the act, mixing in water; in *vāsaṁ śithilayati* of one, doing the act of loosening the clothes, in *annaṁ madhurayati* of one, doing the act of sweetaning a

1. ibid., p. 443.
2. ibid., p. 443.
3. ibid., p. 443.
4. ibid., p. 443–44.
5. ibid., p. 444.
6. श. श. प्र. p. 444.

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meal, in *caitram mitrayati* of one, doing the act of befriending *caitra*.[1]

Opponents argue : How could a person, the meaning of the word, *nara* be liable to comprehension as the object of doing the act of shaving ? For the word, *muṇḍa* means one who is shaven and as such, one is not the recipient of the fruit, one with the determinant of denotation of the root-verb, *muṇḍa*.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : The word, *muṇḍa* being denotative of an attribute and thus a person being the receipient of the fruit, one with the determinant of denotation of the denominative root-verb, *muṇḍa*, there is no bar to a person being comprehended as the object of doing the act of shaving.[3]

The suffix, *ṇiḥ*, added to the nominals, *pṛthu*, *mṛdu* or *bhṛśam*, in the sense of making (or doing) gives the forms, *prathayati*, *mradayati* and *bhraśayati* respectively. Hence *vāsaḥ prathayati* (making the cloth broad), *vāsaḥ mradayati* (making the cloth soft), and *vāsaḥ bhraśayati* (making the cloth stronger) are used in language. The letter, *ṛ* in *pṛthu*, *mṛdu* or *bhṛśa* is transformed into *ra*. So also is the case in *parivraḍhayati* in *caitraṁ parivraḍhayati*.[4]

The suffix to be added to the nominal, *kaṇḍu* in the sense of what the said nominal means is *yaṅ* and not *niḥ* as in *gātraṁ kaṇḍuyati* or *kaṇḍuyate*. The suffix being *yaṅ and ñ* having been elided, the denominative verb has taken the two-fold form of both the *parasmaipadī* and *ātmanepadī* root-verbs.[5]

The suffix, *yaṅ*, in the like manner, added to the nominal, *mahī*, bearing the sense of doing, gives the form,

1. ibid., p. 444.
2. कृष्णकान्ती p. 444.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 444.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 444.
5. ibid., p. 444.

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mahīyate as in *svargaloke mahīyate* (doing one's abode in heaven).[1]

Opponents ask : How is it then, that the denominative root-verb, formed thus, do not take to the two-fold form of both the *parasmaipadī* and the *ātmanepadī* root-verbs ?[2]

Jagadīśa replies : It is in view of the indicatory syllable *ṇ* in *mahiṇ* that only the *ātmanepadī* form is provided for as in the case of *śabdāyate* with *kyaṅ* suffixed to the nominal, *śabda*.[3]

The suffix, *ṇiḥ*, in *kṛtayati*, *varṇayati* and the like gives the sense of acknowledging the services, done to oneself and so on. In *satyāpayati*, *arthāpayati* and the like, it gives the meaning of narrating the truth and so on. The said suffix is added to the nominals like *priya*, *sthira* and so on to give the forms of denominative verbs like *prāpayati*, *sthāpayati*, the words, *priya* or *sthira* being transformed into *pra* or *sthā* bearing out the sense of telling aggreable or steadfast words. The said suffix is also added to the nominal, *aśvatara* to give the form *aśvayati* to mean talking to an ass, the suffix, *tara* in *aśvatara* going elided. It is also added to the nominal, *go* or *gūṇa* or *sraja* to give the forms, *gavayati*, *guṇayati* or *srajayati* bearing out the sense addressing one, possessed of a cow (*gomantamācaṣṭe*) or one, possessed of virtues (*guṇa-vantamācaṣṭe*) or one, possessed of a garland (*srag-vinamācaṣṭe*), the suffixes, *man*, *van* or *vin* going elided. Similarly, the said suffix, added to the nominal, *kartā*, in the sense of addressing the agent gives the form of *kāryati*, the suffix, *tṛc* going elided. *Nedayati* is used in the sense of calling one to proximity. *Sādhayati* is used in the sense of one's nodding assent. *Kanayati* gives the sense of one, talking to the young or talking less, the alternative forms being *yava-*

1. ibid., p. 444.
2. कृष्णकान्ती p. 444.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 444.

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yati and *alpayati*, respectively. *Sthavayati*, *davayati*, *yavayati*, *kṣapayati* and *kṣodayati* are used to bear out the comprehension of one, addressing a fat person, a person to a far off place, a young man, a person to be in haste a person smaller in stature respectively. *Bhūyayati* is used to give the sense of one, addressing many. *Hastayate* or *pādayate* conveys the sense of removing the hand or the feet.[1]

Bhāguri observes that the suffix, *niḥ* is added to the words denoting the tufts of hair, clothes and a tail; posited as the objects of the act of removing covering up or raising high respectively denoted by the root-verbs, *han*, *cchādi* and *kṣīp* prefixed by *vi*, *saṁ* and *ut*. Hence *vitustayati* is used to give the sense of one removing the tufts of hair, *saṁvastrayati*, the sense of one, covering up with clothes, *utpucchayati* of what raises its tail high. *Paripucchayate* too is validly used in an identical situation.[2] *Saṁbhāṇḍayate* is used to convey the sense of collecting the treasures.[3] *Sañcīvarayate* gives the sense of one, cleansing one's garment.[4]

With the indeclinables being affixed to its bases, the suffix, *ṇṭiḥ* is also added to nominals like *vīṇā*, *hasti*, *senā* and *śloka* posited as instruments of the act of singing out, of the act of violating, of the act of advancing and of the act of praising respectively to give the denominative verbs, *upavīṇayati*, *atihastayati*, *abhisenayati* and *upaślokayati*. Hence *upavīṇayati yaśaḥ* (*upavīṇyate yaśaḥ*), *atihastayati gṛhaṁ*, *abhisenayati samaraṁ*, *upaślokayati śivaṁ* and the like are used in language. The said suffix is also added to the nominals, *aśana*, *ghana* and *udaka* to give the formations of denominative verbs, *aśanāyati*, *ghanāyati* and *udanyati* respectively in the sense of desire for what the said nominals denote; *āya* being provided for in the first two cases and

1. श. श. प्र. p. 445.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 445.
3. ibid., p. 445-46.
4. ibid., p. 446.

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nya in the last one with the final letter, *ka* being elided.[1] Others hold that *aśanāya* and the like are independent root-verbs.[2]

The suffix, *ṇiḥ* has another distinguished role. It is added to root-verbs too in the sense of a contributory act or an act as such. Although, there is no word to present the meaning of contributoryness, such meaning is liable to comprehension arising out of syntax. Hence *caitraṁ bhāvayati* gives the comprehension of one, undertaking the act, contributing to the development of *caitra*; *ātmānaṁ gamayati* bears out the verbal knowledge of one, undertaking an act contributing to the movement of oneself.[3]

The said suffix, at times, again, means an act, contributing to (the growth of) knowledge. In *kathakaḥ kaṁsaṁ ghātayati*, the verbal knowledge, therefore, is like this : The story-teller has undertaken an act (that is) contributing to (the growth of) the knowledge of *kaṁsa* being slain and by the said act is meant the act of dramatic representation and the like.[4]

The said suffix added to the root-verbs of *curādi* class means self-sameness. *Corayati*, *cintayati* and the like, therefore, give the verbal knowledge of one having the agency of the self-sameness of the act of theft and so on.[5]

The suffix, *niṅ* as added to the root-verbs, *gupu*, *dhupu*, *vicchi*, *paṇi*, *pani* and *kam*, in the sense of self-sameness to give the forms like *gopāyati* meaning doing the self-sameness of the act of protection, *dhupāyati*, doing the

1. ibid., p. 446.
2. ibid., p. 446.
3. वा. सा. सं. p. 446.
4. ibid., p. 446.
5. ibid., p. 446–47.

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self-sameness of the act of causing grief, *vicchāyati*, doing the self-sameness of the act of movement, *paṇāyati*, doing the self-sameness of the act of trade or that of praise, in the first four tenses.[1]

Opponents argue : The *kārikā* of Bhāguri reads *svārthe* and *sva* should mean the meaning of the root-verb. As such, it is not reasonable to hold that the suffix, *niṅ* is denotative of self-sameness.[2]

Jagadīśa replies : Unless a suffix is held to denote a meaning of its own, the word, *alpa* ln *alpāpi vipragopāyā svargānantyapradā bhavet* would have been used in the neuter gender in view of its being an adverb. For the suffix in the case of its being without a meaning, the verb being predominant, the said word would come to be a modifier thereof.[3]

Svargaṁ kāmayate gives the verbal knowledge of one having the self-sameness of desire for heaven and the verb is of the *ātmanepadi* kind in view of the original root-verb being *kamaṅ*, the final letter of which is *ṅa* to be elided in course of conjugation.[4]

With the root-verb, *ṛti*, the suffix *īyaṅ* is used to give the sense of self-sameness, giving the form of the verb, *ṛtīyati* bearing out the comprehension of one, doing the self-sameness of censure.[5]

In other than the first four tenses; alternatively, *goptā*, *kamitā*, *artitā* and the like are used.[6]

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1. ibid., p. 447.
2. कृष्णकान्ती p. 447.
3. श. श, प्र. p. 447.
4. ibid., p. 447.
5. ibid., p. 447.
6. ibid., p. 447.

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CHAPTER XXXVI

DESIDERATIVE (SANANTA) AND FREQUENTATIVE (YAṄANTA) VERBS

Desiderative verbs may be formed from all roots and are coujugated in all tenses and moods. The desiderative base is formed by reduplication of the original root-verb and with the addition of the letter, *sa* thereto. The general rules of reduplication are also applicable in this case. But *a*, *ā* and *ṛ* in reduplication become *i*. Generally an intermediary *i* in prefixed to *sa* after *seṭ* and optionally after *veṭ*. No such *i* is prefixed in the case of an *aniṭ* root-verb.

The root-verb, *bhū* with the addition of *san*, therefore, gives the form, *bubhūṣati*, *sthā*, *tiṣṭhāsati* and *paṭha*, *pipaṭhiṣati*.

As a rule, the vowel of the root-verb undergoes *guṇa* before *i-sa* but not before *sa*. Hence the root-verb, *śī* with *san* gives the form of *śiśayiṣate*, *nṛt* of *ninartiṣati*. The medial *i* does not undergo *guṇa* as in *vivadiṣati*. The final *i* and *u* are lengthened before *sa* as in *jigīṣati*. The final *ṛ* and *ṝ* become *īr* and *ūr* respectively to give the forms like *cikīrṣati*, *titīrṣati* and *mumūrṣati*. The root-verb, *gam* suffixed with *san* gives the from, *jigamiṣati*, the root-verb, *mān*, *mīmāṁsate*, the root-verb, *han*, *jighāṁsati*, the root-verb, *dā*, *ditsati*, the root-verb, *dhā*, *dhitsati*, the

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root-verb, *mā*, *mitsati*, the root-verb, *labh*, *lipsate*, the root-verb, *graha*, *jighṛkṣatī*, the root-verb, *svap*, *suṣupsati* and so on.

Bhāguri holds that the suffix, *san* added to the root-verb, *gup* or *vadhi* meaning to censure, or to the root-verb, *tij* meaning to pardon or to the root-verb, *kit* meaning medical treatment, bears out the sense of self-sameness.[1] Hence *jugupsate*, gives the verbal knowledge of the agent of the self-sameness of censure. Unless the suffix, *san* is held to bear out the meaning of self-sameness or a meaning of its own, the use like *jugupsā svalpāpi kṣapayati mahatvaṁ pariṣadi*, would turn out to be unreasonable. For in that case, the word, *svalpa* should have been used in the neuter gender in view of its being an adverb by virtue of its being an attribute to the verb.[2] *Tapastitikṣate* gives the verbal knowledge of the agent of the self-sameness of enduring the rigour of penance.[3] *Cikitsatyāturaṁ* gives the verbal knowledge of one doing the self-sameness of medical treatment of an afflicted person. *Ripuṁ cikitsati* gives the comprehension of one doing the self-sameness of repression of passions. *Vicikitsati manmanaḥ* gives the verbal knowledge like this : my mind is engrossed with the self-sameness of doubts.[4] No verbal suffix is added to the root-verbs, *gup*, *tij* and *kit* used to mean otherwise. Hence in the sense of 'to conceal,' 'to sharpen' and 'to dwell' respectively, these root-verbs bring about the formations of words, *gopana*, *tejana* and *ketana*. As such, the suffix, *san* too, is not used, therewith, to convey the said meanings.[5]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 447.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 447–48.
3. ibid., p. 448.
4. ibid., p. 448.
5. ibid., p. 448.

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The suffix, *san* added to the root-verbs, *mān*, meaning to adore, (or to delibearte), *dāna* to cut to pieces, and *śān* to sharpen gives the forms, *mīmāṁsate*, *didāṁsate* and *śiśāṁsate* respectively bearing out the verbal knowledges of the self-sameness of adoration (or of deliberation), that of cutting into pieces and that of sharpening .[1]

In *pākaṁ cikīrṣati*, *odanaṁ bubhūkṣate* and the like, the suffix, *san* denotes desire. The word, ending in the second declensional suffix viz., *pākaṁ* means the state of what embraces the act of cooking as the substantive, to be posited as a feature against the said desire, through the relation of self-sameness (*svarūpa*). The meaning of the root-verb, viz., *kṛ* is also related thereto (i.e. desire) through *sva-sādhyatva-prakāri-niṣṭha-sva-samāna-kartṛkatva* (i.e. the desire being of the kind, *pāka me kṛti-sādhyo bhavatu*). Hence *pākaṁ cikīrṣati* gives the verbal comprehension of one who has the desire embracing the act of cooking as its substantive (through the relatton of self-sameness) and is qualified by (the) agency (thereof) through the relation of *sva-sādhyatva-prakāritvecchā-samāna-kartṛkatva*. As such, in reference to one having the desire in respect of the act of cooking to be performed by somebody else, *ayaṁ cikīrṣati* (*pipakṣati*) and the like are not used in language. This is the view of the author of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*.[2]

Sondaḍa holds a different view. In *pākaṁ cikīrṣati*, the second declensional suffix in *pākaṁ*, means being a content (*viṣayatā*), to be related to the meaning of the original root-verb, viz, *kṛ* as a feature. Thereupon, the said meaning viz., being a content of agency (*kṛti*) is posited as a feature against desire, the meaning of the suffix, *san*, through the two-fold relation of *samāna-kartṛkatva* and *viṣayatva*. The verbal

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1. श. शा. प्र. 448.
   Vide also कृष्णकान्ती p. 448.
2. श. शा. प्र. p. 448.

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knowledge, therefore, from the sentence is like this : one is with the desire, embracing oneself having the agency, embracing the act of cooking.

The view of Sondaḍa is more reasonable. For in his view the second declensional suffix in the word, *pākāṁ* is treated as a case-ending and the meaning thereof has been held to be related to the meaning of the root-verb involved.

Conversely, the said declensional suffix in the instance, cannot be treated as other than a case-ending. For otherwise *gṛhaṁ tiṣṭhāsati* would come out to be validly used in language in place of *gṛhe tiṣṭhāsati*. Following the principles laid down by the author of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, the sentence *gṛhaṁ tiṣṭhātati* may well bear out the verbal comprehension of desire qualified by one's being, embracing one's home as its substantive and thus turn out to be a valid form of expression. The view of Sondaḍa rules out all such possibilities. For abiding or what is denoted by the root-verb, *sthā*, an intransitive root-verb, cannot embrace one's home as a content (i.e. the object).[1]

Opponents argue : The desire for doing (*cikīrṣā*) is an instrument of what is sought for (*iṣṭasādhana*), the suffix, *san*, therefore, should be further added thereto to convey the desire for such an instrument, giving the form, *cikīrṣiṣati*.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For this would lead to a state of agumentum ad infinitum. There is also the provision that the suffix, *san* is not to be added to a root-verb ending in the said suffix.[2]

The suffix, *yaṅ* denotes frequentation. By frequentation again is meant the succession of the act similar to the act following the act of the kind of what is denoted by the primary root-verb. This is related to the meaning of the primary root-verb as a feature. As such, *pāpacyate*, for an

1. श. श. प्र. p. 448-49.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 449.

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example, gives the verbal knowledge of one having the agency of the act of cooking occurring in succession to the said act following the act of cooking.[1]

Opponents argue : In cooking twice (an item), repetition is involved. As such, such a situation should call for the use of the suffix, *yañ*.

Jagadīśa replies : No. For repetition notwithstanding, the repeated act of cooking does not involve frequentation. For the said act is not an act, occurring in succession to the act of cooking following the act of cooking.[2]

Opponents argue : *Pāpacyate* should be used in reference to one undertaking the act of cooking, occurring in succession to the act of cooking, performed by some one else following the act of cooking, denoted by the root-verb, *paci*.[3]

Jagadīśa replies : By succession to the act of cooking, the state of being performed by a common agent is also implied. Hence there is no reason why *pāpacyate* should be used in language in such a situation.[4]

Not only that. The expression, *taṇḍulaṁ pāpacyate* is used only in case rice (*taṇḍula*) consistently comes to be the object of the successive acts of cooking. As such, in reference to a common agent undertaking the act of cooking rice in succcssion to the act of cooking curry and so on, such an expression is not used in language.[5]

Similarly *tuṣeṇa pāpacyate* and the like are used in language only case chaff or the like is consistently the means of the successive acts of cooking.[6]

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1. ibid., p. 449.
2. ibid., p. 449.
3. कृष्णकान्ती p. 449.
4. श. श. प्र. pp. 449-50.
5. ibid., p. 450.
6. ibid., p. 450.

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In *jangamyate, cańkramyate,* the suffix, *yañ* presents one more meaning viz, craftness (*kauṭilya*) in addition to frequentation.[1]

In *lolupyate, cañcūryate* (*cūrṇam karoti*), *jañjapyate, daṅḍaśyate* and the like, censure (*nindā*) is denoted in addition to frequentation by the suffix, *yañ*.[2]

The suffix, *yañ* being provided for to be added to a monosyllabic root-verb, the initial letter of which is a consonant, it is not added to the root-verbs like *kathi, jāgṛ* and so on. The root-verbs like *in* or *ej* although are monosyllabic, the initial letters of these are not consonants. As such, the suffix, *yañ* is not added thereto. The forms like *arāryate, aśāsyate, arātyate* are only specially provided for; *śośubhyate, rorucyate* and the like, on the contrary, are not used in language.[3]

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1. ibid., p. 450.
2. ibid., p. 450.
3. ibid., pp. 450-51.

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CHAPTER XXXVII

SECONDARY SUFFIXES
(TADDHITA-PRATYAYAS)

The kind of the suffixes that is distinct from the three other suffixes viz.; the inflections, the primary suffixes and the suffixes that form part of verbs is called the secondary kind of suffixes. It is not enough to define it as what is added to a nominal. For in that case, its definition would unwarrantedly over-extend to the declensional suffixes and the suffixes that bring about denominative verbs.

Not only that. The definition would be too narrow to cover the suffixes like *tara* as in *pacatitara*.[1] At the same time, as it is added to a nominal, it is distinct from primary or verbal suffixes. The most distinguished picularity of this kind of suffixes is that it is added to what is liable to use in language but for the addition thereof even, unlike the other kinds of suffixes. This kind of suffixes renders a service to its base liable to use in langnage, as it were, by making itself further liable to use, subsequent to the addition thereof and thus called *taddhita (tebhyo hitaṁ)*.

Ka (n) and the like other suffixes meaning 'small' or so as in *vṛkṣaka* also are but secondary ones. Those who do not admit such suffixes as secondary ones may read the

1. विभक्त्यादित्रिकादन्यः प्रत्ययस्तद्धितं मतम् ।
नामप्रकृतिको नैवमतिव्याप्त्यादिदोषतः ॥ श. श. प्र. का. 110.

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definition given as further qualified by the clause 'being other than *Ka* (*n*) and the like.[1]

The said suffixes are of various types. For these carry various meanings such as 'descended from', 'being the distinguished descendent', 'time marked by the moon in a certain constellation', 'being dyed with', 'the multitude thereof', 'learning that', 'being the god thereof' and so on.[2]

The suffix, *aṇ* is added to a nominal ending in the sixth declensional suffix, but for a provision otherwise, to bear out the comprehension of progeny in general, *iṇ* is added to such a nominal ending in the vowel, *a*, in the said sense. Nominals like *niṣāda* if suffixed with *iṇ*, the final vowel thereof is substituted by *ak*.[3]

The suffixes *aṇ* is added to the nominal, *marīci*, ending in the sixth declensional suffix, therefore, to give the form, *mārīca* to bear out the comprehension of the progeny in general, of *marīca*.[4]

To the nominal, *dakṣa*, ending in the sixth declensional suffix, the suffix *iṇ* is added in the said sense, to give the form *dākṣiḥ*. The said suffix, however, added to the nominal, *niṣāda*. ending in the sixth declensional suffix, gives the form *naiṣādakiḥ*, to the nominal, *vyāsa*, *vaiyāsikiḥ*, to the nominal, *caṇḍāla*, *cāṇḍālikiḥ* and so on.[5] The nominal, *kaśyapa* is suffixed with *aṇ* to give the form *kāśyapaḥ*, the word, *kāśyapiḥ* is formed of the nominal, *kāśyapa* and the suffix *iṇ* added thereto bearing out the sense of a distinguished progeny.[6]

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1. वृत्तक इत्यादौ ह्रस्वार्थकः कादिरपि तद्धितमेव। तदन्यत्वेनापि प्रत्ययं विशेषयन्त्यन्ये। ibid., p. 451.
2. ibid., कारिका 111-12.
3. श प्र. का. p. 113.
4. ibid., p. 452.
5. ibid., p. 452.
6. काश्यपिरित्यादौ अपत्यविशेषभाने तु तद्धितभेदो वक्ष्यते। ibid., p. 452.

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The nominals, *śiva, varuṇa, kukutstha, putra, vaśiṣṭa, vasudeva, nakula* and *sahadeva* although end in the vowel, *a*, these are not suffixed with *iṇ* but with *aṇ* to bear out the sense of progency as such, thereof.[1]

Opponents point out : But in *śatānikastu nākuliḥ*, the suffix, *iṇ* is added to the nominal, *nakula*.

Jagadīśa replies : The suffix, *iṇ* is added to such nominals, as provided for by the general rule in violation of the exception thereto or the meaning conveyed, thereby, in such cases, is not the progeny as such but the foremost of progeny.[2]

The nominals, *garga* and the like signifying patriarchs (*gaṇa*) are suffixed with *ṇya* to bear out the comprehension of the progeny of *garga* and the like as in *gārgyaḥ, kāṭhyaḥ, vātsyaḥ, pārāśaryaḥ, kārtavīrya, jāmadagnyaḥ* and so on.[3] In case, however, a nominal like *garga* stands for an individual, it is suffixed with *iṇ*, giving the form, *gārgiḥ* bearing out the comprehension of the progeny of *garga*, an individual. The expression, *gārgiḥ* also bears out the comprehension of the foremost of the progeny of *garga*, the patriarch.

The nominals like *kuñja* are suffixed with *āyanaṇ* followed by *ṇya* to bear out the comprehension of the progeny as such other than the female ones of *kuñja*, the patriarch, as in *kaunjāyanyaḥ*. In case of the female progeny, the said nominal is only suffixed with *āyanaṇ* to be followed *ṅīp*, as in *kaunjāyanī*. The expression, 'other than the female ones' also means other than many. Hence in case the descendents of *kunja* are to be conveyed, the word, *kuñja* is to be suffixed only with the suffix, *āynaṇ* and not with *ṇya*. Hence *kauñjāyanāḥ pumāṁsaḥ* are

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1. ibid., का. 114.
2. 'शतानीकस्तु नाकुलिरि'त्यादौ क्वचिदपवादविषयेऽप्युत्सर्गविधिः, प्रथमापत्यं वा तत्रार्थः। श. श. प्र. p. 543.
3. ibid., का, 114. Vide also ibid., p. 543.

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validly used in language.[1] In *kauñjiḥ*, it is pointed out, the sense borne out is not that of the progeny as such but of the foremost of the progeny of *kuñja*.[2]

The suffix, *ṇya* is optionally added to a nominal ending in the vowel, *a*, signifying an artisan or to a nominal ending in *sena* or to the nominal, *lakṣaṇa* giving the forms like *tāntravāyyaḥ, tāntravāyiḥ; kaumbhakāryaḥ, kaumbhakāriḥ; mahasainyaḥ, mahāsainiḥ; lākṣaṇyaḥ, lākṣaṇiḥ* to bear the sense of progeny as such.[3]

The suffix, *ṇāyana* is, as a rule, added to the nominals, like *naḍa* to give the forms, *nāḍāyanah, cārāyaṇaḥ* bearing out the sense of progeny as such, of *naḍa*, the patriarch and the like.[4]

With the nominals, read under the group of *bāhu*, however, the suffix, *iṇ* is added in the said sense to give the forms like *bāhaviḥ, saumitriḥ* and so on.[5]

The nominals, *vinatā, suparṇā, kamaṇḍalu, yuvati* and the like ending a feminine suffix are suffixed with *eyaṇ* to bear out the comprehension of progeny as such in exception to the general rule, providing for *aṇ*. As such, *vainateya, sauparṇeya, kāmaṇḍaleya, yauvateya* and the like are formed.[6]

The said suffix is also added to the nominal, *atri*, in the said sense, to give the form, *ātreya*. The word, *atri* also stands for the words comprising of two vowels and ending in *i* which is other than a suffix. *Śauceya, hāreya, āgneya* and the like

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1. अत्रास्त्रिय्यामित्यबहुत्वस्याप्युपलक्षकम्, तेन 'कौञ्जायनाः पुमांसः' इत्यत्रापि न दोषः। ibid., p. 453.
2. गार्गिः कौञ्जिरित्यादौ नापत्यत्वेन बोधः, किन्तु प्रथमापत्यत्वेनेति वचयते। ibid., p. 453.
3. श. श. प्र. का. 115.
4. ibid., का 115.
5. सुमित्राप्रसूतयस्तु बाह्वाद्विगणे द्रष्टव्याः। ibid., p. 453.
6. ibid., का. 116. Vide also ibid., p. 454.

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are thus formed.[1] The nominal, *vidhi*, however is not suffixed therewith, in view of its ending in *i* itself a suffix. The nominal, *marīci* too, is not suffixed with *eyaṇ*, for although it ends in *i*, other than a suffix, it comprises of more than two vowels.[2]

The suffix, *eyaṇ* is not added to the nominals like *yamunā*, *siprā*, *sarswatī*, *subhadrā*, although ending in a feminine suffix. For nominals, ending in a feminine suffix notwithstanding, signifying a river or a woman are not suffixed with *eyaṇ* in case the first vowel of such a nominal is not augmented. Hence *yāmuna*, *sipraḥ*, *sārasvata*, *saubhadra* are used in language, unlike *jāhṇaveya*, *draupadeya*, *kauśaleya* and so on.[3]

The nominals of the *subhagā* class are, as a rule, suffixed with *eyaṇ*, with the final vowel of the nominal involved being substituted by *in* to bear out the sense of progeny as such. The forms like *Saubhāgineya*, *daurbhāgineya*, *pārastraiṇeya*, are thus formed.[4] The augmentation of two vowels of the two words comprising of the nominals leading to such forms are on the analogy of the word, *sauhārda*.[5] The nominals, *bandhakī* *madhyamā* and *kaniṣṭha* are also read in the class of *subhagā*.

The nominal, *kulaṭā* is suffixed with *eyaṇ*, the final vowel being optionally substituted by *in* in case she is chaste (i e. in case she leaves home for reasons other than sex) and if unchaste, with *eyaṇ* only. Hence *kaulaṭineya* and *kaulaṭeya* are the resultant forms.[6]

To signify the progeny as such, of a woman who is physically handicapped or who is morally unsound and the word

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1. ibid., p. 454.
2. श. श. प्र. p. 454.
3. ibid., का. 116, Vide also ibid., p. 454.
4. ibid., का. 117, Vide also ibid., p. 454.
5. सौहार्दंवदिहोभयपदस्य वृद्धिः। ibid., p. 454.
6. कुलटा तु यदि सती तदा तदन्त्यस्वरस्थैयणि विभाषया इनादेशः. यथा कौलटिनेयः इत्यादौ यदि त्वसती तदा 'कौलटेय' इत्येव प्रयोगः। ibid., p. 455.

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signifying such a woman comprises of *ā* as its initial vowel, *eraṇ* is optionally suffixed giving the forms like *dāseyaḥ, dāseraḥ*; *kāṇeya, kāṇeraḥ*; and so on. The nominal, *kulaṭā* too, in the like manner, is suffixed with *eraṇ* in case the woman is physically handicapped.[1]

The nominal, *caṭaka* under the circumstances, is suffixed with *eraṇ* giving the form, *cāṭakeraḥ* and in case the female progeny is to be signified, the form is only *caṭakā*, with the said suffix being elided.

The nominals like *tīka* are suffixed with *āyaniṇ* to bear out the sense of progeny as such. The pronouns like *tat* are suffixed with it optionally with *aṇ*, or *eyaṇ*. Hence are formed the words like *taikāyaniḥ, kauśalyāyaniḥ, tādāyaniḥ, tādaḥ, tādeyaḥ*; *yādāyaniḥ, yādaḥ, yādeyaḥ*.[3]

The nominal, *svasṛ* is suffixed with *īya* in the said sense to give the form, *svasrīyaḥ*. The nominal, *bhrātṛ* is suffixed with it to give the form *bhrātrīyaḥ*. The word, *bhrātṛvyaḥ* is deduced from the nominal, *bhrātṛ* suffixed with *vya*, meaning both the son of one's brother or through convention one's enemy. The nominal, *śvaśura* is suffixed with *ya* in the sense of the progeny of one's father-in-law.[4]

The nominal, *kula* is suffixed with *ya* optionally with *eyakaṇ* in the sense of the progeny as such, thereof to give the forms like *kulyaḥ, kaulakeyaḥ*. In case the said nominal is prefixed by some other word, it is suffixed with *ina* to give the forms like *ādyakulinaḥ*. The said nominal, not prefixed with any such word, at times, however, is also suffixed with *ina* too as in *kulinaḥ*. The nominal, *mahākula* is suffixed with *inaṇ*, optionally with *aṇ* to give the forms *mahākulīnaḥ* and *mahākulaḥ*.[5]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. का. 118. Vide also ibid., p. 455.
2. ibid., का. 118. Vide also ibid., p. 455.
3. ibid., का. 119. Vide also ibid., p. 455.
4. ibid., का. 119. Vide also ibid., p. 455.
5. 1. श. श. प्र. का. 120. Vide also ibid., p. 456.

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The nominal, *duṣkula* is suffixed with *eyaṇ* giving the form *dauṣkuleya*. The word, *duṣkulināḥ* also is found to be used in language and the reasons thereof is that the suffix, *ina* has been added to the nominal, *kula* prefixed by *duḥ* or that the said suffix being added to the nominal, *kula*, the word, *kulina* has been formed to be syntactically related to *duḥ*, as held by others.[1]

Nominals, conventionally denotative of a country or a species of the *kṣatriya*-tribe are suffixed with *aṇ* in the sense of progeny or the king of the land or tribal species as such to give the forms like *pāñcālaḥ*, *vaidehaḥ*, *aikṣākaḥ* and so on. Words having *na* as the initial letter, the words, *kuru* and *kośala* are suffixed with *ṇya* in the said senses and so also the nominals ending in the vowel, *i*. *Naiṣadhyaḥ*, *kauravyaḥ*, *kauśalyaḥ*, *kauntyaḥ* are the instances in point.[2]

Opponents point aut : There are uses like *naiṣadhaḥ* as in *hiraṇmayaṁ haṁsamabodhi naiṣadhaḥ*, or like *kauravaḥ* as in *parirebhire kukurakauravastriyaḥ* or like *kaunteyaḥ* (as in *tasmāduttiṣṭha kaunteya yuddhāya kṛtaniścayaḥ*).[3]

Jagadīśa replies : The suffix, *aṇ* in *naiṣadhaḥ* or in *kauravaḥ* is used in the sense of belonging thereto (*tasyedaṁ*) and not in the sense of progeny thereof. The word, *kaunteya* is formed of the word, *kuntī* ending in ihe feminine suffix, *ṅīp* and the secondary suffix, *eyaṇ*.[4]

The suffix, *ṇya* added to the nominal, *kuntī*, *avanti* and *kuru*, in the sense of the female progency thereof, gets elided to give the forms like *kuntī*, *avantī* and *kurū* respectively.[5]

The suffix, *aṇ* too, added to the nominals, *kamboja*, *cola* and *kerala* conventionally meaning a country, in the sense of

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1. ibid., का. 120. Vide also ibid., p. 456.
2. ibid., का. 120. Vide also ibid., p. 456.
3. श. श. प्र. p. 456.
4. ibid., p. 456.
5. ibid., p. 457.

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progeny or the king thereof, gets elided to give the forms like *kambojaḥ, colaḥ* and *keralaḥ*[1].

The nominal, *mātṛ*, preceded by a word, denotative of a numeral, the word, *ṣaṭ* (signifying the six constellations), the word, *bhadra*, is followed by the suffix, *ḍuraṇ* in the sense of progeny as such, thereof. Thereupon, the feminine suffix, *ṅīp* is added thereto to signify the female progeny as in *dvaimāturaḥ, traimāturaḥ, ṣāṇmāturah, bhādramāturaḥ, dvaimāturī, traimāturi*, and *bhādramāturi*.[2]

The nominal, *go* is suffixed with *ya* in the sense of progeny as such as in *gavyaḥ*, the nominal, *yama* with *ṇya* as in *yāmyaḥ*, the nominals, *aditi* and *diti* too, with *ṇya* as in *ādityaḥ* and *daityaḥ*.[3]

The words, *āditeyaḥ* and *daiteyaḥ* are formed with the nominals, *aditi* and *diti* ending in a feminine suffix and the secondary the suffix, *eyaṇ*, added thereto.[4]

To a word formed of a secondary suffix bearing the sense of progeny, another secondary suffix bearing the said sense is further added in case the progeny signified is a distinguished one, the general rule barring the provision of such addition notwithstanding, as in *kāśyapiḥ, aupagaviḥ gārgyāyaṇaḥ* and the like.[5]

The suffix, *āyaniaṇ* is added to a word, ending in the suffix, *ṇya* or *in* to bear out the sense of a distinguished progeny (i.e., bearing the marks of the progenitor) as in *gārgyāyaṇaḥ. vātsyayaṇaḥ, dākṣāyaṇaḥ*. The words, coming under the class of *kuñjādi*, although end in *ṇya*, these are not further suffixed with a secondary suffix in the sense of a distinguished progeny as in *kauñjāyanyaḥ*.

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1. ibid., p. 457.
2. ibid., p. 457.
3. श. श. प्र. का. 122.
4. कथमादितेयो दैतेयः ? अदितिदितिभ्यां स्त्रीप्रत्ययान्ताभ्यादेयण। ibid., p. 457.
5. ibid., का. 123.

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The suffix, *āyanaṇ* is also added to the nominal, *droṇa* not suffixed with a secondary suffix, even, to bear out the sense of the distinguished progeny of *droṇa* as in *droṇāyano'-śvatthamā*, alternatively with *drauṇiḥ*.[1]

The nominals like *garga* are suffixed with the secondary suffix, *iṇ* and neither with *ṇya* or *āyanaṇ* in the sense of the first son, as in *gārgiḥ*, *vātsiḥ*, *kauñjiḥ*, *mauñjiḥ* and so on.[2]

The nominal, denotative of a constellation is suffixed with *aṇ* in the sense of time marked by the moon associated with a particular constellation as in *pauṣaṁ* (*dinaṁ*) or *pauṣī* (*rātriḥ*), *āśvinanaṁ*, *kārtikaṁ* and so on. *Pauṣaṁ puraṁ* is not used in language. For the said secondary suffix is provided for only to signify time marked by the moon associated with a constellation only. In case, however, the time signified by the moon as associated with a couple of constellations, it is the suffix, *īya* that is added to the compound of the words denoting the said couple of constellations as in *puṣya-punarvasvīyaṁ* or in *aśvinī-bharaṇīyā* (*rātriḥ*)[3]

The suffix, *aṇ* is provided for to be added to nominals in general, to bear out the sense of being dyed with what the nominal means as in *hāridraṁ*, *kausumbhaṁ* (*vāsaḥ*) except to the nominals like *lākṣā*, *rocanā*, *śakala* and *kardama*. For *lākṣā* and *rocanā* are suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the said sense and *Śakala* and *kardama* with both optionally as in *lākṣīkaṁ*, *raucanikaṁ*, *śākalaḥ*, *śākalikaṁ*, *kārdamaḥ*, *kārdamikaṁ*.[4]

The nominal, *nīla* is, as a rule, suffixed with *a* in the said sense as in *nīlaḥ paṭaḥ*, the nominal *pīta* with *ka* as in *pītakaḥ paṭaḥ*.[5]

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1. ibid. का. 124. Vide also ibid., p. 458.
2. श. श. प्र. का. 125.
3. ibid., का. 126. Vide also ibid., p. 458.
4. ibid., का. 127. Vide also ibid., p. 459.
5. श. श. प्र. का. 128.

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Opponents argue : In *hāridraḥ kukkuṭapādaḥ, lākṣimadharaṁ, pītakaṁ svarṇaṁ* and the like, the sense of dyeing is not conveyed. The use of the secondary suffixes, therefore, in the words, *hāridraḥ, lākṣikaṁ, pītakaṁ* is unreasonable.

Jagadīśa replies : In such cases, the said secondary suffixes convey through implication a secondary sense viz., similar to what is dyed with what the nominals mean.[1]

The suffix, *aṇ* is also provided for to convey the sense of multitude thereof as in *kākaṁ, śaukaṁ, bhaikṣaṁ* and the like. The nominal, *yuvati*, suffixed with *aṇ* in the said sense gives the form *yauvataṁ* according to *jayāditya*. But in the *bhāgavṛtti*, the form is read as *yauvanaṁ*, with the word, *yuvati* transformed to its masculine base.[2] The nominal, *pāśa* and the like are suffixed with *ya* and the words formed, thereupon, are used, as a rule, in the feminine gender as in *pāśyā, dhūlyā, vātyā, vanyā, rathyā*, and so on. The nominals, *garga* and the like denoting a patriarch are suffixed with *akaṇ* in the sense of multitude (community) thereof as in *gārgakaṁ, dākṣakaṁ*. So are the nominals, *ukṣa, uṣṭra* and the like as in *aukṣkaṁ, auṣṭrakaṁ* in the sense of multitude thereof.[3]

The nominal, *aśva* is suffixed with *tvīya* optionally with *aṇ* giving the resultant forms, *aśvīyaṁ* and *āśvaṁ*, in the sense of multitude thereof.[4] The nominal, *dhenu* is suffixed with *kan* as in *dhenukaṁ*; *adhenu* with *aṇ* as in *ādhenavaṁ*. *Sundara-garga* is suffixed with *kan* as in *saundara-gargakaṁ, kedāra* with *yaṇ* as in *kaidāryaṁ* and optionally with *ikaṇ* as in *kaidārikaṁ* and with *akaṇ* as in *kaidārakaṁ*. The synonyms of *piṣṭa* (cake), the nominals *kavacin, hastin* are suffixed with *ikaṇ* as

1. 'हारिद्रः कुक्कुटपादः, लाक्षिकमधरं, पीतकं स्वर्णमि'त्यादौ स्वभावसिद्धपीतादौ गौणवृत्त्या हरिद्राद्यै रक्तसदृशे तद्धितं प्रयुज्यते । ibid., p. 459.
2. 'युवतीनां समूह' इत्यर्थे यौवतमिति जयादित्यः, तद्धितानपत्यस्वरे पुंवद्-भावात् यौवनमिति तु भागवृत्तिः । ibid., p. 459.
3. ibid., p. 460.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 460.

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in *paupikaṁ, śāṣkulikaṁ, kāvacikaṁ, hāstikaṁ* and so on. The nominal, *keśa* is suffixed with *ikaṇ* optionally with *yaṇ* as in *kaiśikaṁ* and *kaiśyaṁ.*[1]

The nominals like *khala, uluka* and *padma* are suffixed with *ini* in the sense of multitude thereof to give the forms like *khalinī, ulukinī* and *padminī.* The nominal, *ratha* is suffixed with *kaḍya* in the said sense giving the form, *rathakaḍyā.* The characteristic feature of the words ending in these two suffixes is that these are used only in the feminine gender.[2]

The nominal, *gaṇikā* is suffixed with *yaṇ* in the said sense to give the form, *gāṇikyaṁ.* So are the nominals, *brāhmaṇa, mānava, vāḍavā* and the like.[3]

The nominals, *gaja, bandhu, jana, grāma* and *sahāya* are suffixed with *tā* in the said sense and words thus formed end the feminine gender. The nominal, *pṛṣṭha* is suffixed with *yat* in the said sense and the word thus formed ends in the neuter gender.[4]

The words signifying the branches of the vedic lore are suffixed with what indicate the sect or in the sense of multitude thereof as in *kāṭhakaṁ, chāndogyaṁ, ātharvaṇaṁ* and the like.[5]

The nominals, *nimitta* (occasions), *utpāta* (natural calamity), *muhūrta* (astrological calculations) *chandas* (metres) and the like are suffixed with *aṇ* in the sense of one knowing or studying what is denoted by the nominal involved as in *naimittikaḥ, autpātikaḥ, mauhūrtakaḥ, chāndasaḥ, vaiyā-karaṇaḥ* and so on.[6]

The nominals denotative of sacrificial rituals are suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the said sense as in *agniṣṭomikaḥ.*[7]

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1. ibid., का. 130. Vide also ibid., p. 460.
2. ibid., का. 131.
3. ibid., का. 131.
4. ibid., का. 132.
5. श. श. प्र. का. 132.
6. ibid., का. 133.
7. Op. cit.

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The nominals ending in the word, *sūtra*, other than the nominal, *kalpasūtra* are suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the said sense as in *vārtikaḥ*, *sāṅkhya-sūtrikaḥ* unlike *kālpasūtraḥ* ending in the suffix, *aṇ* The nominal, *sūtra* itself too, is suffixed with *ikaṇ* to give the form, *sautrikaḥ*.[1]

The nominals like *uktha*, *nyāya*, *patañjala*, *lokāyata* and the like are suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the said sense to give the forms like *aukthikaḥ*, *naiyāyikaḥ*, *pātañjalikaḥ*, *lokāyatikaḥ* and so on [2]

Nominals ending in the word, *vidyā*, but not preceded by the words like *aṅga*, *dharma*, *tri* and *kṣatra* are suffixed with *ikaṇ*, in the sense of knowing or studying what is denoted by the nominal base thereof as in *vāyasa-vidyikaḥ*, *sarva-vidyikaḥ*, *cāra-vidyikaḥ* and so on as against *āṅga-vidyaḥ*, *jyotirvidyaḥ*, *gāndharva-vidyaḥ*, *dhārma-vidyaḥ*.[3]

The nominal, *trividyā*, an instance of the *karmadhāraya* compound meaning the lore having three aspects (*tryavayavā vidyā*) is suffixed with *aṇ* in the said sense (*tām vetti adhīte vā*) to give the form *traividyaḥ*. The nominal, *trividyā*, an instance of the *dvigu* compound, however, meaning the three lores (*tisro vidyāḥ*), although, is suffixed with *aṇ*, the word thus formed is *trividyaḥ*; for the secondary suffix added to an instance of the *dvigu* compound gets elided.[4]

The nominals like *śatapatha*, *ṣaṣṭipatha* are suffixed with *ṭika* to give the forms like *śata-pathikaḥ*, *ṣaṣṭi-pathikaḥ* and so on,[5]

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1. Op. cit.
2. ibid., p. 461.
3. श. श. प्र. का. 134. Vide also p. 462.
4. त्र्यवयवा विद्या त्रिविद्या, तां वेत्ति अधीते वा 'त्रैविद्य' इति कर्मधारयादण्। तिस्रो विद्या वेत्तीत्याद्यर्थे तु द्विगुतस्तद्धितस्य लुकि 'त्रिविद्य' इत्येवम्। ibid., p. 462.
5. ibid., p. 462.

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The nominals, *krama, sāman, śikṣā, mīmāṁsā* and the like are suffixed with *ka* in the aforesaid sense as in *kramakaḥ, sāmakaḥ, śikṣakaḥ* and *mīmāṁsakaḥ*. The nominal, *pada* is suffixed with *ka* optionally with *ika* as in *padakaḥ, padikaḥ*. The secondary suffix added to words preceded by *sarva* and *sādi* in the said sense gets elided as in *sarvavedaḥ, sādi-vārtikaḥ*.[1]

The nominals like *aṣṭādhyāya* are suffixed with *ka* in the aforesaid sense and the word, *adhyāya*, thereupon, gets elided to give the forms like *aṣṭakāḥ (pāṇinīyāḥ), pañcakāḥ (gotamīyāḥ), daśakāḥ (vyāghrapadīyāḥ)* and *dvādaśakāḥ (jaiminīyāḥ)*.[2]

Others say that primarily, the suffix, *ka* is added to a nominal like *aṣṭādhyāya*, in the sense of what is of eight chapters and thereupon, the secondary suffix, added thereto in the sense of knowing or studying that, gets elided.[3]

The suffix, *aṇ* is added to a word, synonymous with *tat*, in the sense of 'belonging thereto' as in *vārkṣaṁ, dārśadaṁ*. The words, *sva, rājan, para, deva* and the like are suffixed with *īya* preceded by *ka* in the said sense as in *svakīyaḥ, rājakīyaḥ, parakīyaḥ, devakīyaḥ, janakīyaḥ* and so on. Forms like *svīya* are also used in language. For the letter *ka*, preceding the suffix, *īya* is only optionally used with a word like *sva*.[4]

The suffix, *īya* in the aforesaid sense is also added to words of the *tyadādi* class as in *tyādīyaḥ, yadīyaḥ, tadīyaḥ, madīyaḥ idamiyaḥ* and so on. The word, *bhavat* (meaning you) is also suffixed with *īya* in the said sense, with the letter *t* being substituted by *d* as in *bhavadīyaṁ*. The word, *bhavat*, formed of *bhu* and *śatṛ* is suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the said sense as in *bhāvātikaṁ*.[5]

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1. ibid., का. 135 Vide also ibid., p. 462.
2. श. श. प्र. का. 136. Vide also ibid., p. 462.
3. Op. cit.
4. ibid., का. 137. Vide also ibid., p. 463.
5. श. श. प्र. का. 138. Vide also p. 463.

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The nominal, *ardha* itself and if perceded by *pūrva, avara* and the like is suffixed with *yat* in the aforesaid sense as in *parārdhyaṁ, avarārdhyaṁ, ardhyaṁ, uttarārdhyaṁ, adhamārdhyaṁ.* The nominal, *ardha,* however, if preceded by *pūrva* and the like signifying direction (*dik*), is suffixed with *ikaṇ* optionally with *yat* as in *paurvārdhikaṁ pūrvārdhyaṁ; dākṣiṇārdhīkaṁ, dakṣiṇārdhyaṁ* and so on.[1]

The pronouns, *yusmat,* and *asmat* assuming the form *yusmāka* and *asmāka* respectively meaning, of you two, of you all and of us two, of us all, are suffixed with *aṇ* and *inaṇ* optionally with *īya* as in *yauṣmākaṁ, yauṣmākīṇaṁ, yuṣmadīyaṁ, asmākaṁ, āsmākiṇaṁ; asmadīyaṁ.* The said pronouns meaning of you (singular) and of me are suffixed with *aṇ* and *inaṇ,* preceded by *ka* optionally with *īya* as in *tāvakaṁ, tāvakīṇaṁ, tvadīyaṁ, māmakaṁ, māmakīnaṁ, madīyaṁ.*

The word, *araṇya* is suffixed, as a rule, with *kaṇ,* signifying an elephant, a way, a pleasure-garden, a chapter (of the Vedas) and a man (dwelling in a forest) as in *āraṇyakaḥ* (*karī, panthāḥ, vihārah, manuṣyah*).[2] The word, signifying the chapter of the Vedas, called *āraṇyaka* implies that it was preached in the forest,[3] The word, *araṇya* is suffixed with *kaṇ* and it signifies cowdung in a forest as in *āraṇyakaṁ āraṇyaṁ vā gomayaṁ.* The said word, as a rule, is suffixed with *ṇa* to signify any thing other than what are spoken of above as in *āraṇyā latā, āraṇyaḥ paśuḥ* and so on.[4]

The suffix, *aṇ* is suffixed to words in general, in the sense of being there. The word, *grīva,* however, is optionally suffixed with *eyaṇ,* in the said sense ns in *graivaṁ, graiveyaṁ*[5]

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1. Op. cit.
2. ibid., का. 140.
3. अध्यायस्वरण्यगोतत्वादारण्यकम् । ibid., p. 464.
4. श. श. प्र. p. 464.
5. Op. cit.

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The suffix, *ma* is added to the words, *ādi* and *madhya* in the said sense as in *ādimaḥ* and *madhyamaḥ*. The said suffix is added to the word, *adhas* also, the final consonant viz., *s* going elided as in *adhamaḥ*.[1]

The words like *agra*, *paścima*, *anta* are suffixed with *ḍima* as in *agrimaḥ*, *pāścimaḥ*, *antimaḥ*. The words like *māsa* signifying a period of time are suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the aforesaid sense as in *māsikaṁ*, *sāṁvatsarikaṁ*, *mauhūrtikaṁ*, *paurvāhṇikaṁ*, *aparāhṇikaṁ* and so on.[2]

The nominal, *śarat* is suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the said sense, to signify a *śrāddha* as in *śāradikaṁ śrādhaṁ* and if otherwise with *aṇ* as in *śāradaścandramāḥ*. If, however, a disease or the sun is signified, the said nominal is optionally suffixed with both as in *śārada*, *śāradikaḥ* (*jvaraḥ*, *ātapaḥ*).[3]

The word, *niśā* or *pradoṣa* is suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the aforesaid sense as in *naiśikaṁ*, *prādosikaṁ* (*tamaḥ*). The word, *śvaḥ* meaning the next-day is suffixed with *ikaṇ*, optionally with *tya* and *tana* as in *śauvastikaṁ*, *śvastyaṁ* and *śvastanaṁ*.[4]

Words like *sandhyā* are suffixed with *aṇ* in the aforesaid sense and so are the words, denotative of different seasons or constellations as in *sāndhyaṁ*, *sandhi-velaṁ*, *āmāvasyaṁ*, *cāturdaśaṁ*, *pañcadaśaṁ*, *paurṇamāsaṁ*, *prātipadaṁ* (*tamaḥ*); *graiṣmaṁ*, *pūrva-graiṣmaṁ* (the initial vowel of the word, *grīṣma* denotative of a season is augmented in view of the provision that a word, denotative of a season forming a part is augmented); *pauṣaṁ*, *taiṣaṁ*, *rauhiṇyaṁ*. The word, *saṁvatsara* signifying a fruit or a ritual (*parva*) is also suffixed with *aṇ* as in *sāṁvatsaraṁ* (*phalaṁ*, *parvaṁ vā*) but otherwise with *ikaṇ* as in *sāṁvatsarikam* (*karma*). The nominal, *prāvṛṣ* is suffixed

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1. Op. cit.
2. ibid., pp. 464–65.
3. ibid., का. 143; Vide also ibid., p. 465.
4. वा. प. प्र. का. 143. vide also ibid., p. 465.

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with *eṇya* in the said sense as in *prāvṛṣeṇyaṁ* (*tṛṇaṁ*).[1] The nominal, *varṣā* is suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the said sense as in *vārṣikaṁ tṛṇaṁ*. The word, *kemanta* is suffixed with *ikaṇ* optionally with *aṇ* is in *haimaṇṭīkaṁ, haimantaṁ* and the letter *ta* of the said word (*hemanta*) being elided, *haimanaṁ* is also used in language.[1] Following rules abided by in *pūrva-graiṣmaṁ, pūrva-haimanaṁ, haimanaṁ* is formed and used in language. Words like *sāyaṁ* are suffixed with *tanaṭ* in the aforesaid sense as in *sāyantanaṁ, cirantanaṁ, pragetanaṁ, prahṇetanaṁ, divātanaṁ, doṣātanaṁ* and the like.[2]

The words, *parutaḥ* (last year), *parāri* (the year before last), and *cira* are suffixed with *tna* in the aforesaid sense as in *parutnaṁ, parāritnaṁ, ciratnaṁ* used alternatively with *paruttanaṁ, parāritanaṁ, ciratanaṁ*. The word, *purā* is optionally suffixed also with *na* as in *pūrāṇam* used alternatively with *purātanam*.[3]

The word, *kāla*, prefixed by *tat* or *āpat* is suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the aforesaid sense as in *tātkālikaṁ*, and *āpatkālikaṁ*. The word, *tātkalika*, again, is suffixed with both a *ṭāp* and *ṅīp* in the feminine gender as in *tātkālikā, tātkālikī*.

The word, *parvata* is suffixed wit *īyaṇ* in the said sense to signify a man (of the mountain) as in *parvatīyo naraḥ* and otherwise with *aṇ* optionally with *īyaṇ* as in *pārvatīyaṁ, pārvataṁ* (*phalaṁ*).[4]

Words like *diś* are suffixed with *yat* in the aforesaid sense as in *diśyaṁ, ādyaṁ, antyaṁ, rahasyaṁ, divyaṁ, udaryaṁ, yūthyaṁ, vaśyaṁ, daṇḍyaṁ* and the like.[5]

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1. ibid., का. 144. Vide also ibid., p. 465.
2. ibid., का. 145. Vide also ibid., p. 466.
3. ibid., का. 147. vide also ibid., p. 466.
4. ibid., का. 147. vide also ibid., p. 466.
5. ibid., का. 148. vide also ibid., p. 467.

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Words, denotative of different parts of the body also are suffixed with *yat* in the said sense as in *dantyaṁ, karṇyaṁ, auṣṭhyaṁ, mūrdhanyaṁ, mukhyaṁ, uravyaṁ,* and the like.[1]

The words, *dṛti, vasti* and *kukṣi, kalasa,* and *ahi* are suffixed with *eyaṇ* in the said sense as in *dārteyaṁ, vāsteyaṁ, āstheyaṁ, kaukṣeyam, kālaseyaṁ* and *āheyaṁ.*[2]

The word, *caturmāsa* is suffixed with *yaṇ* in the said sense to signify what is other than a sacrifice as in *cāturmāsyaṁ vrataṁ.* The word, *catuṣ* in *caturmāsa* being indicative of the four specific months beginning with *āṣāḍha,* the compound, *caturmāsa* is not an instance of the *dvigu* class of compounds. As such, the elition of the secondry suffix added thereto, is not called for as in *pañcakapāla(ścaruḥ).* To signify a sacrifice, however, the suffix, *aṇ* is added to the said word as in *cāturmāsa yāgaḥ.*[3]

Instances of the *avyayībhāva* compound, formed with the word, *antaḥ* as the first member thereof are suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the aforesaid sense as in *āntardaiḥikaṁ, āntargaṇikaṁ* and the like. The words, preceded by *antaḥ,* however, not forming an instance of the *avyayībhāva* compound, are suffixed with *aṇ* as in *āntaḥ-karaṇaṁ duḥkhaṁ.* The words, *samāna* and *tatpara* are suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the said sense as in *sāmānikaḥ,* and *tāt-parikaḥ.*[4]

Kavarga, cavarga, tavarga and so on are suffixed with *īya* in the aforesaid sense as in *Kavargīyo* (*varṇaḥ*) and the like. The words, *jihvāmūla,* and *aṅgula* are also suffixed therewith in the said sense as in *jihvāmūlīyaḥ,* and *aṅgnlīyaḥ.* The word, *varga* following the words l ke *mitra* are suffixed with *yat* or *in* or *īya* as in *mitra-vargyaḥ, mitra-vargiṇaḥ* and *mitra-vargīyaḥ.*[5]

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1. श. श. प्र. p. 467.
2. Op. cit,
3. ibid., का. 159. vide also abid., p. 467.
4. ibid., p. 467.
5. श. श. प्र. का. 150.

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The word, *strī* is suffixed with *naṇ* in the said sense as in *straiṇaḥ* and the word *puṁ* with *snaṇ* as in *pauṁsnaḥ*. These two words are optionally suffixed with the said two suffixes respectively in the sense of the nature thereof as In *straiṇaṁ, strītvaṁ.*[1]

The word, *go* is suffixed with *yat*, known as the *svarādi taddhita* (or a secondary suffix begining with an *udātta-svara*) in multiple senses. Thus *gavyaṁ* bears out the sense of *garapatyaṁ, gaurdevatā yasya, gavā carati, goḥ samūhaḥ*, and the like.[2]

The suffixes used in the sense of 'being there', are also used in the sense of 'growing thereform' but for a specific provision otherwise as in *māthuraḥ, straiṇaḥ, pauṁsnaḥ, grāmyaḥ, grāmiṇaḥ* and the like.[3]

The words, *prāvṛṣ* however, is suffixed with *ika* instead of *eṇya*, to bear out the said sense and so is the word, *pradoṣa* is suffixed with *ika* instead of *ikaṇ* as in *prāvṛsikaṁ patraṁ*, and the like.[4]

The word, *śaraḥ* is suffixed with *ikaṇ* in the aforesaid sense to signify a specific meaning as in *śāradikāḥ mudga-prabhedāḥ* and otherwise with *aṇ* as in *śāradamannaṁ.*[5]

The words, *pūrvāhṇa, madhyāhna* and *aparāhṇa* are suffixed with *ka* in the said sense as in *pūrvāhṇakaṁ, aparāhṇakaṁ, madhyāhnakaṁ*. So are the words like *ārdrā, mūlā* as in *ārdrakaṁ, mūlakāṁ* and the like.[6]

The word, *amāvāsyā* is suffixed with both *aṇ* and *aka* in the aforesaid sense as in *āmāvāsyaḥ, amāvāsyako bālakaḥ*. The

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1 ibid., का. 151.
2. ibid., का. 151.
3. ibid., का. 152.
4. ibid., का. 152.
5 श. श. प्र. का. 153.
6. Op. cit.

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expressions like *āmāvāsyaḥ* and *amāvāsyākaḥ* too are used in language.[1]

The secondary suffixes added to words ending in *sthāna* in the aforesaid sense are, as a rule, elided as in *gosthānaṁ* (*patraṁ*), *aśvasthāṇaṁ*, *śaśa-sthānaṁ*, *gośālaṁ* and the like and such words always end in the neuter gender. Any such suffix, added to the word, *vatsaśāla* is optionally elided as in *vatsaśālo vātsaśālaśca vṛkṣaḥ*. So also is the case with any such suffix, added to the word, *abhijit* as in *ābhijito vā bālakaḥ*. Any such suffix added to the word, *aśvinī* is also optionally elided. Such a suffix, added to the word, *maghā*, however, does not elide and no such suffix, is provided for to be added to the word, *mṛgaśiras*.[2]

Such suffixes added to words like *anurādhā*, *tiṣya*, *puṣya*; *haṣṭā*, *svāti*, *punarvasu*, *viśākhā*, *bahulā* (*kṛttikā*) also are, as a rule, elided calling for the elition of the feminine suffix as well.[3]

Opponents argue : How then *bāhuleyastārakajit* be explained ?

Jagadīśa replies : Here the word, *bāhuleya* although formed of the word, *bahulā* suffixed with the secondary suffix, *ayaṇ* signifies a specific individual and thus the said suffix is not elided,[4]

The words, *śraviṣṭhā*, *āṣāḍhā* are suffixed with *eyaṇ*.[5]

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1. Ibid., का. 154. Vide also ibid., p. 469.
2. मृगशिरसि भवं जातम् इत्यर्थे तु न तद्धितमनभिधानात्। ibid., p. 469.
3. श. श. प्र. का. 155.
4. बहुलो कृत्तिका तत्र जात इति संज्ञायामेयण्। ibid., p. 469.
5. ibid., का. 155.

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GLOSSARY

akarmaka-kriyā—intransitive verb
akhaṇḍopādhi—an unanalysable property
atideśa—analogical extension
atideśa-vākya—statement of comparison
atiprasaṅga—unwarranted over-extension
atyantābhāva—absolute negation
anitya-samāsa—irregular compound
anupapatti—inapplicability
anupalabdhi—non-perception of the perceptible
anubhava—direct knowledge
anumāña—Inference
anumiti—inferential judgement
anuvyavasāya—confirmatory knowledge
anyathāsiddha—superfluous
anvayī—counter-co-relate
apekṣa-buddhi—the notion of addition
abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā—suggestion rooted in denotation
abhividhi—a limit inceptive
arthāpatti—presumption
alaukika-pratyakṣa—extra-ordinary perception
avagāhi—embracing
avyaya—indeclinable
avyāpya-vṛtti—category of limited application
ākāṁkṣā—expectancy, sequence
ākhyāta—verbal suffix
āgama—augment
ādeśa—substitute
āvāpa—existence of a subsequent consequent on the presence of an antecedent
āśīrliṅ—benedictive mood
āsatti—juxtaposition
āhārya-jñāna—purposed knowledge

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udvāpa—non-existence of a subsequent consequent on the absence of an antecedent
upapada-vibhakti—prepositional inflection
upamāna—analogy, subject of comparison
upameya—object of comparison
upādhi—condition
upādheya—conditioned
eka-prasaratā—a syntactical unity
aupādhiki saṁjñā—conditional noun
kaṭṛvācya—active voice
karma-kaṭṛ-vācya—quassi-passive voice
karmavācya—passive voice
kāraka-vibhakti—case-ending
kārṛṇata'vacchedaka—determinant of causality
kṛt-pṛatyaya—primary suffix
kṛti—agency
jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti—supernormal operation based on knowledge
jñāpaka—suggestive (indicative)
taddhita-pratyaya—secondary suffix
tātparyya—speaker's intention
tiṅ-vibhakti—verbal inflection
nāma-dhātu—nominal verb
nitya-sāmāsa—regular compound
nipāta—particle
nirdhāraṇa—selection
nirūḍha-lakṣaṇā—frozen metaphor
naimittiki saṁjñā—occasional noun
pāribhāṣiki saṁjñā—current noun
prakāra—feature
Prakṛti—Radical
Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa—Perception
Pratyaya—suffix
Pramāṇa—instrument of valid knowledge
prayojaka-kartā—causative agent
prayojya-kartā—instrumental agent

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paryāpti—collective extension
Pravṛtti-nimitta—connotation
phalopadhāyaka-kāraṇa—operative cause
bhāva-vācya—impersonal voice
maryādā—limit conclusive
mukhya-viśeṣya—invariable substantive
yaṅantadhātu—frequentative Verb
yoga-rūḍha—derivative-conventional
yogyatā—compatibility
yaugika—derivative
yaugika-rūḍha—derivative-and-conventional
rūḍha—conventional
lakṣaṇā—implication
laṭ—present tense
laṅ—imperfect tense
liṅ—potential (optative) mood
liṭ—perfect tense
luṅ—aorist tense
luṭ—periphrastic tense
lṛt—future tense
leṭ—subjunctive mood
loṭ—imperative mood
vākyaśeṣa—supplementary statement
vigrahavākya—sentence of analysis
vinigamanā—conclusive reasoning
viśiṣṭa-jñāna—synthetic knowledge
viśeṣaṇatā'vacchedaka—determinant of attribution
viśeṣya—substantive
vivaraṇa—exposition
vṛtti—faculty of communication
vyañjanā—suggestion
vyabhicāra—inconstancy
vyavasāya—first knowledge
vyāpaka—inclusive
vyāpāra—intermediary act
vyāpti—invariable concomitance

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śakti-graha—knowledge of import (denotation)
śakyata'vacchedaka—determinant of denotation
śabda—verbal testimony
śābdabodha—verbal knowledge (comprehension)
sakarmaka-kriyā—transitive verb
saṁketa—convention
saṁjñā—noun
Saṁsarga—co-reletion (of meanings)
Saṁsarga-maryādā—syntax
sananta-dhātu—desiderative verb
samāpikā kriyā—finite verb
sāmagrī—condition
sāmānādhikaraṇya—collocation
sāmānya-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti—supernormal operation based on a common feature
Siddhānta—conclusion
sup-vibhakti—declensional suffix (nominal inflection)
strī-pratyaya—feminine suffix
svarūpa—self-sameness
svarūpa-yogya-kāraṇa—potential cause

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